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I. INTRODUCTION
The Investment Company Act of 19401 and the Investment
Advisers Act of 19402 have not yet been the subject of a formal
IThe Investment Company Act was originally enacted in 1940, Act of Aug. 22,
1940, ch. 686, tit. I, §§ 1-53, 54 Stat. 789, and was in many respects substantially modified
by the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, §§ 2-22, 29,
30, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to a-52 (1970)). Subsequently, § 18 of
the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1970), was amended by the Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-595, § 2(g), 86 Stat. 1316, and § 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1970), was
amended by the Act of Nov. 23, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-165, 85 Stat. 487 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-18, a-27 (Supp. III, 1973)) (capital structure of investment companies;
periodic payment plans). The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29,
§§ 27-28, 89 Stat. 163, amended §§ 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 32, 36, and 49 of the Act (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-9, a-10, a-13, a-15, a-16, a-18, a-31, a-35, a-48 (Supp., Aug.
1975)).
To simplify citations, all references will be to the section numbers of the 1940 Act
and corresponding United States Code citations will be omitted. From §§ 1 to 28 the Act
and code references are parallel. E.g., § 2 of the Act is 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2. From § 80a-29
of the code, § 30 of the Act, the section number in the code is one less than that in the
Act. E.g., § 45 of the Act is 15 U.S.C. § 80a-44.
2 The Investment Advisers Act was originally enacted in 1940, Act of Aug. 22, 1940,
ch. 686, tit. II, §§ 201-21, 54 Stat. 847, and was amended in some respects by the
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tentative draft of the American Law Institute's Federal Securities
Code (ALI Code) project.3 Although Professor Louis Loss, Re-
porter for the Code, initially intended merely to incorporate the
provisions of these statutes in the ALI Code, he recently has
indicated his interest in considering major substantive changes in
the two 1940 Acts.4 Accordingly, one purpose of this Article will
be to suggest-for consideration by Professor Loss; Professor
Victor Brudney, Assistant Reporter for the Code's investment
company portion; and the ALI-certain changes, some minor
and others substantive, designed to correct errors, fill inadver-
tent legislative gaps, and remove needless complexities in the
present statutes. A second purpose is to suggest that Professors
Loss and Brudney and the ALI consider substantive modifica-
tions that would extend a regulatory environment, based on the
framework of the two Acts, to some externalized investment
management arrangements not currently so regulated. Although
the proposed extensions might result in some restructuring of
the tax shelter, oil and gas drilling fund, and investment man-
agement industries, we suggest that any such restructuring in
response to an improved regulatory environment would be in
the public interest and for the protection of investors. Because of
the specialized nature of the legislation, specific recommenda-
tions for changes in each Act will be prefaced by a summary of
its general coverage and most important provisions.
II. THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
A. The Regulatory Framework
5
By drastically curtailing the permissible activities of unregis-
tered investment companies, section 7 of the Investment Coin-
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, §§ 23-26, 30, 84
Stat. 1430 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to b-21 (1970)). The Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 27, 29, 89 Stat. 163, amended §§ 203, 204, and 217
of the Act (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-3, b-4, & b-17 (Supp., Aug. 1975)).
To simplify citations, all references will be to the section numbers of the 1940 Act
and corresponding United States Code citations will be omitted. The original and codi-
fied section numbers are parallel. E.g., § 205 of the Act is 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5.
2 ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1975); id. (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3,
1974).
4 Compare Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAw.
27, 36-37 (1969), with ALI FED. SEC. CODE XVi (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1975). Part XI of the
ALI Code will deal with investment companies; Part VII will consolidate the registration
provisions for brokers, dealers and investment advisers. Id. xv.
5 For reviews of the legislative history of the Investment Company Act, see North, A
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pany Act in effect compels any "investment company" to register
under section 8. The term "investment company" is defined
broadly in section 3(a) to include any issuer 6 which:
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of invest-
ing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
7
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type,
or has been engaged in such business and has any such
certificates outstanding;8 or
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in
securities, and owns or proposes to acquire invest-
Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 667 (1969);
Survey, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732, 794-808
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Mutual Fund Survey]. As these articles discuss more fully, the
legislative history of specific provisions in the Investment Company Act is frequently
opaque, largely as a result of the Act's tortuous progress through Congress. At the
direction of Congress the Commission conducted a massive five-year study of so-called
investment trusts, transmitted parts of the study to Congress, and prepared the bills that
were initially introduced. Because of the breadth and scope of the study, specific provi-
sions in the initial bills can be correlated with specific abuses identified in the study only
with difficulty; cross-indexing can be done with little assurance of absolute accuracy. This
difficulty is compounded enormously by the fact that the bills ultimately considered and
passed by Congress emanated from Commission/industry negotiations that commenced
after the industry voiced strong opposition to the initial bills. Strictly speaking, the "legis-
lative history" of the bills which ultimately passed consists solely of their provisions being
read into the record with relatively brief comments by the parties concerned.
Congressional intent, however, may be gleaned by diligently tracing the evolution of
particular provisions from bill to bill. See, e.g., notes 64, 178 & 215-18 infra.
' An issuer of securities is, of course, typically a company. "Company" is defined
broadly in § 2(a)(8) as "a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock com-
pany, a trust, a fund, or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not
.... " A company need not be a "recognizable business entity." Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); see SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
7 The definition of "security" in § 2(a)(36) is identical to that in § 2(1) of the Sec-
urities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). The Commission staff has interpreted the
two sections in a consistent manner. See, e.g., Moultrie Nat'l Bank, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,081 (SEC staff letter, Nov. 27, 1974); Arthur E. Fox,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,082 (SEC staff letter, Nov. 12,
1974).
8 The term "face-amount certificate" is defined in § 2(a)(15). Certain of these se-
curities are further defined as being installment type securities. Section 28 generally
governs issuers of such securities of the installment type. See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMM'N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No.
2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS]. For a discussion of the effect of the Investment Company Amendments
Act of 1970 on face-amount certificate companies, see SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 6392, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,984 (Mar.
19, 1971).
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ment securities having a value exceeding 40 per cent-
um of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive
of Government securities and cash items) on an uncon-
solidated basis.9
As used in this section, "investment securities" includes
all securities except (A) Government securities, (B) se-
curities issued by employees' securities companies, and
(C) securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries of
the owner which are not investment companies.
Because of the breadth of the definition of "investment
company," a number of statutory exclusions are specified in sec-
tions 3(b) and 3(c). Excluded are: industrial and certain types of
holding companies primarily engaged in other businesses (sec-
tions 3(b)(1)-(b)(3)); t0 broker-dealers (section 3(c)(2)); banks, in-
surance companies," and savings and loan associations (section
3(c)(3)); companies regulated or supervised by the Interstate
Commerce Commission or by the SEC under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 (sections 3(c)(7), 12 3(c)(8)); and
single or collective pension and profit-sharing plans qualified
under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code (section
3(c)(1 1)). Also excluded are: persons substantially all of whose
business is confined to commercial financing and other money
lending activities (sections 3(c)(4), 3(c)(5)(A) and (B)); funds
consisting of securities related to oil and gas interests and com-
panies purchasing real estate and whole mortgages (sections
3(c)(9)' 3 and 3(c)(5)(C)); 14 certain charitable, educational, and
religious organizations (section 3(c)(10)); and voting trusts and
security holders' protective committees (sections 3(c)(12) and
3(c)(13)). Finally, presumably because of the lack of significant
public interest, an investment company that has fewer than 100
9The full sweep of the investment company definition in § 3(a)(3) has yet to be
determined. The definition's expansive nature, taking in companies that have uninten-
tionally stumbled into investment company status, has been criticized. For good discus-
sions of the development of the applicability of § 3(a)(3), see Kerr, The Inadvertent Invest-
ment Company: Section 3(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, 12 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1959);
Kerr & Appelbaum, Inadvertent Investment Companies-Ten Years After, 25 Bus. LAW. 887
(1970). See also SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); Garrett,
When Is An Investment Company?, 37 U. DET. L.J. 355 (1960). For a discussion of pro-
posed refinements of the definition, see text accompanying notes 47-71 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
11 See text accompanying notes 82-109 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 290-304 infra.
13 See text accompanying notes 305-12 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 313-29 infra.
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shareholders and is neither making nor proposing to make a
public offering of its securities is excluded from the definition
of investment company by section 3(c)(1).
15
Predominant among the entities remaining within the in-
vestment company definition are diversified,' 6 open-end 17 in-
vestment companies, popularly known as "mutual funds."' 8 The
unique characteristics of the investment company industry have
led to an unusual regulatory framework. A fund's assets, usually
consisting of a large pool of cash and securities, are highly liquid
and highly vulnerable. Those involved in fund management and
share distribution both have structural incentives to see that
fund shares are aggressively marketed. Externalized manage-
ment, which is prevalent in the industry, provides investment
advice and managerial services for a fee which is generally a
fixed percentage of the amount of assets under management.1 9
I" See text accompanying notes 74-80 infra.
16 "Diversified company" is defined in § 5(b)(1) as a management company with 75%
of its assets limited to securities representing not more than 10% of the outstanding
voting securities of any one company and not more than 5% of its total assets in the
securities of any one company. Any investment company other than a diversified com-
pany is non-diversified. Section 5(b)(2). The principal advantage of diversification is the
special tax treatment afforded such investment companies under subchaper M of the
Internal Revenue Code (which uses a somewhat different test). See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 851-55. Diversified investment companies that distribute at least 90% of their
ordinary income in the form of dividends avoid double taxation on both the distributed
income and on certain long-term capital gains. For a thorough explanation of the special
tax treatment afforded diversified investment companies, see PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 79-82.
17 "Open-end company" is defined as a management company that is offering for
sale or has outstanding a redeemable security that it issued. A closed-end company is any
other management company. Section 5(a). A redeemable security is one that entitles the
holder, upon presentation to the issuer, to receive approximately his proportionate share
of the issuer's current net assets or the cash equivalent. Section 2(a)(32).
" In the 1920's, closed-end funds predominated. Net assets in mutual funds did not
exceed those in closed-end funds until 1944. By 1966, 379 registered mutual funds had
$38.2 billion in total assets under management, while 149 active closed-end funds had
$6.6 billion in total assets. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 43-44. By De-
cember 1970, mutual funds had $54 billion in total assets under management. 2
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc.
No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 139 (1971) [hereinafter cited as IIS REPORT]. A recent
calculation published by the Investment Company Institute, the trade association for
mutual funds, indicates that mutual funds presently have $43.2 billion in total assets
under management, of which $2.5 billion is held by so-called money-market funds. Wall
St. J., April 23, 1975, at 29, col. 4. It is unclear how much of the drop is attributable to
depressed market prices, poor investment performance, or poor sales. For an introduc-
tion to the investment company industry, see Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 5, at 740-58.
19 For discussions of the role of fund managers and the current debate over the fees
paid to external managers, see PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 83-154;
Conference on Mutual Funds: The Mutual Fund Management Fee, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 726
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Assets, of course, may be increased not only by skillful invest-
ment management but also by heavy promotion leading to ex-
tensive sales of fund shares. The distribution network involves a
principal underwriter, a broker-dealer, and a registered rep-
resentative. Typically the costs of the network are charged to the
ultimate buyer as the sales load, which is usually expressed as a
percentage of the total purchase price and is specified in the
mutual fund's prospectus. 20 Responsive to the highly liquid na-
ture of a mutual fund's assets and to the pressure to adopt ag-
gressive marketing tactics, the Investment Company Act is un-
like other federal securities laws in going beyond minimum
disclosure requirements to establish a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme for the sale of shares and management of assets.
First, many of the provisions of the Investment Company
Act are intended to prevent or inhibit outright fraud. Section 9
prohibits persons convicted of or enjoined from committing cer-
tain types of misconduct from becoming any part of the invest-
ment company industry. Section 37 makes larceny, conversion,
or embezzlement of investment company assets a federal crime.
Section 36(a) authorizes the Commission to obtain injunctions
against persons associated with investment companies for a
breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct. Section
36(b), added by the Investment Company Amendments Act of
1970,21 authorizes the Commission or a shareholder to bring
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Management Fee]; Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 5, at
881-956.
20 For descriptions of mutual fund sales distribution systems, see PUBLIC PoucY
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 201-21; Division of Investment Management Regulation,
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Mutual Fund Distribution and Section 22(d) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, in CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE No. 155, pt. II (1974); Conference on
Mutual Funds: The Financing of Sales of Mutual Fund Shares, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 769 (1967);
Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 5, at 813-5 1. The Supreme Court recently discussed the
history and goals of regulation of mutual fund distribution in United States v. National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
21 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413. During 1971, the Commission issued several
releases interpreting certain provisions of the Amendments Act. E.g., SEC Investment
Company Act Release Nos. 6336, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,951 (Feb. 2, 1971) (application of "interested person" concept; approval of certain
performance-based advisory contracts); 6430, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 1 78,019 (April 2, 1971) (insurance company separate accounts); 6440,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,022 (April 6, 1971) (repeal of
exclusions for certain companies; limitations on pyramiding of investment companies);
6568, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 78,125 (June 11, 1971)
(guidelines for additional disclosures concerning new refund and election provisions
affecting periodic payment plan certificates); 6863, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,449 (Dec. 6, 1971) (guidelines relating to checking accounts for
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actions against persons associated with an investment company
with regard to the investment advisory fee, compensation for
services, or any payments of a material nature.22 Section 31 au-
thorizes the Commission to prescribe accounting policies and
practices; section 32 requires investment company financial
statements to be certified by independent public accountants
whose selection must be ratified by an investment company's
shareholders.
Certain paragraphs in section 17, the Investment Company
Act's conflict of interest provisions, also contain important anti-
fraud protections. The Commission is authorized to establish
bonding requirements 23 and to adopt rules governing custody of
investment company portfolio securities.24 An investment com-
pany is prohibited from protecting any officer or director of the
companies with bank custodians). For a history of the Investment Company Amend-
ments Act of 1970, see North, The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 712 (1971). For comments on § 36 as amended by the 1970 Act, including a
discussion of the availability of private rights of action, see Freedman & Rosenblat, Duties
to Mutual Funds, 4 REv. SEC. REG. 937 (1971). For a discussion of the SEC's report, Public
Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth (see note 8 supra) and its recommendations
that led up to the 1970 Act, see Werner, Protecting the Mutual Fund Investor: The SEC
Reports on the SEC, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1968).
22 See North, supra note 21, at 726-28. Section 36(b)(1) states that a plaintiff shall
have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty and that it is not necessary to
allege or prove personal misconduct. Section 36(b)(2) permits a court to give such consid-
eration as may be appropriate to the fact that an investment company's board of directors
has approved the payments at issue. Section 36(b)(3) limits recovery of damages to the
period ending one year prior to commencement of the action and precludes recovery of
actual damages in excess of the amount of compensation received by the associated
person. Section 36(b)(4) excludes from direct attack under § 36 payments that are subject
to § 17 or are sales loads paid in a share-for-share or share-for-assets acquisition by a
registered investment company. Section 36(b)(5) provides exclusive federal jurisdiction
for actions brought under § 36. See Freedman & Rosenblat, supra note 21, at 937-38. In
Carl L. Shipley, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8394, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,833 (June 21, 1974), the Commission held that
§ 36(a)-and by dictum implied that § 36(b)-cannot be used as the sole basis for an
implied grant of power to conduct administrative proceedings. See also Boyko v. Reserve
Fund, Inc., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1975) (demand
for board action prior to filing a derivative action presumed to be futile where action is to
be brought under § 36(b) and at least one interested director sits on the fund's board).
Finally, § 36(b)(6) prevents adverse court verdicts under § 36 from (1) being used to
disqualify a person under §§ 9 and 49 [Note that the cross reference in 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35(b)(6) (1970) to § 80a-49 is erroneous; the reference should be to § 80a-48.
Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1428.]
of the Investment Company Act, § 203 of the Investment Advisers Act, or § 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (Supp., Aug. 1975), amending 15
U.S.C. § 78o (1970), or (2) being used to enjoin the person from further association with
the investment company.
23 Section 17 (g); rule 17g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 27 0.17g-1 (1975).
24 Section 17(f); rules 17f-1, 17f-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17f-1, 17f-2 (1975).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:587
company or its investment adviser or principal underwriter from
liability for "willful misfeasance, bad faith, or gross negligence,
in the performance of his duties, or by reason of his reckless
disregard of his obligations and duties .... ,,25 The Commission
is authorized to adopt rules to prevent fraudulent or deceptive
practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
held or intended to be acquired by an investment company, and
to require adoption of codes of ethics by investment companies
and their investment advisers and principal underwriters. 2
6
Second, section 18 of the Investment Company Act contains
important restrictions on investment company capital structures.
Every share of stock issued by a registered management-type
27
investment company must have voting rights equal to those of
every other outstanding share of stock. 28 Registered open-end
investment companies cannot issue any senior securities, 29 while
25 Section 17(i); § 17(h).
26 Section 17(j). This section was added by the Investment Company Amendments
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 9(c), 84 Stat. 1420, but the Commission has not yet
exercised the rulemaking power that was granted. See SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 7581, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,157 (Dec.
26, 1972) (proposed rule 17j-1).
The proposed rule would, inter alia, implement the congressional policy of declaring
unlawful "insider trading" by affiliated and access persons of an investment company in
securities the company holds or intends to acquire. See § 17(j). The rule would, within its
limits, give the Commission and probably an investment company a right of action
against the "insider" whether or not the company is a purchaser or seller of the security
in question. This broad right is especially important because recent judicial interpreta-
tions may deny to an investment company that is not a purchaser or seller of securities a
cause of action under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (1975). E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
The code of ethics requirement in proposed rule 17j-1 is also important. For a
discussion of the problems of disclosure of investment advice, see Fleischer, Mundheim &
Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Infornation, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 798, 824-40 (1973).
27 The Investment Company Act provides for three different types of investment
companies: face-amount certificate companies, discussed at note 8 supra; unit investment
trusts, defined in § 4(2), which are governed generally by the provisions of § 26 of the
Act; and all others, which in § 4(3) are termed management companies.
28 Section 18(i). This requirement of "shareholder democracy" may produce irrecon-
cilable problems when a limited partnership is found to be within the investment com-
pany definition and is unable to satisfy any of the statutory exclusions. Careful structur-
ing may successfully finesse the problem by avoiding characterization of the partnership
as an "investment company." See, e.g., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8456, 4
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 47,357 (Aug. 9, 1974) (two-tier real estate companies).
29 Section 18(f)(1). The scope of the general definition of "senior security" in § 18(g)
is limited for registered open-end companies by § 18(f)(2). The companies may borrow
from banks if asset coverage is a minimum of 300% or in other limited circumstances. See
§ 18(f)(1); rule 18f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-1 (1975). When a company issues securities
that but for § 18(f)(2) would be senior, the Commission is authorized to prescribe special
voting rights for the security holders. See rule 18f-2, 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-2 (1975).
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closed-end funds can issue senior securities only where asset
coverage is 300% (debt securities) or 200% (preferred stock).3"
Section 12 augments the capital structure restrictions of section
18 by giving the Commission rulemaking authority over margin
buying 31 and short sales of securities32 and by imposing severe
restrictions on investments in securities of other issuers in the
investment company,33 insurance, 34 and securities industries.
3 5
Third, section 10 of the Act places strict limitations on the
composition of the board of directors of a registered investment
company. No less than forty percent of most boards must consist
of persons who are not officers, directors, employees or other
"interested persons" of the investment company, its investment
adviser, or its principal underwriter.3 6 Further restrictions are
imposed on the board depending on relationships between the
investment company and brokers, underwriters and investment
bankers.3 7 These limitations on the composition of the board of
directors help to insure that someone in a position of power will
serve a "watchdog" function on behalf of investment company
shareholders, especially in situations involving the possible con-
flicts of interest of external investment advisers.
38
30 Sections 18(a)(1)(A), 18(a)(1)(B). The terms "senior security" and "asset coverage"
are defined in §§ 18(g) and 18(h) respectively.
31 Section 12(a)(1).
32 Section 12(a)(3).
" Section 12(d)(1). This section was extensively amended in 1970 to deal with the
problems of mutual fund holding companies. The Commission had proposed abolition
of such companies. See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 323; North, supra
note 21, at 720-21 & n.38.
34 Section 12(d)(2).
35 Section 12(d)(3). Rule 12d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d-1 (1975), conditionally exempts
certain limited purchases or acquisitions of securities from the prohibitions of § 12(d)(3).
36 Section 10(a). "Interested person" is a very broad and intricate term of art defined
in § 2(a)(19). A subset of "interested person" of an investment company is "affiliated
person" of the company. The latter term is defined in § 2(a)(3). For the legislative history
of "interested person," see North, supra note 21, at 718-20. Certain no-load funds have
less stringent requirements. Section 10(d).
11 See §§ 10(b)(1)-(b)(3). The applicability of these provisions is contingent upon a
director, officer or employee or a related person of one of these persons being employed
as broker or principal underwriter of the company or on a director, officer or employee
being an investment banker or an affiliated person of an investment banker. For the
definitions of "broker," "principal underwriter," and "investment banker," see, respec-
tively, §§ 2(a)(6), 2(a)(29) & 2(a)(21). Section 10(c) further prohibits persons who are
officers, directors, or employees of any one bank from constituting a majority on the
board.
" See Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 179,
230-64 (1971). Added in 1970, § 15(c) requires that a majority of the disinterested
directors approve investment advisory and principal underwriting contracts. It also states
that they have a duty to request and evaluate "such information as may be reasonably
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Finally, in what many observers feel is the heart (and
perhaps the principal roadblock) of the Investment Company
Act, certain subsections in section 17 prohibit various conflict of
interest transactions between an investment company and its in-
vestment adviser, principal underwriter, or other "affiliated"
persons39 unless advance Commission approval has been ob-
tained. 40 Thus, section 17(a) generally prohibits any affiliated
person (or any affiliated person of such affiliated person) of a
registered investment company knowingly from selling, purchas-
ing, or borrowing securities or other property from the invest-
ment company.41 Section 17(d) generally empowers the Commis-
sion to establish rules and procedures tightly restricting any
affiliated person (or any affiliated person of such affiliated per-
son) of a registered investment company acting as principal from
effecting any transaction in which the investment company (or a
company controlled by the registered investment company) is a
joint or joint and several participant with the affiliated per-
son.42 Section 15 contains important safeguards for the execu-
necessary to evaluate the terms" of the investment advisory contract. It will be recalled
that § 36(b), which also was added by the 1970 amendments, specifies that the investment
adviser has a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services or of
any payments of a material nature. The legislative history of this provision, and the
controversy preceding its adoption are discussed in Freedman & Rosenblat, supra note
21, at 738-39; North, supra note 21, at 721-22; Nutt, supra, at 238-51. For a pre-1970 Act
discussion of the factors that independent directors ought to consider to properly fulfill
their role, see Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated
Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1058 (1967).
39 The broad definition of "affiliated person," § 2(a)(3), can lead to very complex
results. For example, on the problems raised when a portfolio company becomes an
affiliated person of an investment company, see Kroll, The "Portfolio Affiliate" Problem, in
THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 261 (R. Mundheim & A.
Fleischer, Jr. eds. 1972); Comment, The Application of Section 17 of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 to Portfolio Affiliates, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 983 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 205-19 infra.
40 For the procedure for prior approval, see rules 0-2, 0-5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-2, 0-5
(1975). The standard for granting an order is found in various provisions, such as
§ 2(a)(9) ("control") and § 2(a)(19) ("interested person"). Section 6(c) provides generally
that exemptive orders may be granted by the Commission "if and to the extent such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the
protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of
this title." Section 17 itself provides standards for certain exemptions. Sections 17(b) &
17(d).
41 Sections 17(a)(1)-(a)(3). The Commission has adopted a series of rules under
§ 17(a) that exempt certain specified transactions from the prohibitions of § 17(a) in
circumstances in which the need for Commission review is remote, and which thereby
obviate the need for filing applications requesting an exemptive order provided for in
§ 17(b). See rules 17a-1 to a-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17a-1 to a-7 (1975).
42 The Commission has also adopted a rule that sets forth the standard for review of
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tion of contracts between the investment company and its in-
vestment adviser and principal underwriter,43 and section 17(e)
limits the amount of compensation that affiliated persons acting
as brokers may receive from the investment company.
44
an application for an exemption from § 17(d), defines the term 'joint enterprise or other
joint arrangement or profit-sharing plan," and exempts from the prohibition of § 17(d)
certain specified transactions in circumstances in which the possibility of the investment
company involving itself in disadvantageous arrangements is remote. See rule 17d-1, 17
C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1975); text accompanying notes 177-205 infra.
While § 17(d) authorizes the Commission to. adopt rules prohibiting joint transac-
tions where the evidence establishes merely that the investment company is participating in
the joint transaction on a basis- different from or less advantageous than the other par-
ticipants, § 17(b) permits the Commission to grant exemptive orders from § 17(a) limita-
tions only where: (1) the terms of the proposed transaction are reasonable and fair, and
do not involve overreaching on the part of any person concerned; (2) the proposed transac-
tion is consistent with the formal investment policy of each registered investment com-
pany participant; and (3) the proposed transaction is consistent with the general purposes
of the Investment Company Act. Thus, the scope of Commission inquiry regarding a
§ 17(b) application is somewhat wider than that required for granting a § 17(d) applica-
tion. See, e.g., Bowser, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4842, [1966-1967
Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. RE!'. 77,435 (Feb. 8, 1967). There an affiliated
person (Bowser) of an affiliated person (Sterling Precision Corp.) of an investment com-
pany (Equity Corp.) proposed to buy its own (Bowser) shares from Sterling, Equity, and
others. The Commission refused to grant a § 17(b) exemption because, inter alia, under
state law Bowser management would breach its fiduciary duty by using corporate funds
to maintain control.
4. Section 15(c), see note 38 supra, requires that a majority of the disinterested direc-
tors approve the investment advisory and underwriting contracts, and imposes on those
directors the duty to request and evaluate such information as may be reasonably neces-
sary to evaluate the terms of such agreements. The disinterested directors are required
by § 15(c) to cast their votes in person at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on
the contracts. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6336, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,951 (Feb. 2, 1971). Section 15(a) requires that
investment advisory contracts be in writing, be approved by a majority of the share-
holders entitled to vote, precisely describe all compensation to be paid thereunder, and
provide for termination upon 60 days' written notice or automatically in the event of its
assignment. "Assignment" is defined in § 2(a)(4) of the Act. Both investment advisory
and underwriting contracts may be for terms of greater than two years if their con-
tinuance after the first two years is approved annually by the board of directors or by
vote of a majority of the shareholders entitled to vote and by a majority of the dis-
interested directors. See 99 15(a)(2), 15(b)(1), 15(c). For rules exempting certain invest-
ment advisory contracts from the strict provisions of § 15, see rules 15a-I (small invest-
ment advisory contracts) and 15a-3 (certain registered separate accounts), 17 C.F.R. §§
270.15a-1 & 15a-3 (1975).
44 Section 17(e) prohibits any affiliated person (or affiliated person of such person)
of a registered investment company when: (1) acting as agent, from accepting any com-
pensation from any source for the purchase or sale of any property to or from the in-
vestment company except in the course of the person's business as an underwriter or
broker; or (2) acting as broker, in connection with the sale of securities to or by the invest-
ment company, from receiving from any source a commission, fee, or other remunera-
tion which exceeds (A) the usual and customary brokerage commission if the sale is ex-
ecuted on a securities exchange, (B) 2% of the sales price if executed in a secondary
distribution, or (C) 1% of the sales price if otherwise effected. Section 17(e)(2)(C) gives
the Commission rulemaking power, which it has not exercised, to permit larger commis-
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B. Recommendations to Cure Errors, Omissions,
and Needless Complexities
This section will recommend changes in the Investment
Company Act to cure certain legislative errors and omissions. It
will suggest the reworking of the scope of some provisions, such
as sections 3(a)(3) and 17, to remove inconsistencies and com-
plexities that cause affected persons inordinate problems while
not appearing to provide any tangible degree of investor protec-
tion. Many of these recommendations and those concerning the
Investment Advisers Act 45 have already been made to (and ten-
tatively accepted by) Professors Loss and Brudney. One advan-
tage of reiterating them here is to articulate fully their "legisla-
tive" history for the benefit of critical comments and analysis by
other persons interested in the regulation of external investment
management relationships.
1. The Scope of the Act: Definitions and a Prohibition
a. Definition of "Investment Company"
46
The subject of the Act, the investment company, is defined
in several manners. The alternative that has been most trouble-
some, contained in section 3(a)(3), defines such a company as
any issuer which:
is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in
securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment
securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of
the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Gov-
ernment securities and cash items) on an unconsoli-
dated basis.
As used in this section, "investment securities" includes
all securities except (A) Government securities, 47 (B)
sions if they are in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors. With
the demise of fixed minimum brokerage commissions on national securities exchanges
pursuant to Securities Exchange Act rule 19b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1975), it may be
necessary to adopt such rules because of the difficulty of demonstrating what is a "usual
and customary" brokerage commission. The problem may not be significant because few
trades executed by affiliated broker-dealers for the registered investment company may
involve negotiated brokerage commissions in excess of 1%. See also Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ I1 (a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78k(a)(1)-(2) (Supp., Aug. 1975), amending 15
U.S.C. 78k(a)(1)-(2) (1970).4
' See notes 245-89 infra & accompanying text.
4 
See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
47 "Government security" is defined in § 2(a)(16). See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 301 (Rev.
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securities issued by employees' securities companies,48
and (C) securities issued by majority-owned subsidi-
aries49 of the owner which are not investment com-
panies.
Generally speaking, section 3(a)(3) may apply to a company
during three distinct periods in its life.50 First, during the start-
up period a company may in the exercise of prudent asset man-
agement invest its offering proceeds in securities until it can
purchase appropriate assets to begin industrial or other non-
investment company operations. A broad spectrum of issuers
may be confronted with this problem. Real estate syndications
and other tax shelters are particularly vulnerable because of the
unusual amount of time needed to analyze, organize, and
purchase interests in the particular types of deals appropriate
for the specific tax shelter.51 Second, a company that determines
Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974). Section 3(a)(1), unlike § 3(a)(3), does not use the term of art
"investment security" and therefore government securities are presumably considered in
the "primarily engaged" test of § 3(a)(1), but not in the 40% test of § 3(a)(3). A large
portfolio consisting solely of "government securities" could bring a company within the
"primarily engaged" condition of § 3(a)(1).
4' The term "employees' securities company" is defined in § 2(a)(13). Under § 6(b) of
the Act, an employees' securities company may, upon application, receive an order from
the Commission exempting it from the Act to the extent the exemption is consistent with
the protection of investors. Rule 6b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.6b-1 (1975) (exemption from the
entire Act pending Commission's determination of application for exemptive order).
49 Section 2(a)(24) defines "majority-owned subsidiary" as "a company 50 per centum
or more of the outstanding voting securities of which are owned" by a person. The ex-
clusion of securities of a "majority-owned subsidiary" implies that a conglomerate op-
erating primarily through majority-owned subsidiaries would be subject to § 3(a)(3) only
if (1) 40% of its assets, on an unconsolidated basis, were invested in other securities that
fall within the definition of investment securities, or (2) its majority-owned subsidiaries
were themselves investment companies. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 192-93 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN].
50 See Kerr, supra note 9. Some of the issues discussed by Kerr are updated in terms
of more current events in Kerr & Appelbaum, supra note 9.
51 E.g., SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SEC REAL ESTATE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 50-54 (1972) [hereinafter cited as REAL ESTATE REPORT]. The committee
recommended that the Commission deem the Investment Company Act inapplicable to
real estate syndications for the gap in time between an offering and subsequent invest-
ment of the proceeds, possibly with the proviso that not more than 70% of the proceeds
remain invested in securities within 365 days of the offering. The report incorrectly
stated (perhaps through a typographical error) the position of the Division of Investment
Management Regulation and of its predecessors by suggesting that investment of more
than 25%, rather than more than 50%, of an issuer's assets in securities would cause
questions about its status under § 3(a)(1) or § 3(a)(3). Compare id. 51, with U.S. Banc-
shares, Inc. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,789 (SEC staff
letter, Feb. 9, 1972). Moreover, few, if any, tax shelter offerings appear to be having
problems with the Division's present no-action position described at note 55 infra.
The committee's summary of recommendations is reproduced at [1972-1973 Trans-
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to sell off a large operating division 52 or is an aggressor in
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,265. For a recent discussion of this "start-up"
problem, see Cohen & Hacker, Applicability of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to Real
Estate Syndications, 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 482, 482-86 (1975).
52 See Kerr, supra note 9, at 29. The classic case illustrating this problem is SEC v.
Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970), affg 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). New York City condemned all of Fifth Avenue's city bus lines in March, 1962, and
satisfied a portion of the company's claims in October, 1966. In the interim, including at
a shareholders' meeting of August, 1966, management announced its intention to use the
proceeds for investment purposes, and did little but litigate its claims. When Fifth Av-
enue received a condemnation award of $11,500,000, it began to invest in securities. The
Commission sought an injunction against violations of the Securities Exchange and In-
vestment Company Acts and the appointment of a receiver for Fifth Avenue. The district
court and the Second Circuit both found Fifth Avenue to be an unregistered investment
company from June, 1967, granted the injunction requested, and appointed a receiver.
Unfortunately the self-dealing transactions by Fifth Avenue's affiliated persons, as found
by the courts, all occurred prior to June, 1967.
The lower court opinion, by Judge McLean, contained several important errors in
interpreting the Investment Company Act (which for procedural reasons remained un-
touched by the Second Circuit).
First, Judge McLean found Fifth Avenue, as of June 30, 1967, to be an investment
company within the meaning of §§ 3(a)(1) and 3(a)(3). We disagree that the evidence
proffered by the Commission did not support a finding as to applicability of § 3(a)(1)
and Fifth Avenue's satisfaction of the "primarily engaged" test prior to June 30, 1967.
The test of § 3(a)(1) is the existence, holding out, or proposal of primary engagement. We
believe that Fifth Avenue was, as of its annual meeting in August, 1966, holding itself out
and proposing to engage primarily in the business of investing in securities as soon as it
received the condemnation award. It was not merely predicting future events. Thus,
Judge McLean could have found it to be a § 3(a)(1) company as of August, 1966.
Second, Judge McLean ignored the fact that certificates of deposit are plainly se-
curities, and are surely treated as such for purposes of § 3(a)(1). See Josephthal & Co.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,116 (SEC staff letter, Nov. 25,
1974); Arthur E. Fox, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,082 (SEC
staff letter, Nov. 12, 1974); Warren W. York & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,758 (SEC staff letter, Dec. 21, 1973); cf. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332 (1967). We find unsatisfactory Judge McLean's rationale that "a company which
has suddenly come into possession of a substantial amount of cash is entitled to a reason-
able time to decide what to do with it .... " 289 F. Supp. at 28. Section 3(a)(1) speaks in
terms of "primarily engaged," not "reasonable time."
Third, Judge McLean compounded his error as to § 3(a)(1) by bringing his "reason-
able time" test into his analysis of § 3(a)(3). He failed to note the critical inclusion of
the word "holding" in § 3(a)(3), which surely contemplates an inactive investment port-
folio. Kerr, supra note 9, at 34.
Moreover, he also misapplied § 3(a)(3). Here the problem is more subtle. Section
3(a)(3) excludes from the assets test both cash items and government securities. It also
defines the term investment security to include all securities except those securities that
are excluded. Thus, a certificate of deposit that is a security should be treated as an
investment security, not as a cash item, even though the Commission's accounting rules
may dictate otherwise for purposes of the form and content of financial statements for
operating companies and registered investment companies. Compare regulation S-X § 1-01,
17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (1975), with regulation S-X § 6-03-1, 17 C.F.R. § 210.6-03-1 (1975).
For other reasons, the Commission has proposed revising § 6-03-1 to remove the lan-
guage that may have led to confusion in Fifth Avenue. See SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 8801, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,179 (May 27,
1975). With the calculations properly reconstructed, Judge McLean could have found
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takeovers53 may find itself with more than forty percent of its
assets in investment securities. Finally, a company selling off its
assets in the process of final liquidation and dissolution could
also inadvertently cross the forty-percent line.
5 4
(i) Alternatives for Inadvertent Investment Companies
A company that finds itself within the ambit of section 3(a)
(3) has several choices.
First, if the problem that caused the large portfolio of se-
curities is temporary, counsel for the company may choose to
seek a no-action letter. The Commission staff has issued such
letters, stating it would not presently recommend that the Com-
mission take action against the company for failure to register
under the Investment Company Act, contingent upon the truth
of counsel's representations that the company is engaged in bona
fide efforts to get back outside the scope of section 3(a)(3) within
the succeeding six months.55 Assuming the company can reach
Fifth Avenue to be an investment company within the meaning of § 3(a)(3) at least as of
December 31, 1966.
In our view, the Commission's failure to cross-appeal these conclusions as to
§§ 3(a)(1) and 3(a)(3) is not legally significant. Although the points were argued and set
aside as not properly raised before the Second Circuit, the Commission had already won
its major allegations. In view of the court's conceptual errors in interpreting § 3(a)(3), the
Commission staff does not follow its opinion in day-to-day administration of the Invest-
ment Company Act. John G. Sobieski (SEC staff letter, Mar. 13, 1975) (concerning
Lawyers Financial Corp.); Morris & Churchill (SEC staff letter, Nov. 26, 1974) (concern-
ing LectraData, Inc.); Samuel Lippman (SEC staff letter, Oct. 19, 1973).
53 AANow & EINHORN, supra note 49, at 200-03; Kerr & Appelbaum, supra note 9, at
892-99. An unsuccessful tender offeror may find itself with a large investment portfolio,
including securities of the target company, which exceeds 40% of its assets. Kerr and
Appelbaum have capsulized the "Slick" model for undertakings and for related disclo-
sure of potential Investment Company Act problems under § 3(a)(3) and for the possibil-
ity of obtaining exemptive orders from the Commission under § 3(b)(2). Id. 895-98 &
n.50. We would note only that the emphasis on the language in the MITE Corp. merger
proxy statement, id. 898-99 n.52, is misplaced: The Commission staff presently adheres
to the "Slick" model, id. 898, and would take the position that an unsuccessful tender
offeror could not rely on self-executing provisions of § 3(b)(1) for exclusion from §
3(a)(3). The offeror would have to file an application for exemption under § 3(b)(2).
54 The unnumbered paragraph following § 7(a)(5) provides, however, that the pro-
hibitions of § 7 will not apply "to transactions of an investment company which are
merely incidental to its dissolution." Thus, the Commission staff has taken a no-action
position as to the need for registration under the Investment Company Act where the
company can represent that it is in the process of final dissolution and that all of its
activities under applicable state law must be merely incidental to the liquidation and
dissolution. Kaplan, Livingston, Goodwin, Berkowitz & Selvin (SEC staff letter, May 17,
1973) (concerning Wrather Corp.).
55 E.g., Morris & Churchill (SEC staff letter, Nov. 26, 1974) (concerning LectraData,
Inc.).
The Commission staff has taken the position that, in terms of the "primarily en-
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its goal, the risk, of course, is that an unhappy shareholder will
not be equally forgiving of noncompliance with the registration
requirements of section 8 and transaction prohibitions of section
7 and that he will bring a private action.
56
Second, if the problem that caused the large portfolio of
investment securities is of a longer duration, counsel for the
company may choose to file an application seeking an exemptive
order from the Commission under section 3(b)(2), section 6(c),
or both.57 One disadvantage of this route is the amount of time it
may take to receive an order, and the risk that someone will
gaged" test of § 3(a)(1) and the 40%-of-assets test of § 3(a)(3), it will not recommend that
the Commission take any action under the Investment Company Act against a tax shelter
issuer if, at the end of six months from the completion of its offering, the issuer will have
committed or have binding or specific bona fide plans to commit more than 50% of its
assets to operating projects, such that the tax shelter would satisfy the conditions for an
order under § 3(b)(2) or the conditions of an exclusion in § 3(c). E.g., Lund, Levin &
O'Brien (SEC staff letter, July 19, 1974) (concerning Hanover Planning Co.).
Counsel may be able to give his opinion that, despite the apparent applicability
of § 3(a)(3), the company is excluded from the definition of investment company by
§ 3(b)(1), § 3(b)(3), or one of the paragraphs of § 3(c). Section 3(b) excludes, notwith-
standing § 3(a)(3),
(1) Any issuer primarily engaged, directly or through a wholly-owned subsidiary
or subsidiaries, in a business or businesses other than that of investing, reinvest-
ing, owning, holding, or trading in securities....
.... [and]
(3) Any issuer all the outstanding securities of which (other than short-term
paper and directors' qualifying shares) are directly or indirectly owned by a
company excepted from the definition of investment company by paragraph (1)
or (2) of this subsection.
Because these paragraphs are self-operating, while § 3(b)(2) requires submission of an
application requesting a Commission order, the Commission staff under most circum-
stances will decline to take a no-action position as to the applicability of either paragraph
to a particular company.
56 See Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (denial of motion to
dismiss action by shareholder against company directors to enjoin violations of the Act
and to provide other relief). The most accessible remedy against the unregistered com-
pany, it has been argued, is rescission of the company's contracts under § 47(b). Nielson,
Neglected Alternatives for Investor Self-Help: The Unregistered Investment Company and the
Federal Corporate Law, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 699 (1969). For an extended discussion of
problems encountered in reorganizations of unregistered investment companies, see
Kerr & Appelbaum, supra note 9, at 899-905. Under § 42(e), the Commission may seek
the extraordinary remedy of appointment of a trustee in an injunctive action against a
person who has engaged or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a
violation of the Investment Company Act or rules thereunder. This remedy is available
against unregistered companies. An injunction and a trustee were obtained in, for in-
stance, SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970), discussed at note
52 supra. Both the district court and court of appeals were prepared to find an unregis-
tered company to have violated sections of the Act that in the words of the Act apply only
to "registered" investment companies where the company was improperly not registered
when the proscribed activities occurred. Compare Kerr, supra note 9, at 36, with Kerr &
Appelbaum, supra note 9, at 891-92.
'7 Kerr, supra note 9, at 45-63 (§ 3(b)(2) applications), 63 (§ 6(c)); Kerr & Appel-
604
EXTERNAL INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
contest granting the order before the Commission or in the
courts.
58
Finally, if it is not possible for the company to obtain an
exemptive order under sections 3(b)(2) or 6(c), counsel would
have to register the company pursuant to section 8. 59 To termi-
nate registration he may later file with the Commission applica-
tions for orders under section 6(c), section 8(f), or both. As one
commentator has noted, "the company, by registering, will be-
come subject to an act that bows to none in the detail of its
regulation. In continuing to carry on its operating business, such
a company would find itself subject to regulations that do not
reach its competitors. '60 It should not be forgotten, however,
that the company's "assets" have become vulnerable to substan-
tial abuse. The company has become something, no matter how
inadvertently or unintentionally, that the Investment Company
Act was intended to regulate.
We recommend several changes to clarify the scope of sec-
tion 3(a)(3) and the availability of certain exclusions and exemp-
tions. Despite our attempts to foresee problems caused by differ-
ent suggestions, it is impossible to be certain that all implications
of each change have been anticipated. These recommended
changes, then, must be viewed as tentative proposals.
baum, supra note 9, at 889-92. Filing an application in good faith under § 3(b)(2) gives a
company 60 days of automatic exemption from the entire Investment Company Act,
which may be extended upon cause shown.
A company unable to meet the tests for exemption under § 3(b)(2) may nevertheless
believe it can convince the Commission to exercise its broad discretionary power under
§ 6(c) to grant exemptions "necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent
with the protection of investors .... " Indeed, if the company is an investment company
within the meaning of § 3(a)(1) because it is "primarily engaged" in investment company
activities, the company's only avenue for an exemptive order may be § 6(c). Section
3(b)(2) speaks in terms of "primarily engaged" and it would not be possible for a com-
pany simultaneously to be "primarily engaged" both in investment company and
industrial or other non-investment company activities. We disagree with Kerr's analysis to
the contrary. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 67-69.
On the other hand, Kerr is quite correct in stating that the two most important
factors in a § 3(b)(2) application are the ratios of investment securities to total assets and
of investment security income to operating revenues. Id. 67-69. The Commission staff
has taken the position that, if these two factors are substantially negative, satisfaction of
the other tests enunciated in Tonopah Mining Co., 26 S.E.C. 426 (1947), is of no help.
Cf. Electric Bond & Share Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4590 (May 10,
1966).
58 Cf. Christiana Securities Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8615, 5
SEC DOCKET 745 (Dec. 13, 1974), rehearing denied, Investment Company Act Release
No. 8692, 6 SEC DOCKET 366 (Feb. 27, 1975).
59 See rules 0-2 to 0-8, 8b-1 to 8b-32, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-2 to 0-8, 8b-I to 8b-32
(1975).
60 Kerr, supra note 9, at 30-31.
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(ii) Recommended Changes in Section 3(a)(3)
First, section 3(a)(3)'s test of whether forty percent of a
company's total assets are in investment securities is applied to
the balance sheet on an unconsolidated basis. A company's in-
terest in its wholly-owned subsidiaries, 61 which would be in-
cluded in the non-investment security assets, is therefore entered
on the balance sheet at historical cost or in an amount equal to
the net assets of the subsidiaries.6 2 That entry may distort the
relative value to the company of its investment securities and its
other assets. A parent holding company that has extensive indus-
trial operations through wholly-owned subsidiaries is still not
able to consolidate its assets with industrial assets of its wholly-
owned subsidiaries in making the section 3(a)(3) calculations. If it
has a relatively large portfolio of investment securities in com-
parison with its own assets, the company may then be described
by section 3(a)(3). Such a company may be unwilling to risk
potential shareholder suits by relying on an opinion of its coun-
sel that it satisfies the conditions for exclusion in section 3(b)(1),
may not be able to get no-action assurance from the Commission
staff, and thus may feel forced to file an application under sec-
tion 3(b)(2) seeking a Commission order of exemption.
To avoid this problem, we believe section 3(a)(3) should be
amended to require a company to consolidate its total assets with
those of its wholly-owned subsidiaries for purposes of calcula-
tions under section 3(a)(3). Generally speaking, under state law a
parent company's responsibilities in dealing with its wholly
owned subsidiary do not appear to be materially different from
its responsibilities with respect to an unincorporated division of
the company. 63 In the case of majority-owned subsidiaries,
61 "Wholly-owned subsidiary" is defined in § 2(a)(43).
6'2 Such assets could be valued for § 3 purposes at more (or less) than historical cost,
as determined in good faith by the board of directors. See § 2(a)(41)(A)(ii). L. RAPPA-
PORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 15 (3d ed. 1972).
63 This similarity is most apparent under the "short-form merger" statutes that per-
mit a parent company to merge with its wholly owned subsidiary without receiving
stockholder approval from either corporation. The usual shareholder appraisal rights,
however, would run to the wholly owned subsidiary's minority shareholders. V. BRUDNEY
& M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 614-21 (1972); W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 1712-14 (4th ed. unabridged 1969); Comment, The Short Merger
Statute, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 596 (1965). Courts in Delaware and New York have held
appraisal rights resulting in cash payments to be the exclusive remedy of a minority
shareholder of a wholly owned subsidiary in a short-form merger. See, e.g., Stauffer v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Beloffv. Consolidated
Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting
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where the relationship between parent and subsidiary is materi-
ally less close as a matter of state law, the present scheme of
using an unconsolidated basis should and would remain un-
touched. Thus the recommended change would eliminate a dis-
tortion of measurement due only to the form and not the sub-
stance of certain parent-subsidiary relationships; it would not do
violence to the legislative purpose behind section 3(a)(3). 64 The
change would give a parent company greater assurance, without
incurring the expense of seeking an exemptive order, that it is
protected from shareholder suits to enforce the Investment
Company Act.
Second, by its terms section 3(a)(3) applies, and the registra-
tion and regulatory provisions of the Investment Company Act
are triggered, if a company satisfies the statutory conditions at
any moment in time. A company may be subject to significant
penalties for its failure to register promptly 65 even if its portfolio
of investment securities is inadvertently and unusually large for
just a short period of time. The six-month no-action position
taken by the Commission staff in the context of "start-up" com-
panies and in other situations66 is not a complete answer for such
companies because shareholders may nonetheless sue the com-
pany for its lack of compliance. Thus, we believe section 3(a)(3)
should be amended so as not to apply to a company that has met
the substantive conditions of the section for less than six months
during any twenty-four month period, if throughout the six
months the company has made commitments or has made bona
fide plans to commit more than sixty percent of its total assets to
assets that are not "investment securities.
67
Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964). But see Brudney & Chirelstein,
Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1974) (sharing
formula necessary to provide fair treatment of gains realized by all parties to short
merger). See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971) (parent
permitted to force 97%-owned subsidiary to pay out dividends in excess of earnings even
though result was to deny subsidiary any independent opportunity for development).
64 For a discussion of the legislative history of § 3(a)(3), see Kerr, supra note 9, at
32-35. Kerr had access to the personal files of the SEC staff member most closely as-
sociated with the 1940 legislation that became the Investment Company Act. He con-
cludes that the intent of § 3(a)(3) was not to cover companies that were essentially
industrial companies operating through wholly owned subsidiaries. Id. 45-48, 68.
65 See §§ 44, 47(b), 49; note 56 supra.
66 See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
67 A company that would find itself within § 3(a)(3), amended in the manner we have
suggested, for a six-month period in two or more consecutive twenty-four month periods
would, of course, also raise serious questions as to whether the activities in which it was
primarily engaged would not render it an investment company under § 3(a)(1).
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We also recommend changing the constituents of the assets
ratio 68 in section 3(a)(3) in order to avoid unnecessary distortions
of investment choices. We are aware that many companies may
place assets in government securities or cash solely to avoid clas-
sification as an investment company under the section 3(a)(3)
test.69 Of course, these companies cannot so easily escape the
rigors of section 3(a)(1). 70 Distortions may nonetheless occur.
One approach to the problem would be to reinsert govern-
ment securities in both the numerator and denominator of the
A company in a transitional state may also find itself an investment company under
§ 3(a)(1). See note 52 supra. To avoid imposing undue burdens on such a company, a
similar grace period also should be added to § 3(a)(1). This grace, it must be emphasized,
should be contingent on the temporary nature of the condition and on the good faith of
the company, so that it could not be applied to a company that holds itself out as or
proposes to be an investment company. Such an application would be contrary to the
element of good faith and would unnecessarily give a true investment company an
unregulated start-up period.
68 The Commission staff originally drafted § 3(a)(3) so that it would (or would not)
apply to certain industrial companies based on their 1939-1940 balance sheets. See note
64 supra. One can, of course, question whether their 40% test, embodied in § 3(a)(3) and
based on 1939-1940 facts, is responsive to today's balance sheets. Careful financial
analysis, beyond the scope of this Article, is necessary to determine whether a 40% test is
still an appropriate measure.
69 For a company near the 40% line, shifting assets between cash and government
securities would have no effect, making either of those investments preferable in those
circumstances to investment securities, even though the rate of return on the government
securities may be much worse. Shifting assets from investment securities to government
securities, however, would tend to reduce the ratio, because government securi-
ties are presently excluded from both the numerator and the denominator of the §
3(a)(3) equation, although not as much as would shifting to non-cash, non-government
securities. Conversely, where a company has investment securities, going from operating
assets (those that are not cash or investment or government securities) to government
securities would tend to increase the percentage of investment securities held as com-
pared to total assets, but the increment would not be as great as it would be if the shift
were directly to investment securities. Company management will, of course, be required
under state law to invest the assets entrusted to it in a manner that will produce a
competitive return. Thus, where given the choice between government and investment
securities, the company on the line would exhibit a strong preference for government
securities. And given the choice between government securities and operating assets, it
may have a preference for operating assets. Were it not for the need to avoid application
of § 3(a)(3), a company that behaved in such a manner would certainly risk a powerful
suit by shareholders alleging breach of the duty to obtain a competitive return on the
company's assets. It is surely poor public policy to force or encourage companies to
consider and make investment decisions which are not in the best economic interests of
their shareholders.
'0 Section 3(a)(1) applies to those companies that are engaged primarily in investing,
reinvesting, or trading in securities, not merely "investment securities." See note 7 supra &
accompanying text. Section 3(a)(1), however, may not clearly apply to a company that
combines its substantial investing or trading activities in government securities with sub-
stantial operating functions; such a company may argue that maintaining a very large
portfolio of government securities does not make it a company whose primary purpose
is actively to trade in securities.
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section 3(a)(3) fraction-that is, to end the exclusion of govern-
ment securities from the definition of investment securities and
total assets-and also to reinsert cash in the denominator to end
the exclusion of cash and government securities from total assets.
This change would appear to be the least distorting in terms of a
company's decision to invest in investment securities, govern-
ment securities or other assets. But such an amendment seems to
go too far. Government securities do provide a profitable invest-
ment and a safe haven for the funds of a company that must be
highly liquid, but which does not otherwise have the usual char-
acteristics that should lead to registration and regulation as an
investment company.7 1 A company with high cash demands
should not be forced to forego completely the advantages of in-
come from government securities. Such a company, however,
would not be exempt from section 3(a)(3) as we would modify
it, because the company would surely be in and out of its cash/
government-securities position frequently during a period of
more than six months during every twenty-four-month cycle.
Therefore a company's only escape from section 3(a)(3) would
be the exclusion of government securities from investment
securities.
We propose to end only the subtraction of government se-
curities and cash from total assets; the definition of investment
securities would continue to exclude government securities.
Some may suggest that this formulation is even more distorting
than is the present test: A switch from investment securities to
government securities would produce a larger change in percen-
tage under our formula than under the present one. On the
other hand our formula would introduce a sense of reality into
the computations and decisionmaking based on those computa-
tions. The highly liquid, but non-investment company should
not be pushed into section 3(a)(3) status because of a relatively
small holding of investment securities. Management should be
free to maximize its income, within the forty percent limit, with-
7' The apparent intent of the draftsmen of § 3(a)(3) was to permit an industrial
company to place certain of its current assets into cash (or assets readily reducible into
cash) or government securities; such investments were presumably considered appro-
priate methods for a corporation to employ in making the best short-term use of its
surplus working capital. The formula in § 3(a)(3), however, does not stipulate that a
company's investments in government securities and cash be of short-term duration in
fact.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:587
out fear that temporary or brief, recurring surges in liquidity
would turn the corporation into an investment company.
(iii) Recommended Change in Section 3(b)
The introductory words to section 3(b)72 have generated
confusion as to whether that section's exceptions are available
only to companies that would otherwise qualify as investment
companies under section 3(a)(3). Where sections 3(b)(1) and
3(b)(2) apply, the confusion has no import: Any company that
qualifies for these exceptions would not be an investment com-
pany under section 3(a)(1) in the first place.
The true problem resides in section 3(b)(3), which excepts
an issuer all of whose outstanding securities (other than short
term notes and qualifying shares of a director) are held by a
company that is excepted by sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2). Surely
the exception should apply only to a company whose parent is
not primarily engaged in investing, reinvesting, owning, holding
or trading in securities either directly or through its subsidiaries.
The question is why should the exception apply only to a com-
pany whose parent owns or proposes to acquire investment se-
curities having a value in excess of forty percent of the parent's
total assets. The result would be this limited if the parent had to
be excepted under sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2) and to be so ex-
cepted would also have to be a company described in section
3(a)(3).
We believe section (3)(b)(3) should be amended to eliminate
this confusion. The parent should be one that is described in
section 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2), but need not be one that is excepted
from section 3(a)(3) by those paragraphs.
Also, section 3(b) as presently worded creates difficulties for
the subsidiary that qualifies as a section 3(a)(1) company yet is
only the incorporated investment division of a company de-
scribed in sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2). This subsidiary too should
have an exception under section 3(b)(3). We urge that section
3(b)(3) clearly be made an exception for wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries that are section 3(a)(1) as well as section 3(a)(3)
companies .73
2 "Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of this section, none of the following
persons is an investment company within the meaning of this tide. ... (emphasis
supplied).
"' Kerr, supra note 9, at 66. Even if the wholly-owned subsidiary is merely an incor-
porated investment portfolio primarily engaged in investing in securities such that it
610
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(iv) Recommended Changes in Section 3(c)(1)
A company that has qualified as an investment company
may be able to satisfy the conditions in one of the paragraphs in
section 3(c) and thus be excluded from the scope of section 3(a).
Section 3(c)(1) excludes any issuer the outstanding securities of
which (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by
not more than 100 persons and which is not making or propos-
ing to make a public offering of its securities. Beneficial owner-
ship by a company is deemed to be beneficial ownership by one
person if the company owns less than ten percent of the issuer's
outstanding voting securities.7 4 If the company owns ten percent
or more, beneficial ownership is attributed to the holders of the
company's outstanding securities other than short-term paper.
This pass-through is called the attribution rule.
Section 3(c)(1) presents several problems. It may be argued
that a parent company owning interests in an investment com-
pany established in the form of a limited partnership would not
be subject to the attribution rule in section 3(c)(1) even if the
parent held more than twenty percent of the limited partnership
interests. Limited partnership interests would usually not be vot-
ing securities, yet a substantial economic interest may give the
holder the functional equivalent of a voting security.75 This
anomaly, unexplained in the legislative history of the Investment
Company Act, is probably due to the recency of widespread use
of limited partnerships as a medium for investing in securities.
Because the exclusion is presumably bottomed on the lack of
public interest in investment vehicles with not more than one
hundred beneficial owners and because the limited partnership
would be an investment company within the meaning of § 3(a)(1), in addition to § 3(a)(3),
it may still be able to rely on § 3(b)(3). It would also be a § 3(a)(3) company and § 3(b)
provides exclusions from § 3(a)(3). See Kerr, supra note 9, at 66-69. If the value of the
assets of the wholly-owned subsidiary constituted 40% or more of the assets of the parent,
the parent would be a § 3(a)(3) company and the parent's status, and thus that also of the
subsidiary, would then depend on the availability to the parent of the exclusions in
§§ 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2).
"' "Voting security" is defined in § 2(a)(42) as any security entitling the owner or
holder to vote for the election of directors of the company.
3 The Commission staff has taken the position that where ownership of lim-
ited partnership interests exceeds 20% of the equity capital in the limited partnership,
such ownership constitutes the equivalent of greater than 10% of the voting securities.
The owner, the staff reasoned, could be expected to have an ability to exercise control
through economic power. The limited partnership interests, notwithstanding the absence
of a specific right to elect directors, were therefore functionally equivalent to voting
securities. On the last point, see, e.g., Drinker, Biddle & Reath (SEC staff letter, May 10,
1973) (concerning INA Trading Corp.).
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device permits much broader ownership, the treatment of
limited partnerships in section 3(c)(1) should be made consistent
with the section's treatment of other types of companies. The
term "voting" should be deleted.
76
Section 3(c)(1)'s attribution rule has been modified in the
context of small business investment companies (SBICs). In rule
3c-2(a),77 the Commission deems a company's beneficial owner-
ship of ten percent or more of the outstanding voting securities
of an SBIC licensed to operate by the Small Business Adminis-
tration to be beneficial ownership by one person under certain
circumstances. Those circumstances are that the value of all se-
curities of all SBICs in the portfolio of the company holding the
beneficial interest does not exceed five percent of the value of
the total assets of that company.78 Although the Commission
presently has sufficient authority under section 6(c) to adopt
such an exemptive rule of general applicability, it would seem
more appropriate simply to codify rule 3c-2.
The newly codified rule should also be made applicable to
all investment companies whose shares are held by industrial
companies and whose shares and those of all other investment
companies constitute five percent or less of the assets of each of
those industrial companies. This broadened exception would
allow industrial firms to put limited amounts of their cash into
funds specializing in money market instruments without subject-
ing the funds to investment company regulation. The fund
would enable the firms to obtain greater diversity in investing
their excess cash than each could manage individually. This
76 One minor problem caused by this change would be the calculation of the percent-
ages of outstanding securities if the securities issued are in several different classes, or if
both debt and equity securities are outstanding. This problem could be left to and re-
solved by Commission rulemaking.
'7 Rule 3c-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-2(a) (1975). For a thorough discussion of the
interaction of small business investment companies and the Investment Company Act,
see Mendelsohn & Cerino, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Minority Enterprise
Small Business Investment Companies "'Mesbics," 16 HOWARD L.J. 744 (1971). Many SBICs
are established in a manner that satisfies the conditions of rule 3c-2, thereby obviating
the need for filing registration statements under the Investment Company Act and
under the Securities Act of 1933. Mendelsohn & Cerino, supra, 749-51. Under Securities
Act of 1933 regulation E, moreover, a form for "notification" filing and a schedule for
the offering circular are provided for SBICs. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.601-610 (1975).
7' Rule 3c-2 was adopted to effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Small
Business Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-96 (1970). SEC Investment Company Act
Release Nos. 5452, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,582 (Aug.
5, 1968); 2909, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,664 (Sept. 4,
1959).
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would be consistent with the policy of section 3(c)(1) to regulate
purportedly private investment companies which are used as in-
direct media for investment by the public. Where the industrial
company's investment in securities through ownership of in-
terests in an investment company constitutes a relatively minor
part of the industrial company's assets, the need for Invest-
ment Company Act regulation of the investment company is
minimized.
Section 3(c)(1) also limits the issuance of debt securities to
short-term paper by requiring that the holders of all other types
of debt securities be counted toward the ceiling of 100 bene-
ficial owners.7 9 If the company relying on section 3(c)(1) can
otherwise meet the conditions of the section, no public policy
reasons appear for limiting its leverage opportunities to short-
term paper. The financing of the leveraging should be limited to
investors who have the ability and resources to monitor their
investments without a sweeping regulatory overlay. Thus, the
short-term paper exception of section 3(c)(1) should be amended
to include also debt securities held by institutional investors.80
(v) Recommended Change in Section 3(c)(6)
A parent company operating through subsidiaries may also
find its way out of section 3(a) through section 3(c)(6). That
paragraph excludes any company primarily engaged, directly or
through majority-owned subsidiaries, in one or more of the
businesses8' described in paragraphs (3) (banking, insurance,
79 Rule 3c-3, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-3 (1975), excludes the offer and sale of debt se-
curities by SBICs (typically to large institutional investors) from the term "public offer-
ing" as used in § 3(c)(1) if the debt securities are not convertible into equity securities and
are guaranteed as to timely payment of principal and interest by the Small Business
Administration. Rule 3c-3 also counts the holders of these debt securities collectively as
one person for purposes of the 100-beneficial-owners condition. Rule 3c-3 should be
modified to mesh with the changes to § 3(c)(1) recommended at text accompanying note
80 infra.
80 "Institutional investor" is defined in ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 242 (Rev. Tent. Draft
Nos. 1-3, 1974). A similar change should also be made to § 3(b)(3). See notes 72-73 supra.
81 It is not clear from the legislative history of the Investment Company Act why
broker-dealers, excluded by § 3(c)(2), were not included in § 3(c)(6). Perhaps broker-
dealers, traditionally organized as partnerships, were not thought of as possible parents
or subsidiaries. In recent years, however, the broker-dealer industry has tended to
move away from the partnership form to public ownership in corporate form, and, most
recently, to formation of a parent holding company with separately incorporated sub-
sidiaries for broker-dealer and other activities. See Augsburger, Broker-Dealers Going Pub-
lic, in NEW TRENDS AND SPECIAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAW 31 (A. Sommer
Jr. & H. Enberg eds. 1970); Wall St. J., May 2, 1975, at 20, col. 3; id., April 19, 1973, at
12, col. 3; id., Mar. 15, 1973, at 7, col. 1; id., Dec. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Oct.
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savings and loan), (4) (small loans), and (5) (commercial financ-
ing, mortgage banking and real estate), "or in one or more of
such businesses (from which not less than 25 per centum of such
company's gross income during its last fiscal year was derived)
together with an additional business or businesses other than
investing.... ." Section 3(c)(6) thus focuses on the parent holding
company's gross income, but the statute is silent as to whether
the twenty-five percent test is applied on a consolidated or un-
consolidated basis. It would seem appropriate that the ALI Code
resolve this ambiguity. We recommend that gross income of the
parent holding company be computed in a manner consistent
with section 3(a)(3)-that is, on a consolidated basis as to wholly-
owned subsidiaries and on an unconsolidated basis as to
majority-owned subsidiaries that are not investment companies.
b. Definition of "Insurance Company"
Investment Company Act section 2(a)(17) and ALI Code
section 24482 define the term "insurance company" in materially
different ways. Section 2(a)(17) defines an insurance company,
inter alia, as "a company which is organized as an insurance com-
pany, whose primary and predominant business activity is the writ-
ing of insurance. . ".. -83 ALI Code section 244 defines an insur-
ance company as "a company doing business under the laws of a
State if (1) a substantial portion of its business consists of the writ-
ing of insurance or annuity contracts .... -84 The Reporter's
Note 85 states that the definition was "redrafted in the interest of
furthering stylistic consistency," and to conform to the definition
of "bank" in ALI Code section 209(c)(1), 86 although the Note
does concede that the changes in section 244 are substantive and
wi1187 enlarge the exclusion for insurance companies provided by
section 3(c)(3). Assuming arguendo that a good purpose would be
served by standardizing the style of definitions used in the ALI
Code, it nevertheless seems inappropriate in a codification effort
10, 1971, § F, at 2, col. 1; id., Sept. 12, 1971, § F, at 2, col. 1. This trend should be
recognized by amending § 3(c)(6) to refer also to holding companies engaged in broker-
dealer activities described in paragraph (2).
82 ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 244 (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974).
83 Section 2(a)(17) (emphasis supplied).
84 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 244 (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974) (emphasis supplied).
8 5 Id. Reporter's Note.
86 Id. § 209(c)(1). For a discussion of the problems with the definition of "bank," see
notes 110-12 infra & accompanying text.87 Id. § 244, Reporter's Note.
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to enlarge an important exclusion from the federal securities
laws without stating clearly the effects such an enlargement
would have on investor protection. The Reporter's Note,
moreover, leaves one little comfort (but some astonishment) as to
the potential scope of the enlargement by suggesting that
it may be doubted whether the state insurance au-
thorities will permit insurance companies to engage in
mutual fund or other non-insurance activities (other-
wise than through subsidiaries) to the same extent as
the banking authorities have already permitted banks to
engage in activities that are not of an orthodox banking
character.8"
(i) Parity with Banks
Material differences between the banking and insurance in-
dustries and their regulation justify the pattern of differing sub-
stantive conditions presently found in their respective defini-
tions. First, banks generally are regulated at the federal level by
a tripartite arrangement involving the Federal Reserve Board,
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation.8 9 When Congress determines to limit bank
activities,90 or to expand them, 91 communication and legislation
can take effect directly at the federal level. Insurance companies,
on the other hand, are not subject to federal supervision, ex-
88Id.
89 2 IIS REPORT, supra note 18, at 413 n.2, 442-43. See generally Randall, The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation: Regulatory Functions and Philosophy, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 696 (1966); Robertson, Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 673 (1966).
90 See, e.g., Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, as amended (codified in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The scope of the Glass-Steagall Act as applied to com-
mingled managing agency accounts was determined in Investment Co. Institute v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). The Investment Company Institute and the New York
Stock Exchange have begun litigation against the Comptroller of the Currency claim-
ing "automatic investment services" violate the Glass-Steagall Act. New York Stock
Exch., Inc. v. Smith, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. Ra. 95,370 (D.D.C., Dec. 5, 1975).
The Investment Company Institute recently lost litigation against the Federal Reserve
Board, claiming the Board's regulation Y regarding closed-end investment companies
also violates the Act. Investment Co. Institute v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,540 (D.D.C., filed
May 8, 1974).
"See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84
Stat. 1760 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 31 U.S.C.). For an excellent treatise on the
legislative history of the amendments and subsequent interpretations by the Federal
Reserve Board, see C. BLAINE, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
(1973).
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amination, or regulation. 92 Second, although both bank and
insurance company regulators are concerned primarily with the
solvency of their financial institutions, bank regulators also ex-
amine, supervise, and promulgate rules for the fiduciary ac-
tivities of banks. 93 Insurance company regulators, on the other
hand, are almost exclusively concerned with financial solvency
and give regulation of fiduciary activities cursory oversight at
best.94 Thus, assuming the reason bank securities activities were
excluded from certain provisions of the federal securities laws is
the existence of adequate analogous regulation at the federal
level, 95 that reason does not extend to insurance company se-
curities activities.
92 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970). See 2 IIS REPORT, supra
note 18, at 865-66; Frankel, Regulation of Variable Life Insurance, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
1017, 1045-82 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Frankel I]; Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable
Insurance, and Separate Accounts, 51 B.U.L. REv. 173, 209-11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Frankel II].
9' The Comptroller of the Currency's Regulation 9, 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1975), is the
principal federal fiduciary regulatory scheme. See C. GOLEMBE Assoc., INC., THE
ECONOMIC POWER OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 56 (1969). For discussions of bank trust de-
partment examinations and supervision, see id. 55-64; E. NEILAN, TRUST EXAMINATION:
AN EXAMINER'S ANALYSIS (1939); Miller, Regulation of Fiduciaries, in AMER. BANKERS
ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS, FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY SEMINAR 56 (1970); see note 95 infra.
94 2 IIS REPORT, supra note 18, at 865:
The primary objective of State regulation is protection of policyholders, al-
though revenue production through taxation is also a major consideration. To-
ward these objectives State regulation enters all phases of the insurance business
including restricting investment, conducting periodic financial examinations,
approving policies and rates and licensing companies, agents, and brokers.
See Frankel II, supra note 92, at 212: "State regulation is, therefore, aimed at protecting
creditors who have no voice in management and are mostly interested in the security of
the funds and the soundness of the business of their debtor." See also Frankel I, supra
note 92, at 1066-82 (analysis of areas in which the federal securities laws can add in-
vestor protections to the debtor/creditor protections provided under state law).
95 In April, 1974, the Commission announced an inquiry into bank-sponsored in-
vestment services. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,767 (April 30, 1974). SEC Commissioner Evans has indi-
cated, in commenting upon the decision to begin an inquiry, that the Commission is
caught in "a rather serious dilemma ... in fulfilling its responsibilities [in view of] what
some believe to be blanket exemptions for banks from various provisions of the securities
laws." Address by SEC Commissioner Evans, Ninth Annual Banking Law Institute, New
York City, May 2, 1974, at 3, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,775, at 84,102. Commissioner Evans further commented:
[W]hether Congress provided such exemptions because banks were already reg-
ulated by bank agencies or whether such exemptions were provided because
banks were not expected to engage in securities activities to a significant degree
or whether such exemptions were simply a result of bank political power is not
completely clear ....
Id. In this important speech, Commissioner Evans stated several alternative theories and
strategies the SEC could follow if, based on its analysis of the public comments received
in response to its inquiry, it determined that the lack of investor protection under the
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(ii) Types of Insurance Activities Permitted
In suggesting that state regulators will permit only a narrow
range of activities by insurance companies, the Reporter's Note
ignores extensive litigation over the status of variable annuity
contracts under the federal securities laws96 and the Com-
mission's present involvement with regulation of the issuers
97
of variable life insurance contracts under the Investment
banking laws required the Commission to assert jurisdiction and to regulate directly
bank-sponsored investment services. See Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91
BANKING L.J. 611 (1974). For an analysis of the adequacy of the regulation of bank trust
department investment activities compared with the regulation of persons in the se-
curities industry offering similar services, see Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Depart-
ment Investment Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 977 (1973); Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust
Department Investment Activities: Seven Gaps and Eight Remedies (pts. 1-2), 90 BANKING LJ.
912 (1973), 91 id. 6 (1974).
96 In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959), the
Supreme Court held that, for purposes of the federal securities laws, variable annuity
contracts are securities, not insurance contracts, and are therefore subject to the registra-
tion provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. Since VALIC intended to engage pre-
dominantly in issuing variable annuity contracts, which the Supreme Court held were
securities, it could not satisfy § 2(a)(17) and thus could not rely on § 3(c)(3) of the
Investment Company Act, and it had to register. In Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964), the Third Circuit held that
the issuer of proposed annuity contracts was the separate account established by the
insurance company to fund the liability, not Prudential whose predominant business was
the writing of conventional insurance contracts. (It could be argued that the Third
Circuit found that Prudential was a co-issuer.) Thus, the separate account, whose sole
business would be the issuance of variable annuity contracts, would also be required to
register. See Frankel II, supra note 92, at 195-216, 231-34. See also SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
97 Because the issuer of the variable annuity and variable life insurance contracts is
the separate account formed by an insurance company to fund the liabilities, see note 96
supra, the definition of "separate account" is important. The definitions of "separate
account" in the Investment Company Act, § 2(a)(37), and in the ALI Code, ALI FED. SEC.
CODE § 298 (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974), are virtually identical except for stylistic
changes. We believe, however, that it would be desirable to insert a clause that would
require the separate account to be legally segregated, to be exempt from claims arising
out of any other business of the insurance company, and to have assets with a value at
least equal to the reserves and other liabilities with respect to the account. See rule
0-1(e)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(e)(2) (1975). The need for such a clause is articulated in
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5741 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 77,730 (July 15, 1969) (adoption of rule 6e-1 relating to separate accounts
used to fund qualified pension and profit-sharing plans). Many state laws that authorize
the establishment of separate accounts by insurance companies either require or permit
segregation through addition of appropriate provisions in the participation contracts.
Some states do not require or permit such segregation. In such states, the insurance
company could make other arrangements, perhaps through insurance with another
company, to protect creditors in the event of the insurance company's insolvency. See
generally Frankel I, supra note 92, at 1041-82. Rule 6e-1 was rescinded by the Commis-
sion, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6430, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,019 (April 2, 1971), because the Investment Company
Amendments Act of 1970 amended § 3(c)(11) to exclude from the definition of invest-
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Company Act.98 After extensive public hearings during 1972, 9'
the Commission determined that the issuance of variable life
insurance contracts involved the offer and sale of a separate
security by an investment company. 100 The Commission initially
exempted the separate accounts used to fund certain variable life
insurance contracts from the registration and other provisions of
the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts by
adopting the now-rescinded rules 3c-4 and 202-1.101 Rule 3c-4
defined "insurance company" as used in section 3(c)(3) of the
Investment Company Act to include a separate account funding
certain variable life insurance contracts.
In adopting rules 3c-4 and 202-1, the Commission tried to
reconcile the regulatory scheme of the Investment Company Act
with the developing pattern of state insurance regulation, with
emphasis on the role of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) and their Model Variable Life Insurance
Regulations. 10 2 The mutual fund group that had participated
ment company those separate accounts that are funded solely by contributions from
qualified pension plans.
9 See Division of Investment Management Regulation, Securities & Exchange
Comm'n, Report on Variable Life Insurance Rules, in CCH MUTUAL FUNDs GUIDE SPEC. REP.
(Feb. 5, 1973) [hereinafter cited as VLI Staff Report]; Blank, Keen, Payne & Miller,
Variable Life Insurance and the Federal Securities Laws, 60 VA. L. REv. 71 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Blank]; Frankel I, supra note 92. See also Glenn, New Inflation Hedges-Vari-
able Life Insurance, Annuities Gain in Popularity, BARRON'S, Oct. 30, 1972, at 3.
99 VLI Staff Report, supra note 98, at 1-14; Blank, supra note 98, at 82-84.
100 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7644, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,207 (Jan. 31, 1973); N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1973, at 1, col. 2;
Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1973, at 2, col. 2.
101 Rules 3c-4 & 202-1, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.3c-4 & 275.202-1 (1975), were rescinded
effective July 30, 1975. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8826, [Current] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,206 (June 18, 1975).
102 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7644, at 4-6, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,207 at 82,660 (Jan. 31, 1973):
Consistent with the representations made by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, we expect the states to move expeditiously to de-
velop, refine and adopt regulations with respect to variable life insurance.
Further, we expect that such regulations will provide material protections to
purchasers substantially equivalent to the relevant protections that would be
available under the Investment Company Act .... The Commission will closely
monitor the development of state law in this area to assure its adequacy in
providing these protections and, if in the future it appears that substantial
deficiencies exist and are not likely to be remedied, the Commission will then
consider whether it is necessary or appropriate to modify or rescind Rule[s] 3c-4
[and 202-1].
During the initial and subsequent variable life insurance hearings and proceedings, the
NAIC consistently argued that the Commission had and should have no jurisdiction over
variable life insurance. Particularly in the wake of the Equity Funding collapse, however,
others have criticized state regulation of insurance companies. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug.
2, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
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in the proceedings and had opposed the exemptive rules sued
the Commission over the rules it adopted. 10 3 After the com-
mencement of the litigation the Commission proposed amend-
ments to the exemptive rules. 0 4 The proposed amendments
would have conditioned the availability of the two existing
exemptive rules on a determination by the Commission that a
particular state's law and regulations would meet certain min-
imum standards of investor protection substantially equivalent
to relevant provisions of the two 1940 Acts. The NAIC made
extensive efforts to develop model variable life insurance reg-
ulations; 0 5 public hearings were held to discuss the desirability
of adopting the proposed amendments and the adequacy of in-
vestor protection provided by the NAIC's model regulations. 0 6
Despite the NAIC's efforts, the Commission determined not to
adopt the proposed amendments and rescinded the exemptive
rules.' 07 In view of the uniformly unfavorable comments on the
proposed amendments to the variable life insurance exemptive
rules, the Commission concluded that the proposed prior ap-
proval arrangement "would not result in uniformity of regula-
tory oversight . . . or adequate investor protections," and that
application of the Investment Company and Investment Advis-
ers Acts was necessary to achieve investor protection. 0 8 The
103 Wellington Management Co. v. SEC, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 1 93,792 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (petition for review); Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1973, at 12,
col. 2.
104 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8000, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,518 (Sept. 20, 1973); Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1973, at 2, col. 2. For
digests of certain comments on the proposed amendments, see Mutual Funds Group Asks
SEC to Rescind Variable Life Rules, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 229, at A-2 (Nov. 28,
1973); Hart, Proxnire Urge SEC to Reexamine Exenptions for Variable Life Insurance, BNA
SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 228, at A-18 (Nov. 21, 1973).
105 See, e.g., Latest Draft of Model Variable Life Insurance Regulation Released by NAIC,
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 229, at A-1 (Nov. 28, 1973). The October 30, 1973, draft
of the NAIC Model Variable Life Insurance Regulation appears in BNA SEC. REG. & L.
REP. No. 226, at E-1 (Nov. 7, 1973). Excerpts from the draft of Dec. 1, 1973, appear in.
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 229, at D-1 (Nov. 28, 1973).
106 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8216, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,632 (Jan. 31, 1974); SEC To Hold Hearings on Variable Life
Insurance Rules, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 238, at A-4 (Feb. 6, 1974). Two of the
issues at the hearings were whether the NAIC's Model Regulations provided substantially
equivalent investor protections, and, if so, how the Commission should deal with prob-
lems when different states adopt the Model Regulations with changes that would materi-
ally affect investor protections.
107 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8826, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 80,206 (June 18, 1975). See also SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8690,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,117 (Feb. 27, 1975).
I's SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8690 at 4, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,117 at 85,129-30 (Feb. 27, 1975).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:587
Commission has announced its intention to develop by rules a
pattern of appropriate limited and conditional exceptions for
variable life insurance contracts under section 6(e) of the In-
vestment Company Act.10 9 It has not yet acted.
(iii) Conclusion and Recommendation
With all respect, this brief review of the results of the con-
troversy over variable annuity and variable life insurance con-
tracts confirms that state insurance authorities would permit
insurance companies to engage in "mutual fund or other
non-insurance activities." And they would permit it under a
regulatory pattern that the Commission has found to be defi-
cient in comparison with the investor protections provided by
the 1940 Acts. Accordingly, the ALI Code definition of insur-
ance company should require a higher degree of concentration
on insurance matters-the "primarily and predominantly" stan-
dard of present law-before a company engaged to a substantial
degree in the business of issuing securities, not underwriting
insurance, is entitled to rely on an exclusion from the important
investor protections provided by the federal securities laws.
c. Definition of "Bank"
Banks, like insurance companies, are excluded from regula-
tion as investment companies under section 3(c)(3) even if they
109 The § 6(e) rules would develop a pattern of regulation responsive to "the nature
of the product, the risks assumed by the life insurer and regulatory activities of state
insurance regulators." SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8691 at 3, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. V 80,118 at 85,132 (Feb. 27, 1975). One insur-
ance company has chosen to apply individually for what it believes are the minimum
necessary exemptions, rather than wait for the Commission to adopt rules. SEC Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 8888, 7 SEC DOCKET 588 (Aug. 13, 1975) (notice of
filing of application of Equitable Variable Life Insurance Co.); Equitable Life Assurance
Society Submits First Variable Life Insurance Contract, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 318, at
A-19 (Sept. 10, 1975). The application has been granted. SEC Investment Company
Release No. 8992, 8 SEC DOCKET 185 (Oct. 16, 1975), reported in Equitable's Application for
Exemptive Order on Variable Life Product Approved, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 325, at
A-7 (Oct. 29, 1975).
Although the Commission announced its intention to propose a tailored exemptive
rule for variable life insurance under § 6(e) of the Investment Company Act, it did not
propose to adopt any exemptive rules under the Investment Advisers Act. Insurance
companies advising registered investment companies (i.e., separate accounts funding var-
iable annuities' or variable life insurance contracts) have, however, been exempted by
order from registration under the Investment Advisers Act until certain problems could
be resolved relating primarily to the record-keeping rules under § 203. SEC Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 308 (Feb. 10, 1972); see note 230 infra. For a discussion of
proposed rule 202-2, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7565, [1972-1973
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qualify under section 3(a). Section 209(c)(1) of the ALl Code" 0
would omit from the "bank" definition an important condition
now contained in section 2(a)(5) of the Investment Company
Act, section 202(a)(2) of the Investment Advisers Act, and sec-
tion 3(a)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act."' That condition
requires that a state-chartered bank must not have been formed
for the purpose of evading the provisions of the relevant Act.
The ALI Code Reporter's Note states that the "evasion" condi-
tion was deleted as "redundant, and possibly mischievous in the
absence of similar clauses elsewhere."
'"12
The current definition of "bank" is quite unusual in com-
parison with other definitions: A bank is not cdefined primarily
in terms of its functions, but rather by reference to the type of
agency that regulates it. The absence of a similar "evasion" con-
dition in other analogous definitions can be explained, then, by
the prevailing use of functional definitions that implicitly as-
sume a lack of evasive purpose if the functional tests are satis-
fied. In such circumstances, inclusion of an evasion condition
would be redundant.
No legislative history explains why, in all of the Acts, the
condition applies only to state-chartered banks and certain other
institutions. It can be theorized, however, that Congress omitted
the no-evasion condition for national banks and member banks
of the Federal Reserve System because it assumed that they
would always act and be regulated as banks, or that Congress
could use its authority directly to regulate their engaging in
specific securities or investment activities. State-chartered banks,
on the other hand, are excluded from the operation of the Acts
by reference to specific types of commercial or trust activities,
regulation by state or federal bank agencies, and a lack of pur-
pose to evade the provisions of the three Acts. The evasion con-
dition, it can be argued, is not "mischievous" because Congress
must have believed that a bank could obtain a state charter, be
lightly supervised (if at all) by state authorities, and be formed
for the purpose of evading the Securities Exchange, Investment
Company, or Investment Advisers Acts.
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,146 (Feb. 21, 1973), which would require
registration only of an advisory subsidiary of an insurance company, see Lybecker, Advis-
ers Act Proposals, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 916, 917 (1975).
110 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 209(c)(1) (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1970).
112 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 209, Reporter's Note (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:587
Because the "evasion" condition is neither redundant nor
mischievous, it should not be deleted from the ALL Code defini-
tion with respect to state-chartered banks.
d. Registration of Foreign Investment Companies
Section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act prohibits a
foreign-chartered investment company from using the means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce "to offer for sale, sell,
or deliver after sale" any of its securities in connection with a
public offering. 113 Section 7(d), however, goes on to authorize
the Commission, upon application, to permit a foreign-chartered
investment company to register under the Investment Company
Act and to make a public offering of its securities if the Commis-
sion finds
that, by reason of special circumstances or arrange-
ments, it is both legally and practically feasible effec-
tively to enforce the provisions of this subchapter
against such company and that the issuance of such
order is otherwise consistent with the public interest
and the protection of investors.
Very few foreign-chartered investment companies have filed
section 7(d) applications.1 1 4 For a variety of reasons, foreign-
113 Because § 7(d) focuses narrowly on use of the means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce in connection with a public offering of securities, it is basically
irrelevant as a matter of statutory interpretation that an offering and any subsequent
resales are limited entirely to foreign nationals. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler
(SEC staff letter, June 4, 1975) (concerning American Certificates of Deposit Fund).
Nevertheless, some people have apparently interpreted the words "public offering" in
§ 7(d) to include only an offering to U.S. citizens, 3 IIS REPORT, supra note 18, at 882,
based on the Commission's historical restraint from requiring registration of non-
investment company public offerings made outside the United States to foreign nationals
under circumstances where the securities would come to rest outside the United States.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1361-63 (July 9, 1964).
Once a foreign offering has been accomplished, however, § 7(d) would not appear to
prohibit a foreign-chartered investment company from using the jurisdictional means to
conduct its investment activities and related operations. See 3 IIS REPORT, supra note 18,
at 882. For guidelines concerning the applicability of the federal securities laws to the
offering of shares of registered mutual funds outside the United States, see SEC Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 6082, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 77,828 (June 23, 1970); Mostoff, Securities Regulation Aspects, in INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIPS AND "OFFSHORE" INVESTMENT FUNDS 386-96 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
PARTNERSHIPS]. See generally 3 IIS REPORT, supra note 18, at 879-978; Haskins, The Off-
shore Hedge Fund, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79 (1969); Note, Offshore Mutual Funds:
Possible Solutions to a Regulatory Dilemma, 3 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus. 157 (1971). For a
description of the rise and fall of I.O.S. and Bernard Cornfeld, the archetypical offshore
fund operator, see C. RAw, B. PAGE & G. HODGSON, "Do You SINCERELY WANT TO BE
RICH?" (1971).
114 As of June 1974, only eleven foreign-chartered investment companies had re-
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chartered funds have generally preferred to stay offshore." 15
A major deterrent has been the impossibility of meeting the
literal requirements of section 7(d)." 
6
As securities markets and investment companies have grown
more international in character, 1 7 foreign countries have given
greater emphasis to their own schemes of securities regula-
tion." 8 For example, the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) has adopted a code of uni-
form regulation for investment companies." 9 Shortly after
the OECD adopted its "Standard Rules" and as a result of rec-
ommendations in its 1971 Institutional Investor Study Report,
120
ceived orders from the Commission. See, e.g., St. John d'El Rey Mining Co., SEC Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 7885, 2 SEC DOCKET 105 (June 29, 1973); Pan Aus-
tralian Fund Ltd., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8028, 2 SEC DOCKET 585
(Oct. 10, 1973). Rule 7d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.7d-1 (1975), sets forth certain conditions,
undertakings, and agreements which, if met by an investment company organized
under Canadian law, will enable the company to obtain a Commission order permitting
its registration. These conditions have generally been followed by the Commission staff
in considering applications regarding other countries. The Commission has, however, re-
cently issued informal guidelines for case-by-case consideration of such applications not
only under § 7(d) but also under the broad exemptive powers of § 6(c). SEC Investment
Company Act Release No. 8959, 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 47,661 (Sept. 26, 1975).
11s Some of the reasons undoubtedly relate to the inapplicability of the Investment
Company Act to the fund itself, and perhaps to the consequential lack of regulation of
the fund adviser under the Securities Exchange and Investment Advisers Acts. See 3 IIS
REPORT, supra note 18, at 90 1-04; Bialkin, Mostoff & Weiss, Securities Regulation Aspects, in
PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 113, at 345-421. Equally important are the tax advantages of
creating and operating investment companies in so-called tax-haven jurisdictions. See 3
IIS REPORT, supra note 18, at 904-20; Note, United States Taxation and Regulation of
Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1969).
116 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8959, 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
47,661 (Sept. 26, 1975).
117 See Cohen, Toward an International Securities Market, 5 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus.
357 (1973); Address by SEC Chairman Garrett, Boston Stock Exchange, Sept. 25, 1973;
Address by SEC Chairman Casey, First International Meeting on Stock Exchanges,
Milan, Italy, Mar. 15, 1972.
118 E.g., J. BAILLIE & W. GROVER, PROPOSALS FOR A MUTUAL FUND LAW FOR CANADA
(1974); Gori-Montanelli & Botwinik, Mutual Funds in Italy, 4 INT'L LAW. 352 (1970);
Thrope, The Sale of U.S. Securities in Japan, 29 Bus. LAW. 411, 415-16 (1974); Note, West
German Regulation of Foreign Mutual Fund Distributions, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 323
(1970).
119 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, STANDARD
RULES FOR THE OPERATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES
(1972). Representatives of the United States, including a representative of the Commis-
sion, participated in the deliberations of OECD that led to the promulgation of the
"Standard Rules." For a digest of the "Standard Rules," see SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 8596, 5 SEC DOCKET 640 (Dec. 2, 1974) (request for public comments on
issues raised by permitting foreign investment companies to register under the Invest-
ment Company Act).
120 1 IIS REPORT, supra note 18, at xvi-xvii:
[T]he Commission believes that foreign investor confidence in offshore funds
that invest in American securities could be bolstered significantly if they were to
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the Commission in 1973 proposed enactment of the For-
eign Portfolio Sales Corporation Act.12 1 One provision of the
bill would have given the Commission greater flexibility in con-
sidering applications under section 7(d) in response to the
OECD's "Standard Rules."
In view of these developments in the regulation of invest-
ment companies in foreign countries, it seems appropriate to
add flexibility to section 7(d) by amending it to permit the
Commission in granting an order to take into account the differ-
ing laws, regulations, customs, and business conditions of par-
ticular countries and the adequacy of existing regulations in such
countries.
122
become subject to Commission regulation under the federal securities laws.
Offshore funds currently receive treatment under the Internal Revenue Code
which provides them with competitive advantages over domestic, registered in-
vestment companies seeking to sell in offshore markets. Equalization of these
advantages would enable U.S. registered investment companies to compete
more effectively with unregulated offshore funds....
The Commission recommends that a high level governmental task force
organized to explore and develop the possibility of the establishment and regu-
lation of Foreign Portfolio Sales Corporations [registered United States com-
panies distributing shares to foreign investors] as well as registered offshore
investment companies. We would expect such a task force to consider appro-
priate tax treatment for such funds and nonresident foreign investors, and
methods of gathering data with respect to foreign institutional investors in order
to facilitate further study of developments in this area.
121 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7751, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,306 (April 3, 1973). Representative Harley 0. Staggers introduced
the Foreign Portfolio Sales Corporation Act of 1973, H.R. 8256, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). The best description of the bill's provisions is found in the SEC-Treasury De-
partment Memorandum dated March 27, 1973, "Description of Foreign Portfolio Sales
Corporation Proposal," which accompanied the Commission's release. The bill would
have: (1) amended § 7(d) to give the Commission greater flexibility in allowing registra-
tion of foreign investment companies; (2) added new § 7(e)(1) to provide for registration
and regulation of domestic investment companies organized to sell their securities to
foreign nationals; and (3) added new § 7(e)(2) to enable the Commission to deal with the
problem of "shell" companies organized in the United States with foreign officers, direc-
tors, and trustees. Although the Commission expressed its strong support for the bill
before and after its introduction, it was never the subject of hearings during the 93d
Congress and has not been reintroduced in the 94th Congress.
122 Although the Commission recognizes that it remains bound by § 7(d), it has
suggested it will use factors similar to those mentioned in the text in considering applica-
tions for exemptions under §§ 6(c) and 6(e). See SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 8959, 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 47,661 (Sept. 26, 1975).
It can be argued that the present statutory requirement that the Commission find it
both "legally and practically feasible to enforce" the provisions of the Investment Com-
pany Act would conflict with a mandate to take into account the foreign country's differ-
ing laws, regulations, and so forth. If this argument is troublesome, additional language
could require, as did OECD with respect to its member countries, that the Commission
when considering applications under § 7(d) give substantial weight, within the regulatory
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e. Definition of "Affiliated Person"' 123
An officer, director, or employee of an investment company
is an affiliated person of the company under section 2(a)(3)(D).
No corresponding language in section 2(a)(3) explicitly directs
that the company is an affiliated person of its officer, director, or
employee.
Thus, an anomalous situation could develop in which two
companies share a common director or officer, but one company
would not be the affiliated person of an affiliated person of the
other company. Section 17 reaches certain dealings of an af-
filiated person of an affiliated person of a registered investment
company.124 Therefore it is not clear that the section would,
without more, reach dealings of a company that shares a com-
mon officer or director with the registered company.
Only in limited circumstances would the alternative defini-
tions of "affiliated person" complete the chain. Under section
2(a)(3)(B), an investment company is an affiliated person of any
person who owns five percent or more of its outstanding voting
securities. Section 2(a)(3)(C) would make the company an af-
filiated person of the director or other person if the director or
other person controls, is controlled by, or is under common con-
trol with the company. But under section 2(a)(9), a person whose
power "is solely the result of an official position" with a company
is excluded from the definition of controlling person. A pre-
sumption is also stated that a natural person is not a controlled
person. Section 221 of the ALI Code would drop the "official
position proviso" and the "natural person" presumption. 25 The
framework of the Investment Company Act, to the foreign investment company's com-
pliance with the regulatory framework of its country's statutes and regulations.
Of course, although amending § 7(d) to give the Commission additional flexibility in
allowing foreign investment companies to register is a necessary first step, substantial
problems would remain. In SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8596, 5 SEC
DocKEr 640 (Dec. 2, 1974), the Commission stated that the basic questions were (1)
whether it was desirable to relax certain provisions of the Investment Company Act,
particularly in view of the OECD "Standard Rules," and (2) how that relaxation could be
accomplished without sacrificing essential investor protections. The Release posed nine
complex questions on which the Commission invited public comments.
The Commission later decided to resolve issues on a case-by-case basis, but also lent
its support to legislative review of the efficacy of § 7(d). See SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 8959, supra.
123 For a discussion of the importance of the term "affiliated person" to the conflict
of interest prohibitions of § 17, see text accompanying notes 39-44 supra; text accompany-
ing notes 205-20 infra.
'
24 See notes 39-44 supra & accompanying text.
122 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 221 (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974). The "official posi-
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modifications are a helpful step, but not dispositive of the prob-
lem.
Under present law, a person owning five percent (an arbi-
trary number) of a company's outstanding voting securities may
forge the link in both directions to make section 17 applicable
while that particular person can exert no real influence over the
management or policies of a company. Yet a person holding an
official position, and thus able to wield great power, might not
create the link. In analogous situations, where two investment
companies have a common investment adviser and common of-
ficers and directors, the Commission has taken the position that
common control may exist as a matter of fact, rendering the two
investment companies affiliated persons of each other.
126
To obviate future arguments and to cover the more com-
mon types of interlocking situations involving a natural person,
we recommend that section 2(a)(3) be amended by adding new
clause (G): " 'Affiliated person' of another person means . ..
and, (G) if such other person is an officer, director, or employee,
any company for which such person acts in any such capacity."
Under new clause (G), a company would be an affiliated person
of its officers, directors, and employees. It would thus become an
affiliated person of an affiliated person in respect to any person
who is an affiliated person of its officers, directors, or em-
ployees. Transactions involving a registered investment company
and such affiliated persons of affiliated persons would then be
subject to section 17, thereby removing an inexplicable omission
from the section's investor protection scheme.
12
f. Definitions of Terms Not Currently Defined
Several terms, including "depositor" and "officer," are used
in the Investment Company Act without being defined.
tion" proviso of § 2(a)(9) has been difficult to apply and interpret. The ALI Code
changes are essential to our recommended change in § 2(a)(3) of the Investment Com-
pany Act. Section 221(c) would permit filing of applications for a Commission order
declaring whether or not control exists.
126 E.g., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4697, [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,405 (Sept. 8, 1966) (adoption of rule 17a-7) (affilia-
tion based upon control would depend upon the facts of the given situation, including
extensive interlocks of officers, directors, or key personnel, common investment advisers
or underwriters); SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7035, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,608 (March 9, 1972) (proposal to amend rule 17d-1).
The proposed exemptive rule would have permitted affiliated persons of affiliated
persons to combine their securities transactions together with the order of a registered
investment company for the sole purpose of achieving the best overall execution.
127 This change would, of course, expand the present scope of § 17. As discussed in
text accompanying notes 137-220 infra, we would also amend § 17 in other respects.
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ALI Code section 269 defines "officer" as
(a) the chairman of the board of directors, president,
treasurer, secretary, controller, or principal executive,
financial, or accounting officer of a company; (b) a vice
president or other employee who participates or has
authority to participate, otherwise than as a director, in
major policy-making functions of a company .... 128
The effect of this section and section 226, which defines
"director,"'12 9 is to cover all persons who would perform such
functions with respect to any type of company (as defined in ALI
Code section 2 19).130 We support these revised definitions.
The term "depositor" is used, among other places, in In-
vestment Company Act sections 2(a)(3)(F), 7(b), 9(a), 10(h),
17(a)(1)(C), 26, and 27. A definition of the term is necessitated
by the extent of its usage in the Investment Company Act and
the importance of the provisions in which it appears. For exam-
ple, section 10(a) requires that no more than sixty percent of an
investment company's board of directors be interested persons,
which includes affiliated persons, which in turn under section
2(a)(3)(F) includes depositors. Further, section 271s requires a
depositor of a company issuing periodic payment or contractual
plans to see that planholders pay no more than the maximum
sales load permitted and that the issuer meet such reserve re-
quirements as the Commission may impose.'3 2
"Depositor" has been defined by the Commission in Form
N-LR, the annual report required to be filed by registered in-
vestment companies, 133 but because of its importance the term
128 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 269 (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974).
129Id. § 226. The term "director" is also defined in § 2(a)(12) of the Investment
Company Act. While ALI Code § 226 and § 2(a)(12) contain similar thoughts and words,
the ALI Code formulation appears superior because of its explicit reference to the
general partner of a partnership as compared with the more general reference to "any
person performing similar functions" in § 2(a)(12).
130 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 219 (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974).
131 Sections 27(d)-(h), providing further regulation of the sales load paid by pur-
chasers of periodic payment or contractual plans issued and sold by investment com-
panies, were added by the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-547, § 16, 84 Stat. 1424. For a discussion of the notice and refund provisions added
in 1970, see North, supra note 21, at 724-25. For discussions of the law and operations
of periodic payment plans prior to the 1970 Act, see PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS,
supra note 8, at 223-50; Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 5, at 861-65.
132See 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.27a-1 to a-3, 27c-1, 27d-1 to d-3, 27e-1, 27f-1, 27g-1, 27h-1
(1975).
33 Rule 30a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30a-2 (1975); Form N-IR is prescribed at 17 C.F.R.
§ 274.101 et seq. (1975). The form required to be filed by unincorporated management
19761
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:587
deserves statutory treatment. 134 Based on the definition in Form
N-1R, we would recommend the following as new Investment
Company Act section 2(a)(1 1)(A):
(1 1)(A) "Depositor" means the person primarily respon-
sible for the creation or operation, or both, of an in-
vestment company not having a board of directors, in-
cluding any person who is designated as the sponsor or
manager of the investment company and who has con-
tinuing functions or responsibilities with respect to the
administration of the affairs of the investment com-
pany, but not including a trustee or custodian desig-
nated in accordance with the provisions of section 26 of
the Act, unless the trustee or custodian is also the
creator, sponsor, or manager of the investment com-
pany.
The exclusion of trustees and custodians designated under sec-
tion 26 of the Investment Company Act is appropriate because
the trust indenture or agreement of custodianship specifying a
particular bank as trustee of a unit investment trust provides
adequate investor protections of the kind that would otherwise
be applicable under the Investment Company Act.
135
2. Fundamental Investment Policy
Section 8(b) of the Investment Company Act authorizes the
Commission to require, in the registration process, disclosure of
certain fundamental aspects of an investment company's in-
tended policies and operations. These aspects include: diversifi-
cation, borrowing, lending, issuance of senior securities, under-
writing the securities of others, concentration of investments,
purchase of assets other than securities, and portfolio turnover.
investment companies currently issuing periodic payment plan certificates is Form
N-30A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 274.103 (1975).
134 S. 3772, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1960), would have added a definition of the
term "depositor"; the bill's definition would have included persons with the administra-
tive function of eliminating or substituting portfolio securities, but not persons whose
functions as a depositor had been assumed by another. S. REP. No. 1759, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-3 (1960). S. 3772 passed the Senate and, with amendments, the House. H.R. 2481,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 2178, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1960). It
failed to pass both houses after conference and never became law. See generally Meeker,
Current Proposals to Amend the Federal Securities Laws, 37 U. DET. L.J. 335 (1960).
135 Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (1970).
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Section 13 prohibits a registered investment company from
changing or deviating from its recitals of these fundamental
policies without seeking and obtaining the approval of a majority
of its outstanding voting securities. The classifications of policies
contained in sections 8(b) and 13(a) are too broad. Specifically,
the sections do not require disclosure or adherence to objectives
concerning the types of securities in which a company will
invest-for example, equity securities, triple A bonds, convert-
ible preferred stock, and so forth.136 Because nothing could be
more important to a shareholder than awareness of the invest-
ment company's basic investment objectives, we recommend
that sections 8(b) and 13(a) be amended to require that a com-
pany disclose the types of securities in which it intends to in-
vest and that it not change or deviate from that statement
without approval of a majority of the company's outstanding
voting securities.
3. Regulation of Investment Company Transactions
and Conflicts of Interest
a. Services Rendered to an Investment Company
Section 15 of the Investment Company Act requires that
contracts with the investment company's investment adviser and
principal underwriter be executed in writing and provide in sub-
stance for their automatic termination upon assignment.137 It
permits such contracts to continue beyond the original two-year
term if the board of directors or a majority of the fund's out-
standing voting securities annually re-approves their con-
tinuance; and it requires a majority of the disinterested directors
to approve the terms of the contracts. The draftsmen adopted
those requirements because of the lack of arm's-length bargain-
136 Section 8(b)(2) requires disclosure of all investment policies changeable only by a
shareholder vote; § 8(b)(3) requires disclosure of all matters which the investment com-
pany deems to be fundamental policy. Thus, under present law an investment company
may voluntarily disclose and adhere to specific investment objectives; but it may also
structure the corporate charter and by-laws to preclude any voting by shareholders on
investment objectives and deem those objectives not to be a matter of fundamental policy.
Meeker, supra note 134, at 347-48 (analysis of gap in §§ 8(b) and 13 in context of SEC's
1959-60 legislative proposals).
137 See notes 38, 43 supra. Section 15(a) also requires that an investment advisory
contract describe precisely all compensation to be paid thereunder and be terminable at
any time, upon sixty days' written notice and without the payment of any penalty, by the
board of directors or by vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities.
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ing between the investment company and its investment
adviser.1
38
In recent years the trend has been to contract out to af-
filiated persons of the investment adviser or principal under-
writer certain duties, such as recordkeeping or stock transfer
activities. 139 These duties were traditionally undertaken either by
the investment company itself or by unrelated third parties (typi-
cally commercial banks) otherwise in the business of providing
such services.' 40 In terms of their dollar impact, contracts for
administrative services may be as material to investment com-
pany shareholders as the investment advisory or principal un-
derwriter contracts' 41 and are surely as central to the efficient
"' SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND
INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 3, at 1918-40
(1940) (devices of control and related problems-management contracts); Hearings on S.
3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.,
pt. 4, at 1113 (1940) (Statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, Investment Trust
Study, SEC: "[Section 10] will provide the independent directorships where you have a
management contract."); Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 5, at 800-02. For a thorough
discussion of the responsibilities of "independent" directors in the context of approval of
the advisory contract, see Nutt, supra note 38, at 230-50.
139 Operation of an investment company creates a variety of administrative needs,
including: preparation, printing and distribution of prospectuses, shareholder reports,
and proxy materials; issuance, transfer, and cancellation of share certificates; payment of
dividends and capital gains distributions; custody of portfolio securities and other assets;
transfer, receipt, and delivery of portfolio securities bought and sold; and computation,
usually at least once daily, of offering and redemption prices of the investment
company's shares. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 86-87; Mutual Fund
Survey, supra note 5, at 885-86.
140 E.g., PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 90-94; Mutual Fund Survey,
supra note 5, at 885-86, 891-904. Both the Commission and the Survey found that the
services least often covered by the basic advisory fee were custodial, stock transfer, div-
idend disbursement, audits, and reports to shareholders. These services were almost
invariably furnished by a commercial bank or trust company. PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 91-92; Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 5, at 891-92. For a
discussion of the expanded concern over the choice of custodian banks by pension
funds, produced by uncertainty over the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, see
Patocka, Custodian Banks, The Next Pension Battleground, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept.,
1975, at 87.
141 In 1966 the Commission cited the arrangements of Keystone Custodian Funds as
a typical example of administrative-fee agreements. The investment adviser to the Funds
charged for its investment advice 0.5% of the net assets under management of the first
$150 million, and for its administrative services and expenses 0.25% on the first $500
million. Both fees scaled down with increased asset size. On June 30, 1966, Keystone had
combined assets of $1.1 billion. The advisory fee actually charged was 0.35% of average
net assets; the administrative fee, 0.21%. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at
92-93. Examples of several unusual arrangements were also noted. An independent
investment adviser of Washington Mutual Investors Fund, Inc., received a 0.25% fee; a
wholly owned affiliate of the fund's principal underwriter received another 0.25% as
"business manager"; yet the fund itself bore the expense of stock transfer, custodial, legal
and auditing fees, and the cost of preparing shareholder reports. Id. 93-94; see Mutual
Fund Survey, supra note 5, at 885-86 n.1019.
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operation and success of an investment company as are its in-
vestment decisions.
Because investment companies and unrelated third parties
otherwise in the business of providing administrative services
would typically bargain at arm's length over contracts for admin-
istrative services, the draftsmen of the Act did not give the
Commission specific statutory responsibility to oversee these con-
tracts, nor did it give the disinterested directors of an investment
company greater responsibility therein than that provided by
state law. 142 These contracts between an investment company
and an affiliated person (or an affiliate of an affiliate) are not
subject to the review procedures of section 15 and may not be
within the conflict of interest prohibitions of sections 17(a) 143
or 17(d).' 44 The investment company's personnel and the af-
142 For a thorough discussion of state law duties of "independent" directors, see
Nutt, supra note 38, at 202-07.
143 It might be argued that execution by an investment company of a contract for
administrative services with an affiliated person is a sale by the affiliated person of "other
property" to the investment company within the meaning of § 17(a)(1). Cf. Ivy Fund,
Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6509, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,069 (May 6, 1971) (consideration to be paid by investment
adviser for license to use mutual fund's name for itself was found not to be fair and
reasonable; § 17(b) application for exemption from § 17(a)(2) denied); Union Data Ser-
vice Center, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,994 (SEC
staff letter, July 24, 1972) (no-action letter given where an affiliated broker-dealer wished
to utilize the data processing services of an affiliate of the investment company on terms
of cost of services plus 15%).
If execution of an administrative services contract with an affiliated person is within
§ 17, the crucial reviewing standards of § 17(b) ("reasonable and fair and do not involve
overreaching on the part of any person concerned") seem more appropriate to the
problem than those of § 17(d) (participation by the investment company in a joint trans-
action with an affiliated person must not be "on a basis different from or less advanta-
geous than that of [the] other participant"). Jurisdiction over execution of the contract is
much clearer, however, under § 17(d). See note 144 infra.
144 The Commission staff has for some time asserted the applicability of § 17(d) to
the execution with an affiliated person of a contract for transfer agency services. See
Investment Company Act Release No. 8245, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 79,667 (Feb. 25, 1974). Indeed, but for an express exclusion in rule 17d-1,
17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1975), some people feared even an investment advisory contract,
subject to § 15, would fall under § 17(d). Rule 17d-1(c) defines 'joint enterprise or other
joint arrangement or profit-sharing plan to mean any written or oral plan, contract .. "
As originally adopted, the rule had no express exclusion; commentators expressed con-
cern that it would also cover advisory contracts. See SEC Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 2226, [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,362 (Sept. 12,
1955). Thus, a clause was added to the end of paragraph (c) to exclude "an investment
advisory contract subject to Section 15 of the Act." SEC Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 2472, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,501 (Jan. 10,
1957). The point, of course, is that if an investment adviser would be dealing as a prin-
cipal in a joint enterprise, so would a transfer agent. The adviser has been expressly ex-
cluded; the agent has not been.
In 1969 the investment adviser to Pace Fund, Inc. wished to establish a wholly owned
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filiated person also may not, in respect to those administrative
services contracts, be subject to the fiduciary duty provisions of
sections 36(a) and 36(b). 145 But the relationship of the parties
subsidiary to act as the fund's transfer agent; we understand the Commission staff as-
serted the applicability of § 17(d) to the proposed arrangement, but took a no-action
position based on representations that the transfer agency services would be provided at
cost. [No citation to public documents is available.] And in 1971, former Commissioner
Hugh G. Owens noted:
Another area involving compensation which is of some concern is the possi-
ble application of Section 17(d) of the Act to transfer agency arrangements
between an investment company and its investment adviser or an affiliate of the
adviser. The banking community, which has historically performed the transfer
agency function, appears increasingly reluctant to provide this service to invest-
ment companies. A trend is developing, therefore, where investment advisers
undertake the transfer function themselves or set up affiliated companies to do
the work.
The question arises whether these transfer agency arrangements constitute
joint arrangements between the investment companies and their advisers subject
to the Commission's review under Section 17(d) of the Act and Rule 17d-1. The
lack of arm's-length bargaining between the fund and its adviser regarding such
arrangements raises the spectre of the kind of abuses which Section 17 was
directed against. Thus, the Section 17(d) question would not arise where such
dangers are not present as, for example, in a case where services are performed
at cost or the fund itself creates its own subsidiary to perform these services.
This area is still under staff consideration, and no firm determinations have yet
been made.
Address by SEC Commissioner Owens, Mutual Fund Seminar, Dallas, Texas, May 6,
1971, at 5-6, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 101, at E-1, E-2 (May 12, 1971).
Finally, in February 1974 the Commission proposed that rule 17d-l(c) be amended
to remove existing uncertainties and to clarify the ground rules under which affiliated
persons enter into service contracts with the investment company. SEC Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 8245, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,667 (Feb. 25, 1974). The proposed amendments would add new clause (ii) to para-
graph (c) to exclude service contracts from the definition of "joint enterprise" if they
meet certain conditions: (1) the service contract is written, approved, and renewed in the
manner required for investment advisory contracts by §§ 15(a) and 15(c); and (2) a
majority of the disinterested directors determine that (a) the contract is in the best
interest of the company and its shareholders, (b) the services to be performed are re-
quired for the operation of the company, (c) the affiliated person can provide services at
least equal in quality and nature to those provided by others offering the same or similar
services, and (d) the fees are fair and reasonable in light of the usual and customary
charges made by others for services of the same nature and quality. The proposed rule
is reproduced at 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 48,392.
145 An investment adviser to an investment company is specified by § 36(b) to have a
fiduciary duty "with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or payments of a
material nature, paid by such registered investment company . . . to such investment
adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser." Section 36(b)(4), however,
excludes from the fiduciary duty provisions in subsection (b) all "compensation or pay-
ments made in connection with transaction subject to Section 17 ...." Since, we believe,
separate contracts for administrative services are subject to § 17(d), they could not be
attacked directly under § 36(b). Payments incident to such contracts should nevertheless
be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of overall management consid-
eration in the context of § 36(b). Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13,754 & H.R. 14,
737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
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can be presumed to preclude true arm's-length negotiation of
the contracts. We therefore recommend several amendments to
clarify the regulatory scheme.
(i) "Investment Company Manager": Recommended Changes
in Sections 2, 15, and 36
Section 2 should be amended by adding a new paragraph
defining "investment company manager" as any person who is
an affiliated person (or an affiliate of such affiliated person)
146
of a registered investment company and who engages on behalf
of such registered investment company to perform as its transfer
agent (as defined in section 3(a)(25) of the Securities Exchange
Act147 ), to keep, prepare, or file such accounts, books, records,
or other documents as the investment company may be required
to keep under the Investment Company Act 148 or state law, or to
provide any similar services with respect to the daily administra-
tion or management of the investment company. But "invest-
ment company manager" would not include the investment
company's investment adviser.
149
The investment company manager should also be brought
Commerce, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 177-78 (1969) (testimony of SEC Chairman
Hamer Budge) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]. Section 36(b), however, applies only
to the investment company's investment adviser and the adviser's affiliates. Itdoes not
apply to the investment company's principal underwriter and its affiliates, or to other
affiliated persons of the investment company, if they do not otherwise have a fiduciary
duty with respect to such compensation or payments.
146 The need for review by the disinterested directors (or the Commission) occurs
only where there is a presumptive lack of arm's-length bargaining with the person con-
tracting to provide administrative services. Thus, it would be inappropriate to change the
Investment Company Act definitions of interested person and affiliated person to in-
clude expressly within their scope all persons who carry out the functions of an invest-
ment company manager; rather, affiliation tests should be built into the definition of
ihvestment company manager to make the definition applicable only where that person is
also an affiliated person (or an affiliated person of an affiliated person) of the investment
company.
147 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(25) (Supp., Aug. 1975).
14 8E.g., rules adopted pursuant to §§ 30 (periodic and other reports) and 31 (ac-
counts and records), 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30a-1 to a-3, 30bl-1 to bl-2, 30b2-1, 30d-i to d-2,
30f-1, 31a-1 to a-3 (1975).
149 This definition should exclude only an investment company's investment adviser
and not the principal underwriter or other affiliated persons of an investment company.
The adviser, but not the others, is already subject to the review and fiduciary duty
provisions of §§ 15(a) and 36(b). If an investment company's principal underwriter also
wishes to be an investment company manager (directly or through an affiliated person)
for the same investment company, it should be included within the definition, and thus
be subject expressly to §§ 15, 17(a), 17(b), and 36(a) as to its arrangements for providing
those services.
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under the strict regulation of sections 15(c)150 and 36(a)(1).151 To
that end, those two paragraphs should be amended by
adding to the list of persons subject to their requirements the
new term "investment company manager."
(ii) Selling Services: Recommended Changes in Sections 17(a)
and 17(b)
In view of the clear potential for overreaching, and in view
of section 17's intended purpose, it would be appropriate to
amend section 17(a) by adding a new paragraph (4) prohibiting
any affiliated person (and any affiliate of an affiliate) acting as
principal, from knowingly selling any services to the affiliated
registered investment company or any company controlled by
such registered company, except services which are described in
section 17(e)152 or are subject to section 15(c).1 53 To avoid forc-
ing affiliated persons to file (and the Commission to process).
applications for exemptive orders under section 17(b) for the
I50 It could be argued, as the Commission did in proposing amendments to Rule
17d-I(c), see note 144 supra, that a contractual arrangement with an investment company
manager should be subject to § 15(a), as well as § 15(c). Although it would be desirable to
have § 15(a)(1) apply (and thus require a contract for services to describe precisely all
compensation to be paid thereunder), §§ 15(a)(2), (3), and (4) do not mesh as well with a
contract for administrative services. For example, many service contracts, such as transfer
agency agreements, are amended frequently and may require voting by the board of
directors or investment company shareholders more frequently than annually. Thus, the
cost of formal review would probably not be commensurate with the investor protections
provided. Subsection (c), on the other hand, would not appear to involve any undue
burdens and would require the contract with an investment company manager to be
approved by the disinterested directors of the investment company.
I" Section 36(a)(1) authorizes the Commission to bring an action for breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct, and obviously should be applicable to an
investment company manager. If the investment company manager is an affiliated per-
son of the investment adviser, § 36(b) as presently written would also be applicable, see
note 145 supra, and appropriately so.
152 For a discussion of § 17(e), see note 44 supra & accompanying text.
153 In view of the proposed addition of § 17(a)(4) and of a proviso to § 17(b), see
notes 154-55 infra & accompanying text, § 17(c) would be confusing and probably super-
fluous. It should be deleted. Section 17(c) excepts from the prohibitions of § 17(a) any
person who, in the ordinary course of business, sells to or purchases from the investment
company merchandise or who enters into a lessor-lessee relationship and furnishes ser-
vices incident thereto. Historically, virtually all situations involving § 17(c) have involved
lease arrangements between the investment company and its affiliated persons. Solo,
Bergman, Padova & Albert (SEC staff letter, Feb. 28, 1974) (concerning Capital Corp. of
America); Creative Capital Corp. (SEC staff letter, April 24, 1974). One unresolved
interpretive problem, however, has been in whose ordinary course of business the trans-
action must be. In any event, all matters presently covered by § 17(c) would clearly fall
within § 17(a)(3) and new § 17(a)(4) and thus be governed by the recommended proviso
to § 17(b). The recommended proviso to § 17(b), moreover, should be much more
workable than the relatively vague language of § 17(c).
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sale of routine services, a proviso should be added to section 17
(b). Under the proviso, an application would not have to be filed
where a majority of the disinterested directors154 determines
that: (1) the service is in the best interest of the investment com-
pany and its shareholders, and is required for the daily ad-
ministration or management of the investment company; (2)
such affiliated person can provide the service in a manner at
least equal in nature and quality to that which can be provided
by others who offer the same or a similar service; and (3) the fee
for the service is fair and reasonable in light of the usual and
customary charges made by others for a service of the same
nature and quality.'
55
Section 17(b) should also be amended to require the invest-
ment company to submit a quarterly report, perhaps as an
amendment to Form N-1Q, regarding each contract executed
pursuant to sections 17(a)(4) and 17(b), as revised.
b. Oversight in Sections 1 7(a) and 17(b)
If streamlining the oversight of purchases of routine ser-
vices makes sense, could a similar approach be taken in all trans-
actions subject to section 17(a)? What are the alternatives to the
requirement of a formal application requesting a section 17(b)
exemptive order?
(i) The Oil and Gas Investment Act 56
One scheme for handling conflicts of interest, analogous to
our proposed modification of section 17(b) of the Investment
Company Act, is section 18 of the Oil and Gas Investment Act of
154 Interaction of the definitions of affiliated person and interested person should
assure that the directors voting on the investment company manager's contract are totally
disinterested at least in the statutory sense. See notes 123-27 supra & accompanying text.
155 Our recommended proviso to § 17(b) closely resembles the Commission's pro-
posed amendments to rule 17d-1(c). See note 144 supra. We believe that many of the
problems that the comment letters raised about the amendments have been resolved in a
manner responsive to the comments.
Further, because of the special nature of the finding that disinterested directors
would have to make under § 17(b) with respect to services subject to § 17(a)(4), it would
not appear necessary to provide special fiduciary duty provisions, such as those discussed
with regard to §§ 17(b) and 17(d) generally. See text accompanying notes 169 & 201 infra.
156 Oil and Gas Investment Act of 1972, H.R. 17082, S. 3884, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). Oil and Gas Investment Act of 1973, H.R. 6821, S. 1050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
Beginning in 1966, the Commission sought to remove the § 3(c)(9) exclusion from
the definition of investment company for persons "substantially all of whose business
consists of owning or holding oil, gas, or other mineral royalties or leases .... " PUBLIc
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1972 (Oil and Gas Bill). 157 Section 18, as proposed by the Com-
mission, contains ten subsections that roughly parallel, in terms
of coverage of conflicts of interest, their counterparts in section
17 of the Investment Company Act. Section 18(a)(1) would pro-
hibit any manager, promoter, or principal underwriter of a reg-
istered oil program, 158 or any affiliated persons of such persons,
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 329. In the Commission's draft of the mutual fund
legislation, the exclusion in § 3(c)(9) would have been narrowed by making it unavailable
where the oil and gas program issued redeemable securities, face-amount certificates, or
periodic payment plan certificates. S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(5) (1967); S. 3724,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b)(5) (1968); S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 36,(1968).
This provision was deleted by a floor amendment prior to Senate passage of S. 3724,
which died when the House took no action.
In the 91st Congress, the oil and gas provision was again included in the mutual
fund legislation. This time the amendment to § 3(c)(9) would not have become effective
until 18 months after passage of the bill so that the Commission and the oil and gas
industry could work out a scheme for regulation through use of the Commission's ex-
emptive authority in § 6(c). S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(5) (1969); 115 CONG. REC.
13694-97 (1969) (Senate floor debate on S. 2224). The Senate again passed the mutual
fund legislation. Testimony by oil and gas industry witnesses in the House suggested that
no scheme of exemptive rules under the Investment Company Act would accommodate
the industry's operating structure, which was tailored to receive favorable treatment
under the Internal Revenue Code. In its House testimony the Commission offered a com-
promise that would have placed limitations on sales to unsophisticated investors of
limited means. 1969 Hearings, supra note 145, pt. 1, at 180, pt. 2, at 873-74 (remarks of
SEC Chairman Budge); H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970). Ulti-
mately, however, the Conference Committee decided to drop the oil and gas provision
passed by the Senate. The decision followed an agreement between the Commission and
the Oil Investment Institute, a newly formed trade association of oil and gas program
managers and sponsors, to cooperate in the drafting of a statute that would parallel some
provisions of the Investment Company Act. The bill, however, would be especially tai-
lored to the practices, problems, and operating methods of the oil and gas industry,
thereby producing "a reasonable regulatory statute consistent with the need for protec-
tion of investors in this area." INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970, H.R.
REP. No. 1631, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. 27 (1970).
1M7 For purposes of convenience, all references to sections and provisions in the Oil
and Gas Bill will be to the draft bill sent to Congress by the Commission. H.R. 17082, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), introduced by Representative Staggers, is generally the same as
the Commission's draft, although sections are numbered in the 100's. For contem-
poraneous discussions of the Oil and Gas Bill, see Address by SEC Commissioner Owens,
Independent Petroleum Association of America, Dallas, Texas, Oct. 16, 1972; Address by
SEC Chairman Casey, Colorado Bar Association, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Oct. 13,
1972; Address by SEC Chairman Casey, Texas Bar Association, Houston, Texas, July 6,
1972, discussed in Casey Says SEC Will Not Accept Stock Phrases or Boiler Plates for Disclosure,
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 160, at A-3 (July 12, 1972). Cf. Berner & Scoggins, Oil and
Gas Drilling Programs-Structure and Regulation, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 471 (1973) (dis-
cussion of the Oil and Gas Bill is in large part about staff drafts preliminary to the bill
approved by the Commission and sent to Congress as S. 3884).
158 These terms are defined in §§ 2(a)(19) ("manager"), 2(a)(30) ("promoter"),
2(a)(26) ("principal underwriter"), and 3(a)(3) ("oil program") of the Oil and Gas Bill.
The definitions parallel those of analogous terms under the Investment Company Act.
To avoid unnecessary citation, reference will be made to a definition of a term in the Oil
and Gas Bill only when the definition differs materially from its expectable meaning.
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from selling property to or purchasing property from the oil
program unless certain conditions are met: (1) a sale must be
made at cost or fair market value, whichever is less; and (2) a
purchase must be made at fair market value or cost, whichever is
more. Section 18(a)(2) would require the oil program to file with
the Commission, and transmit to its participants, an annual re-
port of all transactions executed under subsection (a)(1).
Section 18(g)(1) would permit the manager or principal un-
derwriter (or any affiliated person of such persons) of a regis-
tered oil program to render services or to sell or lease equipment
and supplies to the oil program, if. (1) the person is engaged,
independently of the oil program and as an ongoing business, in
rendering services or selling or leasing equipment and supplies
to unaffiliated persons; (2) the services, equipment, and supplies
are necessary in the ordinary course of the oil program's busi-
ness; and (3) the compensation for the services, equipment, and
supplies is competitive with prices charged by others engaged in
these businesses. If the manager or principal underwriter is not
otherwise engaged in those businesses, compensation for the
services, equipment, and supplies must be at cost or competitive
price, whichever is less, or at a price established by competitive
bidding. Like section 18(a)(2), section 18(g)(2) would require the
oil program to file with the Commissidn, and transmit to its
participants, an annual report of all services, equipment, and
supplies purchased under the provisions of subsection (g)(1), in-
cluding data from which competitive prices could be deter-
mined.
Finally, section 22, combining elements of section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act and of rule 1Ob-5,1 59 would prohibit
any oil program, its manager (or any affiliated person of the
manager) from engaging directly or indirectly in any fraudulent
activities with respect to any investor or prospective investor in
the oil program, and would authorize the Commission to define
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent the
fraudulent activities. 160 The Oil and Gas Bill contains no provi-
sions parallel to sections 17(b), 17(d), 36(a), or 36(b) of the In-
159 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
160 In the Investment Company Act only § 17(j) contains antifraud provisions, see
note 26 supra, but an investment adviser to an investment company would 6e subject to
§ 206 of the Investment Advisers Act and, of course, all persons are within the ambit of
rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
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vestment Company Act; 161 nor does it provide any review-and-
approval procedure comparable to that found in section 15(c).1
6 2
(ii) Comparison of Oil and Gas Bill Provisions with Recom-
mended Proviso to Section 17(b)
The essential test of transactions prohibited by section 17(a),
contained in section 17(b)(1), is that the proposed transaction
must be fair and reasonable and must not involve overreaching
on the part of any person concerned. Sections 18(a)(1)(A) and
(B) would provide detailed but somewhat arbitrary guidelines in
determining what is a fair and reasonable price for property
purchased from or sold to an oil program. These paragraphs
require that the price in such transactions be cost or fair market
value, whichever would be of greater benefit to the oil program.
It is possible, of course, that a fair and reasonable price for a
particular transaction would be different from cost or fair mar-
ket value, 63 but the bill would trade economic accuracy for
timeliness, simplicity, and certainty. The price for a specific
161 Provisions which specifically set forth a fiduciary duty may not be necessary if
fiduciary duties may be imputed from general antifraud provisions. See SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (investment adviser is a fiduciary and
must expose all conflicts of interest that would cause him to render advice which is not
disinterested); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
162 Most oil programs that would be subject to the Oil and Gas Bill are organized as
limited partnerships. The corporate structure, with directors having oversight functions,
makes § 15(c) practicable for investment companies. With limited partnerships, whether
one focuses on the limited partners or general partners, § 15 would be difficult to apply.
Limited partners who take on management functions would lose their limited liability;
persons appointed as general partners merely to serve as disinterested overseers would
nevertheless be subject to general liability. Neither alternative is commercially tolerable.
If the general partners are organized as a corporation, it would be theoretically possible
to require that disinterested directors be appointed to serve on the board of the corpo-
rate general partner. In some states, though, a corporation cannot be a general partner
of a limited partnership. In any event, such an arrangement raises serious questions
about the status of the limited partnership for federal income tax purposes, putting at
risk the tax shelter's "flow-through" treatment of its income and deductions. See generally
R. HAFr, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS (1973); P. REID & G. SIMMONS, CORPORATE AND
EXECUTIVE TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS (1972). Thus, § 18 of the Oil and Gas Bill had
to provide objective conditions for execution of transactions involving potential over-
reaching or require that prior Commission approval be obtained for all transactions in-
volving potential overreaching.
'63 For example, it is not unusual in the oil and gas industry for the sponsor or
manager of an oil program to purchase property in its own name and then immediately
resell the property at a mark-up to the oil program. Sections 18(a)(1)(A) and (B) deal
directly with that practice. If, however, the sponsor or manager held the property for
some time before attempting to resell to the oil program, it would be possible for the fair
market value of the property greatly to exceed the sponsor or manager's cost.
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transaction could be readily determined; the transaction
promptly executed. For routine transactions, an affiliated person
wishing to deal with an oil program might well determine that
the arbitrary scheme of sections 18(a)(1)(A) and (B) provides a
reasonable quid pro quo. An affiliated person might not reach the
same conclusion in the context of complicated transactions in
which cost and fair market value of the property are widely
disparate.
164
Section 17(b) of the Investment Company Act, on the other
hand, forces all transactions covered by section 17(a), regardless
of size or importance, into a cumbersome application procedure,
preventing timely execution and, in some cases, entirely preclud-
ing consummation of the proposed transaction. An affiliated
person of an investment company, then, should usually be un-
willing to deal as a principal with the investment company
when a proposed transaction is large, complicated, pressing, and
subject to differing opinions as to a fair and reasonable price. 165
To offer services under section 18(g)(1)(D). of the Oil and
Gas Bill, an affiliated person would have to be in the business of
offering the services to unrelated third parties outside the scope
of the program and would have to charge cost or a competitive
price, whichever is less. Thus, an affiliate with shallow pockets
and an abiding interest in keeping all aspects of his oil program
to himself would have little incentive to develop an integrated
line of services, vertically or horizontally. An affiliate who is
164 That an affiliated person would never take transactions to the oil program when
he stands to suffer large adverse economic consequences does not end the analysis. If
such a transaction would otherwise be in the best interests of the oil program, the
affiliated person would then be acting in a manner quite disadvantageous to the pro-
gram. He might then be violating fiduciary duty under state law to deal fairly and
honestly with the oil program. See W. GARY, GASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
550-697 (4th ed. unabridged 1969). A less arbitrary method of determining fair and
reasonable prices might encourage him to fulfill his duties and not to divert oppor-
tunities from the oil program.
15 The result of § 17(b)'s cumbrousness is the opposite of the result of § 18(a)(1):
When the stakes are lowest and the likelihood of overreaching is in fact the least, an
affiliated person is effectively prohibited from dealing with the investment company. In
most low-stake, fair and reasonable transactions, an affiliated person would receive no
significant special economic reward for dealing with the investment company rather than
an unrelated third party. In fact, the person would be penalized by the expense of a
§ 17(b) application. An affiliated person behaving as a rational economic man would take
a proposed transaction to the investment company, rather than to an unrelated third
party, only if he believed the transaction would produce incremental economic rewards
above those that would be fair and reasonable. Of course, people do not always behave as
rational economic men; and undoubtedly affiliated persons might choose to deal with
the investment company for reasons ranging from altruism to personal greed.
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otherwise already engaged in offering the same services to unre-
lated third parties could charge a competitive price, no matter
how favorable his economies of scale and how large his incre-
mental profit in providing that particular service to the oil pro-
gram. Again, section 18(g)(1) would sacrifice a refined test of
fair and reasonable compensation for services in return for
timeliness, simplicity, and certainty.
Section 17(a), as amended by proposed paragraph (4), and
section 17(b), as amended by the recommended proviso, would
provide a more finely tuned approach than section 18(g)(1) to
the problems of fairness and overreaching: The revised sections
would permit a contract for services to be executed without re-
ceiving prior approval from the Commission only if, among
other conditions, the disinterested directors of the investment
company are prepared to find the contract fair and reasonable
in the light of their fiduciary duties to the investment company
under section 36(a)(1).
(iii) Recommendations
166
A more delicate balance of timeliness, simplicity, and cer-
tainty on the one hand, and fairness and lack of overreaching on
the other, might be reached for securities and property transac-
tions under section 17(b) by affirming certain aspects of the ex-
isting pattern requiring prior Commission approval and by
adopting to a certain extent an arbitrary pattern analogous to
that provided in the Oil and Gas Bill. We would, of course, leave
intact the earlier recommended proviso to section 17(b) for ser-
vice transactions subject to new section 17(a)(4). As we noted
with respect to section 3(a)(3), this is a complex area and it is not
possible to foresee accurately all implications of each suggested
change. The changes we recommend here, and with regard to
section 17(d), must thus be viewed as tentative proposals.
We propose consideration of a three-tier pattern under sec-
tion 17(b) for securities and property transactions described in
sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3).
The first tier would except from the application require-
ment of section 17(b) those proposed transactions with affiliated
persons involving less than a statutorily specified de minimis
166 For this purpose, we will assume that § 17(d) would not apply to any transaction
for services between an affiliated person and the investment company, a proposition with
which we disagree. See note 144 supra. We would, however, amend § 17(d) to preclude its
applicability where § 17(a) is also applicable. See text accompanying notes 204-05 infra.
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amount (measured as against the affiliated person) and which
are arbitrarily priced at cost or fair market value, whichever is in
the investment company's best interest.
167
The second tier would consist of proposed transactions
which the disinterested directors 168 of the investment company
are willing to find fair and reasonable, subject of course to the
fiduciary duty provisions of section 36(a)(1).169
Some might suggest that placing these additional respon-
sibilities on the disinterested directors is self-deluding.1 70 We
would argue, however, that the thrust of much of the Com-
mission's present enforcement program is to place greater em-
phasis on the men on the spot, making them the first level of
review for compliance with the federal securities laws. 17 ' We
would further note that the Investment Company Amendments
Act of 1970, itself the product of lengthy Commission study, also
placed great emphasis on the integrity and competence of the
disinterested directors. 7 2 Recent events have provided en-
167 The fact that the first tier is arbitrary with respect to price would not, of course,
permit the affiliated person to sell undesirable securities or property to the investment
company. In our view, an investment adviser (who generally would be the person dealing
with the affiliated person) would breach its fiduciary duties to the investment company if
it accepted securities or other property that did not conform to the investment company's
investment policy or that were otherwise unacceptable or undesirable.
168 One would expect, of course, that a director who is disinterested in the statutory
sense, but is interested in fact in the particular transaction, would disqualify himself from
consideration of and voting on that transaction.
169 One would expect the second tier to be used by an affiliated person to achieve
prompt action where the disinterested directors could easily find the terms of the pro-
posed transaction to be fair and reasonable; by the same token, the disinterested direc-
tors would presumably take very seriously their fiduciary duties and should drive very
hard bargains. Thus, an affiliated person may be willing to forgo the promptness of the
second-tier procedure voluntarily in return for a slower Commission review of a pro-
posed transaction in order to take the calculated risk that the Commission may allow him
a "fairer" profit on the transaction than would the disinterested directors. A three-tier
system should reduce the number of applications for exemptive orders, leaving for
review only those situations in which direct Commission involvement is necessary and
appropriate for the protection of investors.
1 See, e.g., Management Fee, supra note 19, at 739 (remarks of Abraham L. Pomer-
antz): "Who picks the unaffiliated directors? The affiliated men pick the unaffiliaed
men. The men who need to be watched pick the watchdogs to watch them."
171 See, e.g., Address by SEC Commissioner Sommer, First National Conference on
Current SEC Developments, AICPA, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 79,620 (Jan. 1974); Address by SEC Commissioner Sommer, Section on Banking,
Corporation, and Business Law, New York State Bar Association, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,631 (Jan. 24, 1974); American Bar Ass'n National
Institute, Proceedings: Advisors to Management: Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and
Accountants, 30 Bus. LAw. 1 (Special issue, March 1975); SEC v. Stirling Homex, SEC
Litigation Release No. 6960, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,218 (July 2, 1975)
(release and consent order concerning Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.).
112 See notes 22, 26, 38 & 43 supra.
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couraging evidence that investment company directors can and
will exercise their responsibilities in the manner contemplated.
73
Finally, we would expect disinterested directors to follow proce-
dures similar to those used in section 15(c) to obtain detailed
information, to have the information reviewed by independent
financial analysts and independent legal counsel, and otherwise
to create a formal record carefully documenting the facts and
reasons that persuaded them that the proposed transaction was
fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the investment
company. If our recommendations are adopted, the Commission
could be expected to publish rules or guidelines providing fac-
tors for disinterested directors to consider in reviewing proposed
transactions.
The investment company would be required to file a quar-
terly report 174 detailing the transactions consummated under the
first and second tiers, as would be required under section
18(a)(2) of the Oil and Gas Bill.
On the third tier would be proposed transactions which fall
within a zone of reasonableness but which the disinterested di-
rectors are unable or unwilling to find to be fair under the sec-
ond tier procedures. Here the traditional application procedure
contemplated by section 17(b) would operate, culminating in a
formal Commission order finding fairness and a lack of over-
reaching on the part of any person involved.
75
In our view, this three-tier system would force the affiliated
person (at the first tier) or the disinterested directors (at the
173 Compare Ivy Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8687, 6 SEC
DOCKET 360 (Feb. 25, 1975) (exemptive order permitting appointment of interim invest-
ment adviser after the investment company's board of directors terminated its
agreement with the prior investment adviser), with Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 802 (1972) (sale of fiduciary office for profit
prohibited) and Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994
(1972) (advisers must present to disinterested directors the possibility of establishing a
broker-dealer affiliate for the purpose of recapturing brokerage commissions on behalf
of the mutual funds).
1'4 This information could easily be added to Form N-1Q.
15 The Commission has been criticized for reading this phrase, as it plainly can be
read, as a mandate for reviewing each proposed transaction from the standpoint of any
person involved in the proposed transaction, not just the investment company. See, e.g.,
Comment, supra note 39, at 992-93, 1003. Although we believe that Commission deci-
sions most often criticized-those involving Talley Industries and General Time Corpo-
ration, and Bowser, Inc.-were correct and justified in terms of the language presently in
§ 17(b)(1) and its legislative history, see id. 988-93; note 42 supra, the paragraph could
be rephrased in the interest of clarity to read "and do not involve overreaching of the in-
vestment company on the part of any person concerned."
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second tier) to weigh and balance competing interests in reason-
ably delineated situations, allowing business decisions to be made
expeditiously, with little cause for concern for unfairness to or
overreaching of an investment company. Quarterly reports
would permit indirect Commission oversight. Private rights of
action by investment company shareholders 7 6 would serve a
prophylactic function.
c. Section 17(d) Generally
Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act prohibits any
affiliated person (or any affiliated person of such person) acting
as principal, from effecting any transaction in which the regis-
tered investment company (or a company controlled by the reg-
istered investment company) is a joint, or a joint and several,
participant with the affiliated person in contravention of such
rules as the Commission may prescribe.177 Thus, while sections
17(a) and 17(b) are concerned with unfairness and overreaching
in transactions in which the investment company and its affiliate
are on opposite sides of the table, section 17(d) was intended to
regulate those situations in which the investment company and
its affiliate are on the same side of the table.'7 8 Nevertheless, it
176 It has long been settled that an investment company shareholder has a private
right of action, but recent cases have held that a target company lacks standing to
complain about an alleged lack of compliance by the offeror company with the registra-
tion and regulatory provisions of the Investment Company Act. See SEC v. General Time
Corp., 407 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969) (target company
lacks standing to complain of acquisition of its stock absent compliance with the prior
approval procedure of rule 17d-1); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,455 at 95,595 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (target company
lacks standing to seek relief for alleged violation of the registration and regulatory provi-
sions of the Investment Company Act). In our view, these cases evidence an unfortunate
trend predicated upon an unduly narrow reading of the policies underlying the Invest-
ment Company Act and are at variance with the general judicial trend of granting
standing to persons who have suffered injury. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). But cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
177 Rule 17d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1975). Paragraph (c) of rule 17d-1 defines the
phrase "joint enterprise or other joint arrangement or profit-sharing plan" and para-
graph (a) requires an application to be filed for each such "arrangement." Paragraph (b)
sets forth the standard for Commission approval of the application: that the registered
investment company's participation in the proposed transaction will not be "on a basis
different from or less advantageous than that of other participants." For a representative
sampling of the types of transactions that have been found to be within the ambit of
§ 17(d) and rule 17d-1,see 4 CCH FED. SEc. L. RPp. 48,399.
178 The initial Investment Company Act bills introduced in 1940, S. 3580 and H.R.
8935, included a § 17(a)(4) which prohibited joint transactions, although applications for
exemptive relief could have been filed under § 17(b). H.R. 8935, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d
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would be possible to amend section 17(d) along the lines of the
proposed amendments to section 17(b), thus obviating the need
for filing applications for routine transactions and defining more
Sess. §§ 17(a)(4), 17(b) (1940). In language very similar to present § 17(d), § 17(a)(4)
would have authorized the Commission to prescribe rules for the purpose of "(A) limit-
ing or preventing participation by such company on a basis different from or less advan-
tageous than that of such other participant, and (B) protecting the independent invest-
ment and managerial judgment of such company." The Senate hearings on S. 3580 are
replete with examples of self-dealing transactions of the type described in §§ 17(a)(1) to
(a)(3), but not § 17(a)(4). Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 256-65 (1940) (remarks of Mr.
Schenker) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. S. 4108 and H.R. 10065, substitutes for
S. 3580 and H.R. 8935, were introduced subsequent to the hearings on S. 3580 after five
weeks of negotiation between representatives of the investment company industry and
the Commission. H.R. 10065, S. 4108, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); S. REP. No. 1775,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1940). The substitute bills contained the present § 17(d), but the
legislative history of the reason for the change from § 17(a)(4) to present § 17(d) is
limited to Mr. Schenker's recitation of the broad purposes of § 17. Senate Hearings, supra,
pt. 4, at 1116 (remarks of Mr. Schenker). For contemporaneous discussions of § 17 which
also focus on the anti-self-dealing provisions, see Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of
1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303, 317-19, 321 (1941); Thomas, The Investment Company Act of
1940, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 918, 937 (1941); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41
COLUM. L. REv. 269, 288-89 (1941); Federal Legislation, The Investment Company Act of
1940, 29 GEO. L.J. 614, 623-24 (1941); Note, Regulation of Investment Companies, 88 U. PA.
L. REv. 584, 592, 606 (1940); Comment, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J.
440, 449 (1941).
The legislative history of § 17(d) does, however, offer some possible insights. First,
the draftsmen clearly had two concerns: (1) the price at which an investment company
would participate in a joint transaction and (2) the independence of judgment to be
exercised where an investment company was dealing with one of its affiliated persons.
Second, the draftsmen recognized that with joint transactions, unlike other self-dealing
transactions, the problem was not only one of overreaching or unfairness, but one bot-
tomed on the special access enjoyed by affiliates. Third, despite an enormous study of
investment companies and the many grossly abusive transactions perpetrated upon them
during the 1930's, the draftsmen were unwilling to define precisely the types of joint
transactions which concerned them-rather, they chose to leave the whole problem to
Commisson rulemaking. And, finally, removal of the paragraph prohibiting joint transac-
tions from § 17(a) to a separate subsection suggests that the review standards of § 17(b)
might not have been considered entirely appropriate for § 17(d)-type transactions; re-
moval, however, need not be construed as implying that the application procedure of
§ 17(b) was itself considered inappropriate.
Indeed, the initial rule adopted under § 17(d) by the Commission in 1946 also
provided for applications to be filed in all circumstances, although the application was to
become effective the tenth day after filing unless the Commission issued a notice order-
ing a public hearing on the application. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 858
(Feb. 8, 1946). For subsequent amendments to rule 17d-1, see SEC Investment Com-
pany Act Release Nos. 1060 (May 23, 1947); 1598 (Mar. 20, 1951); 2472, [1957-1961
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,501 (Jan. 10, 1957);,3361, [1961-
1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 76,806 (Nov. 17, 1961); 6154
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,847 (Aug. 10, 1970); & 8542
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,982 (Oct. 15, 1974). The
amendments generally have refined the rule to follow more closely the language of
§ 17(d), or have excepted from the rule certain classes of transactions. See text accom-
panying notes 182-86 infra.
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precisely the types of persons and transactions subject to the
requirements of the section.
(i) The Exceptions Under Rule 17d-1
Paragraph (d) of rule 17d-1179 provides that an application
need not be filed respecting proposed joint transactions under
five circumstances. First, a profit-sharing, stock option, or stock
purchase plan of a controlled company of an investment com-
pany is not required to file an application if no individual par-
ticipant in the plan is an affiliate of the investment company, its
investment adviser or principal underwriter, and if no partici-
pant has been such an affiliated person during the life of the
plan and for six months prior thereto. Second, a pension plan
for the registered investment company or any controlled com-
panies and their employees which is qualified under section 401
of the Internal Revenue Code' 80 need not file an application.
Third, any arrangement regarding credit or securities between
a bank and an SBIC 181 where the bank is an affiliate of the
SBIC, will not require prior approval from the Commission;
182
nor, fourth, will issuance of stock options qualified under sec-
tion 422 of the Internal Revenue Code.' 83 Finally,184 subsection
(d)(5) of rule 17d-1 permits joint transactions between a regis-
tered investment company, or a controlled company, and an af-
filiate of the investment company without obtaining prior
Commission approval where: (1) certain key persons of the in-
vestment company do not also have a financial interest 185 in the
joint transaction; and (2) neither the investment company nor
179 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(d) (1975).
180 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
I'l SBICs are those investment companies licensed under the Small Business Invest-
ment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 662 (1970), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 662 (Supp. III, 1973);
see text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
182 The SBIC is, however, required to file reports with the Commission containing
pertinent details. Rule 17d-2, Form N-17D-1, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17d-2, 274.200 (1975).
183 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422.
184 The Commission has proposed another paragraph (d) (4), which would permit
affiliated persons of a registered investment company to combine purchase or sale orders
with those of the investment company for the sole purpose of achieving best overall
execution, but it has not been adopted. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7035,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,608 (Mar. 9, 1972). The
industry, however, has been "bunching" the transactions of investment companies in a
complex of funds under a no-action position issued in late 1971. Ropes & Gray (SEC staff
letter, Dec. 10, 1971) (concerning undisclosed client).
185 "Financial interest" for the purposes of paragraph (d)(5) is defined not to include,
inter alia: "(a) any interest through ownership of securities issued by the registered in-
vestment company; . . . (c) usual and ordinary fees for services as a director; . . . (e) an
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a controlled company commits in excess of five percent of its
assets to the joint transaction.
(ii) The Oil and Gas Bill
Sections 18(b) and 18(c) of the Oil and Gas Bill18 6 were
designed to protect oil program participants from overreaching
by managers and sponsors of an oil program through their op-
portunity to manipulate properties and drill for their own ben-
efit on property contiguous to the oil program's property or on
any prospect in which the oil program also has an interest. Sec-
tion 18(d) 87 provided that, for purposes of sections 18(a)18 8 and
18(c), 189 a manager or controlling person of an oil program shall
not be deemed to own an oil or gas interest or to drill for its own
account: (1) solely by reason of its participation or interest in a
registered oil program, or (2) where the manager or controlling
person retains the same proportionate interest in all properties
in which the oil program owns an interest and the manager or
controlling person is obligated to participate with such programs
in the exploration and development of the property on a cost
basis proportionate to its retained interests in such properties.
Thus, where an oil program and its manager or controlling per-
son would participate jointly in the development of particular
properties the effect of sections 18(d)(1) and (d)(2) would have
been to provide a precise but arbitrary determination of fairness
by limiting the manager to no more than its proportionate share
as measured by its cost basis in the retained interests.' 90
(iii) Comparison of Oil and Gas Bill Provisions with Rule 17d-1
Section 18(d) of the Oil and Gas Bill provides a precise,
albeit arbitrary, guideline of fairness in transactions where an
interest of an insurance company arising from a loan or policy issued ... to a natural
person ...." 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(d)(5)(iii) (1975).
186 H.R. 17082, S. 3884, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 18(b), (c) (1972); see note 156 supra.
187 Id. § 18(d).
188 Id. § 18(a).
1
89
Id. § 18(c).
190 Because § 18(b) really provided an exception from the "for his own account"
treatment of a manager or controlling person of an oil program, persons not complying
with subparagraphs (1) or (2) of § 18(d) would be thrown back on the provisions of § 18
generally, thereby limiting compensation in the manner described above. See text accom-
panying notes 156-62 supra.
Also since a manager or controlling person would not be likely to have a cost basis
lower than the oil program's because the property transferred to the oil program subject
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affiliate and the oil program are participating in a joint transac-
tion. An affiliate can buy an interest in an ongoing oil program,
but only on the same terms as a public investor.' 91 This is
roughly parallel to the requirement in section 17(d) of the In-
vestment Company Act and rule 17d-l(b) 192 that an investment
company not participate in a joint transaction with an affiliated
person respecting the same security "on a basis different from or
less advantageous than that of any other participants," although
an affiliated person of an investment company would still have
to get prior Commission approval. 93 An affiliate of an oil pro-
gram should, then, be willing to purchase an interest in an ongo-
ing oil program only if the oil program otherwise appeared to be
a wise investment, since he would be denied any advantage de-
riving from his special relationship. An affiliate of an investment
company, on the other hand, should be willing to purchase se-
curities that are also being purchased by the investment com-
pany only if the expected performance of the security appeared
to be exceptional, because he would have the burden of filing an
application seeking prior approval from the Commission in addi-
tion to his being denied any advantage deriving from his special
relationship with the investment company.' 94
to the retained interests would have been subject to § 18(a), the inhibiting effect of
§ 18(d) would parallel that of § 18(a). See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra.
191 Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act could also mandate a similar result
if the affiliated person were purchasing shares issued by the investment company (rather
than shares of another company which the investment company was also purchasing or
selling), although subsection (h) of rule 22d- 1 permits certain affiliated persons of an
investment company to purchase shares in the investment company at less than the full
sales load otherwise described in the investment company's prospectus. 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.22d-l(h) (1975).
192 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(b) (1975).
193 Rule 17d-l(d)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(d)(5) (1975), might be available to this
type of transaction, thereby removing the need for an application, if the affiliated per-
son were not also an officer, director, employee, investment adviser or controlling per-
son of the investment company. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
194 It can be argued that the affiliated person still derives an advantage from his
special access to the investment company's investment plans because, in a market where
the investment company's purchases or sales influenced the direction or amplitude of the
market for the security that is bought or sold (perhaps due to a thin "float" or an
imbalance in institutional trading in the security), the affiliate can take advantage of the
investment company's clout in the marketplace to obtain a more favorable price. Assum-
ing for the sake of argument the existence of such clout and its consequential effect on
the market price of the security, it is nevertheless difficult to place much weight on this
phenomenon because any unrelated third party who was in the market at the same point
in time would also benefit from the investment company's influence on the market
pricing mechanism. The difference, of course, between the unrelated third party and the
affiliated person with special access would be the lack of inadvertence in the affiliate's
behavior, traceable to his special access. From the standpoint of the investment company,
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With respect to jointly initiated joint transactions, section
18(d) would limit an affiliate of an oil program to a participa-
tion in profits and expenses proportionate with the cost of the
affiliated person's investment in the property, but the affili-
ated person would have to retain an interest in 'all properties
transferred to the oil program. Such a total commitment by an
affiliate is not, however, required by section 17(d) or rule 17d-1.
Thus, an affiliated person of an oil program should be unwilling
to engage in jointly initiated joint transactions with the oil pro-
gram unless he is a passive investor by choice, willing to share all
entrepreneurial risks and rewards equally with the public par-
ticipants in the oil program. 195 Section 17(d) and rule 17d-1, by
contrast, would permit an affiliate to enter into a transaction
with the investment company which was jointly initiated, subject
roughly to the proportionality requirement of section 18(d) of
the Oil and Gas Bill, although the affiliated person would still
have to get prior Commission approval.196 An affiliate of an in-
vestment company, then, should be willing to purchase or sell
securities in a joint transaction with the investment company
only if the expected performance of the security appears to be
exceptional, because he would have to file an application with
the Commission seeking prior approval and would also be de-
nied any advantage deriving from his special relationship.' 97
however, there would be little, if any, discernible damage from the parasitic behavior of
its affiliate.
Because of the suggestive implications of "free-riding" by affiliates on an investment
company's investment decisionmaking, many investment companies have adopted codes
of ethics prohibiting such behavior. Proposed rule 17j- 1, discussed in the text accompany-
ing note 26 supra, would require all investment companies to adopt codes of ethics that
would prohibit affiliates of the investment company from reaping any advantage in the
marketplace gained from knowledge of its investment decisionmaking.
195 This arrangement may, however, be sound from the affiliate's standpoint if one's
analysis of the economic risks related to exploration and development of oil and gas
properties were that having public investors supply a large portion of the risk capital
balanced favorably in the affiliate's favor, as compared with sharing entrepreneurial
rewards which were infrequent but more than adequate when they occurred.
196 See note 193 supra.
197 As was discussed, note 194 supra, it can be argued that "free-riding" by an affiliate
is parasitic on the investment company's clout in the marketplace and thus public policy
should prohibit an affiliate from taking advantage of his special relationship. In a sense, a
jointly-initiated joint transaction may provide an opportunity for a bigger "free-ride"
than joining a transaction in midstream because the affiliate would not just be taking
advantage of his special access to gain knowledge of existing transactions but using his
special access to initiate entire transactions. Again, however, if the investment company
is shown especially attractive transactions by affiliates because the affiliates can "free-
ride," should public policy prevent or inhibit affiliates from bringing attractive transac-
tions to an investment company so long as the investment company is materially ad-
vantaged by the relationship?
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d. Recommended Changes to Section 17(d)
With respect to joint transactions between an affiliate and
the investment company involving securities or property, we be-
lieve that a more sensitive balance might be struck under section
17(d) by combining the existing pattern requiring prior Commis-
sion approval with a scheme of regulation analogous to that pro-
vided in the Oil and Gas Bill.
(i) Prior Approval Procedure
First, as was suggested with respect to section 17(b),'198 we
propose consideration of a three-tier pattern for transactions
within the scope of section 17(d). The first tier would except
from the application requirement of section 17(d) those pro-
posed joint transactions with affiliated persons that are below a
statutorily specified de minimis amount (measured as against the
affiliated person) and are arbitrarily priced at the same price the
investment company would obtain.199 The second tier would
consist of proposed transactions above the de minimis amount
which the disinterested directors200 of the investment company
are willing to agree to, subject of course to the fiduciary duty
provisions of section 36(a)(1) 20 1. As to transactions executed
under both the first and second tiers, the investment company
would be required to file a quarterly report detailing the con-
summated transactions, as it would under section 17(b).20 2 The
third tier, to be used when disinterested directors are unable or
1"' See text accompanying notes 166-76 supra.
199 As we noted with respect to § 17(b), see text accompanying note 167 supra, the
fact that the first tier would be arbitrary with respect to the price to be received by the
affiliated person would not permit the affiliated person to initiate or participate in joint
transactions respecting undesirable securities or property. In our view, an investment
adviser would breach its fiduciary duties to the investment company if it accepted pro-
posed transactions respecting securities or property which did not conform to the in-
vestment company's investment policy or otherwise were not acceptable or desirable. In
any event, a de minimis amount of "free-riding" should not influence an investment
adviser to take undue risks when the affiliated person stands to reap only a de minimis
profit. For an earlier unsuccessful attempt to revise rule 17d-1 along somewhat similar
lines, see SEC Investment Company Act Release Nos. 5128, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,477 (Oct. 13, 1967) (proposed amendments); 5874,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,758 (Nov. 7, 1969) (withdrawal
of proposed amendments).
200 See note 168 supra.
201 See notes 169-73 supra. Again, in most circumstances, special access should not
tempt independent directors to risk violation of their fiduciary duties, thereby suggesting
continued independence in decisionmaking as to the investment company's purchases
and sales.202 See note 174 & accompanying text supra.
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unwilling to agree to the proposed transaction under the second
tier procedures, would be the traditional application procedure
presently contemplated by section 17(d), culminating in a Com-
mission order. As we argued with regard to section 17(b), a three
tier system of this type would force the affiliated person (in first
tier deals) or the disinterested directors (in second tier deals) to
weigh and balance competing interests. Quarterly reports of
transactions executed under the first and second tiers would
permit indirect Commission oversight, as would subsequent re-
view by investment company shareholders. 20 3
(ii) Standard for Review
Second, we suggest a new standard for review of proposed
transactions within the scope of section 17(d). Under the present
standard, a proposed transaction arguably would be eligible for a
203 See note 176 supra. One alternative we have considered and rejected is a rule
10b-5 type of prohibition in lieu of the present provisions in rule 17d-1. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1975); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1975). Because one concern of§ 17(d) is with
special access by affiliates affecting independent judgment by an investment company,
there is some surface appeal to a rule 10b-5 type provision. However, 17(d) is also
concerned with the relative fairness of the proposed transaction, a concept generally
considered to be outside the scope of rule 1Ob-5. See generally Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d
714 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, it seems preferable to retain the direct prophylactic of prior
Commission approval, as modified above, rather than rely on specialized judicial review
on an ex post facto basis. The Commission recently utilized an approach that bears a
close resemblance to our recommendation when it published its proposal to adopt rule
6c-2 in response to problems of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act corporations. SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 8902, [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 80,271
(Aug. 22, 1975).
Similarly, we have considered and rejected the alternative of amending rule 17d-I to
include a long list of "transactions" clearly covered by § 17(d), with a catch-all purporting
to prohibit also any other joint transaction which is identified in rule 17d-1. One serious
problem with this suggestion is that whenever a new, innovative type of joint transaction
was proposed (or discerned by the Commission staff), it would take a minimum of six
months to crank up the necessary administrative procedure to add that "new" joint
transaction to the list in rule 17d-1. The author of the "new" joint transaction would
almost certainly argue that he had been singled out for punishment prior to an impartial
determination by the Commission on the merits-with all the protections of due
process-in the context of a formal application for an exemptive order. Unlike section
17(a), where most of the direct conflicts-of-interest between an affiliate and an invest-
ment company can easily be identified, there are limitless ways, as Judge Friendly noted
in the Talley case, of paralleling an investment company's activities to provide the affiliate
with a "free ride." SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969). Compare SEC v. Midwest Technical Develop. Corp.,
[1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,252 (D. Minn. 1963) (parallel
purchases of securities), with In the Matter of First Provident Co., SEC Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 6400 (March 4, 1971) (registration of public offering of portfolio
affiliates securities). Promulgating a list of "joint transactions" would exhaust the in-
genuity of regulators and provide little, if any, additional investor protection while at the
same time providing little additional comfort or guidance to affiliates.
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Commission exemptive order so long as the investment company
was participating in a manner not "different from or less advan-
tageous than that of other participants," even if all of the par-
ticipants on the investment company's side of the transaction
were participating on equally bad terms in a very undesirable
transaction.2 0 4 Thus, it would seem appropriate to revise the
section 17(d) standard for review to require a finding that the
terms of the proposed transaction are fair and reasonable and
that the investment company will be participating on a basis "not
less advantageous" than that of other participants.
(iii) Joint Applicability of Sections 17(a) and 17(d)
Third, it is possible that certain transactions may fall under
both sections 17(a) and 17(d), thereby requiring the Commission
to issue two exemptive orders for the same transaction. Because
section 17(b) is designed to deal with transactions presenting a
direct conflict of interest between an affiliate and the investment
company, thereby suggesting a potential question as to unfair-
ness and overreaching, it would be more appropriate for the
entire transaction to be judged under the standards of section
17(b). The determination as to the fairness of the entire trans-
action required by section 17(b) should satisfy any residual
concern regarding the basis for the investment company's par-
ticipation with respect to all the other participants on its side
of the table.
e. The Portfolio Affiliate Problem
20 5
Section 17 prohibits any affiliated person, promoter, or
principal underwriter of an investment company, or any af-
filiated person of such person from engaging in certain activ-
204 A literal reading of the present standard would disallow a proposed transaction
that was in any way "different," even if the proposed transaction appeared to be fair as to
the investment company. However, this anomaly has been mitigated by the Commission's
review of 17(d) applications. Exemptive orders have been issued where an investment
company participated in a proposed transaction on a basis different from other partici-
pants if the transaction otherwise appeared to be fair and reasonable. See, e.g., Israel
Development Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release Nos. 4169 (Feb. 19, 1965)
(notice of application), & 4202 (Mar. 29, 1965) (order).
205 The best discussions of the portfolio affiliate problem are Kroll, The "Portfolio
Affiliate" Problem, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 261 (R.
Mundheim & A. Fleischer, Jr. eds. 1972); Comment, The Application of Section 17 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 to Portfolio Affiliates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1972). See
also Dudley. Transactions with Affiliates, in MUTUAL FUNDS 357 (R. Mundheim & W.
Werner eds. 1970); Routier, Affiliated Person and Section 17, in MUTUAL FUNDS 369 (R.
Mundheim & W. Werner eds. 1970).
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ities. The definition of "affiliated person" in section 2(a)(3) is
broad.2 0 6 Swept within its ambit by clause (B) are non-investment
companies ("portfolio affiliates") five percent of whose outstand-
ing voting securities are owned by an investment company.
207
Taken literally then, section 17 prohibits activities between an
investment company and its portfolio affiliates and the portfolio
affiliates of such portfolio affiliates. For example, applica-
tions have been filed under section 17(b) regarding purchases
of a portfolio affiliate's own securities by the investment com-
pany,20 8 of a third company's securities, 20 9 and of property.
210
Applications have also been filed under rule 17d-1 21 regard-
ing a registered public offering of a portfolio affiliate's secu-
rities which involved the investment company,2 12 joint holding
of a third company's securities, 21 3 and joint acquisition of a third
company's securities.2 14 As one experienced securities lawyer has
quipped:
[T]he problems that can arise under the [Investment
Company] Act for such portfolio affiliates or companies
which, in turn, are affiliated with them should be of
interest not only to 1940 Act buffs, but to any lawyer
for an operating company the shares of which are the
object of the affections of any mutual funds. The topic
also should appeal to double-crostic fans.
21 5
The legislative history of section 17 concentrates 21 6 on self-
dealing by insiders-that is, by persons who control the invest-
ment company through stock ownership or through official posi-
206 See text accompanying notes 123-27 supra.
207 By virtue of section 17's coverage of affiliated persons of affiliated person,
§ 2(a)(3)(B) must be reapplied to each portfolio affiliate to determine whether the non-
investment company also has portfolio affiliates (second level portfolio affiliates).
208 E.g., Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6394
(Mar. 22, 1971); Scripps-Howard Investment Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 5175 (Nov. 27, 1967).
209 E.g., Great American Ins. Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4989
(June 13, 1967).
210 E.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
6526 (May 17, 1971) (patents and licenses).
211 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1975).
212 E.g., First Provident Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6400 (Mar.
23, 1971).
213 E.g., Wisconsin Securities Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5708
(June 12, 1969).
214 E.g., SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1015 (1969).
215 Kroll, supra note 205, at 262.
216 H.R. Doc. No. 136, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, ch. VII, at 2581-2720 (1941)
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tions as officers, directors, investment advisers, or principal
underwriters. Neither the Commission nor Congress addressed
itself to self-dealing by "downstream" affiliates.217 Although
the statutory language is quite clear, the portfolio affiliate prob-
lem does not appear to have been anticipated or intended.21
8
Moreover, as an economic matter it seems probable that, absent
some other relationship to an investment company, a portfolio
affiliate would exercise independent judgment in any dealings
with the investment company. A second-level portfolio affiliate is
(purchases and sales of portfolio securities; loans); SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N,
INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, ch. IV (1939) (problems in connection with shifts in control, mergers, and
consolidations); Senate Hearings, supra note 178, pt. 1, at 256-65, pt. 4, at 1116. See note
178 supra.2 17 Senate Hearings, supra note 178, pt. 1, at 256-57 (remarks of Mr. Schenker):
The only thing this section [17] says is that a person who is an officer, a
director, a manager, or underwriter, shall not as principal sell any property to
the investment trust. ...
So an affiliated person is nothing but an officer or director or any partner
of his in a firm in which he is a partner. Also no corporation which he controls
can sell any securities or property directly to the investment trust.
Senator Taft did raise several questions about affiliation based on § 2(a)(3)(B), but
David Schenker responded by reading the definition in the proposed bill and once again
characterized 5% ownership affiliation solely in the context of officers and directors:
Senator Taft: An affiliated person includes any person owning 5 percent or
more of the outstanding voting securities. That makes the definition of an
affiliated person, does it?
Mr. Schenker: That means an officer, director, any partner of his in a partner-
ship, and any company of which he is a 5-percent owner.
Senator Taft: Does it go beyond that? Does it go to an affiliated person of [a
portfolio affiliate of an officer of an investment company] or some other person
who owns 5 percent of that company's stock, and provide that he could not sell
either? Is it to the second degree?
Mr. Schenker: He [presumably the second degree affiliate] could [not] sell it. We
tried to get the situations where it would be to his [presumably the officer's, a
first degree affiliate] pecuniary interest to unload securities on the investment
trust. We figured that if he had a 5-percent interest in the company that is
selling the securities, then he has a sufficient interest to affect his judgment, and
therefore we say that he cannot sell.
Senate Hearings, supra note 178, at 260-61. However, Judge Friendly, in his opinion in
SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 339 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969),
did offer a theory as to why Congress might have intended to include-portfolio affiliates:
"[C]ongress could have thought that downstream affiliation also involved some danger
that the investment company's stockholders might be put upon for the benefit of other
stockholders of the affiliate." Id. at 403.
218 All problems regarding downstream affiliates discussed in the Senate Hearings
involved controlled downstream affiliates, whether control ran directly to the investment
company or existed indirectly through ownership by an officer or director of the invest-
ment company. Senate Hearings, supra note 178, pt. 1, at 257160.
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even less likely to be susceptible to any attempt by the investment
company to affect the independence of its decisionmaking.
21 9
Accordingly, we recommend that sections 17(a) and 17(d) be
amended so a company that is a portfolio affiliate of an invest-
ment company solely220 by virtue of the affiliation described in
section 2(a)(3)(B) will be excluded from the prohibitions of those
sections.
III. THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT
2 2 1
A. The Regulatory Framework
Section 203(a) of the Investment Advisers Act requires the
registration of all "investment advisers. '222 The term "invest-
ment adviser" is defined broadly in section 202(a)(1 1) to include
any person:
219 Rules 17a-6 and 17d-l(d)(5) presently provide for similar exceptions from the
prohibitions of § 17(a) and rule 17d-1, respectively. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17a-6, 17d-l(d)(5)
(1975).
220 A company that is otherwise a portfolio affiliate of an affiliated person of an in-
vestment company should continue to be subject to the prohibitions in § 17 because,
with the affiliated person's special access to the investment company, there is oppor-
tunity for precisely the type of self-dealing that the legislative history of § 17 makes
plain was intended to be prohibited. See text accompanying notes 216-18 supra.
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-i to b-21 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to b-21
(Supp., Aug. 1975); see note 2 supra. See generally 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1392-1417 (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. 3511-25 (Supp. 1969); Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214 (1959). For a
discussion highlighting recent staff interpretations, cases, rules, and legislation affecting
the Investment Advisers Act, see Lybecker, Advisers Act Developments, Advisers Act Proposals
(pts. 1-2), 8 REV. SEC. REG. 927, 916 (1975) [hereinafter collectively cited as Advisers Act
Developments.]
The specific legislative research and recommendations regarding enactment of a
regulatory statute covering investment advisers are found in a supplemental report to the
Commission's main study of investment trusts and investment companies. SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMM'N, INVESTMENT COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT
SUPERVISORY, AND INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES, H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1939). The Investment Advisers Act was, of course, an integral part of the Invest-
ment Company Act legislative efforts in 1940 and 1970, and the legislative history of
specific provisions may be found more readily in those documents, with the caveat ex-
pressed in note 5 supra. See North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation,
44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 677 (1969); North, supra note 21, at 717-18, 728-29.
222 The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 29(1), 89 Stat. 97,
made significant changes in the registration provisions of the Investment Advisers Act.
Prior to May, 1975, the unnumbered paragraph following § 203(c)(2) mandated that an
application for registration as an investment adviser automatically became effective thirty
days after the Commission's receipt of the application. In the event it desired to prevent
this automatic effectiveness, § 208(g) required the Commission to commence a formal
proceeding to deny registration; however, under § 209(a) the Commission could seek an
injunction against any person who has or is about to violate any provision of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act. Section 29 of the 1975 Act amended § 204 to conform generally to
the broker-dealer registration provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
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who, for compensation, engages in the business of ad-
vising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advis-
ability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities,
or who, for compensation and as part of a regular busi-
ness, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concern-
ing securities .... 22
Because of the breadth of the definition of "investment ad-
viser," five statutory exclusions from the definition appear in
section 202(a)(1 1).224 Clause (A) excludes "a bank, or any bank
holding company as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act
U.S.C. § 780, as amended 15 U.S.C.A. § 780 (Supp., Aug. 1975). As amended, § 203(c)(1)
authorizes the Commissiori to require disclosure of a balance sheet certified by an inde-
pendent accountant and other financial statements in addition to a statement whether the
investment adviser's principal business is to act as an investment adviser and to render
investment supervisory services. Section 203(c)(2) requires the Commission to grant
registration or to institute proceedings to determine whether registration should be de-
nied within forty-five days of filing the application. See SEC Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 465, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,209 (June 20, 1975). Section
203(g) was deleted from the statute because it was rendered superfluous by the 1975
amendments.
Section 208(c) prohibits any registered investment adviser from representing that he
is an "investment counsel" unless his principal business consists of acting as an invest-
ment adviser and a substantial part of his business consists of rendering investment
supervisory services. Section 202(a)(13) defines the phrase "investment supervisory
services" to mean "the giving of continuous advice as to the investment of funds on the
basis of the individual needs of each client." For a recent discussion of the investment
counsel industry and its background, see ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE ON INDIVIDUAL INVES-
TORS, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, SMALL ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT SERVICES: RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR CLEARER GUIDELINES AND POLICIES, at App. E, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. No.
465, pt. III (Feb. 6, 1973).
223 "Security" is defined in § 202(a)(18) in a manner identical to and is generally
interpreted by the Commission in a manner consistent with § 2(1) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). See note 7 supra.
214 Section 202(a)(1 1)(F) also authorizes the Commission to exclude (by rule, regula-
tion, or order) any other person "not within the intent of this paragraph." There have
been very few applications under this clause. However, in the 1940's, the Commission did
grant certain persons exclusion from the definition of investment adviser. E.g., Marine
Midland Group, Inc., SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5 (Nov. 6, 1940) (exclu-
sion granted to affiliate of bank holding company organized to give advice solely to
group of twenty controlled banks and trust companies); Augustus P. Loring, Jr., SEC
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 33 (July 22, 1942) (person primarily engaged in
business as a professional trustee; any advice was solely incidental to services as court-
appointed fiduciary). It should be noted, however, that a recent application for an order
of exclusion met with stiff opposition from possible competitors in the investment advi-
sory industries and was withdrawn when the application was set down for a hearing by
the Commission. See note 226 infra. No rules or regulations have been promulgated by
the Commission under § 202(a)(1 1)(F). However, the Commission recently proposed rule
202-1, which would exclude from the definition in section 202(a)(1 1) persons who, in the
course of their regular employment, give investment advice to their employer's employee
benefit plans. Proposed rule 202-1, SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 478,
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,304 (Sept. 29, 1975).
The Commission also has exemptive power under § 206A, which was exercised most
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of 1956,225 which is not an investment company. '22 6 Clause (B)
excludes "any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose
performance of [advisory] services is solely incidental to the
practice of his profession." Clause (C) excludes "any broker or
dealer whose performance of [advisory] services is solely inciden-
tal to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who
receives no special compensation therefor. ''22 7 Clause (D) ex-
cludes "the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news
magazine or business or financial publication of general and
regular circulation." Finally, clause (E) excludes any person
whose advice, analyses, or reports relate solely to United States
Government securities.
To further alleviate possible problems raised by the broad
definition of investment adviser, section 203(b) contains three
exceptions to the registration provisions of section 203(c) of the
Investment Advisers Act.228 Subsection (1) excepts any invest-
ment adviser all of whose clients are residents of the state within
which he maintains his principal office and place of business,
recently with respect to broker-dealers and problems associated with the unfixing of
brokerage commission. See note 227 infra.
225 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1970), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (Supp. I, 1971).
226 "Bank" is defined in § 202(a)(2) to include national banks, member banks of the
Federal Reserve System, and state-chartered banks and trust companies. This definition
would not generally include either foreign-chartered banks or affiliates or subsidiaries of
a bank or a bank holding company. Thus, nonbank investment subsidiaries of bank
holding companies have been required to register under the Investment Advisers Act.
Chase Investors Management Corp. New York, SEC Adm. Proc. File No. 3-3859; SEC
Investment Advisers Act Release Nos. 333 (Aug. 27, 1972) (notice of application); 342
(Oct. 12, 1972) (order for hearing); & 348 (Nov. 14, 1972) (order discontinuing hearing).
227 For a discussion of recent events regarding registration of broker-dealers under
the Investment Advisers Act as one implication of the Commission's decision in rule
19b-3, 17 C.F.R. 240.19b-3 (1975), to prohibit the fixing of brokerage commission, see
SEC Investment Advisers Act Release Nos. 455, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 80,160 (Apr. 23, 1975) (adoption of rule 206A-1(T)); 456, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,163 (Apr. 30, 1975) (adoption of rule
206(c)-1(T)); 470, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,268 (Aug. 20, 1975) (adoption
of rule 206(3)-I); 471, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,269 (Aug. 20, 1975) (adop-
tion of amendments to rule 206A-1(T)). See also Advisers Act Developments, supra note 221,
at 916.
221 Excepting certain persons from the registration provisions does not have the
same sweeping effect as does a statutory exclusion from the definition of investment
adviser. A person excepted from the registration provisions would nevertheless still be
subject to §§ 206-22, although he would not be subject to § 204 (recordkeeping) or § 205
(performance fee and other restrictions on investment advisory contracts). What a person
avoids, therefore, in structuring his business to satisfy one of the clauses in § 203(b) is the
one-time $150 registration fee, the recordkeeping requirements, the performance fee
restrictions, and occasional inspections by the Commission staff. The antifraud provisions
of § 206, and all rules thereunder, would still be fully applicable to such a person. Pass,
Fuinsbert & Augur, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,070 (SEC
Staff letter, Oct. 30, 1974) (concerning TISE, Inc.).
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and who does not furnish advice or issue analyses or reports
with respect to securities listed (or admitted to unlisted trading
privileges) on any national securities exchange. 22 9 Subsection (2)
excepts any investment adviser whose only clients are insur-
ance companies;2 30 and subsection (3) excepts any investment
adviser "who during the course of the preceding twelve months
has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds him-
self out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor
acts as an investment adviser to any [registered] investment
company ....231
The Investment Advisers Act follows, to some extent, the
regulatory scheme of the Investment Company Act, but relies
much more heavily on disclosure and the antifraud provisions of
section 206 than on substantive regulation. Sections 203(e) and
(f), however, authorize the Commission (after notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing) to censure, to deny registration, to suspend
for a period not exceeding twelve months, or to revoke the reg-
istration of an investment adviser or person associated with it
23 2
229 See text accompanying notes 245-55 infra.
230 Prior to the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547,
84 Stat. 1430, § 203(b)(2) excepted from registration any investment adviser whose only
clients were investment companies and insurance companies. Thus, advisers to registered
investment companies (including separate accounts of insurance companies funding vari-
able annuity contracts) were not required to register under the Investment Advisers Act.
Narrowing the registration exception to insurance companies, defined in § 202(a)(12) to
have the same meaning as in the Investment Company Act (§ 2(a)(7)), meant investment
advisers to investment companies would be subject to the same registration provisions as
all other types of investment advisers. See North, supra note 21, at 717-18. For a discus-
sion of some of the problems relating to registration of insurance companies under the
Investment Advisers Act, see Advisers Act Developments, supra note 221, at 917.
231 Because any person relying on an exception or exemption from the registration
provisions of the federal securities laws must carry the burden of proof that he has
satisfied the conditions of the exception or exemption, an investment adviser attempting
to rely on § 203(b)(3) may have some difficulty in creating negative evidence demonstrat-
ing that he does not hold himself out to the public as an investment adviser. Cf. Potomac
Fed. Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,741 (SEC staff
letter, Feb. 14, 1974); Potomac Fed. Corp. v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,815 (D.D.C. 1974) (complaint dismissed for lack of merit; Commis-
sion action was not arbitrary or capricious). Moreover, to qualify for the exception an
investment adviser is required to restrict his total clients (including all those gained and
lost) to fourteen duringany twelve month period. The usefulness of this exception to
registration may therefore be very limited. But see Peper, Martin, Jenson, Maichel &
Hettage (SEC staff letter, Jan. 28, 1975) (concerning A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.).
232 The term "person associated with an investment adviser" is defined in
§ 202(a)(17) and was added by the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 to
bring within the disqualifying provisions of § 203(e) persons controlling an investment
adviser and employees of an investment adviser. The term "control" is defined in
§ 202(a)(12) as "the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or
policies of a company, unless such power is solely the result of an official position with
such company." See North, supra note 21, at 717. Section 202(a)(17) gives the Commission
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if it, or any associated person, has committed certain types of
misconduct. 23 3 Section 204 also empowers the Commission to
adopt rules specifying which accounts, correspondence, memo-
randa, papers, books, and other records must be kept by a regis-
tered investment adviser, 23 4 and authorizes the Commission to
conduct such examinations of those books and records "as the
Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." Section 205 also pro-
vides a degree of substantive regulation by prohibiting an in-
vestment adviser who is subject to the registration requirement
from entering into any investment advisory contract which:
(1) provides for compensation to the investment adviser
on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital
appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds of
the client;
2 35
(2) fails to provide, in substance, that no assignment
236
rulemaking power to classify controlling persons falling within the ambit of § 202(a)(17).
For a discussion of rules recently adopted under § 204 which utilize this power, see
Advisers Act Developments, supra note 221, at 916.
233 Section 29 of the recently adopted Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 amended
§§ 203(e) and 203(f) generally to conform to similar provisions in the Securities Ex-
change Act. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 29, 89 Stat. 97;
see H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-83 (1975).
For a brief discussion of the pre-1970 Act provisions and the provisions added in
1970 regarding revocation or suspension of registration which also parallel those in the
broker-dealer registration provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, see North, supra
note 21, at 717-18. Subsections (5)(A) and (5)(B) of § 203(e), relating to an investment
adviser's failure to supervise any person with a view toward preventing violations of the
federal securities laws, exclude from the misconduct provisions any person who estab-
lished procedures and a system that could reasonably be expected to prevent and detect
violations and who reasonably discharged his duties under the system.
234 Rules 204-1 & 2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204-1 & 2 (1975). For a discussion of important
recent amendments to the recordkeeping requirements in rule 204-2, see Advisers Act
Developments, supra note 221, at 916. Section 29 of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975 amended § 204 of the Investment Advisers Act to define "records" as it is defined
in § 3(a)(37) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(37) (Supp.,
Aug. 1975), and to give the Commission rulemaking power to require public dissemina-
tion of such reports as the Commission may require. Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 29(5), 89 Stat. 97; see H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
79-83 (1975).
23' The prohibitions of § 205(1) were eased somewhat by expansion of the unnum-
bered paragraph following § 205(3) in the Investment Company Amendments Act of
1970. For a discussion of the legislative history of the performance fee restrictions, see
North, supra note 21, at 728-29. For a discussion of current problems involving § 205(1)
and the paragraph easing its prohibitions, see Advisers Act Developments, supra note 221, at
930-31.
236 "Assignment" is defined in § 202(a)(1) to include "any direct or indirect trans-
fer or hypothecation of an investment advisory contract by the assignor or of a control-
ling block of the assignor's outstanding voting securities by a security holder of the
assignor .... "
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of such contract shall be made by the investment adviser
without the consent of the other party to the contract;
or
(3) fails to provide, in substance, that the investment
adviser, if a partnership, will notify the other party to
the contract of any change in the membership of such
partnership within a reasonable time after such change.
As noted above, though, the antifraud provisions in section
206 are the heart of the Investment Advisers Act. Paragraphs
(1), (2), and (4) of section 206 make it unlawful for any invest-
ment adviser to engage in fraudulent misconduct,23 7 and section
206(4) further authorizes the Commission to adopt rules defin-
ing and prescribing "means reasonably designed to prevent, such
acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative." The Commission has adopted two rules
under section 206(4):238 rule 206(4)-1239 (advertisements by in-
vestment advisers), and rule 206(4)-224o (custody or possession
of funds or securities of clients by investment advisers). Finally,
paragraph (3) of section 206 makes it unlawful for an investment
adviser (acting as an investment adviser in relation to the secu-
rities transaction):241
27 -The scope of § 206 is apparently broader than rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5
(1975), because there is no requirement that the investment adviser's client be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities. See note 26 supra. See also Angelakis v. Churchill Manage-
ment Corp., [Current) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,285 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1975). With
respect to recent developments in the availability of private rights of action under § 206,
see Advisers Act Developments, supra note 221, at 932-34.
238 A third rule, which would establish standards for the publication, circulation, and
distribution of investment advisory communications, was proposed in 1968 and is still
pending. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 231, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,612 (Oct. 10, 1968) (rule 206(4)-3). A recently proposed fourth
rule would mark an important departure from its predecessor rules by requiring an
investment adviser to prepare and disseminate a written disclosure statement containing
certain specific information about the adviser, his staff, and the types of services he
performs. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 442, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder], CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,128 (Mar. 5, 1975) (rule 206(4)-4). For a discussion of this so-called
brochure rule, see Advisers Act Developments, supra note 221, at 917.
239 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-I (1975). See Intersearch Technology, Inc., SEC Adm.
Proc. File No. 3-2991, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,139
(Feb. 28, 1975).
240 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (1975).
241 In Investment Advisers Act Release No. 40 (Feb. 5, 1945), the Commission pub-
lished the opinion of the division director then responsible for administration of the Act
regarding § 206(3). The division director stated that the disclosure and consent arrange-
ment required by § 206(3) could not be satisfied by a general agreement, but must be
satisfied before the completion of each separate transaction.
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acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to
sell any security to or purchase any security from a
client, or acting as broker for a person other than such
client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any
security for the account of such client, without dis-
closing to such client in writing before the comple-
tion of such transaction the capacity in which he is
acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such
transaction ....
The adoption of rule 19b-3,242 which prohibits fixing rates
of commission by exchanges, poses severe problems for invest-
ment advisers who are also registered broker-dealers. Conse-
quently, the Commission recently adopted rule 206(3)-1243 to
remove certain "impersonal advisory services" from the reach of
section 206(3). Registered broker-dealers who are investment
advisers only to the extent that they make certain information
available for public distribution, provide generalized advice not
geared to the investment needs of any particular individual, and
respond to requests for specific statistical information not involv-
ing an expression of opinion, are not required to comply with
section 206(3).244
B. Recommendations to Cure Errors, Omissions,
and Needless Complexities
245
1. Definition of "Investment Adviser"
Section 202(a)(l1)(D) excludes from the definition of in-
vestment adviser "the publisher of any bona fide newspaper,
news magazine or business or financial publication of generaf
and regular circulation ... ." Does this exclusion cover financial
columnists who recommend the purchase or sale of specific
securities?246 Two prominent securities lawyers have stated that,
242 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1975).
243 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(3)-l (1975).
244 Rule 206(3)-1 was proposed in Investment Advisers Act Release No. 448, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,145 (Mar. 31, 1975), and adopted in a
slightly modified form in Investment Advisers Act Release No. 470, [Current] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 80,268 (Aug. 20, 1975).
245 For a discussion of the legislative history of the Investment Advisers Act, see
notes 5 & 221 supra. The SEC recently proposed amendments to the Investment Advisers
Act which follow substantially the recommendations made in text accompanying notes
254-66. For the full text of the proposed amendments, see SEC Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 491, [Current] SEC FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,341 (Dec. 15, 1975).
246 It is obvious that the publisher of a book, the producer of a radio or television
show, and the person responsible for production of any other type of mass-
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although the issue is a "close question," the spirit of the pub-
lisher's exclusion should extend to a syndicated financial col-
umnist.247 We believe that good arguments can be made the
other way, especially in view of events such as the alleged re-
cent "scalping" operation conducted by Alex N. Campbell, a Los
Angeles Herald-Examiner financial columnist, and his son.248 Al-
though section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act2 49 and rule
lOb-5 250 do provide a limited method of policing such activities
communication medium should also be excluded from the definition of investment ad-
viser. By the same token, any person who gives advice through any type of medium
regarding the purchase or sale of specific securities is subject to the same policy argu-
ments made hereinafter about financial columnists. But see 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1398 (2d ed. 1961).
247 Id.; Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 245 n.97 (1959).
248 Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1974, at 10, col. 2. According to the complaint, the father (in
his role as a newspaper financial columnist) interviewed executives of various businesses.
Father and son (who is also the editor of a financial news and investment advisory
journal) allegedly made 101 purchases of securities just prior to favorable reports on
those securities in the son's financial journal. Neither father nor son disclosed to sellers of
the shares they purchased that a favorable column would soon appear, nor did they
disclose to their newspaper and financial journal readers that they held a position in the
securities. In 75% of the instances, the stocks were sold within a week after the column
appeared. SEC v. Campbell, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,580 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (summary of complaint); SEC Litigation Release No. 5645
(Nov. 22, 1972) (order of preliminary injunction).
"Scalping" by investment advisers has long been illegal. SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (investment adviser enjoined from purchasing
stock shortly before publishing recommendation, then selling shortly afterwards; dis-
closure of practice necessary to preserve the climate of fair dealing to maintain public
confidence in the securities industry and to preserve the economic health of the coun-
try). Accord, Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8426,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,618 (Oct. 19, 1968) (manager
of investment advisory service purchased and sold securities for his own account and ac-
counts of his relatives shortly before executing orders for clients of the service at less
favorable prices). For discussions of the Capital Gains case, see Note, Stock Scalping by the
Investment Adviser: Fraud or Legitimate Business Practice? 51 CALIF. L. REV. 232 (1963);
Comment, The Regulation of Investment Advice: Subscription Advisers and Fiduciary Duties, 63
MICH. L. REv. 1220 (1965); Note, Investment Advisers and Disclosure of an Intent to Trade,
71 YALE L.J. 1342 (1962). See also SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, SPECIAL STUDY
OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 65-102
(1963).
Both the New York and American Stock Exchanges have condemned selective pref-
erential disclosure by a broker to a few clients prior to publishing a market letter. NYSE,
GUIDELINES FOR MEMBER FIRM COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC 5 (1970); NYSE, M.F.
Circular No. 170 (Nov. 16, 1962); ASE, Info. Circular No. 51-71 (April 30, 1971). The
New York Stock Exchange recently disciplined a securities analyst by barring him from
employment with any member firm for eighteen months because he had disseminated
selectively to an investment counseling firm an internal report on hospital management
companies prior to official publication. Wall St. J., July 6, 1973, at 7, col. 1.
249 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
20 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
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by financial columnists who recommend the purchase or sale of
specific securities, registration under the Investment Advisers
Act could be expected to have the desirable effect of permitting
periodic inspection of the books and records which would have
to be kept under rule 204-2.251
It could be argued, however, that registration under the
Investment Advisers Act would have a "chilling effect," be a
"prior restraint," or otherwise unconstitutionally impinge upon
the first amendment rights of a financial columnist. This argu-
ment was advanced by the defendant and found wanting by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Wall Street Transcript
case.252 Moreover, a financial columnist recommending the
purchase or sale of specific securities holds himself out as a disin-
terested observer; readers are entitled, at a minimum, to clear
warning of any departure from this standard. The Investment
Advisers Act would not impose any substantive or censorship-
like restraints on a financial columnist's freedom of expression;
it would only affect those few actions a financial columnist would
take in recommending the purchase or sale of specific securities
that would conflict with his duties to his readers. 253 That, in our
251 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (1975).
252 SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
958 (1970), rev'g 294 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The Commission sued The Wall Street
Transcript to enforce a subpoena duces tecum requiring production of certain advertising
materials and correspondence with subscribers, prospective subscribers, and suppliers of
securities reports published in The Wall Street Transcript. In deciding that the Commission,
rather than a court, was the proper body to make the initial determination as to The Wall
Street Transcript's status under the Advisers Act, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
stated:
We do not think, however, that [the First Amendment was] what Congress
had in mind when it placed "bona fide" newspapers among the exclusions from
the statute's coverage. Section 202(a)(1 1) of the [Investment Advisers] Act lists a
number of examples of persons or entities whose activities might fall within the
broad definition of "investment adviser" but whose customary practices would
not place them in the special, otherwise unregulated, fiduciary role for which
the law established standards. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
supra. The phrase "bona fide" newspapers, in the context of this list, means
those publications which do not deviate from customary newspaper activities to
such an extent that there is a likelihood that the wrongdoing which the [Advisers
Act] was designed to prevent has occurred ....
• . . What matters is whether or not a specific publication is engaged in
practices which the [Investment Advisers] Act was intended to regulate, such as
the offering of investment advice without revealing the possibility of personal
gain to the publisher from what he reports or how he presents it. See SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., supra.
422 F.2d at 1377-78 (footnote omitted).
213 Section 206 would of course require disclosure of "scalping," as discussed
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view, is precisely what the Investment Advisers Act was intended
to accomplish.
Thus, we recommend that section 202(a)( 1l)(D) be amended
to make clear254 that financial columnists who regularly rec-
ommend the purchase or sale of specific securities are required
to register under and comply with the substantive require-
ments of the Investment Advisers Act. 55
2. Exceptions to Registration
Section 203(a) prohibits all investment advisers from making
use of the mails or any other means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce in connection with their business as an invest-
ment adviser, unless registered pursuant to section 203(c). Sec-
tion 203(b), however, excepts from the registration requirements
of section 203(c) those investment advisers who satisfy the condi-
tions of paragraph (1), (2), or (3). Paragraph (1) of section 203(b)
excepts
any investment adviser all of whose clients are residents
of the State within which such investment adviser main-
in note 248 supra. Moreover, the advertising restrictions in rule 206(4)-1(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-1(a) (1975), would apply to any written communication addressed to more
than one person, which offers analyses or reports concerning securities or any other
investment advisory service regarding securities.
254 In our view, as a matter of statutory interpretation financial columnists who
recommend the purchase or sale of specific securities are already covered by the general
definition of investment adviser and are not excluded from the definition by the
publisher's exclusion of § 202(a)(1 1)(D). E.g., Raymond L. Panico (SEC staff letter, Jan. 7,
1975); Sam Shulsky, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 227, at C-3 (Nov. 14, 1973) (SEC staff
letter, Oct. 2, 1973); Theodore H. Friedenberg (SEC staff letter, June 20, 1973).
255 It seems equally clear that any person who holds himself out as a financial analyst,
financial adviser, financial counselor, or any of the other titles which are merely permu-
tations of these, whether self-employed or employed by others, could engage in the same
fraudulent activities as an investment adviser or a financial columnist and would be
subject to the same policy arguments regarding the overriding public interest in registra-
tion and regulation of a financial columnist. In most instances, such quasi-investment
advisers appear to hold themselves out to others as disinterested observers and thus
would have analogous opportunities for self-dealing or overreaching their clients, be they
public investors or corporate employers. However, some of the provisions of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act would present practical problems of application such as the perfor-
mance fee restrictions in § 205 or the advertising restrictions in rule 206(4)-i, to quasi-
investment advisers, for example, with corporate employers; for such persons, it might
be desirable to adopt exemptive rules under § 206A which would tailor more closely the
provisions of the Investment Advisers Act to the activities of the persons being regulated.
Nevertheless, it seems plain that such quasi-investment advisers fall within the findings in
§ 201 of the Investment Advisers Act to the same extent as the more traditional invest-
ment counselor or monthly securities report writer, thereby confirming the appropriate-
ness of their registration under the Investment Advisers Act. Cf. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, §§ 3(a)(30), 15 B(a), as amended, Pub. L. No. 94-29 §§ 3(6), 13, 89 Stat. 97.
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tains his or its principal office and place of business,
and who does not furnish advice or issue analyses or
reports with respect to securities listed or admitted to
unlisted trading privileges on any national securities ex-
change ....
No legislative history explains why Congress intended to ex-
clude an "intrastate" investment adviser even though he was giv-
ing advice solely about securities traded over-the-counter. If
Congress' theory was that regulation of such a person at the
state rather than the federal level was more appropriate, in
view of the relatively modest amount of contacts with interstate
commerce, that theory breaks down in every state where there is
not at least the equivalent of the Investment Advisers Act.256
Moreover, with the advent of NASDAQ,257 which is treated for
many purposes as if it were a national securities exchange, it
would appear that the extension of section 203(b)(1) to some
securities traded over-the-counter is too broad since use of
NASDAQ surely involves more than modest contacts with inter-
state commerce.
Accordingly, because it deprives a class of investors of pro-
tection for reasons that are no longer compelling in light of
technological advances in the marketing of securities, we rec-
ommend that secion 203(b)(1) be repealed entirely258 or, at the
very least, that the reference to securities listed or admitted to
unlisted trading privileges on national securities exchanges be
expanded to include securities listed in NASDAQ.2 59
256 Further, in many states that do have some type of Investment Advisers Act, its
purpose is to do no more than provide a census and the statute is unlikely to have
substantive regulatory provisions.
257 NASDAQ is the acronym for the National Ass'n of Securities Dealers' Automated
Quotations System, which began in February 1971 to provide a centralized nationwide
electronic auction market system for over-the-counter securities. CCH NASD MANUAL
1653A; see NASD, THE NASDAQ COMPANY AND THE NASDAQ MARKET (1974); Katz,
NASD Automated Quotations System, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 359 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer, Jr. eds. 1972).
251 It could be argued that an investment adviser who curtails his activities so se-
verely as to be able to rely on § 203(b)(1) may place himself in a position where the
securities he can recommend that his clients purchase or sell are so unsuitable with
respect to a typical investment portfolio that the investment adviser virtually breaches his
fiduciary duty to render investment advice impartially and in the best interests of his
clients.
2-59 But see Pass, Fuinsbert & Augur, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 80,070 (SEC staff letter, Oct. 30, 1974) (concerning TISE Inc.) (intrastate offer-
ings of tax shelter securities); C. Dale McClain (SEC staff letter, Sept. 24, 1974) (concern-
ing undisclosed client) (municipal bonds).
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3. Financial and Professional Responsibility
The Investment Advisers Act lacks statutory provisions of
the kind found in section 15(b)(7) of the Securities Exchange
Act 60 authorizing the Commission to establish standards for
classifying investment advisers, requiring persons in any class to
pass examinations and to comply with specified standards of
training.261 Similarly, section 15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange
Act262 authorizes the Commission to adopt rules2 63 providing for
"financial responsibility and related practices" of broker-dealers,
including acceptance and use of customers' securities, carrying
and use of customers' securities, carrying and use of customers'
deposits or credit balances, and maintenance of reserves with
respect to customers' deposits or credit balances.
Such aufhority is clearly necessary and appropriate if the
Commission is to engage in meaningful regulation of the ac-
tivities of investment advisers, and we recommend amendment
of the Investment Advisers Act to provide authority to set fi-
nancial and professional responsibility standards.
4. Self-Regulation
Moreover, the Investment Advisers Act also lacks statutory
provisions similar to section 15A of the Securities Exchange
Act2 64 authorizing the registration of any association of broker-
dealers dedicated to the self-regulation of its members, and pro-
visions similar to sections 15(b)(8) and (b)(9)265 authorizing the
Commission to collect fees from and prescribe rules governing
principles of trade and other matters for broker-dealers who
choose not to belong to a self-regulatory organization. Again,
260 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(7) (Supp., Aug. 1975).
261 See rules 15b8-1 to -2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15b8-1 to -2 (1975); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1288-1343 (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. 3349-3406 (Supp. 1969). See generally E.
WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS (1965).
262 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(c)(3) (Supp., Aug. 1975).
26
3 See rules 15c3-1 to -3a, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1 to -3a (1975) (net capital require-
ments, customers' free credit balances, reserves and custody of securities); 2 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1346-55 (2d ed. 1962); 5 id. 3406-08 (Supp. 1969).
264 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(a) (Supp. Aug. 1975). See rules 15Ab-1, 1SAg-1, 15Aj-1
to -3, and 15A12-1, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15Aa-1, .15Ab-1, .15Ag-1, .15Aj-1 to -3, .15A2-1
(1975); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1359-91 (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. 3448-3511 (Supp.
1969); White, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 250
(1959).
265 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o(b)(8), (9) (Supp., Aug. 1975); see rules 15b9-1 to -2, 15b10-1
to -10, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15b9-1 to -2, .15b10-1 to -10 (1975). See also 5 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3434-48 (Supp. 1969).
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such authority to register self-regulatory organizations is clearly
necessary and appropriate to provide for meaningful self-regu-
lation; 266 the authority to adopt rules directly regulating those
who choose not to join a self-regulatory organization with re-
spect to matters falling generally into the category of business
ethics is necessary to backstop the work done by self-regulatory
organizations. We recommend amendment of the Investment
Advisers Act to provide such authority.
5. Mini-Accounts
267
a. The SIAS Case
In February, 1970, the Commission brought injunctive pro-
ceedings against First National City Bank (Citibank) and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., alleging violations of the
Investment Company Act and Securities Act in the operation of
Citibank's Special Investment Advisory Service (SIAS).268 SIAS
involved a customer's limited power of attorney giving Citibank
investment discretion and authorizing Merrill Lynch to accept
instructions from Citibank. 269  Citibank and Merrill Lynch
26 Some quasi-self-regulatory organizations of investment advisers already exist,
such as the Investment Counsel Association of America. Investment counselors, however,
would appear to be only one part of the disparate group registered under the 'Investment
Advisers Act, including: bank subsidiaries, insurance company subsidiaries, investment
company advisers, monthly securities report writers, financial columnists, and business
consultants. One would expect that, unlike § 15A under which only the NASD has
registered, several self-regulatory organizations might be formed around the different
constituents within this group and might propose rules of practice that are exclusively
applicable to the problems of their members. See Professional Groups Take Two Approaches
to Regulation of Security Analysts, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 239, at A-15 to A-16 (Feb.
13, 1974).
267 See generally Bines, Regulating Discretionary Management: Broker-Dealers as Catalysts
for Reform, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 347 (1975); Comment, Small Investment Advisory
Services: Reclassification to Aid the Small Investor, 5 CONN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
268 SEC v. First Nat'l City Bank, SEC Litigation Release No. 4534, [1969-1970 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,592 (Feb. 6, 1970). For a contemporaneous
discussion of the SIAS case by a member of the Commission staff (including some
comments on the reasons for its initiation), see Mostoff, The SEC, 17(d), and Incentive
Compensation, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 317, 318-31 (M.
Cohen & K. Bialkin eds. 1970).
269 Additionally, Citibank required a customer to have a minimum account of
$25,000, to authorize the bank to invest in different securities in a manner designed to
produce long-term capital growth or income, and to permit the account to be handled as
a normal brokerage account providing usual advices and confirmations by the broker-
dealer. The complaint also alleged that, after the initial investments were made, all deci-
sions by Citibank to buy or sell a security were generally applied to all persons' accounts
uniformly, even though Citibank's advertising stated that Citibank would give each
SIAS investor the same individualized and personalized attention and supervision as
EXTERNAL INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
agreed, in seeking dismissal of the injunctive proceeding, per-
manently to cease offering SIAS and to refrain from similar
activities in the future; Citibank was permitted, however, to of-
fer a non-discretionary investment advisory service with execu-
don available through any broker-dealer selected from a list of
at least three provided by Citibank.
b. The Advisory Committee Report
Because of the uncertainty caused by the SIAS case, in Oc-
tober, 1972, former Chairman Casey appointed an Advisory
Committee on Investment Management Services for Individual
Investors to assist the Commission in developing clearer policies
and guidelines with respect to these so-called mini-accounts.7 °
was received by customers of its regular Tnvestment advisory service designed for a
minimum account of $200,000. SEC v. First Nat'l City Bank, SEC Litigation Release No.
4534, at 2-3 (Feb. 6, 1970). It has been reported that at the time of the Commission suit
Citibank had $35 million under management for over 1,000 SIAS clients. Everdell,
Individual Advisory Accounts and the Registration Requirenents, in FIFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON SECURITIES REGULATION 163-64 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., & J. Schupper eds.
1974).
The Commission's allegation in the SIAS case that providing discretionary invest-
ment management was the offer and sale of a security was not novel even in 1970. E.g.,
SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Rochkind v.
Reynolds Sec., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975); Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp.
468 (D. Iowa 1974); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968); Maheu v.
Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). Although the idea that a
"company" for the purposes of the Investment Company Act did not have to be a
formally organized entity was also not novel, even in 1970, there were some persons who
were nevertheless surprised by the Commission's allegation of its applicability to the SIAS
case. For Investment Company Act cases involving the concept of "company," see the
cases cited in notes 90 & 96 supra.
Following the SIAS case, Commission staff correspondence with persons requesting
interpretive advice emphasized that the Investment Company Act could be avoided only
if the person offering mini-account services retained little (if any) investment discretion,
or gave individualized treatment and did not mass-merchandise the investment advisory
service through general advertising in the mass media. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDI-
VIDUAL INVESTMENT, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, SMALL ACCOUNT INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT SERVICES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CLEARER GUIDELINES AND POLICIES 19,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 465 (Jan. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ADISORY COMMIT-
TEE REPORT]. The offering of so-called maxi-accounts, the traditional large investor
investment management service, would clearly fall within these tests and would thus
be able to rely for nonregistration on § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (1970), and § 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act.
270 SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 341, at 1 (OcL 12, 1972):
[T]here is a great deal of uncertainty about the applicability of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Act of 1933 in this area. An advisory
service which makes large-scale solicitations of relatively small accounts and pro-
vides substantially the same advice to clients can become functionally indistin-
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After three months of deliberations,2 l the Advisory Committee
submitted its report27 2 and made six major recommendations:
(1) the Investment Company Act should not be applicable to a
mini-account service unless there is a pooling of clients' accounts;
(2) the Securities Act should not be applicable if the offeror of a
mini-account service furnishes individualized service or does not
have discretion to execute portfolio transactions; (3) the Com-
mission should promulgate guidelines for determining the ap-
plicability of the Investment Company Act and Securities Act; (4)
persons offering a mini-account service should give prospective
clients a written disclosure statement containing material infor-
mation to aid them in determining whether to retain the services
of a particular firm; (5) the Commission should adopt rules
under the Investment Advisers Act covering conflicts of interest
and other abuses in connection with the operation of mini-
guishable from an investment company. Representations as to individualized
treatment of clients may in such a case also raise questions under the antifraud
provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. On the other hand, notwith-
standing some overlapping investment advice, such a service might actually pro-
vide individualized service.
Mr. Rosenblat was the Commission staff member appointed to the Advisory Committee,
which also included persons associated with investment advisers, broker-dealers, and
banks. See also Address by SEC Chairman Casey, Economic Club of Detroit, Sept. 18,
1972.,271 At its first meeting, the Advisory Committee approved a memorandum of objec-
tives which was published by the Commission to solicit comments and suggestions from
interested persons, including those in the investment management business. SEC Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 344 (Oct. 27, 1972). Specifically, the Advisory
Committee's memorandum stated that it would: (1) advise the Commission on how
mini-account services were initiated and operated; (2) determine the extent to which the
mini-account services afforded individualized treatment; (3) determine the extent of
conflicts of interest or other abuses presented by the service, including advertising and
suitability; (4) decide whether the mini-account services raised problems with respect to
broker-dealers or investment advisers; (5) review Commission and Commission staff posi-
tions on the basis of the information it obtained in response to its memorandum; (6)
advise which mini-account services should be subject to the Investment Company Act and
offer guidelines for making this decision; and (7) recommend appropriate guidelines for
regulation under the Investment Advisers Act or the Securities Exchange Act where the
Investment Company Act was not applicable. The Advisory Committee had a deadline of
January 5, 1973, for concluding its considerations. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 269.
272 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 269. SEC Investment Advisers Act
Releases Nos. 341 (Oct. 12, 1970) and 344 (Oct. 27, 1972) are reprinted in the Advisory
Committee Report as appendixes A and B. The Advisory Committee's factual findings are
contained in ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 1-15. For discussions of the Advi-
sory Committee Report by two of its members, see Everdell, Individual Advisory Accounts
and the Registration Requirements, in FIFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 163 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., & J. Schupper eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as Everdell Discussion]; Rosenblat, Mini-Accounts, in THE SEC SPEAKS AGAIN 87 (A.
Sommer, Jr. & A. Levenson eds. 1973).
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account services; and (6) the Commission should establish stan-
dards for professional qualifications and financial responsibility
of investment advisers, and a system of self-regulation of invest-
ment advisers.
273
The Advisory Committee, in considering the applicability of
the Investment Company Act to mini-accounts, placed great em-
phasis on the differences between a mini-account client and a
mutual fund shareholder: direct ownership of specified se-
curities rather than an .undivided interest in a changing portfolio
of securities. The Advisory Committee departed from the
Commission's historical, reliance on the significance of "overlap-
ping" investment advice 274 and rejected the regulatory frame-
work of the Investment Company Act in favor of promulga-
tion of rules and guidelines under the Investment Advisers
Act.27 5 With respect to the Securities Act, the Advisory Committee
2'3 The Advisory Committee Report made 24 separate recommendations, many of which
emanated from concerns with specific conflicts of interest, from which the six major
recommendations were drawn. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 269, at 42
(fee-splitting), 42-51 (relationships with broker-dealers), 54-55 (use of insidelinforma-
tion). The Advisory Committee recommended that the broker-dealer exclusion in
§ 202(a)(I 1)(C) not be deemed available to a broker-dealer who actively solicited mini-
account clients, and that banks, although not generally subject to the Investment Advisers
Act, should voluntarily follow their Report's guidelines as a "safe harbor" from attack
regarding non-registration under the Investment Company and Securities Acts.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 269, at 59-62.
274 Id. 20-22. If the securities owned by a mini-account client were not pooled or
commingled with those of other clients, the mini-account client would be able to deal
independently with them at any time, unlike a mutual fund shareholder who has an
undivided interest in a changing portfolio of securities. This contrast has been used in
other contexts to distinguish situations which might require registration under the fed-
eral securities laws. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4790, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1131-33 (July 13, 1965) (employee stock purchase plans); Lucky Stores, Inc.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,903 (SEC staff letter, June 5,
1974) (dividend reinvestment plans). However, even if the Advisory Committee Report can
be read to say that there would be no "company" merely because a mini-account service
may permit a client to deal independently with his shares at any time, we believe such a
mini-account service may yet be a "company" within the meaning of § 2(a)(8) of the
Investment Company Act. For cases involving the expansive concept of "company," see
notes 90 & 96 supra. See also note 279 infra.
275 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 269, at 22-23. But see Comment, supra
note 267, at 664-69, 669-76; Everdell Discussion, supra note 272, at 169-70 (remarks of
Stanley Sporkin):
I disagree. These services look like an investment company-one hundred peo-
ple each buying one share through a broker and adviser is the functional equiv-
alent of each owning 1 percent of a hundred-share lot. In addition, the mer-
chandising and practical operation make this vehicle indistinguishable from an
investment company. The investors need the same protection in both cases and
the Investment Company Act will give that to them ....
What we are concerned with is whether someone, claiming to act as an
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Report conceded that many discretionary investment services
would result in the creation of separate securities and that the
solicitation of clients could be a public offering of one or more
investment contracts, but concluded that no public offering
should be deemed to occur if each mini-account contract was
essentially different or individualized, 276 and that the Securities
Act itself should not apply where a person offered an imper-
sonal investment service on a non-discretionary basis.
277
c. Recommendations Regarding Mini-Accounts
The ALI Code, which would move away from the tradi-
tional theology of the past forty years regarding registration of
investment adviser, is merely providing services which would be available from
an investment company. The law affords investors certain protections. The
mere fact that the stock is put into the person's account, to me, would not
determine that the operation is not an investment company, especially where
overlapping is present.
276 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 269, at 23-25. The Commission re-
cently imposed sanctions upon a registered investment adviser whose representations
regarding its "individualized" service were found to be untrue and misleading. Chase
Investment Services of Boston, Inc., SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 449 (Mar.
28, 1975); Wall St. J., April 1, 1975, at 16, col. 3. According to the Advisory Committee,
the conclusion that no public offering was involved would be a logical extension of the
private offering exemption. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 24. But see Com-
ment, supra note 267, at 657-64. See also Everdell Discussion, supra note 272, at 176:
I have gradually come to the conclusion, however, that advertising in this con-
text changes the nature of the product. It isn't that advertising is reprehensible
in itself or that it invites the attention of the [Commission] staff but it is in the
advertising that the product is not only widely offered but explicitly and im-
plicitly defined and determined. Since what is described and offered in an
advertising campaign through the press and other media is offered to everyone,
it is fair to apply the definitions of the [Securities Act of 1933] to that which
everyone is offered. If the offer is limited to a simple solicitation of inquiries
from those interested in individual investment management, without any de-
scription of the relationship or any claims to results, the question of whether
there is a security can be determined by what the individual investment man-
agement involves.
However, the advertising for small accounts has gone well beyond such
limits. Perhaps when the parties get together and the customer walks in with his
money for investment, the papers which he signs or the arrangement im-
plemented will not create an investment contract for purposes of the 1933 Act
definition. But if the advertising material touts investment management services,
it is investment management services which are being offered, not any particular
contract. However extensive and detailed the advertising material may be, it
never contains a suggestion that any substantial efforts on the part of the cus-
tomer were being required for him to make money. Since the offering made by
the advertisement is identical for millions of people, there is even commonality,
which is the other element of the test under [SEC v. W.J.] Howey [Co., 328 U.S.
293 (1940)].
27 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 269, at 25; Everdell Discussion, supra
note 272, at 172. The Advisory Committee noted that the arrangement adopted by
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securities rather than issuers, 278 provides a unique opportunity
to resolve the mini-account questions.27 9 Critics of the Advisory
Committee Report have generally raised questions about the effi-
cacy of the Investment Advisers Act as a regulatory statute, as
compared with the Investment Company Act,28 0 and about sub-
stitution of disclosure under the Investment Advisers Act for the
disclosure framework of the Securities Act.2 8 ' Especially as aug-
Citibank and Merrill Lynch in settling the SIAS case would provide an appropriate
model for "a truly non-discretionary service." ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
269, at 25.
278 See Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW.
27, 33-34 (1969); ALI, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE §§ 401-05 (Reporter's Revision of Text
of Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, Oct. 1, 1974) (registration of issuers with publicly held sec-
urities). The difficulties in preparing a coherent regulatory scheme regarding mini-
accounts within existing law, statutory and judicial, is exceptionally well stated in Bines,
Regulating Discretionary Management: Broker-Dealers As Catalysts for Reform, 16 B.C. IND. &
Com. L. REV. 347, 389-90 (1975).
279 Although the Advisory Committee Report was published in January 1973, the Com-
mission has not yet formally reacted to its recommendations. However, there have been
some indications that the Advisory Committee Report has been actively considered by the
Commission. See Commission Inquiry Concerning Bank-Sponsored Investment Services,
SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 409, at 5-6, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,767, at 84,074 (April 30, 1974) ("The Commission expects shortly
to publish for comment certain proposed positions with respect to the issues raised
generally by the offering of such [mini-account] services and the recommendations of its
Advisory Committee on Investment Management Services for Individual Investors.");
Address by SEC Chairman Garrett, Investment Company Institute, Washington, D.C.,
May 15, 1974, at 11-15, summarized in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 79,791, discussed in Mutual Fund Managers Celebrate 50th Birthday, BNA SEc. REG. &
L. REP. No. 253, A-I1, A-12 (May 22, 1974):
In the near future, we will announce the direction we intend to move, and will
solicit comments from the public on certain of our proposed positions.
In summary, these are:
1. Where assets are managed on a discretionary basis, registration would be
required under the '33 and '40 Acts if clients do not receive individualized
treatment, even though the assets are not pooled (that is, investors retain all the
incidents of ownership of the underlying securities) ....
2. Non-discretionary services should not be treated as offering a security for
purposes of either the '33 or '40 Acts, if they afford clients a meaningful basis
for making their own investment decisions. Generally, this would mean that
clients should receive a statement furnishing them with a reasonable basis for
the adviser's recommendation so that they can make an independent judgment
as to its merits.
3. Rules and guidelines under the Advisers Act, and possibly the '34 Act, need
to be developed to deal with disclosure, conflicts of interest, and other investor
protection problems where mini-account arrangements will not be registered
under the '33 and '34 Acts. An information statement disclosing the material
facts about the advisory service should be required to be transmitted to prospec-
tive clients, and other potentially dangerous practices should be prohibited or
regulated.
Id. 12-14.
280 E.g., Comment, supra note 267, at 669-79.
281 E.g., id. 676-83.
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mented in the manner we have recommended above, the In-
vestment Advisers .Act would contain sufficient statutory au-
thority to regulate persons offering mini-accounts. 28 2 Investor
protection could be achieved under the Investment Advisers
Act, we believe, without having to resort to imposition of the In-
vestment Company Act.28 3 A continuous disclosure statement
along the lines of proposed Investment Advisers Act rule
282 One major problem which our formulation leaves unresolved is that not all per-
sons who would be likely to offer mini-account services are subject to the Investment
Advisers Act, e.g., banks. For a discussion of some aspects of the bank exclusion from the
Investment Advisers Act, see note 95 supra. We can discern no reasons why the invest-
ment advisory function of banks should not be subject to the Investment Advisers Act,
and we believe that the bank exclusion from the definition of investment adviser in
§ 202(a)(1l)(A) should be removed. Because the broker-dealer exclusion in §
202(a)(I 1)(C) would generally be unavailable to broker-dealers who provide mini-account
services (because they would charge an advisory fee and thus would meet neither the
"solely incidental" nor the "no special compensation" conditions of the exclusion), there
would not appear to be any reason to remove the broker-dealer exclusion. A recent Note
concludes that banks are subject to regulation comparable to that governing broker-
dealers, investment advisers, or investment companies, where banks offer comparable
investment services. Note, The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J.
1477, 1497-1504 (1975). In particular, the Note examines the appropriate regulatory
agency's ability to inspect books and records, investor protection against the entity's
insolvency, and suitability of investments, all in the context of a service providing pooled
execution of securities transactions, although presumably the same analysis could be
made for mini-accounts and other investment services. We disagree with the analysis
offered and the conclusions reached in the Note. Although this topic is certainly worthy
of substantial independent consideration, based on the extended analysis developed in
Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities: Seven Gaps, Eight Re-
medies (pts. 1-2), 90 BANKING L.J. 812 (1973); 91 id. 6 (1974), we believe that the fiduciary
aspects of bank investment management are not now regulated in a manner comparable
with similar activities of broker-dealers, investment advisers, and investment companies.
Moreover, even if the fiduciary aspects of investment management were regulated in
a comparable manner for bank and non-bank investment managers, and if one were
willing to hold apart as a neutral factor the enormous difference in regulatory attitude
toward enforcement of violations, it would still be true that significant differences would
face an aggrieved investor. First, other than rule lOb-5 (under which the aggrieved
investor would have no cause of action unless he was a purchaser or seller of the sec-
urities involved in fraudulent or deceptive acts), no general antifraud provision (like
§ 206 of the Investment Advisers Act) would apply to a bank. Second, assuming, de-
spite bank assertions that many of their investment services do not even involve a
fiduciary relationship, that an aggrieved investor could find a suitable cause of action
under state trust law, he would be remitted to an action for an accounting. Compare
Shaffer v. Chemical Bank, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,403
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class action regarding use of brokerage to attract deposits dismissed on
the ground that the better remedy would be a trust accounting procedure), with
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969)
(nontendering shareholder and target company have standing to allege violations of
Williams Act provisions relating to tender offers).
283 Any attempt to apply the Investment Company Act would have to be coupled
with extensive exemptive relief from provisions of the Act which plainly can have no
applicability if mini-accounts are to exist at all. For example, the integral concepts of
disinterested directors (§§ 10 & 15) and shareholder democracy (§ 18(i)) would appear
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206(4)-4284 would further the public policy goal of disclosing
material facts about the offeror of a mini-account service with-
out becoming entangled in the metaphysics of Securities Act
short-form registration statements, 285  post-effective amend-
ments,286 rescission rights,287 and stringent liability for false and
misleading registration statements.288
These investor protection objectives are consistent with the
stated objectives of the ALI Code and would properly focus the
regulatory effort where investor protections can be most closely
tailored to the actual and potential abuses. A person offering
discretionary investment management services2 89 who is regis-
tered under the Investment Advisers Act should be exempt from
the registration and regulatory provisions of the Investment
Company and Securities Acts with respect to that service.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REMOVE EXCLUSIONS FROM
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT-TYPE REGULATION
A. ICC Companies
Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act excludes
from the definition of an investment company:
Any company subject to regulation under the Interstate
Commerce Act, or any company whose entire out-
to have little relevance to the clients of a mini-account service. Similarly, the sales load
provisions (§ 22), anti-pyramiding provisions (§ 12), and capital structure provisions
(§ 18) also would appear to have little relevance to the clients of a mini-account service.
The crucial sections seem to be § 17 (conflicts of interest) and § 36 (fiduciary duties),
which have analogies in the Investment Advisers Act.
284 SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 442, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,128 (March 5, 1975). For discussions of proposed rule
206(4)-4, see Advisers Act Developments, supra note 221, at 917; Fleischer, Forcing Advisers
to Open Up, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 95 (May, 1975).
285 E.g., rule 145, form S-14, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.145, 239.23 (1975); rule 430, form
S-8, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.430, 239.16b (1975).
286 E.g., SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 5439, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,559 (Nov. 14, 1973) (annual updating of investment company
prospectuses); 5305, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,998 (Sept.
21, 1972) (post-effective amendments to investment company registration statements).
287 Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970); see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1699-1712 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. 3831-34 (Supp. 1969).
288 Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970); see Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1721-42 (2d
ed. 1961); 6 id. 3842-56 (Supp. 1969). See generally A.B.A. National Institute, The
BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 523 (1969); Folk, Civil Liabilities under the
Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case (pts. 1-2), 55 VA. L. REv. 1, 199 (1969).
289 A discretionary investment management arrangement regarding any type of
property, not just conventional securities, could be regulated through the Investment
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standing capital stock is owned or controlled by such
a company: Provided, That the assets of the con-
trolled company consist substantially of securities is-
sued by companies which are subject to regulation
under the Interstate Commerce Act.
At the time the Act was proposed carrier-investment companies
were limited to companies holding securities of carrier com-
panies.2 90 Consequently, when the exclusion was suggested by
the American Association of Railroads as a "clarifying" amend-
ment to the Senate version of the 1940 bill, it was readily
accepted both by the subcommittee and by the SEC.29' The
subsequent evolution of the carrier-investment company, and
the ICC's generally ineffective protection of substantive rights
of investors in such companies, together with the narrow area
of overlapping ICC-SEC interest and of possible conflict, are
compelling evidence of the urgent necessity for repeal of sec-
tion 3(c)(7).
The scope of section 3(c)(7)'s exclusion for carrier-
investment companies is conditioned on the jurisdiction of the
ICC which, in turn, is determined by sections 5(2) and 5(3) of
Advisers Act. Indeed, if the definition of investment adviser were revised also to include
a reference to "securities or property," the Investment Advisers Act would have broad
applicability to all persons giving financial advice, whatever mix of securities and prop-
erty they chose to specialize in. One influential member of Congress has suggested that
he would favor this approach. Remarks ofJohn E. Moss, Chairman, House Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Sacramento
Chapter, International Association of Financial Planners, Inc., Nov. 1, 1974, at 2-3.290 See SPECIAL STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 2D SESs., THE
PENN CENTRAL AND OTHER RAILROADS 424-26 (Comm. print 1972) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL STAFF REPORT]. For various reasons, railroad holding companies were popular
vehicles for the control of operating railroads. See STAFF OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D
CONG., 1ST SESS., INADEQUACIES OF PROTECTIONS FOR INVESTORS IN PENN CENTRAL AND
OTHER ICC-REGULATED COMPANIES (Subcomm. print 1971) [hereinafter cited as STUDY
ON INADEQUACIES]. Further, until the early 1960's the ICC policy stated in the 1913 New
Haven Railroad investigation was maintained: "Every interstate railroad should be pro-
hibited from expending money or incurring liability or acquiring property not in the
operation of its railroad or in the legitimate improvement, extension, or development of
that railroad." The New England Investigation, 27 I.C.C. 560, 616 (1913). Since the early
1960's, the ICC has abstained from actively regulating the non-carrier investments of
holding companies, with the consequent development of diversified carrier-investment
companies.
2'91 Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 776-77 (1940). Originally, it was intended that railway holding
corporations be dealt with under § 3(b)(2). Id. 177. See generally Alleghany Corp., SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 6168 (Aug. 21, 1970), reprinted in Hearing on the
Penn Central Transportation Company Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: Adequacy of Investor Protection, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 62 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Inadequacies].
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the Interstate Commerce Act. 292 Because control of two or more
carriers is sufficient to trigger ICC jurisdiction over "a person
which is not a carrier," an investment company which, using a
small part of its assets, exercises such control is excluded from
the Investment Company Act.293 Indeed, the Pennsylvania Com-
292 49 U.S.C. §§ 5(2), 5(3) (1970). Section 5(2) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the [ICC] ... (i)
... . for a person which is not a carrier to acquire control of two or more
carriers through ownership of their stock or otherwise; or for a person which is
not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of
another carrier ....
Section 5(3) then provides:
Whenever a person which is not a carrier is authorized, by an order entered
under paragraph (2) of this section to acquire control of any carrier . . . such
person thereafter shall . . . be considered as a carrier subject to such of the
following provisions as are applicable to any carrier involved in such acquisition
of control: Sections 20(1) to (10), 304(a)(1) and (2), 320 and 913 [requirements
regarding reporting] . . . and sections 20a(2) to (11), and 314 [requirements
relating to the issuance of securities] of this title ....
Any investment company that controls two or more carriers is "subject to regulation
under the Interstate Commerce Act" and is automatically excluded from the Investment
Company Act regardless of the percentage of its assets consisting of carrier securities.
Thus the proviso to § 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act is readily evaded. See
STUDY ON INADEQUACIES, supra note 290, at 33-34.
29 See note 292 supra. The Alleghany Corporation is a leading example of a com-
pany that has drifted in and out of the class of investment companies by virtue of its
varying substantial interests in railroads and investment securities. Alleghany registered
in 1940 as a closed-end, non-diversified management investment company under the
Investment Company Act. In 1945, Alleghany acquired control of the Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway Company and subsequently received an order from the Commission ter-
minating its registration under the Investment Company Act. Alleghany Corp., SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 809, [1945-1947 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 1 75,575 (Oct. 6, 1945) (order terminating registration pursuant to § 8(f)). Be-
tween 1945 and 1953, however, Alleghany disposed of the bulk of its C & 0 stock, and
acquired a controlling block of the stock of Investors Diversified Services, a registered
investment company. The ICC challenged Alleghany's ICC registration in 1954, and
Alleghany proposed to acquire control of the New York Central Railroad Company. The
SEC also wished to consider Alleghany's status, SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 1990 (July 7, 1954) (notice and order for hearing), but postponed its proceeding and
intervened in the ICC proceedings to argue that Alleghany should be registered under
the Investment Company Act. (During the pendency of the proceedings, Alleghany did
register as an investment company.)
The ICC determined to retain jurisdiction over Alleghany; its decision was appealed,
in effect, by minority common stockholders of Alleghany who commenced an action to
enjoin enforcement of the ICC orders. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (temporary injunction), 138 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (permanent
injunction). On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Commission argued that the exclusion
in § 3(c)(7) should not be available unless a company is actually regulated by the ICC, not
merely subject to its regulation. The Supreme Court sustained ICC jurisdiction over
Alleghany. Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957); cf. Schwartz v.
Alleghany Corp., 282 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stockholder derivative actions chal-
lenging 1954 ICC order); Schwartz v. Bowman, 244 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd
mem. sub nom. Annenberg v. Alleghany Corp., 360 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
921 (1966); Schwartz v. Bowman, 156 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), appeal dismissed sub
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pany, a 100% Penn Central owned company through which the
parent conducted its diversified investments, was excluded from
Investment Company Act coverage because, using at most forty-
four percent of its assets, it controlled several carriers.294 This
anomaly, which is limited only by the doctrine that the ICC must
be actively regulating the carrier-investment company, 295 was
considered in the 1959 congressional hearings on legislation to
amend the Investment Company Act. 296 However, no action was
taken on the problem.
The collapse of the Penn Central in 1970297 brought re-
newed congressional attention to the section 3(c)(7) exclusion.
298
Cognizant of the enormous small-investor interests that were
nom. Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959) (stockholder derivative action chal-
lenging 1945 ICC order). The Commission's position on the scope of § 3(c)(7) was, how-
ever, ultimately considered on the merits and approved. Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp.
213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dormant water carrier must be subject to active regulation by the
ICC to rely on § 3(c)(7)).
With the 1968 merger of the New York Central and Pennsylvania Railroads, Al-
leghany no longer controlled a railroad and once again registered with the Commission
as a closed-end, non-diversified management company. SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 5503 (Oct. 3, 1968) (notice of filing of application). Subsequently, Alleghany
acquired control of Jones Motor Co., a motor carrier, and again filed an application for
deregistration. SEC Investment Company Act Release Nos. 6117 (July 16, 1970) (notice
of filing); 6168 (Aug. 21, 1970) (order of deregistration pursuant to § 8(f)). See generally
SEC Division of Corporate Regulation, Memorandum on the Possible Dual Regulatory
Status of Investment Company-Carriers (Dec. 4, 1970), reprinted in Hearing on Inade-
quacies, supra note 291, at 218.
294 Hearings on Inadequacies, supra note 291, at 31.
295 Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
296 In 1959, SEC Chairman Gadsby testified in support of amendments to § 3(c)(7)
(then § 3(c)(9)) and of addition of new § 6(f), which would have subjected the investment
activities of ICC companies to the Investment Company Act and the carrier and related
activities to the Interstate Commerce Act. H.R. 2481, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1959);
Hearings on H.R. 2481 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 407-17 (1959). The amendments were deleted by the full
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce because "[i]t appears that this matter
needs continuing study." H.R. REP. No. 2178, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1960). The
parallel Senate bill, S. 1181, also contained the proposed amendments, but the amend-
ments were deleted by the full Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in reporting
out S. 3772, a "clean" bill. S. REP. No. 1759, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960). See Meeker,
Current Proposals to Amend the Federal Securities Laws, 37 U. DET. L.J. 335, 350-51 (1960). It
is not entirely clear why the Commission did not recommend that the exclusion for ICC
companies be modified or removed in 1966. See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note
8, at 328.297 See generally J. DAUGHEN & P. BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL (1973).
298 In the House, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce commenced hearings in 1970. Hearings on Inadequacies,
supra note 291. The staff, extremely critical of the ICC's regulation of carrier-investment
companies, listed eight provisions of the Investment Company Act which an SEC regu-
lated Pennsylvania Company would have violated:
If the Investment Company Act had been determined to be applicable to the
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involved,2 99 and that the unregulated Pennsylvania Company lay
at the heart of the cash-flow problem that led to the Penn Cen-
tral bankruptcy, 300 Congress studied whether ICC regulation of
securities issues and of corporate reporting provided the neces-
sary prophylaxis for investors. Subsequently, several legislative
Pennsylvania Company, all of the following prohibitions of the Act would have
been specifically violated:
1. transactions between affiliates without prior approval of the SEC,
especially transactions involving the transfer of assets;
2. excessive management compensation;
3. improper allocation of expenses between parent and subsidiary
company;
4. loans to a parent holding company by a subsidiary;
5. guaranty by a subsidiary of loans made to the parent holding com-
pany by a third party;
6. sale of securities without prior approval of the SEC;
7. issue of senior securities such as preferred stock; and
8. issue of excessive debt.
Needless to say, each and every one of these prohibitions was violated, but
the activity was not unlawful because the Investment Company Act was deter-
mined to be not applicable. The Investment Company Act was passed to prevent
exactly the abuses witnessed in the Penn Central situation. In retrospect, it must
be concluded that the regulation of the ICC has been woefully inadequate with
consequent injury to investors and to the traveling public.
STUDY ON INADEQUACIES, supra note 290, at 36. Providing a side-by-side comparison of
ICC and SEC regulation of such companies, the committee staff recommended that
§ 3(c)(7) be repealed. Id. 5. In 1972, the Subcommittee received the SEC staff report on
the Penn Central collapse. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N STAFF, REPORT ON THE Fi-
NANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY (Subcomm. print 1972) [hereinafter
cited as SEC REPORT ON PENN CENTRAL]. The Report studied in depth the lack of ade-
quate corporate disclosure, the suspicious accounting procedures, the dubious conduct
of senior management, and the ineffective control exercised by the board of directors.
It concluded by attacking the Commission's recommendation that § 3(c)(7) be repealed.
Id. 359-66. Cf. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 92D CONG., IST
SEss., THE PENN CENTRAL FAILURE AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Comm.
print 1972) [hereinafter cited as FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PENN CENTRAL].
The Senate efforts extended to forming a special staff to review the Penn Central.
The staff report was transmitted by Senator Hartke, of the Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation, to Chairman Magnuson late in 1972. SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note
290. While criticizing the ICC's failure to exert regulatory control over investments by
non-carrier holding companies, the staff recommended not that the regulatory power be
shifted to the SEC, but rather that the ICC use its existing statutory power more effec-
tively to impose control over these activities. Id. 422-30.
299 At the time of the failure, 100,000 stockholders each held fewer than 100 shares
of Penn Central. STUDY ON INADEQUACIES, supra note 290, at 6-7.
300 The Pennsylvania Company made cash investments of at least $144 million in
four principal subsidiaries: Arvida Corp., Buckeye Pipe Line Co., Great Southwest Corp.,
and Macco Corp. (all but Buckeye were real estate companies). Assuming an additional
market interest cost of $51 million for additional cash borrowed to finance this diversifi-
cation, at least $195 million was tied up by the Company. In view of the unsuccessful
attempts in 1970 to obtain government guarantees on $200 million in loans and to float
$100 million in bonds, the large sums tied up in the Pennsylvania Co. became especially
significant. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PENN CENTRAL, supra note 298, at 23-148; SEC
REPORT ON PENN CENTRAL, supra note 298, at 5.
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proposals have been considered; in the House-passed version
of the Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 the exclusion was elimi-
nated for railroads.
30 1
Despite the evolution of carrier-investment companies, and
the Allegheny and Penn Central experiences, the exclusion has
survived. The ICC's inadequate protection of investors is fun-
damentally the result of its statutory mandate. 30 2 In carrying out
its responsibilities, the ICC has developed a policy of abstention
from the regulation of non-carrier investments by carriers and
by carrier holding companies, providing an unwarranted gap in
the regulation of investment companies. 30 3 The SEC often has
proposed the repeal of section 3(c)(7) and, realizing the current
lack of investor protection, the ICC has supported that action. 30
4
In view of the above, we urge that section 3(c)(7) be deleted from
the ALI Code.
B. Oil and Gas Programs
Beginning in 1966 in its Report on the Public Policy Implications
of Investment Company Growth,30 5 the Commission has recom-
mended extreme curtailment of the scope of section 3(c)(9),
which excludes from the definition of investment company:
Any person substantially all of whose business consists
301 Bills calling for the repeal of § 3(c)(7) were introduced by Representative Staggers
in two successive Congresses: H.R. 12128, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), was never re-
ported out of Committee; H.R. 9810, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), was subsequently
dropped in favor of the provision in the Rail Reorganization Act. See SEC REPORT ON
PENN CENTRAL, supra note 298, at 338-66.
Rather than insisting upon the complete repeal of § 3(c)(7), as in H.R. 9810, Rep-
resentative Staggers finally supported a partial repeal limited to rail carriers. H.R. 9142,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (The Rail Reorganization Act of 1973); see 119 CONG. REC.
36343 (1973) (remarks of Representative Staggers). See also 119 CONG. REC. 36381
(1973). Although this bill passed the House, the version introduced for consideration in
the Senate did not include even the partial repeal. 119 CONG. REC. 41341 (1973).
Subsequently, yet another attempt to repeal § 3(c)(7) was foiled by the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce. S. 3356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see Hearings on S. 3356 Before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-29, 73-84 (1974).
302 See generally STUDY ON INADEQUACIES, supra note 290, at 3. The purpose of ICC
regulation is to insure the financial integrity of carriers. The thrust of SEC regulation, on
the other hand, is to protect investors. This disparity of purposes also underlies the
tension between bank and insurance company regulators and the SEC regarding invest-
ment services offered by banks and insurance companies. See text accompanying notes
82-109, and 110-12 supra.
'03 SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 290, at 424-26.
"4 Letter from George M. Stafford, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission, to
Representative Harley 0. Staggers, April 10, 1972, in SEC REPORT ON PENN CENTRAL,
supra note 298, at 367, 370.
3o5 PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 8, at 329.
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of owning or holding oil, gas, or other mineral royalties
or leases, or fractional interests therein, or certificates
of interest or participation in or investment contracts
relative to such royalties, leases, or fractional interests.
In the Commission's 1967 draft of the mutual fund legislation,
the exclusion in section 3(c)(9) would have been narrowed in a
manner similar to that-both proposed and passed-regarding
section 3(c)(5) (factoring, discounting, real estate, and mort-
gages) by making section 3(c)(9) unavailable where the oil and
gas program issued redeemable securities, face-amount certifi-
cates, or periodic payment plan certificates. 30 6 The Senate
passed a bill in the Ninety-first Congress containing such a
provision,30 7 but the House did not;30 8 the Conference Commit-
tee determined to drop the oil and gas provision based on an
agreement between the Commission and representatives of the
oil and gas industry to draft legislation modeled after the In-
vestment Company Act but tailored to fit the practices and prob-
306 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(5) (1967). However, a floor amendment
deleted this provision from the bill ultimately reported out of committee. The amend-
ed bill died in the 90th Congress when, the Senate having passed the bill, the House took
no action. 114 CONG. REc. 23539-41 (1968), amending S. 3724, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3(b)(5) (1968); S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1968).
307 S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(5) (1969); S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969). The amendment to § 3(c)(9) would not have become effective until eighteen
months after passage of the bill to give the Commission and the oil and gas industry time
to work out a scheme for regulation under the Investment Company Act through use of
the Commission's exemptive authority in § 6(c). 115 CONG. REc. 13694-97 (1969) (Senate
floor debate on S. 2224).
308 Oil and gas industry witnesses suggested that no scheme of regulation through
exemptive rules under the Investment Company Act would properly accommodate their
present operating structure, which was carefully tailored to receive the most favorable
treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. The Commission then offered a compromise
that would have placed limitations on sales by oil and gas programs to unsophisticated
investors of limited means. Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 180, pt. 2, at 873-74, 936-52 (1969). The House,
however, determined not to amend § 3(c)(9). H. R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
11-12 (1970).
In light of the industry arguments and the position taken by the commission
in its testimony, your committee determined not to make any change in the
existing exemption [sic] for oil and gas funds. At the same time, your committee
recognizes the need for protection of investors in this area. Your committee has
reached this decision only because of the assurances of the Commission and
industry representatives that they will work diligently and expeditiously toward
the goal of recommending an effective scheme for providing investors protec-
tion in this area and that those recommendations will be available to the Con-
gress before 18 months after the enactment of this mutual fund legislation.
Id. 12.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:587
lems of oil and gas programs. °9 In June 1972, the Commission
submitted the Oil and Gas Investment Act of 1972.10
Although the momentum generated by the mutual fund
legislation has not carried the Oil and Gas Bill successfully
through to passage in a subsequent Congress, the abuses that
preceded its submission do not appear to have abated, at least in
terms of continuing litigation over activities of the late 1960's
and early 1970's.3 11 Because of the serious investor protection
problems that still remain in this area,31 2 we recommend that
section 3(c)(9) be repealed or, at least, that Professors Loss and
Brudney and the ALL consider including the Oil and Gas Bill in
the ALI Code.
C. Real Estate and Other Tax Shelter Vehicles; REITs
Investment Company Act section 3(c)(5) excludes from the
definition of investment company:
Any person who is not engaged in the business of issu-
ing redeemable securities, face-amount certificates of
the installment type or periodic payment plan certifi-
cates, and who is primarily engaged in one or more of
the following businesses: .. . (C) purchasing or other-
309 The conference substitute follows the House version but with the firm un-
derstanding that representatives of the oil and gas industry will cooperate with
[the Commission], in working out a reasonable regulatory statute consistent with
the need for protection of investors in this area. Such proposal will be submitted
to the Congress within eighteen months from the passage of this legislation. If,
however, the Commission fails to receive prompt cooperation from the oil and
gas industry on this matter, it is understood by the conferees that the Commis-
sion will submit early in the next Congress appropriate legislation to provide
necessary investor protection in this area.
H.R. REP. No. 1631, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1970).
310 Oil and Gas Investment Act of 1972, H.R. 17082, S. 3884, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). The proposed legislation was resubmitted, but not acted upon, in the Ninety-
third Congress as H.R. 6821 and S. 1050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and has not yet
been resubmitted in the Ninety-fourth Congress. For contemporaneous discussions of
the Oil and Gas Bill, see sources cited in note 157 supra.
311 E.g., Egan, 13 Indicted in Swindle of Celebrities, Wash. Post, Dec. 13, 1974, at D8,
col. 1; Lawson, Otis Chandler Wins Dismissal of Charges in SEC Suit Alleging Geotek Fraud
Role, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1975, at 15, col 2; McClintick, Sharing the Blame? Recent Fraud
Cases Leave Professionals Vulnerable to Charges, Wall St. J., July 7, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Mc-
Clintick, The Big Write-Off, Rich Investors' Losses in New "Ponzi" Scheme Could Hit $100 Mil-
lion, Wall St. J., June 26, 1974, at 1, col. 1; Penn, Promoter's Fall, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1975,
at 1, col. 1.
312 The attempts made by the NASD and Midwest Securities Commissioners, dis-
cussed at note 323 infra, are welcomed from the standpoint of increased investor protec-
tion, but do not, in our view, resolve all of the problems adequately. See text accompany-
ing notes 323-28 infra.
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wise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and in-
terests in real estate.
Thus, despite their striking resemblance to investment com-
panies,313 real estate syndications314 and real estate investment
trusts (REITs)315 whose portfolios are invested in securities have
proceeded, in reliance on section 3(c)(5)(C), to sell interests in
their portfolios to the general public without registration under
the Investment Company Act.3 16
There was a marked increase in the sale3 17 of real estate
313 See note 315 infra.
114 For purposes of this Article, all tax shelter investments other than oil and gas
programs will be lumped together with real estate syndications because the analyses,
arguments, and conclusions we present with respect to each individual type appear to
apply equally to all. All are operated by external investment managers; investors are
given little, if any, opportunity to review or control management decisions. Endemic to
externalized management are potential overreaching, conflicts of interest, and excessive
compensation. For descriptions of different types of tax shelter investments, see R. HAFT,
TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS (1973); P. REID & G. SIMONS, CORPORATE AND EXECUTIVE
TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS (1972).
31
5 See generally OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N,
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS: A BACKGROUND ANALYSIS AND RECENT INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENTS 1961-1974 (1975). A discussion of the complex nature of the REIT is
outside the scope of this Article, but an REIT can be described generally as a mutual
fund that invests in real estate, either fee interests or mortgage interests. For a thorough
discussion which contrasts the federal income tax restraints on REITs with the Invest-
ment Company Act regulatory structure, see Carroll, Tax Policy for the Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts, 28 TAX L. REV. 299 (1973). To obtain tax treatment analogous to that
enjoyed by a mutual fund under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code, an REIT
must satisfy similar conditions, including: (1) be a bona fide trust, managed by trustees,
with at least 100 shareholders and issue transferable interests; (2) hold property as a
passive investment, not for sale to a customer; (3) distribute to its shareholders at least
90% of its ordinary income, 75% of which must be derived from rents, interest on
mortgages, and gains from real property; (4) be managed by an independent contractor;
and (5) not derive any income from rendering services. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§
856-57. The first REITs primarily made equity investment in fee interests in real estate;
those underwritten in the late 1960's were principally mortgage-oriented. See Robertson,
How the Bankers Got Trapped in the REIT Disaster, FORTUNE, March, 1975, at 113.
In view of the many recent discussions of the problems which presently beset the
REIT industry, we will not also extensively review alleged abuses, conflicts of interest,
and super-charged capital structures. See, e.g., Gumpert & Starr, Too Much Too Soon, How
2 Realty Trusts Gave Bankers Big Gains-And Then Big Losses, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1975, at
1, col. 6; Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts Annual Accounting and Tax Conference, Bermuda, June 5,
1975.
316 An unusual example of a venture outside the exclusion provided by § 3(c)(5)(C) is
a limited partnership formed solely to invest in other limited partnerships formed to
invest in government-sponsored housing programs. For a discussion of the circumstances
under which the Commission staff would take a no-action position with respect to this
and similar ventures, see SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8456, 4 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 47,357 (Aug. 9, 1974). For a recent discussion of these two-tier limited
partnerships see Cohen & Hacker, supra note 51, at 486-93.
3 17 For example, during the period 1971-72, registration statements were filed for oil
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syndications, REITs, and other tax shelter securities during the
1960's and 1970's. A corresponding increased concern with in-
vestor protection in this area culminated in 1972 with the SEC's
appointment of a Real Estate Advisory Committee and with the
publication of that Committee's report.318 The Real Estate Ad-
visory Committee ultimately recommended that the Investment
Company Act not be extended to tax shelters, chiefly because of
its apparent belief that section 17 of that Act would have im-
posed an unreasonable restraint on the industry. Nevertheless,
the Committee was concerned that interests in real estate syndi-
cations be able to be offered on a national level, through use of
a single prospectus that would be delivered to the public through
participating NASD members.3 19 The Committee concluded:
[I]f the [state and federal] regulatory agencies are un-
able to achieve uniformity within a reasonable period of
time, the [Real Estate Advisory] Committee would favor
federal legislation that would increase the regulatory
power of the Commission and permit the sale of real
estate securities on a national basis only after the offer-
ing satisfied the requirements of the Commission. 320
With respect to the abuses321 in real estate syndications, the Real
Estate Advisory Committee further concluded that
the proper investor protection can best be achieved by
the investor being able to make an informed investment
decision based on full informative, understandable and
and gas programs, real estate, and other more exotic tax shelters totaling slightly less
than $4.8 billion; registration statements regarding REITs totaled slightly less than $4
billion. NASD News, Aug., 1973, at 4.
318 REAL ESTATE REPORT, supra note 51. A summary of the Committee's recommen-
dations is printed in [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,265 (Oct.
12, 1972). For contemporaneous discussions of the Real Estate Report, see Address by SEC
Chairman Casey, National Association of Real Estate Boards, Honolulu, Hawaii, Nov. 13,
1972; The Dickey Report on Syndications, 8 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST L.J. 439
(1973); Comment, Regulation of Real Estate Syndications: An Overview, 49 WASH. L. REV.
137 (1973).
319 REAL ESTATE REPORT, supra note 51, at 13-15, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,265, at 82,772-73 (Oct. 12, 1972).
2 o Id. In the more detailed discussion that followed its recommendations, the Real
Estate Advisory Committee suggested a period of one year as being a reasonable time in
which to achieve uniformity. Id. 34. But see Comment, Condominium Regulation: Beyond
Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 665-69 (1975) (disclosure has failed to solve problems
related to abuses in real estate offerings).
321 For the Real Estate Advisory Committee's views of actual or potential abuses, see
REAL ESTATE REPORT, supra note 5 1, at 35-50 (sales literature, conflicts of interest, and
compensation).
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uniform economic disclosures in real estate security
offerings . . . . If, however, improved disclosure and
enforcement does not achieve this end, a regulatory
approach, perhaps one similar to the Oil and Gas In-
vestment Bill of 1972 may be necessary. 2
In our view, the Real Estate Advisory Committee was partly
right in both conclusions. With respect to disclosure require-
ments, there is a great difference between "stickering" a prospec-
tus to satisfy unusual disclosure requirements in a particular
state and having to write different registration statements for
different states that have different substantive guidelines for the
same type of tax shelters.3 23 Further, just as section 24(d) of the
32 2 Id. 4 (footnote omitted). Other commentators have concluded that an Investment
Company Act-type approach may be warranted. Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regu-
lation of Condominium Offerings, 19 N.Y.L.F. 473, 491 n.79 (1974); Shipman, Foreword to
Securities Symposium, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 253 (1974); Cohen & Hacker, supra note 51, at
493-98.
323 At least three different regulatory patterns have been formulated. California has
adopted the Real Estate Syndicate Act. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10250 et seq. (West
Supp. 1974); 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 260.140.110.1 et seq. (West Supp. 1974). Such
securities may be sold to no more than 100 investors. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10251(a)
(West Supp. 1974). Other offerings are subject to the California Corporate Securities
Law. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100(e) (West Supp. 1974); 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 260.140 et
seq. (West Supp. 1974).
California provides minimum standards for suitability, compensation, conflicts of
interest, and self-dealing. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 260.140.110.1 et seq. (West Supp.
1974). See Van Camp, Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investments: The Calfornia Model,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 309 (1974); Van Camp, Living with Tax Shelters in California: A Discussion
of the New California Real Estate Syndication Rules, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 403 (1973). For a
thorough discussion of suitability standards under the California rules, see Hall, Investor
Suitability Standards in Real Estate Syndication: California's Procrustean Bed Approach, 63
CALIF. L. REv. 471 (1975).
Besides the California scheme, the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association
has adopted a Statement of Policy regarding real estate programs and regarding publicly
offered cattle feeding programs. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4811, 4821 (1975). The Midwest
Commissioners' Statement of Policy for real estate programs contains provisions regard-
ing: (1) requirements for sponsors; (2) suitability; (3) fees, compensation, and expenses;
(4) conflicts of interest; (5) blind pools; (6) rights and obligations of participants;
(7) disclosure; and (8) miscellaneous subjects. The California rules and Midwest Guide-
lines are compared to the NASD's proposed rules discussed below in REAL ESTATE
REPORT, supra note 51, at 34-35.
Finally, in May 1972 the NASD proposed tax shelter rules as amendments to Art.
III, § 33 of the Rules of Fair Practice. CCH NASD MANUAL 2001-2401. The proposed
rules were divided into eight categories: (1) general requirements of sponsors and re-
quirements concerning subscriptions, assessments, reinvestments of revenue, and liquida-
tions; (2) rights of participants; (3) conflicts of interest; (4) suitability; (5) organization
and offering expenses; (6) sponsor's compensation; (7) periodic reports by sponsors; and
(8) sales literature. In July, 1973, the Commission invited public comment on the NASD's
proposed tax shelter rules, and posed three policy questions for comment: (1) whether
the scope of the NASD's proposed rules is supported by or conflicts with federal regula-
tory authority under the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act; (2) whether
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Investment Company Act was required for the effective regula-
tion of investment companies, federal preemption of the disclo-
sure process is required to remove certain exemptions from the
registration provisions of the Securities Act that are presently
available to real estate syndications. 24
It is becoming increasingly clear that mere disclosure of
overreaching, conflicts of interest, and excessive compensation
does not provide adequate regulation of tax shelter vehicles. Nor
is it wise to rely on broad antifraud rules or fraud-oriented en-
there is a need for development of a federal legislative program to bring issuer-oriented
regulation under the Commission's regulatory umbrella; and (3) whether the NASD
should proceed to implement immediately those of its proposed tax shelter rules which
fall into its traditional self-regulatory function. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
10260, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,417 (July 2, 1973). On May 6,
1974, the Commission's Division of Market Regulation informed the NASD that the
Commission had concluded that it would welcome prompt submission by the NASD of
rules dealing with organization and offering expenses (e.g., underwriter compensation),
suitability, and the content of advertising and sales literature. NASD, [1973-1974 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,810 (SEC staff letter, May 6, 1974). The letter
went on to encourage the NASD io consider whether those of its rules which were
issuer-oriented-and should not be applied to sponsors, issuers, and others who were not
members (or affiliated with members) of the NASD-could, nevertheless, be useful as
general guidelines of suitability where they were not directly applicable; it also an-
nounced that the Commission had authorized its staff to prepare draft legislation for its
consideration.
Because there are at least three tax shelter regulatory approaches, a proposed tax
shelter deal tailored to satisfy one approach may be sold only in that state, or in states
with substantially similar structural and operational rules and guidelines. It is also possi-
ble that the NASD rules would permit a deal to be sold by NASD members, but the state
would not allow the prospectus to be disseminated, or the reverse. As the Real Estate
Advisory Committee stated, "the most overriding need ... is the need for uniformity;"
"investor protection is not likely to be served by layered and inconsistent guidelines."
REAL ESTATE REPORT, supra note 51, at 24, 32.
324 Section 24(d) provides that Securities Act §§ 3(a)(8) (insurance contracts) and
3(a)( 1) (intrastate offerings), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(8), (11) (1970), do not apply to any
security issued by an investment company. Securities Act rule 240, which exempts certain
limited offers and sales by closely held issuers, is also not available to any registered
investment company. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(b) (1975). Thus, the nonpublic offering ex-
emption of Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), as interpreted by rule 146,
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975), is the only exception to full registration available to invest-
ment companies registered under Investment Company Act § 3(c)(1). This narrowing of
the exemptions from registration is extremely important in view of estimates that 90% of
all real estate and other tax shelter offerings are intrastate or nonpublic offerings. REAL
ESTATE REPORT, supra note 51, at 11-12. See also NASD, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,810, at 84,194 (SEC staff letter, May 6, 1974) (concerning
NASD's proposed tax shelter rules):
The greater part of the offerings of tax shelter programs, by dollar volume,
appears to be sold in transactions characterized by the participants as not involv-
ing a public offering, and the Commission urges the [NASD] to emphasize that a
member's obligation with respect to suitability exists in connection with every
recommendation for the purchase of a security, not merely those made in con-
nection with offerings that are classified as public by the [NASD].
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forcement actions (whether Commission-initiated or private);
that would be a piecemeal regulatory approach, highly depen-
dent upon good timing and good luck. What is needed is a regu-
latory statute325 along the lines of the Investment Company Act
addressed directly to the abuses, including overreaching, 326 con-
flicts of interest,327 and excessive compensation. 328 To the extent
that the Advisory Committee's rejection of an Investment Com-
pany Act-type regulatory scheme for real estate tax shelters was
premised on its belief that section 17 would have imposed an
unreasonable burden on the industry, revision of that section
along the lines we have proposed will, we believe, meet those
objections.
Accordingly, we recommend that Professors Loss and
Brudney and the ALI consider regulatory provisions for real
estate syndications and all other tax shelter investment vehicles
formed as limited partnerships.329 REITs, on the other hand,
would not fit comfortably into provisions for limited partner-
ships, but could fit comfortably within the ALI Code provisions
patterned after the Investment Company Act.
V. CONCLUSION
We have made a number of suggestions regarding amend-
ment of the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts
which, in our view, would cure errors, omissions, and needless
32- We recognize that there will always be frauds, detailed disclosure documents and
regulatory statutes notwithstanding: That has certainly been the Commission's experi-
ence with all of the federal securities laws. However, the existence of a strong regulatory
statute engenders fairness at the outset and, by its mere existence, tends to prevent or
inhibit certain types of frauds. Moreover, a good inspection program and aggressive
self-regulation under such a statute can also provide substantial investor protection
against overreaching, conflicts of interest, and excessive compensation. In other words,
although there may still be a need to improve disclosure and to improve detection of and
enforcement against frauds, a regulatory statute governing real estate and other tax
shelters is needed to provide investor protection in those situations where full disclosure
is not enough and actions for fraud are just too late.
326 See text accompanying notes 157-76 supra.
327 See text accompanying notes 177-204 supra.
12
8 See text accompanying notes 137-57 supra.
329 It was recently reported that the Real Estate Securities and Syndication Institute
was drafting a model real estate securities law for submission in all state legislatures.
Uniform State Real Estate Securities Laws Sought, BNA SEC. REG. & L. RE'. No. 301, at A-22
to A-23 (May 7, 1975).
One striking example of the inadequacy of state law to furnish significant investor
protection is that, under the law of limited partnerships applicable in most jurisdictions,
any attempt on the part of the limited partner to oversee the partnership's business may
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complexities in the two 1940 Acts, and which would seem to fall
clearly within the scope and spirit of the ALI Federal Securities
Code Project. Our last three recommendations, regarding ICC
companies, oil and gas programs, and tax shelters and REITs
may be more controversial,330 in that we would impose a federal
regulatory statute where one does not now exist. We believe,
however, that an improved regulatory environment for those
industries would be in the public interest and appropriate for
the protection of investors, and therefore should be given seri-
ous consideration by Professors Loss and Brudney and the ALI.
be deemed an exercise of "control" with the result that the privilege of limited liability is
forfeited. See REAL ESTATE REPORT, supra note 51, at 95-97.
330 Although we believe that our recommendations regarding ICC companies, oil
and gas programs, and tax shelters and REITs would provide significant investor protec-
tions, are long overdue, and warrant serious consideration, we are not unmindful of the
political considerations which Professors Loss and Brudney and the ALl must take into
account. Moreover, we believe the ALl Code project is an extremely important endeavor
and wish to make clear our support of its central purpose. Thus, we would understand a
decision by the ALl not to propose regulatory provisions in the oil and gas, tax shelter,
and REIT areas if such a proposal would, in their view, ultimately jeopardize passage of
the overall ALl Code.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSAL
TO "ABOLISH" THE
INSANITY DEFENSE IN S. 1:
SQUEEZING A LEMON
HEATHCOTE W. WALESt
I. INTRODUCTION
As debate over the function and administration of the insan-
ity defense has heightened in recent years, abolition of the de-
fense has become an increasingly serious alternative.' The Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary is now considering one such
proposal. Section 522 of the proposed Criminal Justice Re-
form Act of 1975,2 popularly known as S. 1, states a viable de-
fense if "the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
lacked the state of mind required as an element of the offense
charged. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense."
Born of frustrations over the administration of the insanity
t Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University, A.B. 1965, University of
North Carolina; J.D. 1968, University of Chicago.
1 For the abolitionist positions, see, e.g., S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS
OF CRIME 212-28, 341-42 (1967); H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
24-25 (1964); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 123-46 (1963); B. WOOTTON,
CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963); Goldstein, The Brawner Rule-Why? or No More
Nonsense on Non Sense in the Criminal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 126; Goldstein &
Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense'-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Morris, Psychiatry
and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 514 (1968). Dean Morris' article contains a
summarization of the various positions in an appendix. Id. 544-47.
For arguments that the insanity defense be retained, see, e.g., H. FINGARETTE, THE
MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 1-15 (1972); A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE
222-26 (1967); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 131-35 (1968); Brady,
Abolish the Insanity Defense?-No!, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 629 (1971); Kadish, The Decline of
Innocence, 26 CAMB. L.J. 273 (1968); Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26
RUTGERS L. REv. 719 (1973).
Platt, The Proposal to Abolish the Federal Insanity Defense: A Critique, 10 CAL. WESTERN L.
REv. 449 (1974), discusses constitutional objections to the Nixon Administration's aboli-
tion proposals, but does not consider the manner in which judicial construction can
undercut abolition through an expanded version of mens rea. See text accompanying notes
100-31 infra.
2 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). All citations to S. 1 in this Article refer to the
Committee Print of May 16, 1975.
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defense, the death of the Durham experiment,3 and the rising
influence of the behaviorist position,4 the abolitionist argument
has become respectable for liberal and conservative alike. A
forerunner to section 522 was proposed by a consultant to the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
(Brown Commission) in 1970 but was rejected by the
Commission. 5 Abolition of the insanity defense reemerged in the
Nixon Administration bill in 19736 and has remained in the
Judiciary Committee's bill ever since.
Section 522 is abolitionist in the sense of eliminating a
"separate insanity defense."'7 Although evidence of mental dis-
ease or defect is admissible if it tends to negate the mental ele-
3See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc), overruling
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
The Durham experiment was itself born of frustrations over what Judge Bazelon and
his colleagues on the District of Columbia Circuit considered the limited scope of expert
psychiatric testimony under the M'Naghten rule, M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L. 1843). See Durham, supra at 866-74. Largely indigenous to the District of Columbia
Circuit (New Hampshire has followed a similar rule for nearly a century, see, e.g., State v.
Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870)), Durham exculpated from criminal punishment those individu-
als whose forbidden acts were "the product of a mental disease or defect." Durham, supra
at 874-75. The standard underwent great flux before its demise. See Carter v. United
States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (requiring "but for" causation); Blocker v. United
States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (requiring updated expert testimony
on whether a sociopathic personality disturbance is to be considered a mental disease or
defect); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (defining
mental disease or defect); Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(criticizing conclusory psychiatric labels). Finally, in Brawner, the District of Columbia
Circuit-with Judge Bazelon concurring in part and dissenting in part, Brawner, supra at
1010-39-rejected the Durham rule, citing as its chief defect the domination of the trier of
fact by expert medical and psychiatric witnesses on the issue of insanity, id. at 977-78.
The court adopted a modified version of the American Law Institute rule. Compare id. at
990-94, 1006 n.82, 1008, with MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Though now abandoned and largely unsuccessful in accomplishing its stated goals,
Durham at least proved fruitful in stimulating scholarly and judicial debate on the nature
and purposes of the insanity defense. See Brawner, supra at 976.
4 See, e.g., B. WOOTTON, supra note 1; Monahan, supra note 1, at 733-38.
The behaviorist position stresses that free will is an illusion and that behavior is
conditioned by numerous forces, so that the sole function of the criminal law should be
to modify the personalities of those committing antisocial acts. Accordingly, insanity
becomes relevant only at the sentencing-dispositional stage. See H. PACKER, supra note 1,
at 12.
5 See 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAws 234 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
6 S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1973): "It is a defense to a prosecution under
any federal criminal statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
lacked the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense."
7 See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REVISION, AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, at 111 n.73
(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIARY COMI. STAFF REPORT].
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ment (mens rea) of a crime, it does not constitute a general de-
fense of excuse. Proponents are fond of the illustration of the
man who strangles his wife believing he is merely squeezing
lemons.8 His defense is that he lacked the intent to kill another
human being. His need for introducing evidence of mental dis-
ease would be to give credibility to his story. 9 If section 522 is
indeed restricted to such delusional mistakes of fact, then the
draftsmen have succeeded in largely abolishing the insanity de-
fense as we now know it.
Two problems are posed. First, one may question whether
such alteration of the insanity defense can coexist with an other-
wise rather traditional structure of criminal liability and defenses
without standing the logic of that structure on its head. This
question poses corollary issues of policy and constitutional
interpretation.' 0 Second, one may question whether judicial con-
struction of this "decidely opaque"" provision will conform to
the expectations of the draftsmen. Distinguished students of the
insanity defense have inferred a remarkably broad range of in-
terpretations of the meaning and effect of section 522.12
8 ld. 106. The illustration is drawn from MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment 2
(Tent. Draft No, 4, 1955).
9 Given the redundancy between §§ 522 and 521 (mistake of fact or law), see notes
101-10 infra & accompanying text, it is unclear whether the trier of fact must find that
the defendant had a mental disease or defect as -a precondition to allowing a defense in
the lemon-squeezing illustration. Section 522 implies that such a finding of fact is neces-
sary, as does § 3617(c)(4)(B), which requires the expert witness' conclusion on that issue.
Yet the defendant's proof would be simplified if he could bring his defense under § 521;
and, if successful, he could win outright acquittal rather than the special verdict of
acquittal by reason of insanity with its accompanying civil commitment procedures under
§ 3612-13. See note 31 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 13-99 infra. The due process clause may well be
offended by either partial or total abolition, text accompanying notes 84-99 infra.
I IHearings on S. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. XII, at 219 (1975) (statement of Chief
Judge David L. Bazelon, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
'2 While there is a very vague intent to restrict the insanity defense, the use of
the terms "mental disease or defect" ambiguously indicates some form of
Durham-like experimentation. . . . [T]he Section could be read as endorsing
either the view of the court in Brawner on the role of the jury or the view
expressed in my dissenting opinion.
Id. 288 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, Jr.).
"The ... approach is strikingly reminiscent of the Durham rule." Hearings on S. 1 &
S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. VIII, at 6381 (1973) (statement of Prof. Abraham S.
Goldstein) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
"In effect, S. I abolishes the defense of insanity, since lack of the required criminal
intent is a defense, independent of insanity, in any case." Schwartz, A Proposal to Overhaul
the Federal Criminal Laws, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1975, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4, col. 5.
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II. THE LEMON SQUEEZING VIEW
If we take the draftsmen at their word, section 522 would
exculpate mistakes of fact arising from grossly abnormal ideation
and little else. 13 The lemon-squeezing spouse-killer would be ac-
quitted if the jury were persuaded that he literally thought that
his wife was a lemon.' 4 But if the same defendant was spurred to
kill by voices, by a prolonged depression, or by an uncontrollable
rage associated with a tumor or other organic damage, he should
be convicted.' 5 Not only would the defense discriminate against
particular types of disorders-particularly the affective disorders
such as manic-depressive psychosis-but it would also discrimi-
nate among phases of delusions arising from a single thought
disorder. Thus our lemon-fixated defendant who dispatches his
wife while trying to grip her firmly to prevent her turning into a
lemon is guilty of reckless homicide.'
6
Beneath this interpretation of section 522 lies the criminal
law's traditional objective view of mens rea. The defendant is
assumed to be a rational being exercising free choice. 17 Grada-
tions of culpability are geared to the actor's awareness of his
conduct, the circumstances in which he acts, and the conse-
quences of his conduct, as well as to an evaluation of the ob-
jective conduct, circumstances, and consequences themselves.' 8
13 See JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 106. Similarly, if A suffers
from paranoid delusions that B is trying to kill him, and A kills B, A would be entitled to
an imperfect defense of self-defense, reducing his crime to reckless or negligent
homicide. See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 544(b) (1975).
14 Actually he could be convicted of negligent homicide, S. 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. §
1603 (1975), unless the subjective aspect of negligence--"a reasonable person ... in such
a situation," id. § 302-were enlarged to include his mental abnormality. See Kadish, supra
note 1, at 280.5 
See JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 107 n.64.
16 A similar case occurred recently in Washington, D. C. Defendant, waiting at a bus
stop, perceived that a woman stranger standing near him was rapidly changing shapes.
He proceeded to throttle her-as he explained it, to make her stay in one form so that he
could talk to her. The woman was near death when the man was pulled away by onlook-
ers. The police, rather than booking him, delivered him to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for
reasons of convenience to the police, and the man was civilly committed. No criminal
charges were filed. Conversation between Herbert M. Silverberg, Chief, Mental Health
Division, Public Defender Service, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C., and the
author, Dec. 3, 1974.
17 "Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the
vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and
doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
250 n.4 (1952), (quoting Pound, Introduction to F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW
xxxvi-xxxvii (1927)). See also Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir.
1954). 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20-21.
18 "If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to
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Therefore, the only way to negate mens rea, strictly speaking, is to
demonstrate the absence of awareness of the conduct, circum-
stances, or consequences to which the mens rea applies. In so
doing, one never reaches the underlying assumption that the
defendant is a rational being.
Mens rea has not always been so narrow a construct.' 9 Terms
such as "malice, .... premeditation," and "deliberation" have from
time to time incorporated into the criminal law qualitative con-
cepts of culpability beyond mere awareness of conduct, circum-
stances, and consequences. Recent codification efforts, however,
including sections 301 and 302 of S. 1, have followed the lead of
the Model Penal Code in refining a more objective concept of
mens rea. 20 Thus, the lemon-squeezing view of section 522 is con-
sistent with the emerging view of mens rea.
But what of the underlying assumption of free will? The
Model Penal Code and virtually every code derived from it pro-
vide at least two defenses unrelated to mens rea that may negate
the threshold capacity for free choice assumed by the criminal
law. One, the automatism or involuntariness defense, negates a
prescribed element of the crime, the requirement of a voluntary
act or omission.2' The other, the insanity defense, assumes a
voluntary or conscious act and is directed at substantial impair-
ments to the capacity for free choice arising from mental disorder.
22
Together, the two defenses suggest a concept of culpability
broader than that reflected by the element of mens rea.23 It is
only when the two-step hurdle of minimal capacity for free
choice has been crossed-whether by presumption or by the
state's overcoming defense evidence-that the more refined
measures of culpability contained in the mens rea element
are brought into play. Yet neither defense exists on the face
of S. 1.24
him, and that conduct is forbidden by law under those circumstances, he intentionally
breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent." Ellis v. United
States, 206 U.S. 246, 257 (1907).
19 See generally Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMe. L.J. 31
(1936).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
21 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See generally
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 179-81 (1972).
22 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
23 Other defenses, such as duress, self-defense, and provocation, also tend to reflect
a broader, more subjective notion of culpability. See generally notes 111-13 infra & accom-
panying text.
2 4 See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102, 111 (1975). But see id. § 501 (defenses listed
in S. 1 are not exclusive).
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A. The Committee's Rationale
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Staff Report 25 does not
directly confront the significant changes in the culpability con-
cept implied in the lemon-squeezing interpretation of section
522. Rather, the Report criticizes current formulations of the
insanity defense as vague, wasteful, and inefficient and urges
simple abolition of the inquiry into concepts of responsibility in
favor of more efficient procedures for sorting out and designat-
ing for treatment those offenders exhibiting psychopathology of
any variety.2 6 "The critical issue is seen as one of disposition.
27
Indeed, the Report advances the novel argument2 8 that dis-
positional proceedings constitute a proper forum for determin-
ing culpability.
[T]he stigma attached to a determination of criminality
will be materially mitigated at the sentencing stage by
publicly adjudging [persons convicted under S. 1 who
would have been acquitted under other insanity tests] to
be deserving of proper medical care rather than deserv-
ing of a punitive sentence of imprisonment. The nature
of the disposition ... will constitute society's recognition
of the defendant's lack of moral culpability for his
offense.
2 9
Dean Morris has argued that the current practice of deliver-
ing a special verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity combined
with the commitment of insanity acqriittees amounts to double
stigmatization of the defendant as both bad and mad.30 Surely a
criminal conviction combined with commitment to a psychiatric
facility for criminals will not ameliorate the stigma visited upon
this unfortunate class.3 ' Furthermore, hospitalization of a con-
25 
JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7.
26 These procedures can be found in S. 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 3611-17 (1975).
2 7
JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 106.
28 See B. WOOTTON, supra note I. In contrast to the Woottonian position, which
attempts to eliminate all elements of culpability, the S. 1 abolitionist approach would
apparently retain culpability while allowing psychiatric evidence at the dispositional hear-
ing of an offender convicted because he was unable to establish a mistake-of-fact defense
based on mental disease or defect.
2 9
JUDICIARY COMNIM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 107.
30 Morris, supra note 1, at 524-25.
"1 See Kadish, supra note 1, at 283; Monahan, supra note 1, at 729-3 1. For those few
who may be acquitted under § 522, the same, less formal double stigmatization occurs.
Defendants are accorded a "special verdict" of "not guilty by reason of insanity" under §
3612 and are subjected to proceedings under § 3613 to determine whether they should
be indefinitely hospitalized as mentally ill and dangerous.
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victed person under S. 1 occurs when the person is found to be
suffering from a mental disease or defect and in need of
treatment, 32 so that persons who might have been acquitted
under other insanity tests will be grouped with all other prison-
ers who might benefit from psychiatric care, whether or not
their mental disabilities contributed to their criminal conduct.
Finally, disposition occurs without a jury33 and in substantial
reliance on a psychiatrist's opinion as to the prisoner's present
mental condition. Culpability is simply not in issue.
On a practical level, substituting criminal sentences with
medical treatment for the idefinite commitments usually given to
persons acquitted under current insanity tests is no favor to the
accused, despite the Committee's suggestion to the contrary.
34
Maximum sentences under S. 1 are already substantial, and sec-
tion 3616 permits indefinite commitment of prisoners whose
sentences have expired but who are found to be mentally ill and
dangerous. A convicted person is compelled to receive psychiat-
ric treatment under sections 3614 and 3615 until he is no longer
in need of treatment, whereas section 3613 requires treatment of
the insanity acquittee only so long as he is mentally ill and
dangerous. When the prisoner is discharged from treatment, he
may have to return to prison for the remainder of his sentence, 35
a factor that may discourage discharge.3 6 In short, convicting
those who might otherwise win insanity acquittals subjects such
32 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3614(d), 3615(d) (1975). Because of its extreme
breadth and flexibility, the standard "in need of treatment" raises serious policy and
constitutional questions. Some psychiatrists would view almost any prisoner to be in need
of treatment. See, e.g., Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric
Association, 19 J. C iM. L.C. & P.S. 367, 373 (1928). For the argument that "commitment
on these grounds [mentally ill or in need of treatment] is of necessity a completely
arbitrary act," see Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 748 (1974). See also Developments in the
Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1212-19 (1974).
33 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3614(d), 3615(d) (1975); see 1973 Hearings, supra note
11, at 6379; Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance,
10 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 559, 583 n.103 (1972).
34 JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 108-09.
3' Persons committed while they are serving prison sentences, S. 1, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 3615 (1975), must be returned to prison for the remainder of their sentences
upon discharge from the hospital, id. § 3615 (e). However, persons committed after
conviction but prior to sentencing, id. § 3614, may, upon discharge from the hospital,
obtain adjustment of sentence, id. § 3614(e). The tradeoff is that § 3614 commitments
are given provisional maximum sentences for their offenses at the time of commitment,
id. § 3614(d).
36 Some psychiatrists may be reluctant to return patients to prison for fear that the
prison environment will occasion a relapse. Should this occur in the context of § 3614
commitments, persons so committed would in effect be receiving automatic maximum
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persons to incarceration for a period determined by their past
criminal conduct as well as by their future propensities, whereas
commitment of insanity acquittees, in theory at least, relates only
to future dangerousness.
37
Nor can we take comfort in the Committee's second justifi-
cation for criminalizing the class that under current insanity tests
would be acquitted. In one breath, the Committee suggests that
the injustice wrought by extending culpability to this class will be
minimal because the class is so small. 8 In the next breath, the
Committee urges the benefits to the criminal justice system of
convicting members of this meager class who should and would
have been convicted but for the vagaries of existing insanity
formulations. 39 Playing the numbers both ways is awkward
enough; suggesting that it is better to convict ten nonculpable
persons than to let one malingerer go free is strange talk
indeed.
40
The remaining justifications advanced by the Committee for
narrowing the insanity defense form a catalog of the criticisms
directed at existing insanity tests. With one exception, all of these
criticisms are equally applicable to section 522. Like other formu-
lations, the section 522 defense is subject to expert domination,
both because it is tied to a factual finding of "mental disease or
defect"41 and because psychiatric experts are required by section
sentences solely because they were found mentally ill and in need of hospitalization. See
note 35 supra.
Furthermore, insanity acquittees committed under § 3613 are likely to be deemed by
the courts to be entitled to the least restrictive form of confinement and/or treatment
consistent with their mental condition and degree of dangerousness. See generally
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 1107 (1972). The application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine will of ne-
cessity be more restrictive for those committed while awaiting or serving criminal sen-
tences under §§ 3614-15.
37 To the extent that theory does not conform to practice, see note 49 infra, the better
approach would seem to be to reform the practice rather than to adulterate the theory.
38 JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 107 n.63.
39 Id. But cf. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 131, 110 P. 1020, 1028 (1910) (Rudkin,
C.J., concurring): "[T]he remedy for acquittals through maudlin sentiment or in re-
sponse to popular clamor must be sought by correcting false notions, and not by destroy-
ing the safeguards of private liberty."
40 Even if we can agree on who "should" have been acquitted by reason of insanity, it
is unlikely that the number of persons "improperly" acquitted is very large. Most persons
who might qualify for the defense never go to trial on the issue. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 23-24; Morris, supra note 1, at 519.
41 See note 9 supra. See also Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir.
1967); 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 225 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
Jr.).
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3617 (c)(4)(B) to give conclusory testimony on whether the men-
tal disease or defect operated to negate the defendant's mens rea
at the time of the offense.42 Like other formulations, section 522
is likely to remain a "rich man's defense" 43 because section
3617(b) denies the indigent accused the right to an independent
psychiatrist. Like M'Naghten,4 4 section 522 emphasizes cognitive
mental functioning to the exclusion of all else. Like other formu-
lations, section 522 mingles vague medical terms (mental disease
or defect) unintelligible to lawyers with an unrelated moral-legal
term (mens rea).45 Like many existing procedural provisions, sec-
tion 3613 insures that those few persons who are acquitted
under section 522 will be hospitalized indefinitely if found to be
mentally ill and dangerous.
46
The one criticism of existing insanity tests that section 522
does attempt to resolve is that psychiatric resources have been
misallocated to the guilt-determination process when they could
be devoted to treatment. If the courts adopt the strict lemon-
squeezing view of section 522, a contingency that is questioned
below, 47 then the number of defendants raising the insanity de-
fense will probably drop, thereby reducing the allocation of
psychiatric resources to determinations of guilt.48 The possibility
that such gains may be offset by other demands on psyshiatric
resources by other provisions of S. 1 is not considered in the
Committee Staff's Report.
49
42 If the courts respond to § 522's limitation on the insanity defense, as I believe they
will, by articulating a broader mens rea defense, see text accompanying notes 100-31 infra,
expert conclusions will continue to dominate the adjudication stage.
43 
JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 108 n.65.
44 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
4' The Report confesses this defect but notes that "the reduction in availability of the
defense reduces the harm and impact of the necessary vagueness." JUDICIARY COMM.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 110. That statement may be applicable to other defects in
§ 552 as well.
46 Even in jurisdictions that do not make commitment of insanity acquittees auto-
matic, in practice commitment ensues in virtually every case. See Pugh, The Insanity
Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 87, 92 n.8. See also Goldstein, supra note 1 at 132-33.
47 See notes 100-31 infra and accompanying text.
48 See JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 111.
49 For example, hearings required by §§ 3614-15 for hospitalization of persons who
under other insanity tests might have been acquitted will require some psychiatric par-
ticipation in an adversary setting. Similarly, persons committed under these sections may
be hospitalized for longer periods than if they had been civilly committed. Cf. Burt, Of
Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils of the "Criminal-Insane," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 258, 261
(1974): "The systematic empirical research available in current literature has uniformly
found that those persons caught in the 'criminal-insane' statuses are as a rule confined
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The policy of getting psychiatrists out of the courtroom has
multiple objectives, 50 not all of them commendable. To the ex-
tent that the draftsmen wish to end "the unseemly battle of the
experts,"' 5 1 their solution seems misdirected. The battle becomes
unseemly only when the experts stray beyond their expertise
into opinions on law and morality, whether such wanderings are
the result of their own foibles or the law's specific requests.52
Legislators might more profitably direct their efforts toward
limiting the experts to testimony on their clinical assessments of
a defendant's mental functioning at the time of the alleged
offense. 53  Presumably, public disagreement between two
psychiatrists over such clinical judgments does not diminish their
stature or that of their profession.
Thus the Senate draftsmen address deficiencies in the oper-
ation of current insanity defense formulations by reducing the
availability (and visibility) of the defense rather than by attempt-
ing to cure the deficiences. 54 The draftsmen seem to perceive
the defense as having failed as a mechanism for diversion of the
sick offender to non-punitive treatment, a point already con-
ceded by others on both practical55 and constitutional 56 grounds.
Hence, the primary drafting efforts in S. 1 for mentally abnor-
mal offenders have been directed toward tightening up disposi-
tion procedures to insure such offenders' detention until they
are no longer dangerous. 57 What is missing is an effort to recon-
for longer terms than comparable persons who are socially labeled either 'criminal' or
'insane' alone." See also text accompanying note 37 supra.
50 See JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 111.
51 Id.
'2 See Wales, The Rise, the Fall, and the Resurrection of the Medical Model, 63 GEO. L.J.
87, 91-93 (1974). Compare Psychiatric News, Feb. 5, 1974, at 23, col. 1 (Dr. Alan Stone,
urging psychiatrists to stay out of the courtroom) with Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adver-
sary Process, SCIENTIFIC AM., June 1974, at 18.
'3 Section 3617(c)(4)(B) takes directly the opposite approach, requiring psychiatrists to
report in conclusory terms whether the defendant's mental disease or defect negated the
mental elements in the crimes charged.
"4 See note 45 supra.
" See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 219.56 See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, J.) (interpreting D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-301(a), (d) (1967) to require pre-commitment hearing for insanity ac-
quittees with procedures substantially similar to those in civil commitment proceedings,
avoiding equal protection issue). See generally Note, Commitment of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity: The Example of the District of Columbia, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 733 (1974);
Comment, Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the Equal Protection of the
Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 924 (1968).
-7 See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3611-17 (1975); JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 7, at 1000-18.
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cile the changes wrought by section 522 with the criminal law's
concept of culpability and fully to rationalize the preventive con-
finement scheme created by the new dispositional provisions.
B. Abolition-A Second Look
Dean Morris, whose stylish article may well have been the
basis for the lemon-squeezing version of section 522,58 addresses
the culpability issue somewhat more fully than the Senate
draftsmen, although he too is primarily concerned with remov-
ing psychiatrists from the courtroom to the correctional process.
In so doing, he passes over the impact of his proposal on the
emerging jurisprudence of preventive confinement.
Dean Morris begins by suggesting that current formulations
of the insanity defense are too narrow. By conditioning the de-
fense on a finding of mental disease or defect, the law ignores
other equally potent impairments to the exercise of free will,
such as "dwelling in a Negro ghetto. '59 If we are unwilling to
recognize a broader defense of incapacity, a solution which, he
argues, "would politically be intolerable,"60 then we do no great
injustice to eliminate the excuse based on mental illness.61
But what is meant by "politically . . . intolerable?" Dean
Morris seems to suggest that because dwelling in a black ghetto is
more criminogenic than being mentally ill, the former is a more
58 Morris, supra note 1. It is unlikely, however, that Dean Morris would support the
dispositional provisions of §§ 3611-17. Id. 529-36.
59 Id. 520.
60ld.
"' This argument is bolstered by (1) the trend toward elimination of capital punish-
ment, (2) the low incidence of the insanity defense, and (3) the problem of informal
double stigmatization. Id. 518-19, 524-25. See note 31 supra.
The premise of point (2) above, incidentally, is highly doubtful. While it is true that
the insanity defense itself is none too often invoked, it may well be that many accused
who might otherwise have availed themselves of the defense are instead diverted to
treatment facilities before reaching a full trial. One such diversion method is the compe-
tency hearing; formerly, if at such a hearing the accused was found incompetent to stand
trial, under most statutes he was confined for such indeterminate period as it might take
him to gain competency. See Burt & Morris, A Proposalfor the Abolition of the Incompetency
Plea, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 66, 66-67 n.4 (1972). But see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972) (Blackmun, J.) (incompetency commitment cannot exceed "reasonable" period of
time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial chance of defendant's attain-
ing capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future. Thus prosecutors may be pressed to
negotiate pleas through, say, a finding of incompetency to stand trial, see A. BROOKS,
LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 332 (1974), but such pressure might
well be reduced if the breadth of the insanity defense were narrowed by S. 1.
For a discussion of the abuse of competency hearings, see Ennis, C.L. U. Client "Crazy
but Competent," reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra at 334-37.
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compelling defense than the latter.62 But being mentally healthy
may also be more criminogenic than being mentally ill.6 3 The
issue is not what condition is most criminogenic but what condi-
tion so deprives an individual of the capacity for free choice that
he cannot be held responsible for his conduct. And just as juries
now convict in all but the most extreme cases of mental abnor-
mality, one might expect a similar pattern should "dwelling in a
Negro ghetto" become admissible evidence on the issue of crimi-
nal responsibility. 64 Nor would such a pattern suggest moral in-
consistency in the law.65 Our only inconsistency is in failing to
allow the jury to hear all evidence relevant to a defendant's
capacity for free choice. For it is the jury, not legal scholars, who
are best situated and best equipped, assuming access to relevant
evidence, to determine moral guilt.66
But having dismissed one aspect of criminal responsibility67
for its underinclusiveness, Dean Morris then argues for the re-
tention of the aspect of moral responsibility borne by the objec-
tive version of mens rea. Accidental (non-negligent) criminal con-
duct and the delusional mistake of fact will continue to excuse
whereas the offender who accurately perceives what he is doing
but is powerless to exercise moral judgment will suffer convic-
tion, imprisonment, and involuntary medical treatment.68 In
62 Morris, supra note 1, at 520.
63 See Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U.PA. L. REv. 439
(1974).
64 One is tempted to speculate how a defense lawyer who intended to raise such a
defense might proceed in selecting a jury. My own guess is that upper middle class,
educated whites would be preferred over ghetto blacks.
65 See Kadish, supra note 1, at 284 ("It is never a reason for adding to injustice that
we are already guilty of some."); H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 133 ("The point is that our
attitudes toward volitional impairment can change, and the criminal law can change with
them"); 1973 Hearings, supra note 12, at 6377: "So long as we do not know what really
,causes' crime, the insanity defense will have to be framed in a way which permits juries
to express the feelings of the community on the subject of responsibility."
66 "[The insanity defense represents] a normative standard applied to conflicting
clusters of fact and opinion by a jury, an institution which is the traditional embodiment
of community morality and, therefore, well suited to determining whether a particular
defendant, and his act, warrant condemnation rather than compassion." Id. 6377. See also
note 136 in ra & accompanying text.
67 Dean Morris eschews consideration of the defense of automatism or involun-
tariness in his analysis. See Morris, supra note 1, at 528 n.33. Presumably his argument
would extend to abolishing that defense as well.
68 Under S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3614 (1975), a convicted person suffering from
a mental disease or defect may be involuntarily hospitalized upon motion of the Gov-
ernment after a hearing and an appropriate judicial determination. The insanity acquit-
tee, on the other hand, may be hospitalized only if "his release would create a substantial
danger to himself or to the person or property of another." Id. § 3613(a).
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short, Dean Morris has rejected Lady Wootton's logical extension
of his argument to postpone all considerations of culpability to
the disposition proceeding.6 9 But why? For purposes of impos-
ing blame, the conduct of the Hadfields 70 and M'Naghtens
would seem no more opprobrious than that of the lemon-
squeezing spouse-killer. For purposes of deterrence, we may
achieve greater success in punishing accidental behavior not ris-
ing to criminal negligence than we do in punishing violent street
crime.7 ' Behavior-modifying treatment is clearly worth consider-
ing for the lemon-squeezing spouse-killer and may benefit the
accident-prone as well; both types of offenders may pose the
danger of future harm. Dean Morris' distinction poses many of
the same difficulties as the current insanity defense.
From a larger perspective, Dean Morris sees his proposal for
elimination of the insanity defense as a first step on the low road
toward elimination of the concept of retribution from crim-
inal law.
72
There is a choice. We could follow the pattern of
gradually extending the exculpatory and allegedly de-
stigmatizing defense of insanity to cover larger and
larger slices of criminal conduct, until it encompasses
most criminal behavior. Many working in this field
favor the engulfing process. I do not oppose their pur-
pose, but I do think their political judgment is wrong.
7 3
But Dean Morris' first step is not the most logical, only the most
politically acceptable. And it is not clear that those who would
"expand" the insanity defense by eliminating the restriction of
mental disease or defect are aiming for the same goal. There
may yet be utility in perpetuating our constructs of free will and
blame in the face of mounting psychological evidence that free
69 B. WOOTTON, supra note 1.
70 Hadfield's Case, 27 Howell St. Tr. 1282 (K.B. 1800). Hadfield, who had brain
damage from a war wound, attempted to assassinate King George III to save the world.
" See Zimring & Hawkins, Deterrence and Negligent Behavior: A Preliminary Note
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author), reporting on a 1965 study of key-
losing behavior in a midwestern automobile plant and finding such behavior deterrable.
See also F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENcE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL
128-41 (1973).
72 See Morris, supra note 1, at 526: "1 do not believe that systems of justice can long
survive in which name calling and vengeance figure so prominently. If this be so, then
the issue we are debating becomes one of how we can destigmatize our criminal law
processes as rapidly as possible."
73 Id.
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will is illusory. Empirical evidence abounds for "the proposition
that an individual's perception of personal responsibility or free
will affects his behavior in important ways. ' 74 Until it can be
shown that the insanity defense and related responsibility de-
fenses do not "[reinforce] the average citizen's belief in his own
personal responsibility, '75 we may be better off maintaining the
criminal law's emphasis on culpability.
76
Dean Morris himself illustrates our reliance on the principle
of blameworthiness, observing that sentencing and parole deci-
sions which reflect judgments of the offender's potential
dangerousness are frequently made "[w]ithin the ambit of power
defined by other purposes (most of them retributive). ' 77 Because
our ability to predict future dangerousness and to "cure" antiso-
cial propensities is so tenuous, he argues, we should not create
state power over a criminal's life on those bases alone. 78 Yet he
has done just that by making the insane offender criminally
liable for his conduct: He would defuse retribution as a justi-
fication for confinement by abolishing a significant aspect of
culpability. Nor would deterrence be greatly advanced by
criminalizing the insane. Society's real purposes in confining
such offenders, for the most part, would be prevention and
treatment.
The key point is that retribution and accompanying notions
of blameworthiness constitute a substantial restraint on state
power over the individual. 79 If we are to extend state power over
individuals to the substantially blameless in an attempt to eradi-
cate their dangerous propensities, we should do so directly and
openly under the rubric of a new jurisprudence of preventive
confinement rather than indirectly by warping traditional con-
cepts of criminal accountability. The direct approach would
74 Monahan, supra note 1, at 721.
71 Id. 723. Professor Monahan postulates two psychological processes, neither of
which has empirical support and either of which could occur in response to the law's
embracing the insanity defense: (1) the "process of contrast," by which persons "contrast
their own 'normal' behavior with that of the defendant" and thereby gain an increased
sense of their own responsibility, and (2) the process of "assimilation," by which persons
might respond to acquittals by questioning their own capacity to control their conduct. Id.
724-25.
76 See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 223-26; 1973 Hearings, supra note 12, at 6378-79
(statement of Prof. Abraham S. Goldstein). See generally Reich, Reflections, THE NEW
YORKER, June 19, 1971, at 52.
77 Morris, supra note 1, at 532-33.
78 Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 627, 637-44 (1966).
79 See generally Kadish, supra note 1, at 287-89.
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focus our attention on the real values at issue when the state
seeks power to confine and treat those whose propensities
we fear.
Most important of the unresolved issues in our jurispru-
dence of preventive confinement is the problem of propor-
tionality.80 Dean Morris' proposal would make confinement
proportional with a proven past offense. Yet the primary
rationale for such a link lies in retribution and deterrence,
policies that are not seriously advanced by convicting the insane.
If our real reasons for confinement are primarily preventive,
then our theory of proportionality should be fixed on those
harms we hope to prevent and on the degree of certainty with
which we may anticipate such harms. 81 Dean Morris' proposal
would mask this issue from view.
82
The dispositional provisions of S. 1 illustrate how Dean
Morris' proposal can be misused. In addition to "punishing" the
insane for their past conduct, S. 1 would preventively confine
the offender until he "has recovered from his mental disease or
defect to such an extent that his release would no longer create a
substantial danger. '83 Even if a reviewing court applies notions
of proportionality to the latter, more obviously preventive por-
tion of an offender's confinement, it will be shielded from
scrutiny of the initial sentence which, though administered
largely for preventive reasons, will appear nominally as a term of
"punishment" (involving primarily retribution and deterrence)
80 See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1277, 1321-24 (1973). See also Dershowitz, Indeterminate Con-
finement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 328-38 (1974).
8, A third element might be our capacity to alter the predicted behavior.
82 Professor Dershowitz' historical research has shown us that formal and informal
systems of preventive confinement go back to the time of the Normans and seem unlikely
to wither away in the imminent future. Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement
in Anglo-American Law-Part I: The English Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1974); Der-
showitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law-Part 1L The American
Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 781 (1974). His findings support the hypothesis that as
formal criminal conviction becomes more difficult, persons thought to be dangerous but
not convictable are shunted to less formal systems of preventive confinement, much as
the air in a balloon is squeezed from one end to another. In his terms then, Dean Morris
is simply squeezing the preventive confinement end of the balloon and pushing those
currently viewed as lacking criminal responsibility back- into the criminal justice system.
The alternative urged here is that we confront the reality of preventive confinement and
develop a jurisprudence to either tame or eliminate it. Whether pursuit of this alternative
will cause other air pockets to form--e.g., the expansion of surveillance and intelligence
systems-remains to be seen.
83 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3616 (1975).
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for past conduct. The state will have won two periods of preven-
tive confinement for the price of one.
C. Constitutional Considerations
Oddly enough, Dean Morris' one-step-at-a-time approach to
the destigmatization of the criminal law may be more difficult to
square with the constitutional precepts of substantive due pro-
cess and cruel and unusual punishment than Lady Wootton's
more radical proposal of a totally behaviorist approach. For as
long as courts view stigmatization as a significant component of
criminal conviction, they will impute to the criminal conviction a
quantum of blameworthiness greater than that reflected in the
objective 84 version of mens rea.85 Efforts to exclude defenses to
the larger notion ,of culpability will thus be viewed with some
suspicion, particularly when such defenses are as deeply imbed-
ded in common law as are insanity and automatism.
That such defenses are so deeply imbedded in the common
law may account for the infrequency of legislative attempts to
eliminate the insanity defense and the consequent lack of case
law on the constitutionality of such efforts. Only two states have
seriously attempted to abolish this defense,86 while a third at-
tempted to transfer the power to rule on insanity to experts and
thus beyond the court's jurisdiction.87 Perhaps the best statement
of the matter is found in the plurality opinion in State v.
Strasburg,88 wherein the Washington supreme court, on state
constitutional grounds, invalidated a statute excluding evidence
of insanity from criminal trials. The defendant's sanity at the
time of the act charged, ruled three of the justices, is "as much a
substantive fact, going to make up his guilt, as the fact of his
'4 The "objective" version of mens rea is that version that refuses to find culpability
without an erroneous perception of fact.
8- See generally note 17 supra.
86 See Sinclair v. United States, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (per curiam)
(invalidating Act of Apr. 3, 1928, ch. 75, [1928] Miss. Gen. Laws 92, on state due process
grounds, with three of six justices authoring or joining in concurring opinions, 161 Miss.
at 154-71, 132 So. at 582-88, attacking statute on federal due process and eighth
amendment grounds); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910) (invalidating
Act of Mar. 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 7, [1909] Wash. Sess. Laws 891, on state due process
grounds, with at least three and possibly a majority of justices, 60 Wash. at 110-32,
110 P. at 1020-28, finding statute violative of right to jury trial under state constitution).
See also Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
'7 See State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929) (invalidating Act of Dec. 18,
1928, [1928] La. Acts Extra Sess. 34).
88 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
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physical commission of the act."'89 These justices explained:
If he was insane at the time to the extent that he could
not comprehend the nature and quality of the act-in
other words, if he had no will to control the physical act
of his physical body, how can it in truth be said that the
act was his act? To take from the accused the opportu-
nity to offer evidence tending to prove this fact, is, in
our opinion, as much a violation of his constitutional
right of trial by jury as to take from him the right to
offer evidence before the jury tending to show that he
did not physically commit the act or physically set in
motion a train of events resulting in the act.90
At first glance, this reasoning suggests that evidence of insanity
may be relevant to negate any or all of the three major compo-
nents of criminal liability-mens rea, actus reus, and causation.91
By subsequently suggesting that the insanity defense must be
permitted even in crimes of strict liability, 92 the justices clearly
indicated that the defense goes to a concept of culpability
broader than mens rea. Thus they may have viewed insanity as
going to the defendant's capacity for criminal responsibility-an
issue not necessarily raised directly by the elements of mens rea,
actus reus, and causation, but one that could not be taken from
the jury's ultimate consideration of guilt or innocence.
Although Strasburg was based on the state constitution, its
reasoning could be used in a federal constitutional challenge.
The factual distinction between the total abolition statute in
Strasburg and the near total abolitionary rule of S. l's section 522
should give little comfort to the Senate draftsmen. 93 The
Washington justices clearly viewed evidence of insanity to be
relevant (and therefore constitutionally nonexcludable) to as-
pects of culpability beyond those reflected in the defense of mis-
take of fact. Moreover, S. l's apparent exclusion of an involun-
tariness defense to the conduct element would render section
522 unconstitutional under the Strasburg reasoning.94
8 9 d. at 119, 110 P. at 1024.9 0 Id. Although phrased in terms of the right to a jury trial, the justices' argument
more closely resembles a substantive due process approach.
91 Cf. Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability: Diminished
Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 313, 327-28 (1971).
92 60 Wash. at 120-21, 110 P. at 1024.
'3 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 252.
94 See note 24 supra. The Brown Commission's minority proposal was that evidence
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More recently, five United States Supreme Court Justices
have stated in dictum that punishment of involuntary conduct
may violate the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment. In Powell v. Texas95 Mr. Justice White joined the four
dissenters in suggesting that if a defendant acted under compul-
sion (in that case, compulsion from intoxication), his conviction
would violate the eighth amendment.96 Although the Court was
unwilling, and quite properly so, to freeze experimentation with
insanity defense formulations by articulating a constitutional
formula for involuntariness, 97 a majority was willing to require at
least some defense based on the impairment of free will.
It would be folly to state categorically that, assuming adop-
tion of the lemon-squeezing interpretation, section 522 will be
ruled unconstitutional.9" But one can predict that many courts
will be less than overwhelmed by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's scanty justification for so major a departure from com-
mon law tradition on the culpability issue. Given judicial
reluctance to constitutionalize the insanity defense, 99 the more
probable fate of section 522 in the courts is that it will be con-
strued in such a manner as to resolve indirectly the serious
and difficult constitutional questions it provokes. It is to this
subject that we now turn.
III. ENLARGING MENS REA
Motivated by constitutional concerns and the policy interests
in not "depriv[ing] the criminal law of its chief paradigm of free
of mental disease or defect be admissible to negate any element of the crime, including
the voluntariness requirement which the Commission included in its actus reus provi-
sions. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 234.
95 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
96 Id. at 548-54 (White, J., concurring); id. at 565-70 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
97 A generation ago the Court in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952),
refused to hold that the "irresistible impulse" test of insanity is "implicit in the concept of
order liberty." If Leland is still good law (and the relevant dicta in Powell do not criticize
it), then not every involuntary action caused by mental illness is constitutionally pro-
tected from criminal prosecution.
98 See note 97 supra.
9' Consider, for example, the following testimony of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
Jr.:
Justice Frankfurter told me privately that he intended to make every effort to
avoid a Supreme Court ruling on the definition of the "insanity" defense. The
matter was too fluid, too susceptible of change, too much oriented to the indi-
vidual case for a Supreme Court pronouncement to do anything other than
misdirect the development of the law in this area.
1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 228-29. See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,
376 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.): "Certainly, denial of constitutional power of commitment to
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will,"100 courts may capitalize on two analytical footholds to cir-
cumvent the narrow lemon-squeezing interpretation of section
522: (1) the suggestion in some provisions of S. 1 of a concept of
culpability broader than mere awareness of conduct, circum-
stances, and results, and (2) judicial experience with the defense
of diminished capacity. Both approaches would enable a review-
ing court to broaden the section 522 defense by broadening the
concept of mens rea in sections 301 and 302 to reflect a larger,
less objective concept of culpability. Both lead to revival of an
insanity defense similar to existing formulations at the expense
of muddying the attempt to articulate an objective view of mens
rea in sections 301 and 302.
The first approach begins with section 522 itself. If evidence
of mental disease or defect is relevant only to establish the ab-
sence of a mens rea element, then section 522 would seem redun-
dant given sections 301 and 302 and the mistake-of-fact-or-law
defense in section 521.101 To avoid the redundancy, it has been
argued,10 2 one might assume that section 522 has reference to
aspects of culpability beyond those reflected in sections 301 and
302, and that the term "mental disease or defect" adds substan-
tively to mens rea. The argument is bolstered by the absence of
any voluntariness requirement in the conduct sections of S. 1.103
A court might infer from this omission either that the draftsmen
intentionally abolished involuntariness as a defense, a conclusion
creating serious constitutional tensions, or that they meant to
transfer considerations of voluntariness to the mens rea elements
of sections 301 and 302.104 The latter view would allow the de-
Congress in dealing with a situation like this ought not to rest on dogmatic adherence to
one view or another on controversial psychiatric issues."
100 H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 132.
101 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 521 (1975) provides:
It is a defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that, as a result of
ignorance or mistake concerning.a matter of fact or law, the defendant lacked
the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Except as
otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake concerning a matter of fact or law
does not otherwise constitute a defense.
102 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 219 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
Jr.).
103 See note 24 supra.
104 Section 501 gives the courts authority to infer defenses not specified in S. I but
forbids expansion of named defenses beyond the limits of the statute. Although the
specific language of § 522 would prohibit evidence of mental disease or defect for any
purpose other than to negate mens rea (e.g., to negate the conduct element in § 102), this
language does not prevent a court from reading the mens rea provisions (§§ 301-02) more
expansively. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 207.
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fendant to raise the issue of his ability to control his conduct,10 5
quite apart from his ability correctly to perceive what he was
doing, and to apply evidence of mental disease or defect,
through section 522, to the resolution of that issue.
The principal flaw in this approach is the initial assumption
of redundancy. If section 522 is redundant, so is the similarly
worded section 521 on mistake of fact or law. Yet section 521
does not add substantively to mens rea.10 6 Furthermore, the
draftsmen may have felt section 522 necessary to make explicit
their intent to repeal the judicially created insanity defenses now
operative in the federal system, 10 7 just as section 521 clears up
judicial differences over the role of mistake of fact or law.1
0 8
Nevertheless, if Congress intends to do no more than to lay
down a rule of evidence for the proper scope and relevance of
testimony concerning mental disease or defect in a criminal trial,
that purpose could be more clearly achieved by adding a clause
to sections 301 and 302.109 To set out such a rule separately, in a
subchapter of the statute entitled "Defenses Based on Lack of
Culpability"' 10 is to suggest that the insanity defense has a sub-
stance that the Committee's Staff Report disclaims.
105 Such a construction would also tend to expand current conceptions of the au-
tomatism or involuntariness defense which limit it to cases of somnabulism and occasional
cases of psychomotor epilepsy. E.g., Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879) (evidence
of somnabulism should have been admitted); Bratty v. Attorney-General, [1963] A.C. 386
(H.L. 1961) 3 W.L.R. 965 (H.L.) ("involuntariness" does not include involuntariness due
to disease of mind unless a disease within limits of M'Naghten or automatism (reflex,
convulsive, or unconscious or somnabulistic action) is proven).
'
0 6 
JUDICIARY COMM. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 94. But see 1975 Hearings, supra
note 11, at 228 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, Jr.).
107 Additionally, § 522 codifies the holding of Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469
(1895) (nonconstitutional common law decision), placing the burden of persuasion
beyond a reasonable doubt on the prosecution. Section 522 also purports to focus the
jury's (and the expert witness') consideration of evidence of mental disease or defect on
the issue of mens rea; arguably, current formulations leave the jury at large to do what
they will with evidence of insanity.
For existing federal court formulations of the insanity defense, see note 135 infra.
108 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 356-69 (1972); Judiciary
Comm. Staff Report, supra note 7, at 94-97.
109 Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, Jr., has stated:
I would suggest the following additional explanation be added to clarify such an
intent: "Evidence of a mental disease or defect shall be admissible for the pur-
pose of demonstrating that a person was unaware of the factual circumstances of
his conduct or of the existence of a risk, and for no other purposes." This
additional language should be placed in § 301 and § 522 . . . should be
eliminated.
1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 229.
110 The third defense in this subchapter, intoxication (§ 523), is likewise susceptible
of two substantially different interpretations. On a narrow reading, it functions like
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Nor are certain other S. 1 defenses consistent with the
limited concept of culpability suggested by the lemon-squeez-
ing interpretation of section 522. The affirmative defense of
duress in section 531, under the heading "Defenses Based on
Lack of Volition," exculpates offenders "of reasonable firm-
ness" who are aware of what they are doing but whose powers
of control are impeded by the coercion of "another person."
Provocation is a simple defense to murder for the "ordinary
person," ''  having the effect of downgrading the offense to
manslaughter.112 Reference to the reasonable or ordinary person
in both defenses would presumably preclude their use by one
suffering from mental disease or defect except to the extent that
the provocation or duress would produce the same reaction in
the "reasonable man."' 1 3 And in any event, constitutional con-
cerns may cause courts to balk at an interpretation that permits
an offender to be exculpated for an overpowering of the will by
human agency or "ordinary" fits of pique but not by mental
disease or defect.'
1 4
Further inducement to allow the objective view of mens rea in
sections 301 and 302 to be "pried open" by section 522 comes
from state court experience with the defense of diminished
capacity. Since practically every American jurisdiction maintains
a separate insanity defense along the lines of either M'Naghten or
the American Law Institute formulation, 1 5 the function of the
mistake of fact or law and the lemon-squeezing interpretation of § 522 to negate the wnens
rea element of "intent" or "knowledge." Section 523, however, precludes the use of the
defense to negate a mens rea element of recklessness or negligence. As such, § 523 is a
limitation of the general defense suggested by §§ 301-02 and not a separate defense. On
a broader reading, intoxication, like mental disease or defect, may suggest a notion of
culpability broader than that reflected in the objective view of mnens rea. Like § 522, § 523
can be seen as infusing aspects of the defendant's capacity for judgment and control of
his actions into §§ 301-02. See People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 458, 462 P.2d 370, 379, 82
Cal. Rptr. 618, 627 (1969):
[A] drunk man is capable of forming an intent to do something simple, such as
strike another, unless he is so drunk that he has reached the stage of uncon-
sciousness. What he is not as capable as a sober man of doing is exercising
judgment about the social consequences of his acts or controlling his impulses
towards antisocial acts.
ill S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1601(b) (1975).112 1d. § 1602(a)(2).
"' This statement would not be true if a court were to read into the subjective
language "in the position of the defendant" the fact of the defendant's mental disease or
defect. See note 14 supra. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 197-98.
114 See notes 85-98 supra & accompanying text.
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962): "A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
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diminished capacity defense is to allow the jury to consider
psychological evidence insufficient to exculpate totally for the
purpose of downgrading the level of culpability attaching to the
defendant's criminal conduct. By its very nature, the defense
suggests a notion of culpability broader than mere awareness of
conduct, circumstances, and results. Nevertheless, the defense is
normally used to negate a mens rea element required by the
definition of the offense. 1 6 Hence, courts adopting the de-
fense have had to broaden their mens rea definitions to en-
compass more than mere conscious awareness.
California provides the textbook illustrations. In People v.
Gorshen,1 7 evidence of "uncontrollable compulsion" was deemed
relevant to suggest the absence of malice aforethought, the men-
tal element required for second degree murder, even though
such evidence was excludable on the issue of the insanity defense
since California had rejected the irresistible impulse test." 8 In
People v. Wolff, 19 the first degree murder requirement of a will-
ful, deliberate, and premeditated killing was interpreted to in-
clude consideration of the "extent to which this defendant could
maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contem-
plated act.' 20 The purpose of such inquiry was to assess "the
quantum of his moral turpitude and depravity.' 21 And in People
v. Conley122 the court ruled that a defendant could not be found
to have acted with malice aforethought if he were "unable to
comprehend his duty to govern his actions in accord with the
duty imposed by law.'
123
To be sure, the mens rea elements under review in the above
cases are not precisely those set out in sections 301 and 302 of
S. 1. But the process that the California courts underwent to ad-
just what had previously been a primarily objective concept Qf
mens rea, rendering it more subjective to accommodate evi-
dence of mental abnormality, is critical to evaluating the likely
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."
But see State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870) ("product" test similar to Durham).
116 Dix, supra note 91, at 324-27.
117 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), noted in 12 STAN. L. REV. 226 (1959).
118 Id. at 727, 336 P.2d at 498-99.
119 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
120 Id. at 821, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287 (emphasis in original).
121 Id. at 822, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
122 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
123 Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
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fate of section 522.124 The primary advantage of such a process
is that, unlike the all or nothing proposition of the separate
insanity defense, it permits more refined judgments of an
offender's culpability. The primary disadvantage is that to reach
such refined judgments, some degree of chaos must be endured
as courts struggle to rewrite mens rea to harmonize it with mod-
ern psychological theory.' 25 Along the way, expert witnesses and
trial judges must suffer the indignity of petty intellectual dishon-
esties as testimony is bent to the demands of materiality and
relevance. And, in the end, the process may turn out to be less
effective than the separate insanity defense in bringing to the
trier of fact all psychological evidence bearing on culpability. As
Professor Dix has noted of the California experience: "Despite
the effort the court has expended, it has gone no further than to
develop the cognitive aspects of the state of mind requirements.
... It does not .. provide a satisfactory vehicle for doctrinal
analysis of more complex and sophisticated problems ... 12
Thus, judicial construction could transform section 522 into
a cross between M'Naghten and Durham-the former because of
the emphasis on cognition in Sections 301 and 302,127 the latter
because the issue of mental illness negating a mental element so
closely resembles the Durham issue of productivity. 28 Such a
course will surely thwart the draftsmen's hopes of removing
psychiatrists from the courtroom 29 and is unlikely to improve
communication among judge, expert witness, and jury. Nor
does it begin to resolve the principal problem plaguing the
insanity defense today, that of "expert dominance.' 130 By in-
sisting on a factual finding of mental disease or defect, section
124 For another example of this process, see Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59
(4th Cir. 1960) (mens rea element of knowledge interpreted to include "capacity to know,"
on which psychiatric evidence deemed relevant).
125 For evidence of this chaos and the highly subjective decisions that may result,
compare the majority and dissenting opinions in People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 423
P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1967).
126 Dix, supra note 91, at 331. For a discussion of the California experience in modi-
fying mens rea definitions, see id. 328-32.
127 The California experience emphasizing cognitive aspects of mental capacity must
be evaluated in the context of a parallel full insanity defense derived from M'Naghten.
The absence of a separate S. I insanity defense could conceivably lead the federal courts
to view mens rea even more subjectively than the California courts.
12' See note 12 supra.
' 
9 See notes 47-53 supra & accompanying text.
130 1974 Hearings, supra note 11, at 224 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
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522 perpetuates our modern tradition of asking medical, ex-
perts to resolve for us the moral and legal issue of criminal
responsibility.
131
IV. ALTERNATIVES
In urging the abolition of a separate insanity defense, Dean
Morris observed, "It too often is overlooked that one group's
exculpation from criminal responsibility confirms the inculpa-
tion of other groups."' 32 That simple perception provides as well
the principal justification for retention of the defense. For it is
through the on-going, case-by-case process of exculpating the
non-responsible that society evolves its concepts of individual
autonomy and acrountability. As long as we retain our commit-
ment to the political ideal that an individual is able in some
degree to control his own destiny, we shall resist efforts to elimi-
nate our principal mechanism for testing that capacity in our
criminal law.133 If we abolish in large measure the defense of
blamelessness, we detract from our ability to impose blame. The
number of offenders so exculpated is likely to remain small; they
are the exception we use to prove the rule of personal accounta-
bility. Symbolically, their significance outstrips the social gains to
be realized by submitting them to our largely ineffective correc-
tional process.
What, then, should Congress do about the insanity defense?
There is little to be gained by adopting the recommendation of
the Brown Commission.134 Because virtually every circuit has
adopted a close facsimile of that test 35 and because it fails to
I See id.; Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); note 53 supra.
12 Morris, supra note 1, at 520.
1M3 See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 223-26; 1973 Hearings, supra note 12, at
6378-79 (statement of Prof. Abraham S. Goldstein).
134 Report of the National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 194 (1971):
§ 503. Mental Disease or Defect
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a resut of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law. "Mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. Lack of
criminal responsibility under this section is a defense.
135 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979-85 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade v.
United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-73 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908,
915-16 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1968); United
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answer the principal criticisms of the insanity defense respecting
expert dominance and the illogical strictures of the medical
model, legislation would achieve no more than to curtail what
limited experimentation exists today. Indeed, one may doubt
any special competence of a legislative body, dealing with the
issue on an abstract level, to formulate a "test" of criminal re-
sponsibility. The better forum for evolving our notions of per-
sonal accountability and measuring them against our developing
knowledge of human behavior may be, as Judge Bazelon has
argued, individual cases.136 For it is the individual case which
provides us with bits and pieces of the knowledge we now lack.
And it is the jury, subject to judicial guidance, which, when face
to face with the power to decide the fate of the accused before
them, may be society's most efficacious representative in drawing
the moral line. The first option, then, is for Congress to stay its
hand, to provide procedures for raising a defense of lack of
criminal responsibility, 137 but to leave the substantive "test" to
the common law.
A second option would be to clear away the obstacles of
expert dominance and the medical model which now encumber
full jury consideration of the responsibility issue. Judge
Bazelon's suggested jury instruction represents one such for-
mula: "[A] defendant is not responsible if at the time of his unlaw-
ful conduct his mental or emotional processes or behavior controls were
impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be held responsible for his
act.' 38 Like the option of doing nothing, this option leaves the
law of criminal responsibility free to develop with judicial
experience. 39 In addition, it enhances that development by re-
States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926-27 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383
F.2d 680, 684-87 (7th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 735-36 (8th Cir.
1967), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968); United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622-24 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1963); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774
& n.32 (3d Cir. 1961).
... 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 226-28 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Baze-
Ion, Jr.).
137 See, e.g., S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3612(a), 3617 (1975).
13' United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
139 Appellate supervision of the "justly responsible" test would be altered to the
extent that appellate courts would no longer be able to base their rulings upon formal
definitions of "mental disease or defect." Additionally, the test suggests greater deference
to a properly instructed jury's determination of community standards of blameworthi-
ness. Whether such a test renders the definition more lawless depends on one's percep-
tion of the operation of existing insanity defense formulations. If the element of "mental
1976]
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moving the distraction of determining whether a defendant's
condition may properly be termed "mental disease or defect"
and concomitantly reducing the jury's dependence on expert
witnesses. It tells the jury that mental processes are at issue with-
out requiring a particular medical diagnosis. Finally, it focuses
jury attention on what must be the central issue: the balance to
be struck between moral blameworthiness and the concerns of
social order.
140
Neither option addresses the important practical issue of
what is to be done with an offender acquitted for non-
responsibility and perceived as mentally ill and a continuing
threat to others. But that issue should be analytically distinct
from the issue of responsibility irrespective of the legal test
employed.14' Preventive confinement addresses future conduct:
Past conduct is relevant only as a factor for prediction. Whether
or not a jury found the actor criminally responsible for such past
conduct is otherwise irrelevant to a determination of preventive
confinement. 142 Indeed, one hidden benefit of the second op-
tion, the "justly responsible" test,' 43 may be that it will force us to
confront the real issues in preventive confinement which now lie
masked behind the "special verdict" of "not guilty by rea-
son of insanity.
'"144
disease or defect" in current formulations is simply an excuse for the expert witness to
inject into the record personal judgments on the ultimate issue of responsibility, see note
131 supra, then current practice may be as insulated from appellate scrutiny as the 'Justly
responsible" approach.
140 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 226 (statement of Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
Jr.). This standard has also been suggested as the most appropriate way to deal with
psychological evidence that might warrant a finding of diminished capacity but not total
exculpation. See Dix, supra note 91, at 333-34.
141 See note 56 supra.
142 Lack of capacity to control given conduct in one set of circumstances does not
necessarily imply lack of capacity to control other conduct in other circumstances. For
one thing, the underlying mental disability may have undergone spontaneous remission.
For another, the disordered thinking may be limited to one particular deed, as when one
spouse kills another believing the victim to be the devil.
143 See text accompanying notes 138-40 supra.
144 Such is the terminology employed in S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3612(b) (1975).
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COMMENT
PRIVATE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
UNDER SECTION 1981
The practice of segregation in private schools vividly pre-
sents the conflict between claimed personal rights of privacy and
free association on the one hand and the rights guaranteed and
enforced by the thirteenth amendment' and section 1981 of title
42 of the United States Code2 on the other. Two recent suits
against segregated private schools under section 1981, McCrary
v. Runyon3 and Riley v. Adirondack Southern Schoolfor Girls,4 reveal
the need for a reexamination of the scope of that section.
Section 1981, formerly section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 5 provides in part that "[a]ll persons.., shall have the same
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides:
"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion."
2 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
3 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), aff'g in relevant part Gonzales v. Fairfax-
Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354
(1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306). [Both the district and circuit court decisions
hereinafter cited as McCrary.]
The district court opinion has been widely commented upon. See Note, Desegregation
of Private Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State Action, 62 G~o. L. J. 1363 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Alternative to State Action]; Note, The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is
Section 1981 the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1147 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Is Section
1981 the Answer?); Comment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. Extended to Private Education:
Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 122 U. PA. L. REV. 471 (1973) (favoring deci-
sion on state action ground) [hereinafter cited as Private Education]; 11 HOUSTON L. REV.
691 (1974); 18 How. L.J. 458 (1974); 7 LOYOLA U.L. REV. 634 (1974); 45 Miss. L.J. 246
(1974) (favoring reversal); 10 TULSA L.J. 292 (1974); 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 767 (1973); 8 U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 285 (1974); 26 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1973).
1 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15,
1974.
5 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted, Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
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right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens .... -6 The section was enacted by Congress pur-
suant to its authority under the thirteenth amendment to outlaw
slavery. It is unclear how far section 1981 extends, and, in par-
ticular, whether the section outlaws private school segregation.
7
If the section is construed to prohibit such segregation, as it was
in McCrary, Congress may have exceeded its power to enforce
the amendment by infringing constitutional rights to privacy and
freedom of association, as guaranteed by the first amendment.
This Comment will consider the significance of the claim, raised
in both McCrary and Riley, that racial discrimination in private
school admissions is a constitutionally protected activity., The
recent Fifth Circuit decision in Cook v. Hudson9 will be considered
in evaluating the constitutional interest, if any, in segregated
private schools. 10
The Comment will conclude that section 1981 as currently
interpreted may constitutionally be applied to private schools.
This Comment will also propose, however, a new interpretation
of the section, somewhat analogous to the theory of mitigation of
damages, which would strengthen the case for applying the
statute to private schools by not denigrating vital associational
6 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
7 Much of the debate about the revival of § 1981 and its companion, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1970), revolves around the legislative history of these and other civil rights laws.
See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (compare majority with
dissenting opinions). This Comment will for the most part ignore the historical approach
to interpretation of the statutes, in part because of adequate coverage elsewhere, and in
part because the use of legislative history in this context is often not helpful when used
only as a makeweight after evaluation of other issues.
8 See generally Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus
Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975). Some commentators have sug-
gested that the proper method for attacking private school segregation is through use of
a state action-public function analysis, e.g., Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82
YALE L.J. 1436 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Academies]; Private Education, supra note 3.
These articles adequately cover most of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach.
This Comment will not discuss the state action analysis, in part because of the prior
treatment and in part because state action was not an issue actually addressed in the
McCrary and Riley litigations. The shortcomings of the state action theory are most
graphically set forth in Alternative to State Action, supra note 3, at 1366-69.
9 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.), affg 365 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Miss. 1973), petition for cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1975) (No. 75-503).
10 The district court opinion is commented upon in Comment, Cook v. Hudson: The
State's Interest in Integration Versus the First Amendment Rights of the Public Schoolteacher, 45
Miss. L.J. 953 (1974) (favoring reversal); 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 107 (1974). Text accompany-
ing notes 101-15 infra. In Hudson, a divided court upheld a school board policy against
hiring or rehiring teachers whose children attend private school. The school board
adopted this policy to reinforce a court-ordered program of desegregation of the public
school system. The case presents a variation of the conflict between asserted first
amendment rights and rights to racial equality.
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and privacy rights which might be infringed by an unlimited ap-
plication of section 1981. Section 1981 may be limited by re-
quiring that the plaintiffs show actual injury in the market for
education because of racial discrimination by the defendants;
if alternative equivalent education is obtainable, no violation of
section 1981 should be found. While section 1981 guarantees to
nonwhites the same right to contract as whites, this right should
be interpreted in light of the traditional requirement in the law
of contracts that real injury in the marketplace be shown."
I. ATTACKS UPON PRIVATE SCHOOL SEGREGATION:
MCCRARY AND RILEY
In Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc.,12 it was alleged
that two black children were denied admission to defendant pri-
vate schools because of their race in violation of section 1981.
The district court, finding that the schools' admissions policies
reflected "no 'plan or purpose of exclusiveness' for selection of
students 'other than race',"'1 3 awarded damages for plaintiffs'
humiliation and enjoined defendants from practicing racial dis-
crimination in admissions in the future.'
4
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in
McCrary v. Runyon. ' 5 Chief Judge Haynsworth wrote: "The sec-
tion is violated by the school as long as the basis of exclusion is
racial, for then it is clear that the black applicant is denied a
contractual right which would have been granted to him if he
had been white.' 6 At defendants' schools, there was a class of
qualified applicants defined by "academic, financial, and other
restrictions upon admission," but "[w]ithin the qualified class...
there is no other limitation upon the admission of white appli-
cants up to the school's capacity."' 7 That some whites were out-
"See, e.g., A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1039-44 (1964).
12 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. McCrary v.
Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos.
75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
13 363 F. Supp. at 1204 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
236 (1969), which established that a private group that is not a "private club" under Title
II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970), is not exempt from 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)).
14 The injunction applied not only to the named defendant but also to the Southern
Independent School Association, an intervening defendant. This Association alleged that
it represents "over 300 private, non-profit schools in the South, some of which con-
cededly are racially exclusive in their admission policies." 515 F.2d at 1084.
11 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos.
75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
16 515 F.2d at 1087.17 Id.
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side that class did not "undo" the section 1981 violation, the
court reasoned, because the Supreme Court had found viola-
tions of section 1982,18 whose scope closely parallels that of sec-
tion 1981, in the segregation of private clubs that admitted all
white persons up to the clubs' capacity. 19
Judge Haynsworth disposed of the defendants' claim to as-
sociational and privacy rights by pointing out that the schools
were free to teach whatever doctrines and to use what-
ever methods they wished.20 Moreover, these private groups
could legitimately apply non-racial restrictions on admission,
even if a racial imbalance in the student population resulted.
The schools could not discriminate on the basis of race, how-
ever,2 1 notwithstanding the Supreme Court's speculation in
Norwood v. Harrison that the "Constitution may compel toleration
of private discrimination .... 22
The dissenting judges in McCrary made two important ar-
guments. First, Judge Russell asserted that "[t]he right to make
and enforce contracts does not imply a right to coerce an unwil-
ling co-contractor into making any and every variety of
contract. '23 In his view, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,24 in which
the right of a private club to discriminate was upheld even
though it possessed a state liquor license, indicated that the un-
willing co-contractor has the right to discriminate when impor-
tant personal preferences are involved. Second, the dissent
urged that the contractual features of application for admission
to the defendant private schools were quite insubstantial so that
the right to contract was in effect a pretense, a mere "door
opener," to enable a court to reach the desired result.
Without endorsing the right of private schools to discrimi-
nate in admissions, the court in Riley v. Adirondack Southern School
for Girls25 suggested a somewhat narrower application of section
1981 than did the McCrary majority. In Riley the plaintiff sought
Is 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
19 Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
20 515 F.2d at 1087. The court relied on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
21 515 F.2d at 1088.
22 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973).
23 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
24 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
25 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15,
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to enroll her black daughter in a private, all-white girls' school in
Florida. The district court was "not persuaded that, but for her
race the Plaintiff's child would have been accepted. '26 There-
fore, while the court found that the evidence as a whole strongly
suggested that race was one factor in the applicant's rejection, it
denied relief.
27
Both Riley and the dissent in McCrary tend to limit the appli-
cation of section 1981 in suits against private segregated schools.
In McCrary the dissent found a right in private schools to dis-
criminate racially in their admissions process because of privacy
and associational interests, and in Riley the court relied on a
restrictive definition of causation. Neither case was actually de-
cided on the basis of the claimed associational and privacy in-
terests. These interests warrant closer examination as they are
crucial to the formulation of more rational principles of con-
struction for section 1981.
II. SECTION 1981 AND AsSOCIATIONAL
AND PRIVACY RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW
The law of section 1981, of privacy, and of association have
not yet been effectively synthesized. Before a synthesis can be
attempted, some overview of the areas is necessary.
A. The Right to Make and Enforce Contracts under Section 1981
Two principal theories of the meaning of the phrase "the
same right . . . to make and enforce contracts"' 28 have been
expressed in the cases and the literature.
26 368 F. Supp. at 395. On appeal, plaintiff-appellant will argue that the other
reasons for rejecting her child were subterfuges for race, and that any other finding
would be clearly erroneous. Brief for Appellant at 1.
27 368 F. Supp. at 395.
Riley may be consistent with McCrary in that the plaintiff in Riley failed to meet
non-racial standards established by the school. By applying McCrary's analysis, Riley need
only have held that a violation of § 1981 occurs when a party is denied an opportunity to
make a contract that he could have made had he been white, but that when racial bias
may have been only incidentally appeased, no violation of § 1981 can be found. Indeed
Riley itself states that "[u]nless it can be shown that, but for race the complainant would
have succeeded [in making a contract], there is no denial of rights assured by § 1981." Id.
at 398. A § 1981 action can succeed only when race is found to be the sole element in the
rejection of a student applicant. This explains why the court disregarded its finding that
racial bias played a part in the decision to reject the applicant.
If, on the other hand, appellant in Riley is correct in asserting that race was the only
factor in the decision to reject, the other factors being a subterfuge, then affirmance of
the district court would be inconsistent with McCrary.
28 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
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An early interpretation of the scope of section 1981 was
given in Hodges v. United States. 2 9 That case arose when a group
of white men resorted to violence to prevent certain blacks from
securing employment in a sawmill. The Supreme Court reversed
the criminal conspiracy convictions which had been based on the
violation of section 1981 rights, indicating that the acts of intimi-
dation did not impose a condition of slavery upon their victims.
Having reached this conclusion, the Court proceeded to describe
the intended scope of section 1981 in terms of prohibition of
government-imposed restrictions upon an individual's capacity
to make contracts.
30
This interpretation of section 1981 has been dealt three
blows that must by now be deemed mortal. In Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.,31 a suit based on section 1982, defendant refused for
reasons of race to sell a house to a prospective buyer who was
black. The Supreme Court held that section 1982 reaches private
discrimination and observed that section 1981 also applies to
private discrimination, overruling Hodges to the extent of
inconsistency. 32 In Tillian v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Associa-
tion,33 the Court again indicated that section 1981 is applicable to
private dealings, but did not define the scope of that application.
The demise of the state involvement approach was confirmed
recently in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., a suit in which
plaintiff alleged employment discrimination under section 1981.
The Supreme Court affirmed that section 1981 "affords a fed-
eral remedy against discrimination in private employment on the
basis of race. '34 Clearly the approach taken beforeJones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co. to interpreting "right to contract" can no longer
serve as the basis for interpretation of this statute. 5
29 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
30 Id. at 17-18. This was the traditional approach to interpretation of "right to con-
tract." See, e.g., Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 533-34 (1949); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-55 (1905); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590-91 (1897) (cases representing both sides of the "economic
substantive due process" debate). See also California Drive-in Restaurant Ass'n v. Clark,
22 Cal. 2d 287, 295, 140 P.2d 657, 662 (1943); Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23,
24-26, 63 A. 285, 286-87 (1906); Elder Chevrolet Co. v. Bailey County Motor Co., 151
S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
31 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969) (damage remedy for violation of § 1981).
32Id. at 441 n.78.
33 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
34 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720 (1975).
35 For a discussion of this theory and its demise, see Alternative to State Action, supra
note 3, at 1370-73 & sources cited in id. 1370 n.33.
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The holdings in McCrary3 6 and Riley37 illustrate the second
major approach to section 1981, predominant since Jones, in
holding that the section is violated when a nonwhite cannot
make a contract he could have made had he been white. The
novelty of these holdings lies only in their application to com-
pletely private schools.38 Several courts of appeals had reached
similar results prior to McCrary and Riley in several cases involv-
ing employment contracts39 and in a case involving a privately
owned recreation area.40 As noted above, the Supreme Court
held in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. that section 1981
applies to private discrimination in employment. 41 But the Court
there had no occasion to endorse or reject the standard ulti-
mately articulated in McCrary and Riley defining violation of sec-
tion 1981. There is, however, nothing in Johnson to indicate a
more restrictive interpretation.
This more recent line of reasoning is quite expansive. Sec-
tion 1981 so interpreted applies to the entire body of relation-
ships that may be defined as contractual. Whether the relation-
ship is business or personal is not, according to this view,
important. 42 This interpretation may be limited by strict defini-
tion of what is a contract. For example, the Court of Appeals for
36 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
37 Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973),
appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15, 1974.
38 The schools in these suits received no government funding nor special favors.
Section 1981 had already been applied to a private trade school in Grier v. Specialized
Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971), but the court there held that the fact that
the trade school had to be licensed by the state and that all such state-licensed schools
were segregated (two out of five all black) impermissibly involved the state in the affairs
of the school. Further, some of the school's students received federal aid.
39 Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Gaston County
Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Young v.
International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 758-60 (3d Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1971) (following San-
ders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971)); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 481-84 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
40 Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970) (alternate
holding); see Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974) (swimming
club's rules were alleged to be racial subterfuges).
41 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720 (1975).Johnson held that § 1981 is a remedy forjob discrimina-
tion entirely separate from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (1970), and that therefore an action in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion under that title does not toll the statute of limitations applicable to § 1981.
42 But see Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: A Study of Law in
Search of Morality, 56 IowA L. REV. 473, 506-12 (1971).
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the Fifth Circuit held in Cook v. Advertiser Co.4 3 that a standing
opportunity to publish social notices in a newspaper, without
charge, does not amount to an offer of a unilateral contract, so
that one denied publication on racial grounds has no cause of
action under section 1981. Neither whites nor blacks, the court
reasoned, can claim a contract right to have notices published.
44
Apart from McCrary, only district courts have considered the
right of privacy as a principle possibly limiting section 198 1.45 A
reason for limiting application of the section is to prevent the
danger, somewhat overstated by the McCrary dissenters, that
unwilling co-contractors will be coerced into any and every vari-
ety of contract,46 thus changing the effective definition of con-
tract from a meeting of the minds (subject to legitimate govern-
ment regulation) to a meeting of the minds on all subjects except
race.47 The logic of this line of reasoning has been considered by
many commentators48 and will be discussed below in terms of
the conflict between section 1981 and first amendment and re-
lated constitutional liberties.
B. Associational and Privacy Rights
The Supreme Court has never addressed itself to the prob-
lem of clearly defining or even stating a formula for associational
43 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
44 For purposes of this Comment, Judge Wisdom's concurring opinion is more in-
teresting than the majority opinion. Judge Wisdom's conclusion that the Advertiser's
solicitation of information about social events and responses to that solicitation did not
constitute a contract was
shaped by, if not compelled by, the First Amendment's guarantee of a free
press. It is most unlikely that any court in our land could constitutionally en-
force a promise by a newspaper to publish any particular item of news [citing
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)]. Even if a newspaper stooped to sell its
news coverage for hard cash, I suppose the most a frustrated buyer would be
entitled to would be a refund of the dollars he had parted with.
458 F.2d at 1123 (Wisdom, J., concurring). But see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) ("commercial speech," here in the
form of sex-segregated want ads, not protected by the first amendment) (5-4 decision,
Burger, C.J., and Douglas, Stewart and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
45 See, e.g., Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1198 (D. Conn. 1974) ( § 1981 found unconstitutional if read with no limits, but "saved"
by "harmonization" with the private club exemption of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970), by exempting private clubs from § 1981 as well); Sims v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972).
46 Text accompanying note 23 supra.
47 Of course, it can be said that any limitation on power to bargain inserts an element
of unwillingness into the subsequent deal. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (discredited "substantive due process" cases).
4 8 E.g., Buchanan, supra note 42; Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination:
The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:714
and privacy rights. The following will point out those decisions
that may be useful in synthesizing a definition of these rights
needed to dispose of the cases at hand.
1. The Right of Association
49
Except for "the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," 50
freedom of association is not specifically set forth in the Con-
stitution. The development of associational rights in the Su-
preme Court has been largely dependent on the kind of situa-
tion in which the issue has arisen. It is not clear in any given case
precisely what considerations the Court will take into account, in
developing the doctrine further. The factual settings of McCrary
and Riley have not yet been dealt with by the Court.
At the very least, private schools have a right to exist and to
teach whatever subjects and doctrines not "manifestly inimical to
the public welfare" they wish.5 1 The right to control their own
activities is not unlimited, but is susceptible to reasonable regula-
tion concerning the compulsory teaching of certain subjects and
the qualifications of teachers. 52 (Private schools do not, however,
have the right to discriminate on the basis of race while receiving
federal or state assistance.)53 Whatever additional rights private
schools may have must be deduced from decisions regarding
associational and privacy rights in other contexts and from gen-
eral constitutional and ethical principles.
The right to associate for political purposes has been de-
fined broadly and has been given protection in a number of
contexts. One case in which the right to associate was raised,
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,54 held that a nonsubversive
political organization need not reveal its membership list to the
REV. 449 (1974); Is Section 1981 the Answer?, supra note 3, at 1153-75; Private Education,
supra note 3.
49 See generally C. RicE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962); Emerson, Freedom of Associa-
tion and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Nathanson, Freedom of Association and
the Quest for Internal Security: Conspiracy from Dennis to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 153
(1970).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (both striking down statutes forbid-
ding teaching languages to school children of certain ages).
52 268 U.S. at 534.
53 
E.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455 (1973); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964).
54 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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government when there is some possibility that doing so would
expose some of its members to adverse community pressures
and when the state could accomplish its aim in requiring such a
list less intrusively. Alabama proposed to use the lists to deter-
mine violations of the state's foreign corporation statutes. On the
other hand, in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board55 the Court upheld the federal government's interest in
requiring Communist Party members to register with the gov-
ernment on the basis of a legislative finding that foreign-
dominated Communist activities posed a substantial threat to the
national security.5 6 Even when one is a member of a subversive
organization, however, he must specifically intend to promote
such of the organization's aims as are illegal if he is to be
penalized.5
7
Important to an analysis of the private school segregation
issue is the broad scope that has been given the term "political
association." The Supreme Court has not limited the term "polit-
ical activity" to the narrowly electoral, or even to the promotion
of ideology through speech and associated media. NAACP v.
Button58 held that a Virginia antichamperty law could not apply
to the NAACP's efforts to secure legal assistance for poor blacks,
because of the organization's associational rights.
The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but
the litigation it assists, while serving to vindicate the
legal rights of members of the American Negro com-
munity, at the same time and perhaps more impor-
tantly, makes possible the distinctive contribution of a
minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.
For such a group, association for litigation may be the
most effective form of political association.5"
Against this associational right, the state's claimed interest in
preventing misuse of the courts could not stand. °
55 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
56 A subsequent case rendered the registration requirement invalid on the ground
that it violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965). In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964), the denial of passports to Communist Party members who failed to
register was invalidated for overbreadth, in part because it could be applied to one who
did not know or did not intend the Party's illegal aims.
"7 See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
58 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
59Id. at 431.
60 Justice Douglas, concurring, noted that the purpose of the law in question was to
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An individual may not be punished for teaching a doctrine,
even a code of violence, absent a clear and present danger.
6 1
Presumably an individual or a group may not be punished for
banding together to learn such a doctrine or even to spread it.
One court of appeals has held that protection of political associa-
tion requires that segregated political groups be given the same
opportunity to use state-owned facilities on a temporarily exclu-
sive basis as is given other political groups.
62
Much of the law of free association concerns governmental
restrictions on public employees. The leading cases permitting
such restrictions, United Public Workers v. Mitchell63 and United
States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers,64 upheld enforcement of the Hatch Act, restricting the
right of federal employees to engage in partisan political ac-
tivities. Other cases, however, have protected the rights of gov-
ernment employees to engage in associational activities that are
political in a broad sense of that term but are not partisan in the
sense of the dominant two-party system. United States v. Robe1
65
held that Congress cannot make it a crime to belong to an offi-
cially designated Communist-action organization while working
in a defense plant; but the Court conceded that the result might
be different if the statute required proof of specific intent to
engage in the unlawful activities such an organization might
promote. 66 But absent a strong countervailing governmental in-
terest the right of public employees to associate may not be in-
fringed. This is clear from Shelton v. Tucker,67 in which the Court
held that Arkansas may not require its schoolteachers to file
annual affidavits, listing all current and recent organizational
ties, for the purpose of assessing the teachers' fitness.
There is also some constitutional protection of social, non-
political association, but whether it is as great as protection of
resist the mandate of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) by penalizing the
NAACP because it promotes desegregation. Id. at 445.
61 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Justices Black and Douglas would not
recognize a "clear and present danger" exception. Id. at 449-57 (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring).
62 National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (successor to the American Nazi Party was allowed to rent a public school
auditorium, often used for political discussion, for a public meeting and a private meet-
ing, over the objections of the county that this activity would impermissibly involve it in
discriminatory action because blacks and Jews were to be excluded).
63 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
64 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
65 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
6 6 Id. at 262-63.
67 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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political association is unclear. The strongest recent support for
such rights is provided in two cases concerning appropriate
means of implementing desegregation orders. In Norwood v.
Harrison the Court speculated that "the Constitution may compel
toleration of private discrimination .... ,,68 However, the Court
did not conclude that the Constitution does in fact compel such
toleration.69 The Court voiced this concern in Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, in refusing to restrict certain uses of public parks by
segregated groups: "The freedom to associate applies to the be-
liefs we share, and to those we consider reprehensible. 7 0 This
result was based on the absence of state action, but the Court
had in mind potential encroachments upon discriminatory
groups' associational rights. Significantly, the Supreme Court has
not yet held these rights to include the right to exist as a racially
discriminatory group,71 although several lower courts have
done so.
72
There is a hint, but only a hint, that associational rights do
not include a right to associate on the basis of race or, alterna-
tively, that such associations merit less protection than others
because of the spirit of the post-Civil War amendments. The
McCrary opinion states that some schools may be "so private as to
have a discernible rule of exclusivity which is inoffensive to §
198l1. 73 The principle of exlusivity would have to be racially
neutral, however, to be inoffensive, as, for example, if siblings
retained a tutor for their children.7 4
Shelley v. Kraemer7 5 and Barrows v. Jackson7 6 lend support to
the position that segregation is not a protected form of associa-
tion. A group of people may agree to associate by living together
as a community and may use the device of enforceable property
convenants to ensure the group's cohesiveness. (For example,
covenants requiring that lawns be mowed regularly and houses
maintained can be seen as an effort by the co-covenantors to
68 413 U.S. 445, 463 (1973).
69 But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
70 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
71 Note that the question of a club's right to exist as a segregated organization is
distinct from what rights extent clubs have.
72 See cases cited note 45 supra.
73 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
74 515 F.2d at 1088-89.
75 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
76 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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associate only with people who care about their surroundings. 77 )
Race is not a characteristic that the group may use in defining
itself, however, if it wishes to enforce a convenant restricting the
sale of property. Since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,78 even volun-
tary cooperation in maintaining a segregated community is im-
permissible, because a prospective purchaser has a remedy
against the discriminatory seller. Indeed, it is possible that the
right of association, "penumbral" to begin with, is dimmed
further by the post-Civil War amendments. This Comment is
concerned with more than the shadowing of the right of associa-
tion by the post-Civil War amendments; it is concerned with the
possibility of the right's total eclipse.
2. The Right of Privacy
Cases defining the growing area of privacy7 9 or what might
be described as autonomy"0 of person and family also contribute
to the theory of the rights of private schools. This area was
recognized in 1925 in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,8' in which the
Court invalidated a state law requiring children to attend public
school because the law abridged "the liberty of parents . . .to
direct the upbringing and education of [their] children .... 82
The notion has undergone its greatest development in four cases
decided in the last decade, Griswold v. Connecticut,83 Stanley v.
Georgia,84 Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 5 and Roe v. Wade.86 The principle
common to these cases is that certain aspects of one's life are so
personal that direct governmental encroachment is constitution-
ally impermissible.
For purposes of analyzing the privacy problems in the pri-
vate school setting, Griswold is the most important of the four
7 Of course this might also evidence a financial concern with maintaining property
values.
78 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
79 See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); War-
ren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Symposium-Privacy, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 251 (1966); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal
Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670, 697-705 (1973) [hereinafter cited as On Privacy).
80 See notes 142-77 infra & accompanying text.
81 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
82 Id. at 534-35.
83 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (decision to use contraceptives is a penumbral right for mar-
ried couples).
84 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to have pornography in the privacy of one's home).
85 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (equal protection requires that the availability of contracep-
tives not be dependent on marital status).
86 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
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decisions because it protects a particular intrafamilial relation-
ship, marriage, from certain governmental interference. The
Court in Griswold held that the state may not deny to a married
couple the right to choose whether or not to use contra-
ceptives.8 7 The Court based its holding on several constitutional
principles, primarily the first amendment and its penumbras but
also the third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments,
all of which contain guarantees against governmental interfer-
ence with various aspects of an individual's life. The majority
relied on Pierce to support its holding, 88 suggesting that in-
trafamilial relationships other than the conjugal one share the
same type of protection.
The other three decisions bear less directly on the privacy
rights accorded specific family relationships, but do concern the
general right of individuals to be free from governmental inter-
ference in matters of personal choice, particularly those related
to sexuality. In Stanley v. Georgia,89 the Court held that although
publication and sale of pornography may be unprotected by the
first amendment, the possession of obscene material for use in
the privacy of one's home is protected as part of the right of
freedom of thought. In Roe v. Wade,90 as in Griswold, the decision
to have a child was considered, this time in light of the woman's
particular problems as a childbearer. The private nature of this
decision was found to outweigh many state interests previously
believed to be of overriding importance. In Eisenstadt,91 the right
of unmarried persons to the same freedom of access to con-
traceptives as that possessed by married people was established.
That these cases do not bear directly on the relationship
between parent and child and the decisionmaking aspects of that
relationship does not imply that the parent-child relationship is
not protected by the Constitution. To the contrary, Pierce
demonstrates that the relationship is protected and Griswold,
Stanley, Eisenstadt, and Roe v. Wade reinforce and expand the
Pierce approach by upholding penumbral rights of privacy in
intimate relationships or deeply personal choices.92
87 Note that there are limits even to this freedom, for there is little question that
contraception may be limited in certain ways, as by prohibition of a harmful drug.
88 381 U.S. at 481-83.
89 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
90 410 U.S. 43 (1973).
91 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
92 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the parent-child relationship was
protected against the state's interference in the context of a decision concerning how
much education was enough for the child. That decision was based primarily on the right
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:714
III. LIMITING PRINCIPLES FOR SECTION 1981
The ultimate resolution of the issues raised in McCrary and
Riley will depend on the limiting principles devised for use in
section 1981 cases. This section will deal with several possible
principles for limiting the section, raising issues of both statutory
and constitutional dimension.
A. The "Door Opener" Argument
The dissenting judges in McCrary asserted that in the private
school context "[t]he contract aspect of the situation is minor and
incidental and serves no purpose other than as a door opener in
the present case to bring independent schools within the scope
of § 1981."93 This is so, the dissent believed, because the
student-teacher relationship is one of status rather than contract
and is "related to the contract concept in the same way that the
status of husband and wife may be said to grow out of a contract
.... "94 These situations were distinguished from that of Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. 95 because the property transactions denied in
Jones in violation of section 1982 were "purely commercial," with
a basis in contract and not in status.
96
It is clear, however, that there is a more than token contrac-
tual basis in the relationship between a school on the one hand
and a parent or child 97 on the other. The parent enters into a
binding contract with the school to pay for services and perhaps
to the free exercise of religion, however, and absent the religious element it is unlikely
that the Court would hold that a parent may disregard a compulsory attendance law. See
generally Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
Of course, other cases exist defining the protection given to one or another aspect of
the individual's private life, most notably protection from criminal investigations that
invade one's privacy, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). These cases add to the spirit of the law bearing on the cases under
discussion, but are not directly relevant to the problem of the freedom to be unencum-
bered in intimate relationships and associations.
93 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
94 Id. at 1092-93 (Russell, Field &Widener, JJ., dissenting).
95 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
96 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
97 In the ordinary case, the child does not contract directly with the teacher, but this
is essentially because the child makes none of his own contracts in matters of substance.
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), suggests
that the child has some right to determine whether and where he wishes to go to school.
Id. at 244-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). If the child's role as a decisionmaker is
accepted, the contract between the young student and the teacher clearly will be estab-
lished. The corresponding relationship of an adult student to a college, for instance,
involves the acceptance of mutual obligations and rights and not merely the subordina-
tion of the student to the teacher. In the case of the young student this consensual
relationship is not as clear, because of the seeming split of the child's legal personality
between himself and his parents.
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to perform other duties (such as ensuring the promptness and
neat appearance of his child) in return for the provision of edu-
cation. The period during which a student applies for admission
and chooses among schools is clearly a contract formation peri-
od. Before the relationship of teacher and pupil ensues, an
agreement to teach and to send one's child to learn, in return for
a consideration, is required. Providing teachers, curricula, class-
rooms, and so forth are all undeniably contractual responsibil-
ities of the school. A contractual arrangement thus forms the
basis of all our private educational institutions, except perhaps a
few foundlings' schools. 8
As noted above,99 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found, in Cook v. Advertiser Co. ,'o that a standing opportunity to
place social notices in a newspaper does not constitute an offer
of a unilateral contract, because the Advertiser charged no fee
for stories appearing on the society page and persons who sub-
mitted information for publication had no rights against the
newspaper. Thus, a black who was denied publication of her
announcement in the portion of the paper available to whites did
not have a cause of action under section 1981. However, a par-
ent who pays to enroll his child in a private school certainly has
rights against the educators who operate the institution. The
opportunity to obtain these rights is denied to a person who is
refused a contract because he is nonwhite. The application of the
contract concept to the private school situation is not the ma-
nipulation of a formal relationship for the purpose of opening a
door to government regulation, but rather is a recognition of a
substantial relationship.
B. Autonomy in the Context of Private Schools
1. The Decision in Cook v. Hudson
The supposed right to participate in discriminatory practices
has arisen in a setting different from but related to the attacks
on segregated private schools under section 1981. In Cook v.
Hudson'0 three public school teachers asserted a right under
98 Marriage represents a completely different case. There is a legal contract of mar-
riage into which the two parties enter, but that is not the foundation of the relationship.
The circumstance of marriage would for the most part exist in the absence of any
conception of contract and perhaps in the absence of any organized society at all.
99 Text accompanying note 43 supra.
100 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1973).
101 365 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Miss.), affd, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1973), petitionfor cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1975) (No. 75-503).
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section 1983102 to send their children to segregated private
schools despite a school board policy denying their right to do
so. The Board of Education of Calhoun County, Mississippi,
acting pursuant to a desegregation order, 10 3 adopted an unwrit-
ten policy (not required by the desegregation order but ap-
proved by the Justice Department) of not hiring or rehiring
teachers, residing in the county, who sent their children to a
school other than a county public school.' 0 4 Before the 1968
desegregation order there had never been a private school in the
county; after the order only one, the segregated "Calhoun
Academy," was established. The district court in Hudson found
that the Academy had been established "to provide a haven for
segregated education."'01 5 Subsequent to adoption of this policy,
the plaintiff teachers in Hudson were not rehired, solely because
they would not comply with the board rule.
06
The school board adopted its policy to ensure that the
faculty would be committed to a desegregated school system
and that students would not "perceive rejection . . . from a
teacher whose own children attend a nearby racially segregated
school." 10 7 Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of the policy and the dismis-
sal of the teachers, but on different grounds. The district court
held that the board policy was valid as applied because the only
private school option was a segregated school. 10 8 The rule was
rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of achieving
effective, integrated public education, and therefore did not
deny the teachers equal protection. 109 The first amendment as-
sociational rights of public employees, the court determined,
102 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
103 United States v. Calhoun County Bd. of Educ., No. WC 6637 (N.D. Miss., Aug. 9,
1968), cited in 365 F. Supp. at 856.
104 511 F.2d at 745. Mississippi provides no tenure for public school teachers. Id. n. 1.
105 365 F. Supp. at 857.
106 Id.
1
0
7 Id. at 860, quoted in 511 F.2d at 746.
108 365 F. Supp. at 859. The district court specifically left open the question whether
such a rule would be valid if the private school in question offered a racially neutral
educational advantage not available in the public schools. The court found that the
purpose of the board rule was limited to dealing with the situation at hand, id. at 859-60,
and did not consider the question of overbreadth.109/d. at 860.
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may sometimes be abridged if there is "clear justification" for
doing so, such as the need to vindicate the fourteenth amend-
ment rights of the county's schoolchildren who had been the
victims of past segregation.110
The court of appeals affirmed, its order accompanied by a
per curiam statement of the case and three separate opinions on
the law. In voting to affirm, Judge Coleman cited Supreme
Court decisions upholding the right of the federal government
to prohibit certain political activities among its employees,"' as-
serting that the government policy in question need only be a
good faith effort to maintain an effective school system. 1 2 Judge
Roney voted to "affirm the district court's conclusion that the
school authorities acted within their discretionary authority" in
attempting to lessen the detrimental influence of the existence of
the Calhoun Academy on the integrated public school system.
He added that the case did "not have broad implications" outside
its context of court-ordered desegregation." 3
Perceiving the issue differently, Judge Clark dissented be-
cause the board's rule imposed a "substantial burden upon the
exercise of a fundamental right" without sufficient justifi-
cation. 1 4 He objected to the finding that this policy advanced
the purpose of eradicating discrimination. In Judge Clark's view
the district judge gave too much weight to speculative sociologi-
cal testimony. 1 5 This weak evidence, Judge Clark concluded,
should not override the teachers' otherwise protected rights of
association and privacy.
2. Balancing Constitutional Interests in Cook v. Hudson
If, as Judge Coleman stated," 6 the Hatch Act cases ade-
quately resolve the problems raised in Cook v. Hudson, then Hud-
110 Id. at 859 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 572-73 (1968)
(Board of Education could fire teachers only for speech that would "have impeded the
teacher's performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the
regular operation of the school generally"); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972
(1973) (first amendment rights opposed by state interest in employee discipline)).
111 511 F.2d at 748 (Coleman, J.) (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973) (reaffirming Mitchell)). In both cases, the first amendment rights of
employees were viewed in the context of the government's power to ensure its efficient,
honest administration under the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1970).
112 511 F.2d at 749 (Coleman, J.).
113Id. at 750 (Roney, J.).
11
4 Id. at 751 (Clark, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 752-53, 756-57 (Clark, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 748 (Coleman, J.).
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son has little relevance to the issues raised in McCrary and Riley.
The guiding principle of the Hatch Act decisions is the theory
that the state may have an overriding interest in regulating the
speech and associations of those who voluntarily enter into pub-
lic employment. That principle sheds little light on the rights of
parents and teachers in the private school context. The Hatch
Act cases do not, however, completely dispose of the question
presented in Hudson. Instead, the Hudson decision should be
viewed as depending on a balancing of the relevant first and
fourteenth amendment interests, and thus is illuminating in con-
sidering McCrary and Riley.
There are significant factual distinctions between the United
States Civil Service and a local school system and between reg-
ulating certain types of partisan political speech and electioneer-
ing and regulating association related to the right to bring up
one's children as one sees fit.1 7 There are also distinctions be-
tween the nature of the government interests protected by the
Hatch Act and those of the school board in Hudson. These dis-
tinctions suggest that although the general balancing approach
should not be abandoned, there is insufficient basis for the sug-
gestion by Judge Coleman in Hudson that associational and pri-
vacy interests in segregated private schools are easily overridden.
In the Hatch Act, Congress exercised its power to protect
the integrity of the federal government from a widely perceived
threat of corruption. This is a general governmental power; one
can hardly conceive of a government that does not possess it to
some degree. Yet it is a special power in the sense that its exer-
cise is fundamental to the survival of government, though it does
not advance any particular aim of government. The peculiar
nature of this power precludes unexamined reliance on the
Hatch Act cases to solve the problems raised by encroachment
on civil liberties in the advancement of less basic governmental
interests.
Were the local government's power to run an effective
school system the only issue in Hudson, dissenting Judge Clark
would have a powerful argument that the school board's policy
should be invalidated. The important rights of association and
familial privacy should not be infringed by a general govern-
"'7 The parent is responsible for the child's education even though the state has
established schools and could conceivably have assumed responsibility. See Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925): "[T]hose who nurture [the child] and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."
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mental interest in operating schools, especially where, as here,
the evidence indicates only indirectly that the policy infringing
those rights advances the government's claimed interest."18
There is, however, a stronger characterization of the
county's case. The nature of the power exercised by the school
board is not significantly less important than the federal power
underlying the Hatch Act. Besides having an interest in running
its schools well, the school board in Hudson was acting to imple-
ment a court order requiring it to enforce the fourteenth
amendment rights of the county's black schoolchildren. This
special concern for effectively establishing the priority of equal
protection in the public school system elevates the justification
for the board's exercise of power to a level comparable to that
underlying the Hatch Act decisions. Chief Judge Keady recog-
nized the importance of the school district's equal protection
concerns in the trial court opinion: "Conceding there must be
clear justification for curtailing or limiting First Amendment
rights, nevertheless, plaintiffs' rights as parents may not be con-
sidered in isolation, and to the exclusion of other constitutional
demands of equal, if not greater, magnitude." 119
The existence of this fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion interest of the county schoolchildren as a basis for the
board's policy places the teachers' associational and familial
rights in conflict with strong forces indeed. 20 If the board's
policy had been invalidated in Hudson, the fourteenth amend-
ment rights of those protected by the 1968 integration order
might have been infringed.' 2
1
A conflict between constitutional rights such as the one that
occurred in Hudson is rare but by no means unique. Justice
Douglas attempted to avoid a similar conflict in his famous dis-
sent in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 122 By separating the issue of
118 511 F.2d at 752-53 (Clark, J., dissenting).
119 365 F. Supp. at 859. The opinion continued (quoting Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956)):"As no constitutional guaranty enjoys preference, so none
should suffer subordination or deletion."
120 The 1968 desegregation order issued pursuant to the fourteenth amendment is
of course in accord with the spirit of the thirteenth amendment as well.
121 Of course, this does not vitiate Judge Clark's argument concerning the tenuous-
ness of the psychological evidence supporting the board's policy. But psychological and
sociological evidence has been important in showing harm under the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Where the issue is whether the
fourteenth amendment interests of a large number of schoolchildren will be served by a
given policy, psychological evidence may be the only kind adducible.
122 407 U.S. 163, 179-84 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas followed the
dictum in his opinion for the Court in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966): "A
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association from that of state action, he could affirm the right of
individuals to associate with complete freedom but deny the
right of discriminatory associations to receive significant gov-
ernment benefits available in limited supply. A majority of the
Supreme Court considered this approach in Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery,123 in which segregated school groups were enjoined
from the exclusive use of recreational facilities, in city parks in
order to guarantee full implementation of public park desegre-
gation orders. The private segregated organizations were not
enjoined from using the park, however, although the Court
acknowledged that upon a finding of "impairment of an out-
standing school desegregation order" such a result might
be warranted on remand.
The Court was aware of the implications of its position even
though no private group was ordered to integrate:
It should be obvious that the exclusion of any person or
group... from public facilities infringes upon the free-
dom of the individual to associate as he chooses. ...
[H]owever, we must also be aware that the very exercise
of that freedom to associate by some may serve to in-
fringe that freedom for others. Invidious discrimination
takes its own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is
not subject to affirmative constitutional protection when
it involves state action. 124
The Court recognized that associational rights may conflict both
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rights, 25 while the dissenters in that case characterized them
only as associational. 126 The Hudson dissent spoke of the "per-
sonal freedom as parents to choose the academic environment in
which their children will be educated," a freedom that may be
"viewed as a part of a citizen's Fourteenth Amendment liberty or
First Amendment freedom of association or a combination of
both."'
27
This disparity of definition arises not from the intrinsic
complexity of the interest claimed by the schoolteacher parents
(one has an intuitive feel for what it is); but rather from the fact
that the Supreme Court has never clearly formulated a doctrine
of associational rights. Only in Pierce v. Society of Sisters128 did the
Supreme Court consider doctrines of association and privacy in a
context analogous to the one under consideration here. In Pierce
the Court found these rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 2 9 It must be noted, however, that Pierce was de-
cided during the peak of the "substantive due process" era, when
state interests were frequently afforded little weight.
Parents' decisions concerning the education of their children
involve both political and social aspects of first amendment in-
terests. Parents' decisions concerning the education of their
offspring are political within the broad meaning of "politics"
adopted by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button. 130 Certainly,
discussion of educational matters is protected as discussion of a
subject of public interest.' 3 ' Many parents send their children to
school not only because of compulsory attendance laws, but also
with the hope that education will enable their children to make a
"distinctive contribution"'' 32 to society. Without doubt those who
operate schools also hope this will be one result of their efforts.
The decision to enroll one's child in a private school "presenting
ideas or having educational methods or practices which are not
available in the public schools"' 33 may be viewed as a political
choice, as may the decision to establish such a school. Operating
125 515 F.2d at 1087.
126 515 F.2d at 1094-96 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
127 511 F.2d at 750 (Clark, J., dissenting).
128 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
129 268 U.S. at 534-35. The Pierce Court found the rights in the general principle of
"liberty" and did not identify or place them more specifically. See note 164 infra &
accompanying text.
130 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
131 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
132 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
131 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted,
96 S.Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
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private schools, at least when they do not transgress state statutes
and regulations reasonable under Pierce,13 4 legitimately presents
the public with a choice of educational alternatives. The indi-
vidual should be as free to choose among these alternatives as he
is to choose among the proposed policies of candidates for elec-
tion to school boards.
The associational right claimed by the parents is also social.
A parent may choose a private school for his child partly on the
basis of the sort of people with whom the parent wishes the child
to associate. A parent may believe that a child's social environ-
ment is important to character development. Until Riley and
McCrary, no case had suggested that in the absence of state ac-
tion the power of the state to regulate education included the
power to prescribe who must be allowed to attend a particular
private school. Pierce limits the social setting that one may seek
out in a private school only to the extent of permitting the state
to require that teachers be of good moral character. 35
The right of social association is part and parcel of the asser-
tedly political right discussed above. But in addition, given the
absence of support for the position that the regulatory power of
the state permits it to prescribe which students must be admitted
to which private schools, the school's choice of the composition
of its student body is a legitimate choice of educational methods.
If the school has the right to present such policies to the public,
then the public has a correlative right to consider those policies
in choosing a school.
In addition to these associational rights, plaintiffs' rights of
familial privacy, akin to those raised in Griswold,'3 6 Roe v.
Wade, 137 Stanley v. Georgia,138 and Eisenstadt,139 are involved in
Hudson. Although these cases all center on the problem of sexu-
ality, their logic need not end there. Indeed, Griswold builds the
right of sexual freedom in part on the freedom to choose a
134 The Pierce Court did not question
the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, surpervise
and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character
and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare.
268 U.S. at 534.
135 Id.
136 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
137 410 U.S. 43 (1973).
138 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
139 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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school in Pierce.'40 Sex is but one of a number of concerns of
such central importance to the familial relationship that it should
be unregulated by government.14' The choice of educational pol-
icy is fundamental to the relationship between parent and child
and to the parent's responsibility for the child. It is an intensely
personal matter which in very large part should be between par-
ent and child, and eventually between them and the school.
In summary, the right asserted by the plaintiffs in Hudson to
send their children to a school of their choice consists of at least
(1) an interest in familial privacy, including the freedom to bring
up a child as one chooses, (2) an interest in the social association
of both themselves and their children, and (3) quasi-political in-
terests in effectively supporting a favored educational philoso-
phy. When these rights are viewed together, the real issue is the
"autonomy"'142 of the parent. Professor Henkin has written:
Primarily and principally the new Right of Privacy is a
zone of prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immu-
nity from regulation, in addition to that established by
the first amendment. The zone, Justice Blackmun told
us, ... consists of 'personal rights' that can be deemed
'fundamental,' that are 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.' The right has 'some extension' to mar-
riage, . . .family relations and parental autonomy. But
we will know which rights are and which are not within
143the zone only case by case ....
Professor Henkin's formulation of autonomy focuses
primarily on the four "sexual privacy" cases,'144 yet his analysis
applies equally well to a much larger set of rights including those
examined above.' 45 The courts have denominated as "associa-
tional" the rights upheld in NAACP v. Alabana ex rel.
140 381 U.S. at 482-83.
141 On the other hand, not even the sexual relations of the family are wholly immune
from state regulation. Prohibitions of incest, for example, still stand. See, e.g., Miss. CoDE
ANN. § 93-1-1 (1972).
142 This name for the collection of constitutional rights was suggested in Henkin,
supra note 79, and On Privacy, supra note 79, as a useful device for analyzing the real
nature of the rights involved in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Stanley v. Georgia, and Roe v. Wade.
Henkin notes that these "familial" rights are less matters of "privacy" in the traditional
sense of keeping one's affairs secret, than of "autonomy," meaning the ability to act free
of governmental interference.
143 Henkin, supra note 79, at 1425-26.
144 Cases cited notes 136-39 supra & accompanying text.
141 Text accompanying notes 49-92 supra.
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Patterson,146 NAACP v. Button,' 47 and Shelton v. Tucker,148 but they
can easily be seen as rights of autonomy in Professor Henkin's
sense. The rights asserted by the NAACP on behalf of its mem-
bers in Alabama ex rel. Patterson and the rights asserted in Shelton
are rights of privacy in the traditional sense of the right to keep
information about oneself secret from the government. In both
cases, however, the key support for the holding was the conclu-
sion that governmental knowledge of the association in question
impaired the individual's autonomy by subjecting him to the pos-
sibility of governmental or other intimidation. 49 Similarly, the
limitation of autonomy in childbearing was the central issue in
Roe v. Wade. 150 Further, while Button involved the ability of the
NAACP as an organization to catalyze litigation, the basis of the
holding was that the members of the organization had a right to
be free from government interference when advancing their be-
liefs in this manner.
As Professor Henkin states, the zone in question is only one
of "prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immunity from
regulation"; 151 this holds true for the expanded zone of au-
tonomy suggested here as well. The state's interest in the
mother's decision to abort grows with the fetus.' 52 Similarly, Gil-
more v. City of Montgomery concerned the point at which restric-
tions can be imposed on the autonomy of individuals to practice
segregation in private groups.' 53 In Pierce the parents were pre-
sumed to have autonomy in the decision where to send their
children to school, subject to reasonable regulation of certain
aspects of education. In Shelton v. Tucker the Court did not fore-
close the possibility of inquiry into specific memberships of
teachers.'
54
The theoretical objection to this consolidation of concepts is
that the concepts do not necessarily share a common basis. The
Supreme Court in Griswold found the right of marital privacy (or
autonomy) in the "peripheral rights" that emanate from the first
amendment.'5 5 The reasoning in Alabama ex rel. Patterson was
146 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
147 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
148 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
149 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
150 410 U.S. 43 (1973).
151 Henkin, supra note 79, at 1425.
152 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-65 (1973).
153 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
154 364 U.S. at 487-88.
155 381 U.S. at 482-84.
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similar.' 56 However, the Court in Griswold noted that the right
there discovered was not an exclusive first amendment right but
was also supported by the third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments. 157 The right in Roe v. Wade is less securely tied to
the first amendment; Justice Blackmun stated 158 that different
cases tie different parts of the right to different constitutional
provisions, the first, 5 9 fourth, fifth, 60 ninth,16' and four-
teenth162  amendments, along with the general concept of
penumbral rights. 163 Pierce itself fails to tie the right it assures to
any concept more definite than that of general liberty.'6 4 It is
questionable whether rights of such diverse constitutional origin
are properly subsumed under the single rubric of autonomy.
Most of the majority opinions ground the rights discovered
in the cases under discussion at least partly in the first
amendment. 65 Some, particularly Griswold and Roe v. Wade,
draw much more widely from the Constitution. The Meyer v.
Nebraska-Pierce v. Society of Sisters line of cases does not even find
partial basis in the first amendment, and these cases present facts
156 357 U.S. at 460-62.
157 381 U.S. at 481-85.
158 410 U.S. at 152.
159 Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
160 Id. (citing, inter alia, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967)).
161 Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring)).
162 Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
163 Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)).
164 The Pierce philosophy is best set out in a passage from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923):
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed [by the fourteenth amendment], the term has received much con-
sideratron and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
Among recent jurists, at least the second Justice Harlan would not have objected to this
approach, believing as he did that the proposition that all constitutionally protected
rights must be tied, however tenuously, to some provision more specific than this guaran-
tee, might permit certain rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to be excluded
from fourteenth amendment protection. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
165 The exception of the fourth and fifth amendment cases is not important for
purposes of this Comment. See, e.g., cases cited note 92 supra. These mostly criminal cases
generally guarantee the traditional sense of privacy, meaning the right to be free from
others' prying into one's affairs.
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most closely analogous to our current concerns. The opinions
speak generally of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of
liberty. 166 They were written during the heyday of economic
substantive due process in the 1920's, however, and their
rationales probably did not survive the demise of that doctrine.
Indeed, Meyer stresses the teacher's right to pursue a vocation,1
6
7
and Pierce emphasizes the property and business interests of the
school.1 68 The general reliance on the liberty guaranteed the
parents by the fourteenth amendment in Pierce is a close
analogue to this reasoning. Yet no one suggests that the results
of Meyer and Pierce are no longer law; the Griswold Court cited
both with approval.169 Meyer and Pierce are of course completely
compatible with the new cases proclaiming associational and pri-
vacy rights. They have been absorbed into the new jurispru-
dence of the Bill of Rights, and one suspects if they were to be
decided today, their language would closely resemble that of the
privacy and association cases. The rights identified in all these
cases remain at least presumptively with the people because of
the ninth amendment.
1 70
Another objection to this formulation of the right of au-
tonomy is that the sort of individual interests involved in sexual
relations and political association, for example, are too diverse to
be protected by a single right. Yet in each case the issue is the
same: whether in the context of one's sexual intimacies, political
associations, or other activities there is a right, arising from the
first amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights, to act
autonomously, that is, without government interference.' 7 ' That
we have different reasons for wishing our actions to be free of
governmental regulation in different contexts no more proves
that the autonomy sought consists of several parts than that our
having different interests in speaking freely and on different
subjects proves that there is more than one right of free speech;
' See note 164 supra.
167 262 U.S. at 400.
168 268 U.S. at 534-35.
169 381 U.S. at 481, 482; also cited with approval in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
457 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
170 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
171 The question whether this is a resurrection of substantive due process cannot be
fully explored here. It is not a revival of economic substantive due process, whose abuse
led to the decline of the doctrine. Note also that the interests of individuals in acting
autonomously in the situations under consideration have been tied to guarantees in the
Bill of Rights more specific than general liberty, or at least has been found in the
penumbras of such guarantees.
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the right to discuss politics and the right to discuss personal
matters are the same. The difference between the cases is that
there are different government interests pitted against the right
of autonomy. Thus the balances struck may be different in each
case. A theoretical basis for the right of autonomy, unified in its
central features if not in all details, has thus been laid.
4. Reconciliation of Constitutional Interests
The perennial problem of constitutional litigation is deter-
mining when an individual constitutional interest is ,outweighed
by a conflicting state interest. Many court opinions and much
commentary have sought to determine when the state interest
must be "compelling" and the means used to achieve it "neces-
sary," when the interest must be "substantial," and when it need
merely be "legitimate" and the means to achieve it "rational."
Such a determination is arduous, and, as is evidenced by the
splits of opinion on the Supreme Court, an unscientific
undertaking.
1 72
Fortunately, the facts of Hudson allow us to short-circuit
most of the inquiry because of the nature of the state's interest.
The most significant state interest involved here is the protection
of the right to equal protection of each of the black schoolchil-
dren of Calhoun County. The countervailing right of autonomy
is accurately characterized as presumptive or prima facie; it con-
tains a built-in acknowledgement of limitation. The right of
black people to equal protection of the law has never been found
less important than any other interest; 17 3 the balance struck in
Hudson does not depart from precedent.
C. Autonomy and Thirteenth Amendment Rights
in the McCrary Situation
The kind of constitutional balancing required for analysis of
17 See generally, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (ma-
jority opinion and opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) (majority opinion and opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
173 In only one modern case has state discrimination based on race been found
supportable, and that case arose in a tense wartime atmosphere. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The refusal of the Supreme Court in Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), to grant injunctions against the nonexclusive use of
public recreation facilities by discriminatory groups was not a denial of the paramount
nature of fourteenth amendment rights, but an admission by the Court that it lacked
sufficient information to decide whether such use sufficiently implicated the city in the
discriminatory practices of the groups to constitute state action.
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Hudson'7 4 can be applied to McCray 175 and Riley' 7 6 as well. The
constitutional conflict in these two cases is even sharper than in
Hudson or Gilnore. 7 7 In the former cases two private parties
asserted conflicting individual rights, whereas in the latter cases
local governments asserted the rights of others. The method
used above to short-circuit the inquiry into degrees of constitu-
tional interest and necessity of particular means will be even
more useful here. The conflicting rights have closely analogous
constitutional bases, thus intensifying the value judgment re-
quired to dispose of these cases.
The claim of the plaintiffs in McCrary and Riley is that a
statute, section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code, pro-
tects nonwhites from racial discrimination in contract formation
by private parties. The constitutional provision granting Con-
gress power to afford them this protection is the thirteenth
amendment, which explicitly forbids slavery but has been held to
allow Congress also to prohibit any practice that it rationally
determines imposes badges or incidents of slavery, particularly
on black persons.' 78 The power exercised by Congress here is
very specific: It is the power to enact appropriate legislation to
prevent whites from imposing badges of slavery on nonwhites by
refusing to contract with them. The right claimed by plaintiffs,
although statutory, carries the imprimatur of the thirteenth
amendment; without that amendment the right would probably
be beyond the power of Congress to guarantee, at least to the
extent that it applies to purely private discrimination.179 Con-
gress enforces the thirteenth amendment right to live as a free
individual under the jurisdiction of the United States by enforc-
ing a right to make private contracts not directly protected by
the Constitution; one personal right gives effect to another.
This relationship of rights and power is different from that
174 Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3230 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1975) (No. 75-503).
175 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278, 75-306).
176 Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla.
1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1976, 5th Cir., Apr. 15, 1974.
177 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
178 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-43 & n.78 (1968) (overruling
prior constitutional construction of § 1981 and upholding § 1982 as a rational measure
aimed at eliminating badges and incidents of slavery). See Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973).
179 It has not been claimed that § 1981 could be enacted under the commerce power,
because the statute is not limited to contracts affecting commerce.
PRIVATE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
usually involved in the enactment of a law. For example, when
Congress enacts a statute pursuant to the commerce power, it
may create in certain individuals statutory rights. 180 But those
rights are based on the grant of a general governmental power
to Congress, not the grant of a power to enforce a specific con-
stitutional right; the grant of the commerce power to Congress
does not create in individuals a right to a well-regulated
economy, and statutory rights granted to individuals thereunder
are not found on individual constitutional rights.' 8 ' The contrast
between the two types of powers does not suggest that absent
congressional action, there would be an independent right in
individuals to the protection now afforded by section 1981. The
Supreme Court has held that the congressional power rationally
to determine the badges and incidents of slavery is part of con-
gressional power to enforce the thirteenth amendment. 8 2 Con-
gress would not need this power if the thirteenth amendment
granted a self-executing right to be free of such badges. This
analysis of the right asserted by the McCrary and Riley plaintiffs
does not depend on whether the statute is interpreted in a
"limited" or "unlimited" fashion' 83 as long as either reading
gives effect to a power of Congress rationally exercised.
Once the courts have satisfied themselves as to the meaning and
rationality of the statute, the right guaranteed is confirmed as
a protection appropriate to the enforcement of the freedom
guaranteed by the thirteenth amendment.
The opposing right claimed by the McCrary and Riley
defendants is the right of autonomy discussed above in the con-
text of Cook v. Hudson. 184 The right has two aspects: first, there is
the right of parents to send their children to the type of school
that they see fit, which defendants assert on the parents' behalf;
second, there is the right of defendants themselves to operate a
school according to their best judgment. The first aspect is the
same as the right asserted by plaintiffs in Hudson; the second
I8 E.g., the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970), granting
workers rights to engage in certain concerted activities without fear of employer retalia-
tion.
181 For example, workers have no superstatutory (constitutional) right to be free
from economic pressure from employers; the NLRA alone creates that right, see note 180
supra.
182 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968).
183 See text accompanying notes 187, 200-08 infra.
184 Since the demise of economic substantive due process, the defendants cannot
claim that § 1981 interferes unreasonably with their business interest in running a school
as they wish.
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recalls the rejected economic substantive due process theories of
Pierce and the early economic regulation cases. Education, how-
ever, is more than just a business. All education involves teaching
debatable ideas and values as well as facts; this is never truer
than in private general elementary and secondary education
offered and selected as an alternative to public school methods
or ideas.
Thus, segregated education may involve association for the
purpose of propagating a social, political, and moral philosophy,
the type of association protected in NAACP v. Button. 1
85
The rights of both plaintiffs and defendants in these cases
belong to those sets of rights necessary to the enforcement of the
rights explicitly granted individuals by the Constitution. Al-
though the rights claimed by plaintiffs were created by Congress
while those asserted by defendants were "discovered" by the
courts, the relationship of each right to the Constitution is the
same: Each buttresses the enforcement of explicit rights.
Because of this similarity, the analysis of each right in terms
of "compelling interest," "fundamentality," and so forth need
not be carried out in detail; l8 6 the relative constitutional weight
of the rights cannot be determined. Which right is more impor-
tant must be determined not in the abstract, but in the particular
factual situation, in terms of both policy and ethics.
The "unlimited" reading of section 1981 asserts that any act
of racial discrimination in the formation or performance of con-
tracts constitutes an insult to the individual against whom the
discrimination is directed, 87 sufficient to constitute a badge of
slavery. Acts of insult differ in the amount of harm done, which
determines the amount of damages awarded or the type of in-
junction granted. In all cases, however, the type of injury is
considered the same, so that all plaintiffs have the same degree
of interest in vindicating constitutional rights. This formulation
answers the McCrary dissenters' contention that certain denials of
contracts are more important than others, and that only impor-
185 371 U.S. 415 (1963); see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
Moreover, the fact that neither the majority nor dissenting opinion in McCrary
distinguishes between the rights of the defendant educators and those of the parents of
the children they teach indicates that these rights are fundamentally the same. The rights
of the two groups, if not identical are at least complementary. But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
186 See text accompanying note 172 supra.
18M Note that the damages awarded in McCrary were for humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental anguish. 515 F.2d at 1089.
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tant denials are forbidden by section 1981; the right to contract
to send one's child to a private school is not protected, because
an adequate integrated public school system is available. Under
the "unlimited" reading of section 1981, discrimination is for-
bidden not because it may prevent a black person from attaining
one of his goals, but because it brands the victim with the odium
of slavery. If acts of discrimination that cause the smallest actual
injury are to be regarded as equivalent to those causing the
largest, then the fact of the insult itself must be extremely pow-
erful; an interest of the discriminator in exercising any other
constitutional right will need to be extremely strong in order to
overcome it.
In McCrary the level of defendants' interest in autonomous
action is high. A restriction of autonomy in choosing a school for
one's children limits the parents' ability to associate for purposes
that are more than colorably political, to associate for social pur-
poses, and to make decisions concerning intimate familial mat-
ters, any one of which enjoys constitutional protection.
The interests of plaintiffs and defendants not only have
equally weighty constitutional bases, but they bear comparable
rank among the rights that could logically be supported by those
bases. The conflict can be resolved only by considering the con-
sequences of affirming or reversing McCrary. A reversal would
undoubtedly be formulated to allow the section 1981 and 1982
cases decided to date to remain standing. 88 Under the new for-
mulation, certain types of racial discrimination practiced by pri-
vate parties, though as invidious as any other discrimination,
could not be reached by Congress because of the shield of au-
tonomy that protects the discriminators. Protection would ex-
tend not only to discrimination involving essentially private in-
terests, such as whom one will marry or with whom one will form
a drinking club,18 9 but also to discrimination in which the in-
terests are more public, such as what type of education will be
available to the children of a community. 19° These consequences
follow if infringement of defendant's autonomy rights cannot be
justified by the need to serve the thirteenth amendment interests
" E.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
19 Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
190 Cf. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974), in which the Court
expressed the concern that complete enforcement of one's right of association may dero-
gate someone else's.
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protected by section 1981. A decision upholding the rights of
defendants in McCrary would in no way reflect a return to the
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,19' but only the position that there
are certain types of discrimination, linked to personal prefer-
ences, that the body politic cannot and should not attempt to
eliminate.
Should the McCrary holding be affirmed, the Supreme
Court will be extending the constitutional commitment to end
racial discrimination as a relic of slavery. The question is
whether this extension would carry with it a license to invade
other constitutional liberties too deeply. The dissenters in
McCrary'92 and Hudson' 93 feared that associational values would
be infringed too easily and often in the future, for reasons that
are not compelling. The McCrary dissenters, as noted above,
feared that this decision would lead to an abuse of the concept of
contract as a door opener to governmental regulation and coer-
cion of unwilling co-contractors.' 94
These fears are justified, if at all, only in regard to the
power of Congress and the courts to eliminate racial segregation
and other badges of slavery.' 95 The logic of McCrary would not
lead to a wholesale expansion of the government's ability to in-
vade private lives. Although the McCrary holding could be used
to justify infringing certain personal rights in a substantial man-
ner solely to vindicate another's personal right, no court will
hold, for example, that a disappointed nonwhite suitor has an
action under section 1981 against a white for refusal to marry.
The interests are too intensely personal and, although narrower,
far stronger than even the parents' interests in McCrary and
Hudson.
191 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
192 515 F.2d at 1093-96 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
193 511 F.2d at 755-57 (Clark, J., dissenting).
194 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, JJ., dissenting).
195 The post-Civil War amendments are peculiar constitutional provisions. They
were intended to protect the rights of a particular class of citizen. The thirteenth
amendment is the only constitutional provision that, in terms, guarantees individual
rights against infringement by other individuals. Originally, the rights created by Con-
gress pursuant to this amendment were meant to protect blacks from a return to slavery
after the Civil War, see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); since then the amendment
has been used to attack various systems of involuntary labor, e.g., Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). No serious
attempt has been made, however, to suggest that the power to eliminate badges and
incidents of slavery extends beyond the power to eliminate all traces of racial discrimina-
tion or discrimination against some other class in danger of falling into slavery. The
holding in McCrary would permit only invasions of autonomy that can effect an end to
racial discrimination. There is no license to invade freedoms for any other purpose.
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Less extreme cases can be imagined, however, to which the
logic of McCrary might but should not automatically apply. Pro-
totypical is the case of the private club. If the interests of parents
and educators may be overridden in the name of racial integra-
tion, why should private clubs with mere social interests be al-
lowed to discriminate when their relationships are contractual in
nature? The only response is that there may not be sufficient
reason or societal interest in prohibiting such clubs from dis-
criminating. A more extreme example would arise if Congress
prohibited racial discrimination by political parties, because polit-
ical powerlessness is undeniably an accoutrement of slavery, in
cases in which the fourteenth amendment would not restrict the
party members' freedom of association. 196 Here the public in-
terest in and impact of the activity is greater, but the first
amendment protection is also greater because explicit.' 97 The
Supreme Court should acknowledge that a separate balancing of
interests must be essayed in each case. Without such a caveat,
courts may find it too easy to sacrifice rights of personal au-
tonomy on the altar of ending racial discrimination.
The reasoning of McCrary, even if carried to its extreme,
does not license destruction of any and every right to act au-
tonomously in the name of equality. Nor does it imply that un-
willing co-contractors can constitutionally be coerced into accord
for any and every reason. It does not even permit any and every
constitutional right to be invaded in order to eliminate badges of
slavery. The holding of McCrary does not even imply that Con-
gress may invade all protected areas of life in order to destroy
the badges of slavery. The majority admits that section 1981
cannot prevent the teaching of any doctrine.198 The ability of
Congress to determine and destroy badges and incidents of slav-
ery does not extend to a direct denial of a right explicitly stated
in the Constitution. A church whose dogma included racial
separatism could not be required to accept black members in
order to eliminate a badge of slavery.
Thus the holding of McCrary allows Congress and the courts
to declare: Race is not an absolutely protected basis of associa-
tion, and certain interests in freedom of action must give way
196 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
197 Cf. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (but note that this was "not a case in
which claims are made that injury arises from invidious discrimination based on race in a
primary contest within a single State," as was Terry v. Adams, id. at 4 n.1); National
Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973).
198 515 F.2d at 1087.
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before an interest in eliminating racial inequality. The thirteenth
amendment does not permit congressional interference with any
other constitutional right for any other reason. There is no
analogous constitutional provision under which Congress will be
able to use the reasoning of McCrary in order to invade protected
rights. 199 If carefully explained and expressly restricted, the
reasoning of the majority in McCrary threatens to infringe only a
limited set of personal liberties in a limited number of situations.
Under the present state of the law, in view of the vital nature of
the struggle against the relics of slavery, the delicate balance tips
in favor of affirmance.
D. A Suggested Principle of Limitation for Section 1981
and Its Application to McCrary and Riley
Although this Comment has suggested that an affirmance of
McCrary v. Runyon would not necessarily injure essential Ameri-
can liberties, such injuries could conceivably result from a broad
construction of McCrary and section 1981. An alternative solu-
tion, rather than simple affirmance or reversal, might better pro-
tect all the interests at stake. For this reason, a construction of
section 1981 will be suggested that allows it to operate in most
cases in which its effect would be most useful but limits its poten-
tial for abuse.
The conventional analysis of section 1981 rests on the de-
termination that any racial discrimination in the formation or
performance of a contract humiliates the rejected party, and that
the Constitution allows Congress to provide an action to redress
such humiliations. 200 If the requisite facts are proven, this action
can be defeated only by showing that the remedy it provides
would severely infringe other important rights of the dis-
criminator. According to this reasoning the fact that some acts of
discrimination result in greater injury than others is considered
only in fashioning a remedy. The analysis that follows will sug-
gest that the real badge of slavery imposed by discrimination in
contracting is not the insult to the rejected party but the actual
burden that such discrimination imposes on an individual. Sec-
199 See note 195 supra.
In some ways the McCrary holding is less dangerous to private rights than a holding
based on a public function theory of state action. But see Private Education, supra note 3;
Academies, supra note 8. The result under a state action theory would infringe individual
liberties no less than the McCrary result, but it would permit more analogies than the
McCrary reasoning and therefore more invasions of personal liberties.
200 See note 187 supra.
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tion 1981 should protect primarily against the imposition of such
burdens.
The courts in Riley and McCrary read the phrase "right to
contract" such that the right is infringed whenever one is re-
fused a contract on the basis of race. This reading, alternative to
the pre-Jones201 reading that the right is violated only when the
state refuses to give legal effect to a contract because of the race
of one or both parties,2 0 2 is not the only reasonable alternative.
The simple refusal of an individual or organization to contract
with another does not necessarily deprive the rejected party of
his freedom, because the latter may be able to go elsewhere with
little inconvenience or diminution of acceptable options. On the
other hand, for example, "when racial discrimination herds men
into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the
color of their skin, then [the exclusion of Negroes from white
communities] too is a relic of slavery. '203 When nonwhites are in
an inferior market position, the refusal of a white to contract
with a nonwhite indeed imposes a substantial burden upon the
nonwhite. The inferior bargaining position of the black is then a
badge of slavery which marks him in all aspects of his business
and social life.20 4
A far different situation would exist if the income and em-
ployment levels of blacks were equivalent to those of whites and
if blacks were not largely confined to inferior housing in urban
ghettos or depressed rural areas. Then the refusal to sell land to
a black, or to hire him for a job, would not bear such long-term
consequences and would not contribute to a string of insults to
the black person's dignity.
An inferior position in a given market is defined essentially
as one's inability to make and enforce contracts as favorable as
those available to most other contractors in the same market.
When such a general disability is attributable to a factor complete-
2 0 1 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
202 See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
203 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968).
204 The Jones Court recognized the importance of racial restrictions in the private
housing market, though the holding does not depend on this recognition. Similar obser-
vations might have been made about the job market, to which the Court has recently
applied § 1981.Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975). Congress
recognized the inferior position of nonwhites in the job and housing markets in Tide VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), and Title VIII of the 1968
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). (These acts were based on the commerce
power rather than the thirteenth amendment. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).)
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ly beyond the control of the actor, such as the accident of race, his
right to contract is denied more clearly than when he is merely
denied the opportunity to make a single contract for the same
reason. When such a blanket disadvantage exists, a class of con-
tracts is closed to the actor or open to him only on unfavorable
terms,20 5 so that his range of options is substantially narrowed.
He is presented with a genuine obstacle to achieving a legitimate
personal or business goal because of race, and such an obstacle is
an incident of slavery.
It may be more difficult to establish the generally inferior
position of blacks in the education market than in the housing or
employment markets. Because of the tradition of local control of
education, patterns in education markets may be much more
fragmented than in jobs or housing, so that courts will not be
able to take the kind of "judicial notice" of educational condi-
tions that they have taken in the other fields.
20 6
If in a given case a black plaintiff proves that he was denied
a contract for education on the basis of race and that because of
this he was placed in an inferior position in the market for edu-
cation, he has made out a far stronger case for relief than a
person who asserts only a denial of contract based on race. Colin
Gonzalez, one of the plaintiff children in McCrary, in fact gained
admission to another private school in the area.20 7 Although the
fact of making a single contract is no more proof of good market
position than is a single denial proof of a bad one, at least it
demonstrates that the plaintiffs may have retained the ability to
pursue desired options as effectively as most other contractors in
the marketplace. If this is true, their right to contract has not
been infringed in the sense under consideration. If, however,
their ability to find a school to their liking is substantially inferior
to that of similarly situated whites, then their right to contract
for the purpose of education has been infringed.
If the "right to contract" is interpreted as the right to an
equal position in the marketplace, which in this context means a
choice of schools substantially as wide as that enjoyed by whites
on equally favorable terms, then either an additional evidentiary
requirement has to be imposed on plaintiffs in order to prove a
205 The unfavorable terms would not necessarily have to be, and usually would not
be, economic terms. Rather, school administrators or admissions officers might avail
themselves of more subtle, perhaps psychological, means of establishing their authority
over black students that they would not employ with white students.
206 See note 204 supra.
207 363 F. Supp. at 1202.
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cause of action, or an additional defense would have to be avail-
able to their adversaries. Plaintiffs in cases like McCrary might be
required to show disadvantage in the education market; alterna-
tively, defendants who have discriminated might be allowed to
show that their victims suffered no market disadvantage. Justice
requires that the market showing be asserted as a defense rather
than as an additional part of the plaintiff's burden. Discrimina-
tion, even when arguably legal, is repugnant to the national
moral sense as expressed in the thirteenth amendment to the
Constitution; an individual claiming a right to discriminate
should be required to prove the harmlessness of his actions in
the market terms described above.2 ° s
The form that the market evidence must take will have to be
developed in the cases. Proof for a McCrary-type plaintiff might
be relatively easy in a locality like that of Cook v. Hudson, where
the only non-public school available is segregated; 20 9 it would be
quite difficult for a defendant there to prove no damage from
his discrimination. Proof of effect may be even easier in areas
where there are many segregated academies and little public
support for predominantly black public schools. 2 10 In other
areas, where many private schools are integrated, problems of
proof will be more difficult. For example, simply showing a dis-
proportion of the number of whites and blacks at private schools
in an area may not prove a market effect of discrimination or
rebut evidence showing no effect. Disproportions will need to be
shown after controlling for those factors normally associated
with private school entrance qualifications, such as ability to pay,
tested I.Q. level (at certain types of school), religion (if the local
private education market is dominated by religious schools), and
others. These disproportions will not always need to be shown at
208 A similar shift of burden has been approved by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In employment cases under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), once a plaintiff shows the discriminatory
effect of an employment practice, the defendant employer must demonstrate that the
practice has a business justification. The plaintiff need not show that the employer had
discriminatory motives.
209 Note 105 supra & accompanying text.
Whether public schools are part of the relevant market for these purposes depends
on the schools in question. For example, if a public school provided education of the
same kind and quality as a private school in the same locale, it would be part of the same
market. (An incidental benefit to the public schools might flow from this formulation: If
public schools had to be equal in quality to the private schools in order to maintain the
right of the private schools to remain segregated, parents who wish to send their children
to segregated private schools would have less reason to oppose supporting the public
schools with their tax dollars.)
220 See Academies, supra note 8.
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the allegedly discriminatory school, but at the other private
schools in the locality.
The advantages of this reading of "right to contract" are
fairly clear. It requires proof of actual damage to the plaintiff in
one of his activities, transforming the content of "badge of slav-
ery" from insult to more concrete harm. Some private discrimi-
natory conduct will not be reached under this reading, but dis-
crimination will be reached whenever defendants fail to establish
that their conduct did not hamper plaintiffs' ultimate attainment
of their goals. Most importantly, this theory will substantially re-
duce the objections to enforcement of section 1981 which may
tend to limit rights of autonomy. As the Supreme Court has
noted, upholding certain associational rights may be at the ex-
pense of others' associational rights.2"' Enforcement of "equality
rights," which substantially restricts another individual's actions
or opportunity for action, can be justified more easily when con-
crete, objectively discernible injury is required than when the
only injury is insult. When this type of proof is required, it will
be more acceptable to shift the balance to favor the rights of
plaintiffs under the thirteenth amendment more heavily against
discriminators claiming rights of autonomy. Of course, interpret-
ing section 1981 in this way will not diminish the infringement of
rights of autonomy in cases in which plaintiffs prove that they
were disadvantaged in obtaining a quality education to their
satisfaction; the interpretation suggested here will only decrease
the number of successful plaintiffs and affected defendants.
Should a plaintiff force desegregation of the Calhoun Academy
of the Hudson case, the autonomy rights of parents, educators,
and students will be infringed to exactly the same degree under
this interpretation as under the McCrary majority's reading of
the statute.
The suggested interpretation of section 1981 contains some
disadvantages. First, it is inconsistent with the theory of most of
the section 1981 cases decided to date, which hold the statute to
be violated whenever a black cannot make a contract because of
his race.21 2 Results under the suggested reading will, however,
mostly be consistent with the results of most of these cases; they
will differ only when plaintiffs fail to prove adverse conse-
quences in the market.
Second, and more importantly, this reading would intro-
21 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
212 See notes 38-47 supra & accompanying text.
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duce an anomaly into the law in that it might be difficult for the
prospective defendant to predict the legal consequences of his
behavior. Whether a single discriminatory act would be action-
able under the proposed reading of section 1981 would depend
on factors beyond the control of the discriminator, such as
whether and to what extent other individuals and organizations
providing the same service discriminate.213 The potential dis-
criminator might not know about racial conditions in the rele-
vant market. Although it is regrettable that one may not know
the consequences of one's conduct in all cases, the strong con-
stitutional and societal position against racial bias dictates that
the courts not be unwilling to require discriminators to act at
their own risk.
Another difficulty arises in defining the relevant market. In
an area such as private education the differences between in-
stitutions are often significant because the whole object of the
enterprise is to provide alternatives to standardized public school
methods. For example, assume that a nonwhite sought to place
his child in a "three R's" school in a community in which several
progressive private schools were integrated, most of the tradi-
tional schools were not, and the public schools were grossly in-
ferior. A court should probably hold that because educational
decisions generally are protected by the right of autonomy, the
plaintiff's assertion that he sought only a conservative school
must be respected as a legitimate choice; the smaller group of
traditional private schools would be the relevant market. This
process of definition must be undertaken on a case by case basis.
A final difficulty, more political than legal, is that the sug-
gested reading of section 1981 would probably force many
Southern private schools and schools in small communities to
integrate while leaving the North and schools in cities virtually
untouched. 214 Some degree of regional ill-will would doubtless
redound from this policy, but not as much as there might have
213 For example, assume a market of three equivalent private schools. Defendant
school is segregated but takes every white who applies. The other schools are integrated
but accept only students who score above 100 on a standardized admissions test. Plaintiff
scored below 100, was denied admission to the defendant school, and could thus make
out a case under the suggested formulation. A black student who scored above 100,
however, would not have a successful cause of action because of the existence of the
other schools which would have admitted him.
Under this approach the general injunction against discrimination presently em-
ployed in § 1981 cases, including McCrary, might not be appropriate. Injunctions would
have to be tailored more closely to particular situations.
214 Note that this is also a problem with the public function theory of state action
suggested in Academies, supra note 8, and Private Education supra note 3.
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been before the federal courts became as concerned with de
facto segregation in the North as with the more formal dis-
criminatory schemes in the South.215
In summary, the suggested reading of section 1981 has both
advantages and drawbacks. It must be decided whether the
added protection given rights of autonomy justifies section
1981's constricted coverage of private discrimination, the in-
creased complexity of litigation, and the introduction of certain
anomalies into the law. If, however, this reading is adopted,
rights of autonomy claimed by discriminating educators and
parents will not stand when the requirements of the rule are
satisfied. This rule would require that the judgment in McCrary
be vacated and the case remanded for findings about the educa-
tion market in Northern Virginia.
2 16
IV. CONCLUSION
When discrimination in private education exists, it imposes a
badge of slavery on the victims according to the sense of that
term since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 21 7 Most courts that have
interpreted section 1981 have reasoned that any discrimination
in private education based on race imposes a badge of slavery.
The difference between the formulation followed in McCrary
and that developed in this Comment is in the degree of ac-
tual damage that must be shown in order to merit relief un-
der the statute. The more stringent requirement of concrete
harm is preferable because it ensures that constitutional rights
will be invaded only when their exercise would occasion serious
infringements of others' constitutional right to equality of treat-
ment under the law.
215 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970) (opinion
on the merits) and 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970) (opinion on remedies), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), modified and remanded, 413 U.S. 189
(1973).
216 If the Court of Appeals in Riley reverses the trial court's finding of fact, a similar
factual determination would have to be made on remand there.
217 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959, Columbia University sued a student and his par-
ents to recover $1,000 for tuition owed to the university.' The
student filed a counterclaim demanding damages of $7,016, al-
leging that the university "had represented that it would teach
the defendant wisdom, truth, character, enlightenment, under-
standing, justice, liberty, honesty, courage, beauty and similar
virtues and qualities; that it would develop the whole man,
maturity, well-roundedness, objective thinking and the like; and
that because it failed to do so it was guilty of misrepresentation,
to defendant's pecuniary damage."'2 The trial court granted the
university's motion for summary judgment and was sustained on
appeal.3
In 1972, a young man with an average or above average IQ
and an average attendance record was graduated from a San
Francisco public high school after having attended San Francisco
public schools for twelve years. He had a reading ability of ap-
proximately fifth-grade level.4 During his period of attendance
in the San Francisco public schools, the student's parents attemp-
ted to obtain information about his educational progress and
were repeatedly assured that he was performing at or near grade
level. 5 The student, alleging that his inability to read and write
resulted from the negligence of his teachers and other school
district employees,6 sued the school district and its employees to
recover damages of over $500,000.7 The trial judge sustained a
demurrer to the complaint without opinion, and the case is now
on appeal.
I Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 574, 148 A.2d 63 (App.
Div.), aff'd, 31 N.J. 221, 156 A.2d 251 (1959).
2 Id. at 576, 148 A.2d at 64.
3
1d.
4 First Amended Complaint at 4-5, Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., No.
653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
5Id.
6 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Demurrer at 1, Doe v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist, No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. CL, Sept. 6, 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Plaintiff's Memorandum].
7 Complaint, supra note 4, at 17.
8 Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. CL, Sept. 6,
1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st Dist. CL App., Apr. 28, 1975.
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Although aspects of each of these suits may seem frivolous
or implausible, these cases raise the issue whether a student can
recover from a teacher, an administrator, a school, or school
district for his failure to learn because of teacher negligence or
incompetence. 9 This Comment will explore various theories
upon which a student might base such a suit. It will focus on the
public school context in order to allow the development of the
fullest range of legal theories and policy arguments and to pre-
sent most of the legal and policy objections that can be raised
against such a suit.
There is virtually no law in this area. The legal basis for this
kind of action will be constructed from general principles of tort
and contract law and by analogy to the law of professional mal-
practice. This Comment will outline a broad range of arguments,
will indicate the strengths and weaknesses of each argument, and
will suggest the situations in which each argument would be most
useful.
II. PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In the public school context, an action for failure to learn
addresses the general problem of providing a remedy to public
school students for the loss of educational benefits because
teachers negligently or intentionally failed to conform to
minimum standards of professional competence in the same or
similar communities.' 0 This loss of educational benefits results in
the harm of the failure of a student or class of students to attain
the educational level they probably would have attained had
their teacher performed at the required level. Such a suit does
not rest on the assumption that students will not learn at all
without teachers or even that teachers are the most significant
determinant of how much children learn." The harm that a suit
of this type could be brought to remedy is the loss of the differ-
ence a teacher makes in how much a student learns.
Because the standard to be applied is based on the mini-
mum acceptable level of competence existing within the com-
munity or comparable communities, such a suit is probably not
an effective approach to a general upgrading of education in a
'See Suing for Not Learning, TIME, Mar. 3, 1975, at 73, describing a University of
Bridgeport student's suit to recover tuition, the cost of books, driving expenses, and legal
fees. The student alleged that a required course was "worthless," that the school did not
provide the course described in the catalog, and that she did not learn anything.
10 See text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
" See generally C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972).
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community or to an equalization of per capita funding, teacher
quality, and facilities among different schools or communities. 12
In other words, a student could not bring an action for failure
to learn alleging that his school is inferior to one in a dissimilar
district, but such a suit might be brought, for example, by a
student or class of students in a prosperous community who fail
to reach the eightieth percentile in a particular subject or by
students in a poor school who are graduated from high school
reading at a third-grade level.' 3 In either situation, a student
may have been denied the benefit of minimally competent in-
struction and suffered the "harm" of not learning as much as he
would have if the teacher had been competent.
A. Remedies
At least three kinds of relief might be sought in the public
school context. A plaintiff might seek removal of an incompetent
teacher (and replacement with a competent teacher); provision
of, or payment for, remedial instruction; and/or monetary com-
pensation for diminished future income due, for example, to
plaintiff's relegation to menial employment because of his in-
ferior education.
Removal of an incompetent teacher has the advantage of
being relatively cost-free. Teacher contracts may contain a provi-
sion permitting dismissal "for cause," and a judicial finding of
negligence or incompetence might permit invocation of the
provision.' 4 Also, under the common law and/or statutes of most
states, teachers (including tenured teachers) can be dismissed for
incompetence.' 5 An injunction could be directed against either
school officials, ordering dismissal, or against the teacher, enjoin-
ing him or her from teaching. This remedy seems to be available
under the tort, contract, and possibly the mandamus theories
which will be developed later in this Comment.' 6 While dismissal
eliminates the possibility that the teacher will harm future stu-
dents, however, it does nothing to make whole those students
who have already been subjected to the teacher. This remedy
also does not seem suitable where the reasons for the negligent
performance are not of a continuing nature, that is, where there
12 For a brief discussion of approaches to these broader problems, see Ratner,
Remedying Failure to Teach Basic Skills, INEQUALITY IN EDUC., June 1974, at 15.
"a See text accompanying notes 94-104, 237-40 infra.
14See E. REUTTER & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 450 (1970).
15 Id.
16 See text accompanying notes 76-218 infra.
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is no strong likelihood that the teacher's performance will con-
tinue to be unsatisfactory.
Requiring a teacher, school, or school district to provide or
pay for remedial instruction sufficient to bring the plaintiff-
students up to the educational level they probably would have
attained if they had had a minimally competent teacher 17 has
several advantages. First, plaintiffs would, in most cases, be made
whole. Second, this remedy does not involve awarding "specula-
tive damages."'18 Third, given the probable infrequency of suc-
cessful suits under the standards developed in this Comment,
this remedy does not involve ruinous expense to the school
district.
In the case of students who have been out of school for a
number of years, remedial instruction might not fully compen-
sate the students for the loss suffered. Suppose, for example,
that the suit is based on the incompetence of an entire reading
staff. The students left school reading (on average) at the third-
grade level. With minimally competent instruction, they proba-
bly would have read at ninth-grade level.' 9 If these students have
suffered several years of diminished earnings because of their
lack of reading ability, remedial instruction alone will not pro-
vide compensation. In such a case, money damages for lost earn-
ings might be sought. Damages would amount to the difference
between plaintiff's actual earnings from the time of leaving de-
fendant school to the point at which remedial instruction cor-
rected the reading deficiency and his probable earnings during
the same period had he not had a "teacher-caused" educational
deficiency. 20 If the reading deficiency was never corrected, the
damages might be the total diminution of plaintiff's lifetime
earnings attributable to teacher negligence or incompetence.2'
In the case of someone who was denied promotion specifically
because of his "teacher-caused" educational'deficiency, and was
consequently relegated to an inferior position, damages might be
the difference between his projected life-time earnings at the
lower level and what he would have earned in the position he
17 See text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
18 See id.
1
9
1d .
20 Id. Presumably statistics correlating income and reading ability have been or could
be compiled. This kind of relief should be sought only where an entire reading or math
program was negligently taught, since it is doubtful that a single teacher's negligence
could substantially affect a student's earning capacity.
21 See Complaint, supra note 4, at 19. The amount of lost earnings may be calculable
on the basis of statistics comparing average lifetime earnings of people at one reading
level with the earnings of people reading on a higher level.
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was denied, or the difference in earnings during the period be-
tween the denial of promotion and remedy of the deficiency.22
Numerous objections can be raised to the demand and
award of monetary compensation for diminished earnings. First,
proof of harm on an individual basis would be difficult if not
impossible, even though the harm to the entire class might be
demonstrable.23 Second, in any individual case, even if harm is
proven, the precise amount of damages necessarily would be
speculative. Courts have refused to award damages which will
eventually be of a fixed amount and susceptible of precise com-
putation, but are nonascertainable at the time of trial.2 4 Third,
damages arguably should never exceed the combination of the
cost of remedial instruction and earnings lost during the period
of remedial instruction; before suffering an income loss, a plain-
tiff could have sought and paid for remedial instruction. Fail-
ure to have done so might be considered a negligent failure to
avoid or minimize damages, possibly barring recovery for the
avoidable damages. 25 Finally, the award of money damages for
diminished earnings could be a potentially crushing burden
upon a school district, especially in a class action. 26 In decid-
22 If the suit is brought under a contract theory, the damages recoverable would be
either compensation for detriment suffered (e.g., loss of earnings during the period a
student who decides not to drop out of school attends school) or loss of the expected
benefit of the bargain (e.g., diminished future income).
23 This greater ease in proving harm to the entire class would support a decision to
bring a class action. The other advantages of the class action for this type of suit are (1)
the reduced cost per student-plaintiff of a class action and (2) the increased possibility
that the publicity generated by a class action could provoke political, legislative, or ad-
ministrative action potentially more far-reaching than any judicially constructed remedy.
See Ratner, supra note 12, at 16, 21 & n.20. The disadvantage of a class action is that the
potential cost to the school district of a plaintiff's verdict and the antipathy and im-
patience that some judges feel toward class actions in general, e.g., Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974), may severely jeopardize chances of success on the liability issue.
24 E.g., Big Rock Mountain Corp. v. Stearns-Roger Corp., 388 F.2d 165, 170 (8th
Cir. 1968); Fireside Marshmallow Co. v. Frank Quinlan Constr. Co., 213 F.2d 16 (8th
Cir. 1954); Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 740
(1937) (court refused to award damages to Indian children for Government's breach of
treaty obligation to provide educational facilities and competent teachers, because
amount of damages could not be calculated with sufficient certainty). This dislike for
speculative damages contrasts with the willingness of courts to allowjuries to speculate on
the monetary value of pain and suffering, which will never be precisely calculable.
25 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 65, at 422-24 (4th ed. 1971).
This argument loses its strength in the context of a misrepresentation case in which the
plaintiff alleges, for example, that he was passed through every grade with satisfactory
reports and it was not until after graduation that he realized his deficiencies. See text
accompanying notes 169-81 infra; see generally W. PROSSER, supra § 110.
26 In Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975, damages
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:755
ing whether to impose liability on the basis of legal theories
as novel as those upon which a plaintiff must rely in a suit
for failure to learn, a court would certainly consider the poten-
tial crippling effect of a large damage award on public educa-
tion. By demanding money damages for lost earnings, past
and future, a plaintiff might diminish his chances of success
on the basic liability issues. 27 It might, therefore, be advisable
either to bring a suit for money damages only where remedial
instruction would not be feasible, or to defer demands for
money damages for diminished earnings to suits brought after
liability has been established in suits for teacher dismissal
and remedial instruction.
In Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District, the plaintiff
sought money damages for mental distress, pain, and suffering
arising from his "teacher-caused" reading deficiency.28 Although
courts have recently recognized the intentional infliction of men-
tal distress as a basis for tort recovery,29 courts generally have
not permitted recovery for negligently inflicted mental distresss
without accompanying physical injury. 30 The demand in Doe
seems to go far beyond any recovery allowed by courts in negli-
gence suits, but it might be made more realistically in an inten-
tional tort action. 3' Even in the latter case, however, difficulties
of proof may make success on this demand highly unlikely;
moreover, seeking damages for mental distress may jeopardize
chances for success on the crucial liability question.
B. Policy
A student's suit for failure to learn because of teacher neg-
ligence or incompetence 32 cannot be won with formal legal ar-
guments alone. Part of any plaintiff's case will have to be social
policy arguments demonstrating why there should be liability.
Although the extent to which denial of education is an in-
jury cognizable in tort or contract is unclear, courts have recog-
nized the denial of education as a significant loss to a student.
33
for lost earnings, mental distress, and pain and suffering were calculated by the plaintiff
to be $500,000. Complaint, supra note 4, at 19.
27 Interview with John G. Harkins, Jr., prominent Philadelphia trial attorney, in
Philadelphia, Oct. 17, 1974.
28 Complaint, supra note 4, at 19. See generally Ratner, supra note 12, at 16-17.
'9 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 12.
30 Id. § 54, at 328-30.
31 See text accompanying notes 164-68 infra.
32 See text accompanying notes 69-218 infra.
33 Cf. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 740
(1937).
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As the Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Board of Education,34
Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for educa-
tion both demonstrate our recognition of the impor-
tance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is
the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.
35
Given the importance of education, lack of legal precedent
should not be determinative. In the past, courts have expanded
the tort law to create remedies for injuries not previously recog-
nized in tort. Prosser writes,
The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of
its development are never set. When it becomes clear
that the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protec-
tion against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact
that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar
to the remedy.3 6
Courts have imposed liability for the intentional infliction of
mental suffering,37 for injuries caused by defective products,38
for the infliction of prenatal injuries,39 and for other injuries
which do not fit into traditional tort categories. Thus if a plain-
tiff can convince a court that there should be liability as a matter
of policy, the absence of formal legal precedents should not bar
recovery in tort.
40
The primary function of the tort law is, as Prosser explains,
"the allocation of losses arising out of human activities .... In
34 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35 Id. at 493.
36 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
37 Id. § 12.
38Id. §§ 95-104.
39 Id. §§ 55.
4' For a model of how to fashion a new tort with a combination of policy and formal
legal arguments, see Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967).
See also W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at4 n.18, § 12, at 51.
4, W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at 6.
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deciding if there should be liability in an action for failure to
learn, we are deciding who should bear the educational "losses"
caused by teacher negligence or incompetence.
Punishment or retaliation has been suggested as one aim of
the tort law, that is, as one principle for deciding who should pay
for losses.4 2 If the cost of making whole the student who has
failed to learn because of teacher negligence is to be assigned in
accordance with a punishment or retaliation principle, a blame-
worthy teacher or school district should bear the loss rather than
the innocent student.
Some authorities suggest that losses should be assigned to
the party better able to bear the costs, or should be shifted to the
public at large. 43 A school district is obviously a better loss bearer
than an individual student because it can pass on the cost of
whatever remedy is awarded to the general public in the form of
increased taxes. Rather than raising taxes, however, a municipal-
ity might lower the overall quality of education to pay for a
major judgment in favor of a single student or class of students.
But even if this were the case, spreading the injury among all
students in the district or municipality is arguably more equitable
than leaving the entire burden on the student(s) who had the
misfortune of drawing an incompetent teacher. Furthermore,
just as school districts are able to obtain liability insurance to
cover physical injuries to students caused by the negligence of
school employees, they could probably obtain insurance against
the type of liability involved here, guaranteeing efficient cost
spreading.44 Even if, because of an immunity statute,45 the
school district is not held liable for the consequences of the
teacher's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior or
for its own negligence in hiring an incompetent teacher, mal-
practice insurance could be made available to teachers. The cost
of the insurance could be passed on to the public through the
mechanism of increased salaries paid with higher taxes.46 Thus,
the teacher himself appears to be a better risk bearer than the
student.
42 Id. § 4, at 23 & n.81.
" See id. 22 & n.69.
14 See Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 185, 202-03 (T.
Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960). Some cases and statutes now recognize that the availa-
bility of liability insurance eliminates the need to protect governments with immunity.
Johnston v. Girvin, 61 111. App. 2d 47, 208 N.E.2d 894 (1965); Thomas v. Broadlands
Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952); Vendrell v.
School Dist., 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961).
4 Notes 70-75 infra & accompanying text.
4 Cf. Proehl, supra note 44, at 202 & n.100.
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
It has been suggested that imposing liability for a student's
failure to learn because of teacher negligence or incompetence
would render public education economically infeasible.47 For
three reasons, this concern may be unjustified. First, this objec-
tion is inapplicable to demands for dismissal of incompetent
teachers. Second, although a large class action suit would expose
a school district to a potentially crushing burden if damages for
prospective loss of income were awarded, the burden would not
be nearly as great if only provision of or payment for remedial
instruction were demanded. Third, since under the standards of
negligence suggested in this Comment4 8 a successful suit would
probably be rare, the school district or individual teacher might
be able to purchase insurance at a reasonable price.49
It is possible that the costs of compensating a class of stu-
dents or a single student for diminished income would, if prov-
able, be so potentially burdensome as to make success on the
liability question unlikely. If a damage judgment would substan-
tially reduce the quality of services that the school district could
provide, courts will most likely decide that the social need for
educational services outweighs the interest of any particular
plaintiff or class of plaintiffs in recovering for educational ben-
efits denied by teacher negligence.
An obvious benefit of imposing liability on teachers, school
officials, and school districts is the deterrence of negligent teach-
ing and the hiring of incompetent teachers. 50 Personal liability,
however, may also discourage people from becoming teachers.
51
Although the availability of malpractice insurance may substan-
tially eliminate fear of financial responsibility, it would not
eliminate the "chilling effect" on entry into the profession
generated by the fear of being disgraced in a courtroom by
public testimony of incompetence.
Furthermore, liability resulting in monetary damages or
dismissal may discourage the experimentation that leads to edu-
"' Demurrer of Defendants on First Amended Complaint at 17, Doe v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Defendants' Demurrer]. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 4, at 22-23.
Text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
See generally Proehl, supra note 44, at 202.
50 Cf. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968), in
which the California supreme court found this consideration persuasive: "An employee
in a private enterprise naturally gives some consideration to the potential liability of his
employer, and this attention unquestionably promotes careful work; the potential liability
of a governmental entity, to the extent that it affects primary conduct at all, will similarly
influence public employees." Id. at 792-93, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
" See Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 627, 657 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Professional Negligence].
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cational progress.52 This problem may be overcome by giving
parents the choice of putting their children in experimental clas-
ses; the doctrine of assumption of risk would then allow ex-
perimentation undeterred by the threat of damages or
dismissal. 53 The threat of liability would have the beneficial ef-
fect of inducing school officials and teachers to explain experi-
mental programs to parents and students in order to secure
formal and voluntary consent sufficient to establish assumption
of risk. Where, in the absence of formal consent, a teacher or
school official decides to deviate from conventional practices,
and, as a result, children suffer an educational loss, perhaps the
victims of the unsuccessful experiment should be compensated or
elevated to the educational level they probably would have at-
tained with conventional instruction.54 Depending on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, a successful suit need not re-
sult in an injunction against experimentation or dismissal of the
experimenting teacher. Payment for the costs of the unsuccessful
experiment may, in many cases, be sufficient.
55
It might be argued that other, non-judicial mechanisms,
such as political action, certification procedures, supervisory con-
trol, and professional review, are adequate to prevent or deter
teacher negligence. 56 But to the extent that an educational mal-
practice suit has a basis in fact, these other mechanisms have
been inadequate to prevent teacher negligence. In addition,
most other procedures provide only prospective relief and none
of them "make Whole" students who have already been injured
by teacher negligence. 57 Professional review boards have been
suggested as a cheaper and more efficient way of enforcing pro-
fessional standards and compensating individuals than the civil
lawsuit. 58 Although fashioning an alternative compensation pro-
cedure may be desirable to eliminate the problems inherent in
litigation-a slow, costly, and inefficient route59-the shortcom-
ings of the judicial process are not a valid reason to deny recov-
ery in a lawsuit.
52 Cf. Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 238 &
n.142 (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
53 School districts might try to take advantage of this defense by requiring parents to
sign a blanket waiver when their children enter kindergarten. It is far from certain,
however, that such a waiver would be enforced. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386-403, 161 A.2d 69, 84-95 (1960).
54 See text accompanying notes 219-40 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 252-55 infra.
56 See, e.g., Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 17-18.
17 See Sax & Hiestand, supra note 40, at 885-86.
58 Professional Negligence, supra note 56, at 688-89.
'9 See Sax & Hiestand, supra note 40, at 875.
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Another argument against recognition of a cause of action
for failure to learn because of teacher negligence or incompe-
tence focuses on the administrative inconvenience which might
be caused by a "flood of litigation" involving difficult problems
of proof. Various authorities, however, have rejected this argu-
ment as a legitimate reason for denying liability when genuine
and serious injuries have occurred.60 For example, Prosser
writes, "It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that de-
serve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation' and it is a
pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of
justice to deny relief on such grounds."' 6 1 Moreover, problems of
proof may be no more insurmountable than those involved in
other kinds of lawsuits that are presently recognized, 62 and,
under the standards of negligence outlined in this Comment,63 a
"flood of litigation" is unlikely.
In Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District,64 defendants
argued that the "social importance" of free, universal public
education should bar recovery for negligence. 65 This argument
has not prevented courts from holding school districts liable for
physical injuries caused by teacher negligence, 66 and the courts
have generally declined to allow the importance of a public func-
tion to determine whether tort liability for negligent perfor-
mance exists.6 7 Furthermore, if the costs of liability would not
make public education economically infeasible (a factual ques-
tion), there is no logical reason why the importance of public
education should imply immunity.
In assessing the possible objections to recognizing this cause
of action, the following observation of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court should be kept in mind:
Throughout the entire history of the law, legal
Jeremiahs have moaned that if financial responsibility
60 E.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); see
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 12, at 51 & n.38.
61 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 12, at 51.
62 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
63 Text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
64 No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st
Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975.
65 Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 17.
66 E.g., Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 73 P.2d 596 (1937), aff'd on
rehearing, 11 Cal.2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938); Gardner v. State, 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d
344 (1939).
6 E.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). But
see Lipman v. Brisbone Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1961).
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were imposed in the accomplishment of certain enter-
prises, the ensuing litigation would be great, chaos
would reign and civilization would stand still. It was
argued that if railroads had to be responsible for their
acts of negligence, no company could possibly run
trains; if turnpike companies had to pay for harm done
through negligence, no roads would be built; if
municipalities were to be financially liable for damage
done by their motor vehicles, their treasuries would be
depleted. Nevertheless, liability has been imposed in ac-
cordance with elementary rules of justice and the moral
code, and civilization in consequence, has not been
bankrupted, nor have the courts been inundated with
confusion.
68
C. Legal Theories
No reported case has allowed public school students to re-
cover for the loss of educational benefits because of teacher neg-
ligence or incompetence. The legal bases for such an action must
be created by analogy from the law of malpractice and by a
somewhat novel application of general principles of tort and
contract law. Although any law student can raise objections to
each of the legal theories that will be outlined, the analysis that
follows may give a judge a legal formula with which to explain a
policy-based plaintiff's decision. A plaintiff's verdict would in
fact be a recognition of a new tort or contract cause of action,
but the framing of the suit in familiar language would increase a
court's receptiveness by making such a verdict appear less
radical.
69
In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff's task may be made much
more difficult by continued adherence to the doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity from tort liability. 70 The extent to which
the doctrine would bar an action of this type varies greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Where the doctrine is applied most
broadly, teachers, school officials, and school districts have been
held immune from liability for students' injuries caused by the
68 Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 218-19, 199 A.2d 875, 884
(1964).
69 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 6, at 27.
" See Memorandum of Defendants at 3, McNeil v. Board of Educ., Civil No.
L-17297-74 (N.J. Super. Ct., Essex County, filed Jan. 15, 1975), arguing that sovereign
immunity should bar a former student's suit against a school board for the school
system's alleged negligent failure to deal adequately with his reading and visual disability.
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 25, §§ 131-32; Proehl, supra note 44, at 185-86,
202-04.
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negligent acts and omissions of teachers or school officials. 71
Unquestionably, jurisdictions that bar liability for physical in-
juries would not allow liability for students' failure to learn. In
some states, governmental immunity extends to school districts
and officials but not to teachers.7 2 In other states, school districts
are liable for injuries caused by the negligent acts and omissions
of their teachers to the extent of the district's liability insurance
coverage. 73 In still other states, the doctrine of governmental
immunity has been generally abrogated and exists only where
immunity is specifically provided for by statute;7 4 in these states
the teacher and the school district will generally be liable for
injuries caused by the teacher's negligence. It suffices to point
out that in at least some jurisdictions the doctrine does not abso-
lutely bar actions against teachers, schools, and school districts to
recover for injuries to students caused by teacher negligence,
and that authorities have contended, as a matter of policy, that
immunity doctrines should not insulate school districts, officials,
and teachers from tort liability where liability insurance is availa-
ble at non-crippling rates.
75
1. Tort Theories
Three broad areas of tort law are relevant to a cause of
action for failure to learn because of teacher incompetence: neg-
ligence, intentional tort, and misrepresentation (deceit and neg-
ligent misrepresentation).
a. Negligence
Section 328 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth
the essential elements of a negligence suit:
In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden
of proving
(a) facts which give rise to a legal duty on the part of the
defendant to conform to the standard of conduct estab-
"1E.g., Carroll v. Lucas, 39 Ohio Misc. 5, 313 N.E.2d 864 (C.P. 1974) (suit can be
brought only with specific statutory authorization).
72 E.g., Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 271 A.2d 547 (1970).
7See Johnston v. Girvin, 61 111. App. 2d 47, 208 N.E.2d 894 (1965); Thomas v.
Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952);
Vendrell v. School Dist., 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961). But see Niedfelt v. Joint
School Dist., 23 Wis. 2d 641, 127 N.W.2d 800 (1964).
7
4 See, e.g., Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795
(1962).
75 See, e.g., Duncan v. Koustenis, 26 Md. 98, 271 A.2d 547 (1970); Proehl, supra note
44, at 202-03.
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lished by law for the protection of the plaintiff,
(b) failure of the defendant to conform to the standard
of conduct,
(c) that such failure is a legal cause of the harm suffered
by the plaintiff, and
(d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind
legally compensable by damages.
76
Phrased differently, these elements are (1) a negligent act or
omission, (2) a legally recognized harm, (3) cause in fact, (4)
proximate cause, and (5) duty.
7 7
A suit against a teacher to recover damages for a student's
failure to learn because of teacher incompetence can easily be
framed in the language of a typical negligence suit.78 At the very
least, the plaintiff's case would involve establishing that the
student's failure to learn is a "harm ' 79 cognizable in tort, that the
teacher was negligent,80 that "but for" that negligence the stu-
dent would not have suffered this harm,"1 and that the teacher
had a duty to teach the student non-negligently.8 2 Proximate
cause is self-evidently present under most interpretations of the
term.8 3 A student's failure to learn is clearly among the foresee-
able risks of a teacher's poor classroom methods, thus satisfying
one formulation of the term.8 4 Under the second major in-
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
7 It is recognized that "duty," in this case duty to teach non-negligently, is a conclu-
sory term. It is not clear whether it has a meaning independent of the concepts of
negligence and proximate cause. Prosser writes:
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question-whether
the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's
conduct.... It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to
analysis in itself.... [I]t should be recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct in
itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 53, at 325-26 (footnotes omitted). Nonetheless, this Com-
ment will retain the term, since it is used by the judges whom the following arguments
are intended to persuade.
78 See Complaint, supra note 4, at 6-8.
79 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
80 Text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
81 Text accompanying notes 219-36 infra.
82 Text accompanying notes 105-63 infra.
83 The defendants in Doe v. San Francisco School Dist., No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, Ist Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975, con-
ceded this point. See Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 14.
84 The area within which liability is imposed is that which is within the circle of
reasonable foreseeability using the original point at which the negligent act was
committed or became operative, and thence looking in every direction as the
semi-diameters of the circle, and those injuries which from this point could or
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terpretation, proximate cause exists because a student's failure to
learn is a direct consequence of the teacher's incompetent
teaching. 85 Unlike many novel tort claims, this type of suit does
not involve injuries of a remote or unforeseeable character.
Assuming that the plaintiff is not barred by governmental
immunity, 86 the liability of the school district or municipality
could be asserted under at least two theories. First, the doctrine
of respondeat superior (either common law or statutory) may ren-
der the school district or municipality vicariously liable for the
negligent acts and omissions of its teacher/employees. 87 In some
jurisdictions where the doctrine is not available, the teacher may
have a statutory right to indemnification for losses incurred in a
negligence judgment arising out of the teacher's employment.
88
Second, the doctrine of respondeat superior may be invoked to
render the school district liable for the negligence of its officials
in hiring an incompetent teacher 89-an act that was the cause
in fact of the student's educational loss. 90 Proximate cause would
not be an obstacle, since the failure of the student to learn is
clearly a direct and foreseeable consequence of the hiring of an
incompetent teacher. Moreover, cases involving recovery for
physical injuries caused by teacher negligence have shown that a
court is more likely to find for the plaintiff on the liability issue if
there is a legal basis for either the direct or derivative liability of
the school district.9 '
Presumably, the usual tort defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk would be available. The methods
of proof suggested in this Comment, however, may eliminate
should have been reasonably foreseen as something likely to happen, are within
the field of liability, while those which, although foreseeable, were foreseeable
only as remote possibilities, those only slightly probable, are beyond and not
within the circle, -in all of which time, place and circumstance play their re-
spective and important parts.
Mauney v. Gulf Ref. Co., 193 Miss. 421, 428-29, 9 So.2d 780, 781 (1942).
s5 " 'Direct' consequences are those which follow in sequence from the effect of the
defendant's act upon conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time,
without the intervention of any external forces which come into active operation later."
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 43, at 263-64 (footnote omitted). See generally id. 251-70.
86 See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
8 7 E.g., Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 73 P.2d 596 (1937), aff'd on
rehearing, 11 Cal. 2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938); Cherney v. Board of Educ., 31 App. Div.
2d 764, 297 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1969); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
" See, e.g., N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3023 (McKinney 1970); Proehl, supra note 44, at 203.
89 See Proehl, supra note 44, at 202.
90 See, e.g., Engel v. Gosper, 71 N.J. Super. 573, 177 A.2d 595 (Super. Ct. 1962);
Kolar v. Union Free School Dist., 8 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Madison County Ct. 1939).
91 Proehl, supra note 44, at 215-16.
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the factual basis for a contributory negligence defense.92 In
some jurisdictions, the availability of both these defenses may
be limited by precedent or statute making it impossible for
a child below a certain age to be contributorily negligent or as-
sume the risk.93
(i) Negligence-The Standard
Professional liability cases within and without the education
area suggest the standard by which teachers' professional con-
duct should be judged:94 They "must have the skill and learning
commonly possessed by members of the profession in good
standing."95 In most states, this standard depends on where the
defendant practices; usually he will be required to exercise only
that degree of skill and training ordinarily possessed by mem-
bers of the profession in his own or similar communities.9 6 When
members of the profession disagree about which practices or
procedures are correct, the professional will usually be judged by
the school of thought to which he adheres, provided the school is
"a recognized one with definite principles, and it must be the
line of thought of at least a respectable minority of the
profession.
97
Thus, a professional will be judged not by the "reasonable
man" standard applied in ordinary negligence cases, but by
comparison with his professional peers. In an ordinary negli-
gence case, the jury may find that a defendant who conformed
to the normal or average conduct of the community was none-
theless negligent. In a professional malpractice case, conform-
ity to the norm or minimum of the professional community
is by definition non-negligent, even though the jury may be-
lieve that the community norm or minimum is too low.9 8 This
comparative standard, holding teachers to only a community
norm or minimum, should keep the number of educational mal -
practice suits within reasonable limits.
92 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
93 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 32, at 156-57, § 65, at 419 & n.31, § 68, at 447 &
n.82.
94 See generally PROFESSIONAL NEGLGENCE (R. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
95 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 32, at 162; accord, RESTATENMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 299A (1965); Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 633.
96 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 32, at 164.
91 Id. 163; accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, commentf at 75 (1965).
9 But see Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 639, arguing that the community
standard has been limited and that a minimum level of competence may be required
regardless of the level of the community.
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Indeed, this definition of negligence is probably under-
inclusive, because, especially in poor schools, the minimum level
of teaching may be so low that many incompetent teachers will
inevitably be deemed non-negligent. This standard therefore
negates the possibility of using a negligence suit to achieve a
general upgrading of ghetto eduication; the performance of the
majority of ghetto schools and teachers will be, by definition,
within the minimum standards of the professional community by
which the teacher's performance is evaluated. It is not clear,
however, that a negligence action is the appropriate legal base
for a general attack upon low quality education. Applying the
minimum standards of the professional community, a negligence
action will at least provide a remedy for the very worst cases.
In suits against teachers to recover for physical injuries
caused by inadequate teacher supervision, the conduct of the
teacher has been judged by the usual tort standard of care-that
of a "reasonable and prudent person acting under like
circumstances." 99 But in suits to recover for physical injuries to
students caused by negligent instruction, the standard of negli-
gence usually applied is similar to the general professional stan-
dard stated above. 100 In a suit to recover for a student's failure to
learn because of teacher negligence, the standard of acceptable
instruction should be comparative, that is, the level of skill and
learning of the minimally acceptable teacher in the same or simi-
lar communities.' 0 ' Unlike the supervision cases, this kind of suit
may require a jury to evaluate the professional methods em-
ployed by the teacher, and the general professional standard is
more suitable than the "reasonable man" standard for evaluating
exercises of professional discretion and judgment. 0 2 In addi-
tion, this standard will not inhibit the adoption of new teaching
methods which have won acceptance by "a respectable minority
of the profession."
Section 308 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests the
99 Proehl, supra note 44, at 204-07.
100 E.g., Gardner v. State, 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939).
101 As Prosser notes, it is misleading to say that the appropriate standard is the level
of skill and learning possessed by the average member of the profession: "only those in
good professional standing are to be considered; and of these it is not the middle but the
minimum common skill which is to be looked to." W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 32, at 163.
It would be especially unwise to apply an "average" standard in a suit to recover for
negligent instruction, because such a standard would define a large number of teachers
as negligent. The standard of the minimally acceptable teacher is much more likely to
receive judicial acceptance.
102 See Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 643-44.
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proper standard for determining the negligence of school offi-
cials who hire incompetent teachers:
It is negligence to permit a third person to... engage
in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if
the actor knows or should know that the person intends
or is likely. . . to conduct himself in the activity in such
a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to
others."10
3
Under this standard, a school official would be liable for hiring a
teacher he knew or should have known was incompetent or
likely to teach negligently. Adoption of the "known or should
have known" standard for school officials would likely have the
beneficial effect of closer supervision of the classroom and the
results produced in the classroom.
Proof of negligence, as will be explained, may involve expert
testimony, evidence of failure to adhere to statutorily prescribed
standards, and circumstantial evidence (inferences from unsatis-
factory results).'
0 4
(ii) Legal Precedents
Various statutory, common law, and scholarly authorities
support the contention that school districts and teachers should
be held liable for the failure of students to learn because of the
negligence of the teacher. These authorities affirm the existence
of a duty of non-negligent instruction and the cognizability in
tort of this type of harm.
Courts in many jurisdictions have held teachers and school
districts liable for physical injuries to students caused by negli-
gent conduct within the scope of the teacher's employment.
10 5
Typical teacher negligence cases involve injuries arising from a
lack of adequate teacher supervision.10 6 In these cases, the teach-
er has been held to the standard of a "reasonable and prudent
person acting under like circumstances."'1 7 Although under
most circumstances a person does not have a duty to take affir-
mative action to protect others from a risk of harm which the
person did not create, a special relationship between the parties,
including the student-teacher relationship, has given rise to
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965).
104 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra; W. PROSSER, supra note 25, §§ 37-40.
105 See Proehl, supra note 44.
106 See id. 204-07.
107 Id. 201.
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
such a duty.10 8 These cases support the general notion that a
teacher may be liable to students for the foreseeable conse-
quences of his negligent teaching. 10 9
Another important line of cases has found liability where a
student suffers physical injury because he was negligently in-
structed by a gym teacher. In Gardner v. State," 0 for example,
the state of New York was held liable for injuries sustained by a
student attempting to perform a gymnastic stunt proximately
caused by the failure of the gym teacher to follow customary
methods of instruction. In a New Jersey case, the court upheld
the legal sufficiency of the complaint in a suit against two science
teachers and the school board to recover for a student's injuries
and eventual death caused in part by the negligent failure of the
teachers properly to instruct the student in the use of rockets."'
These cases, recognizing the legal duty of teachers to adhere to
professionally acceptable (non-negligent) methods of instruc-
tion, 1 2 are precedent for judicial evaluation of teaching quality
and for the liability of teachers and their employers for the con-
sequences of negligent instruction.
One might contend that this duty of non-negligent in-
struction exists only where the consequences of negligent in-
struction involve a risk of serious physical injury. Preventing
failure of a student to learn, however, is arguably no less impor-
tant than preventing physical injuries;" 3 moreover, the tort law
does not recompense only physical injuries. 1 4 Defamation, inva-
sion of privacy, unfair competition, and legal malpractice are
some areas of tort law where recovery is permitted for non-
10 8 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 341-42, 348-49.
109 Cf., e.g., Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Proehl, supra note 44, at 190 n.2 7 .
110 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939); see Bellman v. San Francisco High School
Dist., 73 P.2d 596 (1937), aff'd on rehearing, 11 Cal. 2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938); Smith v.
Consolidated School Dist., 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1966); Keesee v. Board of Educ., 37 Misc.
2d 414, 235 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
"I Engel v. Gosper, 71 N.J. Super. 573, 177 A.2d 595 (Super. Ct. 1962). The bases
for the school board's liability were the doctrine of respondeat superior and negligence in
hiring unsuitable teachers. See also Klenzendorf v. Shasta Union High School Dist., 4 Cal.
App. 2d 164, 40 P.2d 878 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
112 Curran, Professional Negligence--Some General Comments, in PROFESSIONAL
NEGLIGENCE 4 (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960); accord, Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 643 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299 A &
coment c at 73-74 (1965). Another way to describe the "duty" to which the professional
relationship gives rise is that conformity to the standards of the profession is an implicit
term of the contract that arises between the professional and his client, patient, student,
etc. See Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 679; text accompanying note 183 infra.
113 See text accompanying notes 33-40 supra.
114 See generally Sax & Hiestand, supra note 40, at 879-86.
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physical injuries. 1 15 In the education context, courts have held
school authorities liable for the intentional infliction of mental
distress on a student."1
6
Both Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts assert that
when someone undertakes to render a service to another upon
which the other relies, the actor assumes a duty to act non-
negligently and will be liable for harm that results from negli-
gent performance. 1 17 Prosser writes, "Where performance
clearly has been begun, there is no doubt that there is a duty of
care.""18 Applied to education, this formulation suggests that
once a teacher, school, and school district undertake to provide
education, they assume a duty to educate non-negligently. This
general principle of voluntary assumption of duty has been ap-
plied specifically to government undertakings in a variety of
cases. Indian Towing Co. v. United States 1 9 expresses the notion
that the government will be liable for providing a service in a
negligent manner, even though it was under no obligation to
provide the service at all. This case held that when the Coast
Guard exercised its discretion to operate a lighthouse, it was
liable for damages resulting from the negligent failure to keep
the light in good working order. In a California case, a county
sheriff who made a gratuitous promise to warn the plaintiff of
the release of a dangerous prisoner was held liable for injuries
sustained by the plaintiff when the sheriff negligently failed to
give the warning.12 0 Another California case held that the owner
of a boat marina could bring an action against the state for
damages resulting from the negligent preparation and release of
weather and flood information. 12 Similarly, when the state and
its employees undertake to provide education, they assume a
duty to do so non-negligently.
22
115 See W. PROSSER, SUpra note 25, § 1, at 2-3, §§ 111-17, 130.
116 See, e.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
117 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 343-48; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
323 & comment e at 139 (1965).
"18 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 346.
119 350 U.S. 61 (1955); accord, Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); Armiger v. United States, 339 F.2d 625 (Ct. Cl.
1964).
Indian Towing Co. also supports the contention that a plaintiff can recover for the
denial of a benefit which he would have enjoyed but for the defendant's negligence. See
text accompanying notes 127-36 infra. See also Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16
(1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 740 (1937).
120 Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
121 Connelly v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
122 The applicability of the cases cited in notes 113-16 supra may be qualified by the
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A plaintiff in an educational malpractice suit, however, will
probably have to deal with a line of cases headed by H. R. Moch
Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.' 23 In Moch, a plaintiff was denied
recovery against a water company, under contract with the city
to provide water, which negligently failed to provide adequate
water to extinguish a fire before it reached and destroyed the
plaintiff's warehouse. The court held, inter alia, that the suit was
not maintainable as an action for a common law tort.1 24 Al-
though acknowledging that one who undertakes to act, even
gratuitously, has a duty to act non-negligently, Judge Cardozo
wrote,
If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inac-
tion would commonly result, not negatively merely in
withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in work-
ing an injury, there exists a relation out of which arises
a duty to go forward .... The query always is whether
the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a point as
to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or has
stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to become
an instrument for good.'
25
Cardozo characterized the failure to furnish an adequate supply
of water as a denial of a benefit not the commission of a
wrong.
126
Moch could be troublesome for a plaintiff in an educational
malpractice case; it has been argued that the failure of a student
to learn because of teacher negligence or intentional misconduct
is not an injury cognizable in tort-that it is not an injury at all,
but rather the loss of an expectancy or failure to receive a
benefit.' 27 In other kinds of cases, however, plaintiffs have re-
covered in tort for a variety of injuries which might be called lost
expectancies or benefits. Legal malpractice cases, for example,
have allowed plaintiffs to recover for benefits that they probably
would have received under wills or from lawsuits but for the
negligence of a lawyer.' 28 Plaintiffs have also been recompensed
governmental immunity doctrines of the particular jurisdiction. Text accompanying
notes 70-75 supra.
123 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); see Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d
486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952); Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d
325 (1952).
124 247 N.Y. at 167, 159 N.E. at 898.
12- Id. at 167-68, 159 N.E. at 898.
12
6 Id. at 169, 159 N.E. at 899.
127 Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 44-46.
128 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
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for tortious interference with the expectation of business
profits.129 The Restatement of Torts explains that "[w]here a per-
son can prove that but for the tortious interference of another,
he would have received a gift or a specific profit from a transac-
tion, he is entitled to full damages for the loss which has thus
been caused to him . . . ,,130 Recovery usually has been denied,
according to Prosser, in cases in which there was no sufficient
degree of certainty that the anticipated benefit would have been
received, and such cases do not deny the existence of tort
liability.' 31 Courts have allowed recovery where the receipt of the
benefits was not certain but only highly probable. Furthermore,
it has been argued that plaintiffs should be allowed to recover
for the lost chance of receiving a benefit, the degree of certainty
being relevant only to valuation of the loss.' 32
Plaintiffs are also likely to recover for benefits denied be-
cause of the negligence of the person who seeks to bestow the
benefit. For example, a rescuer who abandons or negligently
performs a rescue is liable for resulting injury.' 33 Indeed, Pros-
ser asserts that recovery for a denied benefit is highly probable
even in the absence of evidence that the defendant's action de-
prived the plaintiff of assistance from someone else:
It seems very unlikely that any court will ever hold that
one who has begun to pull a drowing man out of the
river after he has caught hold of the rope is free, with-
out good reason, to abandon the attempt, walk away
and let him drown, merely because he was already in
extremis before the effort was begun.'
34
The plaintiff's reliance and forbearance from seeking
other services significantly strengthen an attempt to recover for
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 130, at 949-54; Wade, supra
note 52, at 234 n.19.
129 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 130, at 950.
130 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 912, commentf at 584 (1939). See also Kely v. Price, 27
Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972). But see H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
" W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 130, at 950-51.
132 Id. 951 & n.75. In Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16 (1936), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 740 (1937), the court recognized that Indian children who had been denied
educational benefits, which the Government should have provided under the terms of a
treaty, had suffered a substantial loss. Yet the court denied recovery because the mone-
tary value of the loss could not be calculated with sufficient certainty and exactitude.
133 
See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 343-44; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 324 A (1965).
134 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 348.
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the denial of benefits. 135 Thus, it seems that the strongest case
would be, for example, one in which the plaintiff's parents were
considering sending him or her to a private school, but, after
receiving assurances from the principal, school officials, and
teachers that instruction in the public school would be compe-
tent, decided to send their child to the public school. As a result
of negligent instruction, the student failed to attain as high an
educational level as he would have attained in a non-negligently
taught class.' 36 Characterizing the student's failure to learn as a
lost benefit or expectation would not seem, at least under these
circumstances, to preclude recovery.
Because the viability of the Moch distinction between denial
of a benefit and commission of a wrong in tort actions is consid-
erably undermined by the foregoing considerations and prece-
dents, Moch is not followed in all jurisdictions. In 1964, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania lheld that a complaint was
sufficient in alleging that the plaintiff's house burned down
because the water company, under contract with the city to pro-
vide water and maintain fire hydrants, had been negligent in
maintaining the hydrant system.' 37 The Pennsylvania court
wrote of Moch,
Once Justice Cardozo recognized that the defendant
was guilty of a "negligent omission," he admitted that
the defendant had committed a breach of duty since
negligence is defined in law as a breach of duty. If there
was no breach of duty on the part of the defendant, its
conduct could be not characterized as a negligent omis-
sion, but would be merely an omission that did not
amount to negligence.' 3
8
Even jurisdictions that follow Moch may not in fact be doing
so in such a way as to impede school/teacher liability. In Reimann
v. Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 139 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey followed the Moch rule enunciating a policy basis, how-
ever, which suggests that the rule should not bar a suit for a
student's failure to learn because of teacher negligence or in-
competence. The court suggested that the availability of fire in-
35 Id. 343-48.
136 This also might be argued under a contract theory. See notes 181-207 infra &
accompanying text.
137 Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964). See also
Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961).
138 Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 214, 199 A.2d 875, 882 (1964).
139 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952).
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surance supports placing the loss on the property owner rather
than the water company. 140 Students, however, cannot purchase
insurance against their failure to learn. Indeed, the availability of
liability insurance for teachers and school districts and the prob-
able infrequency of educational malpractice suits undercut one
of the primary policy reasons for denying liability in Moch-the
fear of imposing a potentially limitless burden on suppliers of
important public services.
1 41
The duty arising from the control of the conduct of others
provides another basis for the liability of school districts and
officials for the educational harms caused by teachers who
negligently or intentionally 142 fail to meet minimum professional
standards. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily
takes the custody of another under circumstances such
as to ... subject him to association with persons likely to
harm him, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so
to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent
them from intentionally harming the other or so con-
ducting themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of
harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control the conduct of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and op-
portunity for exercising such control.
43
These principles suggest that school officials should be liable if
they subject students to instruction by teachers whom they knew
or should have known were incompetent.
144
Statutorily imposed obligations may also be used to establish
the duty necessary for recovery on a negligence theory. 145 In
fact, in cases where tort liability is based on a statutory violation,
the courts may be more willing to allow non-traditional damage
claims than in common law tort actions. For example, section
815.6 of the California Government Code provides:
140 Id. at 139, 87 A.2d at 327.
141 H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 165-66, 159 N.E. 896,
897-98 (1928); see generally text accompanying notes 43-50, 65-68 supra.
142 Text accompanying notes 164-69 infra.
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965); accord, W. PROSSER, supra note 25,
§ 56, at 349-50.
144 As will be explained, these principles should also apply where a school official
knew or should have known that a teacher would intentionally fail to teach according to
minimum professional standards, e.g., because of racial bias. Notes 164-69 infra & ac-
companying text.
145 See generally Sax & Hiestand, supra note 40, at 914 & n.180.
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Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty im-
posed by an enactment that is designed to protect
against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public
entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately
caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the
public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable
diligence to discharge the duty.1 46
The California supreme court ruled in Ranos v. County of
Madera147 that a county welfare department could be liable
under section 815.6 for coercing minors to work under threat of
losing the benefits of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, 148 in violation of various regulations and statutes. In
Bradford v. State,149 that court held that the state could be liable
under section 815.6 for negligent failure to record the dismissal
of criminal charges against an individual as required by statute.
The plaintiff in Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District'5"
invoked educational statutes to support the imposition of tort
liability for negligent teaching under section 815.6.'5 The vari-
ous statutory provisions prescribe duties designed to protect stu-
dents from the risk of not learning, and the plaintiff alleged that
the defendants' failure to perform these duties resulted in the
plaintiff's failure to learn. For example, plaintiff alleged viola-
tion of section 8573 of the California Education Code, which pro-
vides that "[n]o pupil shall receive a diploma of graduation from
grade 12 who has not completed the course of study and met the
standards of proficiency prescribed by the governing board." 52
The defendants allegedly violated other statutory duties to keep
parents accurately informed about the educational progress of
their children, 53 to provide a course of study designed to fit the
needs of the pupils for whom the course of study was
prescribed, 154 to evaluate and revise the school district's educa-
146 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1966).
147 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971). See also Elton v. County of
Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
148 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970), as amended, (Supp. I1, 1973).
149 36 Cal. App. 3d 16, 111 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
"I No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st
Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975).
151 Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 21-23.
152 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8573 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
21 n.12.
153 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
21 n.ll.
"5 CAL EDUC. CODE § 8505 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
22 n.14.
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tional program 155 and to examine, at least once a term, the man-
agement, needs, and conditions of the schools.' 56
The failure of students to learn is clearly the risk against
which the above-described educational statutes were enacted to
protect. Like the statutes involved in Ramos157 and Bradford,1
58
the educational statutes allegedly violated in Doe are designed to
benefit a special segment of the community, school-age children,
rather than the general public-a prerequisite to recovery under
this theory. 5 9 The requirements of section 815.6, therefore,
would appear to have been met in Doe, subject, of course, to
problems of proof. 60
The common law also recognizes the principle that negli-
gent failure to perform a statutory duty gives rise to a cause of
action in tort to recover for injuries caused by the negligence, if
the person injured was a member of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted and the injury was of a type which the
statute was enacted to prevent. 16 1 According to one court, "The
disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a
tort."1
62
The Restatement (Second) of Torts maintains that although a
court will not find that a statutory provision designed to secure a
benefit to the general public creates a duty of reasonable care, an
individual may maintain an action in tort on the basis of the
statutory violation if he suffers a harm distinct from that suf-
155 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8002 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
22 n.13.
156 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1053 (West 1975); Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at
22 n.13.
The plaintiff in Doe also suggested that compulsory attendance statutes give rise to a
"duty" by the school to provide minimally competent instruction, the violation of which
gives rise to tort liability. E.g., CAL EDuc. CODE § 12154 (West 1975); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 76, § 1 (Supp. 1975). See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6; cf. Serna v. Portales
Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.
1974); Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The plaintiff further
suggested that if there is no such "duty," the compulsory education statutes may be
unconstitutional. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 17; cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Other arguments made by plaintiff based on a constitu-
tional right (state and federal) to education are beyond the scope of this Comment.
Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 37-39; see Ratner, supra note 12.
157 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971).
156 36 Cal. App. 3d 16, 111 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
159 See Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288, comment c at 31 (1965).
160 Text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
61 See, e.g., Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 288 B, 286.
162 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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fered by the rest of the community. 163 The harm suffered by the
students of an incompetent teacher is obviously of a different
type from that suffered by the general community.
b. Intentional Tort
Under some circumstances, a student may be able to recover
for failure to learn under an intentional tort theory, akin to
intentional infliction of mental distress.164 Suppose, for example,
that a high school English teacher, with preconceptions about
the limited educability of his ghetto students, decides not to
teach them literature but instead distributes comic books or third
grade reading matter. Suppose that a high school science teacher
with a similar appraisal of his students decides that there is no
reason for them to learn chemistry and spends the term trying to
inculcate passivity, deference, and good behavior. Depending on
the teacher's state of mind, this behavior might be characterized
as an intentional tort. 165 Although intentional denial of an edu-
cational benefit is beyond the present boundaries of tort law, it is
a harm at least as demonstrable and as deserving of redress as
intentionally inflicted mental distress. Because the law of inten-
tional torts is probably more elastic in the recognition of new
kinds of injuries than is the law of negligence, 66 an intentional
tort theory provides a promising legal framework for a suit of
this type, where the facts permit its use.
A plaintiff also might present a case of this type as an inten-
tional infliction of mental distress. If the claim is, for example,
that the teacher intentionally humiliated a student, the case is
not especially difficult 67 but is clearly different from the kind of
suits contemplated by this Comment. If it is argued that mental
distress resulted from the intentional denial of educational
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288, comment c at 31 (1965); see Stang v. City
of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
286, 288 (1965).
I64 See Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926); W. PROSSER, supra
note 25, § 12, at 49-62.
165 The intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile
intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a result
which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law will not sanction.
The defendant may be liable although he has meant nothing more than a
good-natured practical joke, or has honestly believed that he would not injure
the plaintiff, or even where he was seeking the plaintiff's own good.
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 12, at 31.
166 "In this respect, the law is clearly in a process of growth, the ultimate limits of
which cannot as yet be determined." Id. 50.
167 See Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
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benefits,1 68 it is unclear whether this claim puts the case within
the existing case law. Representing the denial of educational
benefits as not merely analogous to but in itself constituting the
intentional infliction of mental distress, however, may make the
argument seem less radical and more familiar and persuasive to
a court.
c. Misrepresentation
In some situations, a student-plaintiff may be able to seek
recovery on theories of negligent or intentional misrepresenta-
tion. Assume that a teacher issues a satisfactory progress report
about a student who the teacher knows or should know is not
progressing satisfactorily. (Standardized test scores, for exam-
ple, indicate that the student is reading far below grade level.)
The student's parents seek confirmation of the report from the
teacher, explaining that they will obtain remedial instruction if
their child is not making satisfactory progress. The teacher, to
dissuade the parents from speaking to his or her superior re-
garding such instruction, reassures them of the student's satisfac-
tory performance; as a result of the teacher's reports, the stu-
dent never receives remedial instruction.
This factual situation seems to satisfy Prosser's enumeration
of the elements of a cause of action in deceit:
1. A false representation made by the defendant....
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant
that the representation is false-or, what is regarded as
equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of informa-
tion to make it....
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to re-
frain from action in reliance upon the misrepre-
sentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the
part of the plaintiff, in taking action or refraining
from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such
reliance. 169
In some jurisdictions, a negligent misrepresentation also
may give rise to tort liability. A representation made without
168 Complaint, supra note 4, at 8-9.
169 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 685-86 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Connelly v. State, 3
Cal. App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
knowledge of its falsehood is negligent if the defendant did not
take reasonable care to ascertain its truth. °70 The necessary duty
of reasonable care in ascertaining the truth1 1 can easily be
found in the student-teacher relationship 172 or in statutes requir-
ing the teacher to give accurate evaluations of students'
achievement. 173 The teacher's knowledge that the parent will
reasonably rely on the representation should also be sufficient to
establish a duty of reasonable care.'7 4 The requirement that the
plaintiff's reliance and his actions based on that reliance be
reasonable seem easily satisfied in this context.
7 5
Misrepresentations of opinion are generally not a basis for
relief, 17 6 and it is debatable whether a student's progress report
is a statement of fact or opinion. Even assuming that it is merely
a teacher's opinion, however, there are exceptions to the general
rule where special circumstances make it reasonable for the
plaintiff to accept and act in reliance upon the statement: where
reliance is justifiable, where the opinion implies that the defen-
dant knows of no facts which would preclude the opinion and
knows facts which justify it, or where the defendant holds him-
self out as having special knowledge of the matter which is not
available to the plaintiff.'77 A student's progress report written
by a teacher seems to fit all these exceptions.
Other situations which could give rise to a misrepresentation
action include the following:
(1) Parents trying to decide whether to send their child to public
or private school ask public school officials about the quality of
the public schools. The school officials, who know or should
know of the poor quality of the public schools, assure the parents
that their school offers high quality education. The student, pre-
viously an outstanding performer, falls to a low level of achieve-
ment, as measured by standardized tests.' 7 8 In the case of a
similar representation by a private school, a claim of deceit or
negligent misrepresentation might be raised to obtain rescission
170 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 107, at 704.
171 Id. 706.
172 "[W]here the representation, although itself gratuitous, is made in the course of
the defendant's business or professional relations, the duty is usually found." Id.
17 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (Supp. 1975).
174 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 107, at 707.
175 See id. § 108, at 714-20.
17 6 Id. § 109, at 721.
177 Id. 726-27.
178 See text accompanying notes 219-55 infra.
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of a contract or used as a defense in a suit by the school for
tuition.
17 9
(2) Teachers and school officials who know or should know of
the student's inferior academic ability urge him to switch from
the vocational to the academic course of study, misrepresenting
his abilities to him in order to correct an imbalance between the
two programs. The student switches, performs poorly in the
academic program, and leaves school without vocational skills
and unqualified for a college education.
(3) The teacher negligently or intentionally misrepresents a
student's progress, as a result of which the student is held back a
year. The student sues for loss of a year's income.1
8 0
2. Contract Theories
The law of contracts provides several lines of argument
which might support a suit for failure to learn because of teacher
negligence or incompetence.' 8 ' First, it might be argued that
there are implied contracts between the teacher and the student
and between the school district and the student. An implied term
of the contracts is that the student will be given non-negligent
instruction. 8 2 The consideration for this promise is that the stu-
179 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 105, at 687-89; text accompanying notes 256-63
infra.
180 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 106, at 694-95. Misrepresentation is available to
people other than the student and his parents. Assume that the school issues a diploma
and recommendation, representing (expressly or impliedly) that the student possesses
certain minimum educational skills. An employer relies on these representations and
hires the student, who is illiterate and consequently untrainable. The student makes
serious reading or counting errors which result in a loss to the employer. The employer
might have a cause of action for misrepresentation. See id. For a discussion of the useful-
ness of misrepresentation theories in the private school context, see notes 256-63 infra &
accompanying text.
181 Since American courts have extended tort liability for misfeasance to virtually
every type of contract where defective performance may injure the promisee, a plaintiff
may have the option to sue in tort, contract, or both. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 92, at
617 nn.47-56 & 65; see Wade, supra note 52, at 219 & n.13.
"' See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), in which the court found that by accepting employment to
give legal advice or services, a lawyer impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of professional tasks they undertake; Wade, supra note 52, at 218-19 n.11;
Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 679. See also Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Parris, 243
Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967); Stad v. Grace Downs Model & Air Career School, 65
Misc. 2d 1095, 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Queens County Civ. Ct. 1971). It should be made clear
that this is something distinct from a negligence action in tort, although Prosser points
out that there will be liability in tort for misperformance of a contract whenever there
would have been liability for gratuitous performance without a contract. W. PRossER,
supra note 25, § 92, at 617. The notion of non-negligent instruction is borrowed from the
tort law to "measure" the promise to teach. It is arguable that by holding himself out as a
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dent, in reliance on this implied promise, forbears seeking edu-
cation elsewhere and attends school although, at least in the case
of secondary school students, he could drop out.18 3 An alterna-
tive formulation could be based on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.' 84 It could be argued that the teacher's implied prom-
ise to teach non-negligently or the school district's implied prom-
ise to provide non-negligent teachers was made binding by the
student's detrimental reliance on the promise.
A problem with this contractual theory is the requirement in
some jurisdictions that consideration be "bargained for."'18 5 Even
in such jurisdictions, however, this contract might stand since the
student's attendance in reliance upon the implied promise of
non-negligent instruction was within the contemplation of the
parties. A second problem is the contention that the student's
attendance cannot be consideration, because it is required by
law 1 86 and the student could not have refused to attend. 187 Fur-
thermore, compulsory attendance does not apply to students
above a certain age; finding consideration in attendance by these
students would not be subject to the above-stated objection. Even
for students within the age of compulsory attendance, forbear-
ance from seeking private instruction could be consideration for
the promise of non-negligent instruction or, alternatively, might
bring into operation the doctrine of promissory estoppel.1
88 Of
course a defendant could require a showing that plaintiff would
or might have sought private education if not for the promise
of non-negligent teaching. This possible requirement might
have the anomalous effect of making this contract theory avail-
able only to relatively wealthy students who could have af-
forded private education.
Although the theory of contractual agreements between
student and school district and between student and teacher is
most plausible in the private school context where both the
teacher in certain school districts a teacher is implicitly promising a higher level of
competence than mere non-negligence. Although this approach is distinct from a negli-
gence theory of tort liability, the procedures outlined in this Comment for proving negli-
gence, causation, and damages seem applicable to the various contract actions suggested
in this section.
' 3 SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 53-56, 61 (1970).
18
4 
See id. §§ 99-111.
185 Id. § 53, at 105.
186 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, §§ 1,2 (Supp. 1975).
1'7 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 60.
188 If students are not given competent instruction compulsory attendance may also
be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. See Ratner, supra note 12, at 18.
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promise and the consideration are easily identifiable, 189 it is ap-
plicable in the public school context in certain situations. For
example, assume that a family moves to a new town and the
parents tell the public school principal that they are trying
to decide whether to send their child to public or to private
school. Perhaps they express particular concern about the read-
ing program. After the principal and teachers assure the parents
of the competence of the reading teachers, the parents decide to
send their child to public school, where he is negligently taught.
The contract approach would also be applicable where a high
school student is negligently taught after being dissuaded, by his
principal and teachers, from dropping out of school to get a job
because he believes his teachers are incompetent.190
There is another contract theory upon which a public school
student might base a suit for his failure to learn because of
teacher negligence. The plaintiff could argue that an implied
term of the contract between the teacher and the school district
is that the teacher will teach non-negligently.' 91 The student, as a
third party beneficiary of the contract, should have a right to
recover for its breach by the teacher.'
92
Professors Calamari and Perillo assert that the test of
whether a beneficiary of a contract has a right to enforce it is
whether there is an "intent to benefit" the third party. 93 While a
minority of courts have held that both parties must intend to
benefit the third party, the majority believe that the promisee's
intention is more important. 94 The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts concludes that "intent to benefit" is ascertained by whether
"[t]he beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise
as manifesting an intention to confer a right on him.' 95 Many
189 See Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Parris, 243 Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967). See also
Stad v. Grace Downs Model & Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d 1095, 319 N.Y.S.2d 918
(Queens County Civ. Ct. 1971).
190 The question of damages is discussed at text accompanying notes 19-31 supra.
'"' See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Professional Negligence, supra note 51; notes 94-104 supra &
accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Gorrell v. Greensboro Water-Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328,
32 S.E. 720 (1899); J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 243; cf. Lemon v. Bossier
Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Randall v. Sumter School Dist., 232 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.S.C.
1964), modified, 241 F. Supp. 787 (E.D.S.C. 1965). But see H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
'93J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 244, at 380-81.
19 4 Id. 380.
195 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133, comment d at 288 (Tent. Drafts
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cases have held that if performance runs to the third party, he
will ordinarily be treated as an intended beneficiary with en-
forceable rights. 196 Under any of these approaches, a student is
at least arguably a third party beneficiary with a right to
enforce19 7 the teacher's implied (or express) promise to the
school district to teach non-negligently.1
9 8
In some jurisdictions, the third-party beneficiary theory is
hampered by the doctrine that where a municipal government
contracts with a contractor for the benefit of the municipality's
inhabitants, individual inhabitants generally do not have a right
to enforce the contract. 99 Yet there are exceptions to this rule.
If a contractor agrees to perform services which the municipality
is under a legal duty to provide to specified individual members
Nos. 1-7, 1973); see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 244, at 381. In some
states the rights of third party beneficiaries are set forth in statutes.
'96 J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 244, at 381.
107 In Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), the court recognized that it is essentially a matter of policy
whether defendant (breaching promisor) will be liable to third party beneficiaries.
[T]he determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of
various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was in-
tended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection bet-
ween the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of preventing
future harm.
Id. at 588, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823. The court also emphasized that the
plaintiff would be able to recover as a third party beneficiary under a contract theory,
because the main purpose of the contract was to benefit third parties, and it was the clear
intent of the promisee that the contract benefit these third parties. Id. at 589-90, 364 P.2d
at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
198 If the school district is not vicariously liable, which it might not be since the
teacher's liability would be for breach of contract rather than for tortious acts or omis-
sions, the liability would rest upon the teacher alone. This might jeopardize both the legal
and practical chances of recovering substantial monetary damages at the present time.
Text accompanying note 91 supra. If, however, a precedent of liability were set, it is likely
that teachers would soon carry malpractice insurance as a matter of course, see notes
44-46 supra & accompanying text, and recovery of money damages for remedial instruc-
tion might become a practical possibility. Even though money recovery seems improba-
ble, the student might, under some circumstances, demand specific performance of the
promise of non-negligent teaching. See Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp.
709 (W.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967);
Randall v. Sumter School Dist., 232 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.S.C. 1964), modified, 241 F. Supp.
787 (E.D.S.C. 1965). For example, if the negligence of the teacher consisted of failure to
follow accepted teaching techniques, the court might order the teacher to adopt accepted
methods, e.g., order a reading teacher who failed to give out books to do so. Also, the
student might be able to enforce a contractual term allowing the school board to dismiss
the teacher "for cause."
199 See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 247, at 387. But see, e.g., Gorrell v. Greensboro
Water-Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720 (1899).
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of the public, a contractor's improper performance of the con-
tract resulting in injury to these individuals will give them a
cause of action for breach.2 0 0 It has also been held that contracts
into which a governmental unit enters, not just to protect the
public from harm, but to secure advantages to the public, create
rights enforceable by members of the public.20I Because students
are an identifiable class of persons for whose benefit the
teacher's promise of non-negligent instruction is ostensibly
made, and because the municipality is probably under a legal
duty to provide education the students should fall within the
exceptions to the non-enforcement rule.
A contract approach in a suit for failure to learn because of
teacher negligence or incompetence may have several advan-
tages over a tort approach. First, governmental immunities,
which may bar recovery in tort, might not preclude a successful
contract action. 2 Second, courts may be more willing to allow
recovery for loss of an expectancy or benefit in contract than in
tort.20 3 In Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District,20 4 the de-
fendant suggested that recovery for the injuries alleged in that
suit would be possible in a contract action, although he denied
the existence of a contract upon which to base an action.205
Third, defenses such as contributory negligence or assumption
of risk may bar recovery in tort but not in contract. Finally,
actions in tort and actions in contract may be governed by dif-
ferent statutes of limitations, the statutes generally being shorter
for tort actions.
20 6
On the other hand, recovery under some theories of con-
tract damages may be limited to the damages tacitly agreed upon
by the parties-perhaps payment for remedial instruction to
confer the benefit denied by the teacher-while recovery in tort
may extend to a wider range of damages, for example, loss of
future income.20 7 Furthermore, the tort law is more flexible and
more hospitable to novel lawsuits than the law of contracts. Ul-
200J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 183, § 247, at 388.
20I Id. 389 & nn.64-68.
202 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 92, at 619; see notes 70-75 supra & accompanying
text.
203 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 92, at 619. But see Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); W.
PROSSER, supra note 24, § 93, at 623.
204 No. 653-312 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 6, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 36851, 1st
Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 1975.
205 Defendants' Demurrer, supra note 47, at 4.
206 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 92, at 618.
2 07Id. 619.
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timately, the desirability of proceeding in tort, contract, or both,
will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.
3. Mandamus
If the court refuses to recognize a tort or contract theory, a
plaintiff might seek relief by petition for mandamus. If this ap-
proach is available at all, however, it could only be used in a very
limited number of situations.
A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a person to
perfom a duty imposed on him by law.208 Mandamus is most
often used to compel an official to take action of a non-
discretionary or "ministerial" nature.20 9 Although it can also be
used to compel an official to exercise his discretion, 210 it will not
compel him to exercise that discretion in a particular manner,
unless the official's prior discretionary action was arbitrary or
unreasonable.2 1 ' Other requirements for use of mandamus (de-
pending on the jurisdiction) are a clear legal right in the
plaintiff212 or a clearly prescribed official duty in the perfor-
mance of which the plaintiff has an interest,213 and the inade-
quacy of other legal remedies.
21 4
In education cases, mandamus has been used to compel
school officials to perform ministerial duties21 5 and exercise
discretion. 16 In some cases courts have reviewed discretionary
actions of school officials under an "arbitrary and unreasonable"
standard.2 1
7
Suppose that a state statute clearly directs school officials to
hire teachers with certain qualifications, and an official hires a
teacher without those qualifications. Mandamus might be used to
enjoin the official from rehiring that teacher. The remedy might
also be available to halt the practice of graduating students who
fail to obtain the minimum level of reading competence required
208 See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
209 See, e.g., Shirey v. City Bd. of Educ., 266 Ala. 185, 94 So. 2d 758 (1957).
2 10 E.g., Martin v. Garnet Valley School Dist., 441 Pa. 502, 272 A.2d 913 (1971);
State ex rel. Knudsen v. Board of Educ., 43 Wis. 2d 58, 168 N.W.2d 295 (1969).
2 11 E.g., Gustafson v. Wittersfield Twp. High School, 319 I11. App. 255, 49 N.E.2d
311 (1943); Martin v. Garnet Valley School Dist., 441 Pa. 502, 272 A.2d 913 (1971).
212 See, e.g., Martin v. Garnet Valley School Dist., 441 Pa. 502, 272 A.2d 913 (1971);
Wenders v. White Mills Indep. School Dist., 171 Pa. Super. 39, 90 A.2d 318 (1952).
213 See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
214 E.g., Shirey v. City Bd. of Educ., 266 Ala. 185, 94 So. 2d 758 (1957).
2 15 Id.
216 See, e.g., cases cited note 210 supra.
217E.g., State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (C.P.
1962); Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
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by statute for graduation.218
Notwithstanding the usefulness of mandamus in these lim-
ited cases, it is unlikely that a court in a mandamus action would
order dismissal of a teacher deemed competent by school offi-
cials, or would compel officials to take a particular remedial
action. Nor would mandamus provide a route for requiring
compensation for lost earnings. The limited extent to which
the remedy can be used to challenge official policies and deci-
sions of a discretionary character severely impairs its efficacy;
it does not serve the function of the tort or contract cause of
action.
D. Problems of Proof
1. Proof of Causation of Harm
The first question likely to be provoked by the suggestion of
a cause of action for the failure of students to learn because of
teacher incompetence is that of proof: How can a plaintiff prove
that a teacher's negligence caused his failure to learn? A method
of proof that relies on inferences drawn from circumstantial evi-
dence is essential in this type of case. 219 If an individual student
alleges that his failure to learn was due to the incompetence or
negligence of his teacher[s], it perhaps seems impossible to prove
that the substandard result was not the consequence of the stu-
dent's own lack of intelligence, aptitude, diligence, attitude, am-
bition, or general educability.22 ° This obstacle to plaintiff's proof
of causation can be avoided if the plaintiff undertakes a com-
parative method of proof.
a. The Comparative Method
Under this method of proof, the plaintiff establishes causa-
tion by proving that a class of which he is a member performed
significantly worse than did classes identical in all essential re-
218 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8573-75 (West 1975).
219 See Lubell v. Nyquist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1968), appeal
denied, 23 N.Y. 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D
& comment b at 157-58 (1965); cf. Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Cal. 2d 681, 394 P.2d 697, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 881 (1964). But see Wade, supra note 52, at 228, stating, "There is no indication of
application of ... res ipsa loquitur to attorney-negligence cases."
220 Of course, a student with a high intelligence, documented diligence, and a record
of achievement in other courses might be able to establish that his failure to achieve high
standardized test scores in a subject was due to the negligence or incompetence of his
teacher, since he could eliminate the other possible causes. For less "ideal" students,
however, this approach would not be available.
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spects except that they were not taught by the defendant
teacher. The class of which the plaintiff is a member ("plaintiff
class") can consist of the students of a particular teacher in one
year or over a number of years, or students who have completed
an entire reading or math program in one year or over a
number of years. The causal effect of a teacher on the educa-
tional achievement of his or her students can be isolated by com-
paring the performance of the plaintiff class with the perfor-
mances, in the same subject, of students in the same or similar
communities, in schools of the same socio-economic composition,
similar size and per-student funding, in classes of similar size,
with the same IQ groupings, or other characteristics identified
by experts as determinants of educational success (comparison
classes). 221 By holding constant these factors, which could have
determined the educational success of the student class, the ef-
fect of the teacher on student performance can be proven.222
The plaintiff would introduce expert testimony that the com-
parisons have, in fact, held constant all the factors, other than
teacher quality, relevant to the performance of a class of
students.223 Class performance could be measured by the aver-
age of the differences between scores on achievement tests taken
by each student upon entering and leaving the teacher's class. 22 4
Suppose that at the beginning of the school year students of
teacher A read, on the average, at the third-grade level. At the
end of the school year they read on the fourth-grade level. Stu-
dents of teacher B, who have the same "essential characteristics"
(enumerated above) as the students of teacher A, begin the year
22
1 See McComIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 202, at 485 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCon icK]; C. JENCKS, supra note 11.
222 See MCCORMICK, supra note 221, § 202 at 485; C. JENCKS, supra note 11. Various
authorities support the use of circumstantial evidence to prove both cause in fact and
negligence. In Lubell v. Nyquist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S. 2d 961 (1968), appeal
denied, 23 N.Y. 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969), a teacher's qualification for license as
chairman of a high school English department was determined by a "teaching test" in
which the teacher's performance was apparently judged by the performance of the stu-
dents on achievement tests. This test assumes that the students' test performance was, to
a measurable extent, "caused" by the conduct of the teacher. Res ipsa loquitur has also
been used to establish negligence and cause in fact in medical malpractice cases. E.g.,
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). Moreover, according to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[niegligence and causation, like other facts, may . . . be
proved by circumstantial evidence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment
b at 157 (1965).
223 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment d at 152-59 (1965). See
generally, C. JENCKS, supra note 11.
224 In a first-year course there would, of course, be no entering test scores. In that
situation, however, we could hold constant performance in related subjects and assume a
zero entering score for all classes.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:755
reading on the third-grade level and finish the year at the 3.2
grade level. Because the only relevant factor that varied between
the groups was the teacher, it can be argued that the perfor-
mance differential was due to differential teacher input.
The probative value of the comparison might be increased
by a presentation of the performances of the defendant teach-
er's classes over a number of years. A showing that the perfor-
mance of the plaintiff class is not significantly different from
that of all of the defendant's classes strengthens the inference
that the performance differential between the plaintiff class
and the comparison class is attributable to the teacher, rather
than to the plaintiff class's abnormality.
22 5
b. Objections to the Comparative Method
Although the intergroup comparison permits the inference
that the .test score differences are due to different teacher
input,2 2 6 the defendant may raise several objections to plaintiff's
presentation. The defendant may argue the comparison has
failed to hold constant a factor, other than teacher performance,
which could have produced the differential test results. For ex-
ample, the plaintiff class may have been abnormal for a group
with the essential characteristics held constant in the comparison.
Absent a showing that the defendant's classes have performed
uniformly poorly over a multi-year period,2 2 7 the showing of
comparatively poor test performance may indicate either that
the inferior group was abnormal-perhaps the class had an un-
usually high number of troublemakers-or that the teacher was
incompetent.
The possibility that the test score differentials were caused
by something other than different teacher inputs, however,
should not eliminate the availability of the comparative tech-
nique to the plaintiff in making a prima facie case. In view of the
obvious difficulty of identifying comparison classes with all pos-
sible characteristics identical to those of the plaintiff class, once
225 While a consistently inferior showing by defendant's students strengthens the
claim that the teacher was the cause, such a showing may not always be essential or
possible, as in the case of a first-year teacher or a previously competent teacher who
becomes senile.
Although the method of proof outlined above would lend itself most readily to a
class action suit, it is available to the individual plaintiff. For a discussion of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a class action suit, see note 23 supra.
226 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment n at 165-66 (1965). See
generally McCoRmicK, supra note 221, §§ 336-47.
227 Such a showing would be impossible in the cases of the incompetent first-year
teacher and the elderly teacher who was competent until the present school year.
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the classes are shown to share the characteristics enumerated
above, they should be presumed to be comparable in all other
respects. The defendant should be permitted to rebut this pre-
sumption with evidence of the abnormality of the plaintiff class,
for example, through the testimony of the principal that this was
the worst behaved class he has seen in twenty years of school
administration. 228 It would then be for the jury to decide
whether it was the teacher or the troublemakers who made the
difference.
Although the defendant might point out that some studies
suggest that teacher quality does not have a very great effect on
achievement test scores,22 9 and that some of the other factors
previously mentioned are more significant determinants of
test-measured success, this technique would allow comparative
measurement of whatever influence a teacher does have on test
scores. The disagreement among authorities regarding the de-
gree of correlation between test scores and cognitive skills,
teacher quality, or economic success 230 should not be crucial.
The judge or jury will simply have to choose among conflicting
expert opinions. As in antitrust cases, where the courts must rely
on highly imperfect and debatable methods of proving cause
and damages, 231 perhaps test scores, though imperfect, are the
best available indicators of how much students have learned
under different conditions. Yet to the extent that courts remain
unconvinced that poor test scores indicate the failure of students
to learn fundamental skills, it is clear that a suit of this type,
proven with the methods herein outlined, will not have a great
likelihood of success.
The comparative technique might also be criticized for sug-
gesting that an entire class was "harmed," while, in fact, the top
or bottom ten percent may have performed better than they
would have performed in comparison classes. For example, the
teacher may have taught to the best or worst students and ig-
nored the rest. Under the negligence standard developed in this
Comment,23 2 however, it is questionable whether a teacher
would be deemed negligent if a significant proportion of his or
her students performed outstandingly. Even if some students
did better with this teacher than they would have done in the
228 See Lubell v. Nyquist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1968), appeal
denied, 23 N.Y. 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969).
129 E.g., C. JENCKS, supra note 11.
230 See, e.g., id.
231 See Sax & Hiestard, supra note 40, at 886-87.
2 Text accompanying notes 94-104 supra.
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comparison classes, there is no reason not to give a remedy to
the students who suffered an educational loss. A comparative
analysis broken down, for example, by IQ groups within a class,
would permit identification of the "injured" groups for purposes
of deciding who should receive remedial instruction.
c. Proof of Causation of Harm on an Individual Basis
If "cause in fact" and "harm" are proven on a class basis,
relief in the form of remedial instruction or dismissal of an in-
competent teacher could be awarded without a showing of harm
to each individual student. If compensation is sought for di-
minished future earnings, however, the individual student prob-
ably must prove that he or she suffered harm because of the
teacher's negligence.
Depending on the availability of the necessary data, the
comparative method might be used to prove that an individual
student's failure to learn was "caused" by the negligence of his
teacher. Consider the following hypothetical. While performing
an operation, a doctor negligently performs a certain procedure
and the patient dies. Assume that when this operation is prop-
erly (non-negligently) performed, there is a two percent chance
that the patient will die. When this particular act of negligence is
committed, there is a fifty percent chance of death. Presumably
there would be no objection to allowing a jury to find that the
negligence of the doctor was the "cause in fact" of the patient's
death. Even though there is some possibility that the patient
would have died even if the doctor had not been negligent, it is
more likely than not that the patient would not have died "but
for" the doctor's negligence. 233 Although the doctor may rebut
the presumption created by the statistics by proving that the
patient was among the two percent who would have died in a
non-negligent operation, the possibility that without the doctors
negligence the patient would still have died 234 does not preclude
a verdict for the patient.
This principle may be applied to education by isolating, in
both the plaintiff and comparison classes, those students with the
233 The preponderance of the evidence standard usually applied in civil cases is,
according to McCormick, proof that leads the jury to find the existence of a contested
fact more probable than its non-existence. McCoRMICK, supra note 221, § 339, at 794
n.56.
234 This possibility exists in many tort cases. In the typical case of the plaintiff's
slipping on a wet floor that the defendant negligently failed to mop, the possibility that
plaintiff would still have fallen if the floor had been dry does not of itself make proof of
cause impossible.
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individual plaintiff's essential characteristics, and comparing the
performance of those sub-classes. Suppose that in the compari-
son classes an average of ninety percent of the students with the
same essential characteristics as the plaintiff progressed at least
one grade level in reading in the fifth grade. In the plaintiff
class, only forty percent of the students with the plaintiff's essen-
tial characteristics advanced at least one grade level. The plain-
tiff failed to advance a grade level in reading (and perhaps was
held back a year). Because the teacher is the only causal factor
not held constant between the two sub-classes, it can be inferred,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the different
achievement rates are attributable to differential teacher input.
While it is possible that the plaintiff would not have progressed
at least one grade level even if he had been in one of the com-
parison classes, it is more likely than not that, but for the
teacher's negligence, the plaintiff would have advanced at least
one grade level.
235
Perhaps the plaintiff should be required to introduce evi-
dence that he is a typical or average member of the plaintiff
sub-class-that there is no reason to place him within the ten
percent who would have failed to progress at least a grade level
even with a non-negligent teacher. For example, he might pro-
duce evidence that his behavior, diligence, and attentiveness
were at least average for students with his "essential characteris-
tics." This showing should at least create a rebuttable presump-
tion or permit the inference that, "but for" the teacher's negli-
23 5 See MCCORMICK, supra note 221, § 339, at 794; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 328 D, comments d & e at 158-59 (1965).
This more-likely-than-not determination may be derived as follows: Since 10% of
those in the comparison class with plaintiff's essential characteristics (the "comparison
sub-class") failed to advance one grade level, that percentage of those in the plaintiff class
with plaintiff's essential characteristics (the "plaintiff sub-class") in excess of 10% who
failed to advance one grade level was caused by the defendant teacher's input. Accord-
ingly, since 40% of the plaintiff sub-class failed to advance one grade level, the fail-
ure of 30% (=40%-10%) of the plaintiff sub-class to advance one grade level was
caused by the input of defendant teacher. The probability that the failure of a stu-
dent in the plaintiff sub-class to advance one grade level was caused by the defendant
teacher is the number of students in the plaintiff sub-class whose failure to advance
one grade level was caused by the defendant teacher divided by the number of stu-
dents in the plaintiff sub-class who failed to advance one grade level. Thus, the proba-
bility that a given student's failure to advance one grade level was caused by the de-
fendant teacher is 75% (30% X number of students in plaintiff sub-class = .75). Since
k40% x number of students in plaintiff sub-class
75% is greater than 50%, it is more likely than not that the failure of one of those in
the plaintiff sub-class who failed to advance one grade level was caused by the defen-
dant teacher's input.
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gence, the plaintiff would have advanced at least one grade level.
The defendant could, of course, rebut this presumption with
evidence that the plaintiff probably would not have advanced a
grade level even if the teaching had been non-negligent because,
for example, he was absent often. This method of proving causa-
tion of harm to the individual student does not provide a less
precise indication of what would have happened "but for" the
defendant's negligence than does reliance on general "world ex-
perience" in more usual negligence cases.
236
236 A problem with this method of proof arises when the standard of harm is not
fixed. In the above example it was assumed that the minimum level of advancement was
failure to advance one grade level. Suppose, however, that in the plaintiff sub-class 80%
of the students failed to advance at least 1.2 grade levels while 40% of the students failed
to advance at least 1.0 grade level. Assume further that 30% of the comparison sub-class
failed to advance at least 1.2 grade levels while 25% of the comparison sub-class failed to
advance at least 1.0 grade level. Under these circumstances, the probability that the
failure of a student in the plaintiff sub-class to advance at least 1.2 grade levels was
caused by the teacher is 62.5%. The probability that the 'failure of a student in the
plaintiff sub-class to advance at least 1.0 grade level was caused by the teacher, however,
is 38%. Therefore, although it is more likely than not that a student's failure to advance
1.2 grade levels was caused by the defendant teacher, it is more likely than not that a
student's failure to advance 1.0 grade level was not caused by the defendant teacher. In
such circumstances the choice of the minimum level of advancement with reference to
which the harm will be identified-the choice between failure to advance at least 1.0 and
1.2 grade levels in this example-is crucial, and thus susceptible to manipulation.
If, fortuitously, the percentage of students in the comparison sub-class failing to
advance beyond each level remains in a constant proportion to the percentage of stu-
dents in the plaintiff sub-class failing to advance beyond each respective level, this prob-
lem is guaranteed not to arise. More realistically, even if the proportion is not constant, it
may not vary sufficiently to change the more likely than not determination. Suppose, for
example, that 80% of the plaintiff sub-class failed to advance at least 1.2 grade levels,
40% of the plaintiff sub-class failed to advance at least 1.0 grade level, 30% of the
comparison sub-class failed to advance at least 1.2 grade levels, and 10% of the compari-
son sub-class failed to advance at least 1.0 grade level. Although the probability that the
defendant teacher caused the failure of a student in the plaintiff sub-class to advance 1.2
grade levels is 62.5%, while the probability that the defendant teacher caused the failure
of a student in the plaintiff sub-class to advance 1.0 grade level is 75%, in both cases it is
more likely than not that the teacher was the cause. If the plaintiff can establish harm
due to teacher inputs over most of the range of progress levels, he might succeed in
making out a prima facie case even when results conflict between any two levels.
237 See notes 94-104 supra & accompanying text. The statistically determined average
worst performance in comparison classes would naturally be the product of perfor-
mances above and below the average, all of which represent the worst performances in
each class or program in the comparison classes, including performances which might be
found negligent. If graphed, these performances might appear approximately as a nor-
mal curve with the mean being the standard of minimum professional competence for
communities of comparable essential characteristics. Teachers whose performances fall
above the mean will not be found negligent even though their performances are the
worst in their respective schools. Arguably, because of the imperfection of measurement,
teachers whose performances are clustered just below the mean should not be found
negligent. Teachers whose performances fall in the extreme tail of the curve below the
mean would clearly be negligent. The point "significantly" below the mean at which
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2. Proof of Negligence
a. The Comparative Method
The comparative method outlined above does not establish
teacher negligence; it establishes only that the quality of a
teacher's performance is inferior to that of the teachers of com-
parison classes. To establish negligence, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant's performance is worse than that of the min-
imally acceptable teacher in the same or similar communities. In
light of the comparative method of proof, this definition of neg-
ligence may be translated into the following standard: A teacher
is negligent if it is proven that his or her performance falls
significantly below the average worst performance of teachers in
comparison classes identical in all essential respects with the
plaintiff class.237
One method of proving that the defendant teacher's per-
formance falls below this standard relies on an inference of the
existence of an unobserved fact from proof of the existence of
an observed fact. The inference, similar to that employed under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,238 is that one teacher's students
do not perform significantly worse than the average worst per-
formance of other teachers' students identical in all essential re-
spects unless the individual teacher's performance is below the
average worst performance of teachers in the community.239
Given this inference and standard of negligence, negligence may
be established by proof that the performance of the plaintiff
class falls significantly below the average worst performance
of the comparison classes. Medical malpractice cases provide
ample authority for proving negligence by circumstantial evi-
dence. 40
Suppose that in a ghetto school over a ten-year period, the
first-year French classes of teacher A have averaged in the fifth
percentile on year-end achievement tests. Average scores in indi-
vidual years ranged between the fourth and sixth percentile. In
the comparison schools, the students of the worst teachers have
performance becomes inexcusable would have to be determined in the courts through
litigation. Although policy would play the major role in the fixing of this point, a plaintiff
might strengthen his case by showing, when the requisite data is available, that
defendant's performance is more than one or two standard deviations below the mean.238 See sources cited note 219 supra.
239 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, commentsf & g at 160-62 (1965).
240 See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); W. PROSSER, supra
note 25, § 39, at 226-28; see note 222 supra. But see Olson v. North, 276 Il1. App. 457,
(1934); Wade, supra note 52, at 228 & nn.67, 68.
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averaged in the fifteenth percentile and the comparison groups
overall have averaged in seventeenth percentile. Unless it is
shown that these test results were "caused" by a factor other than
teacher input, it reasonably could be concluded that the per-
formance of teacher A failed to meet minimum professional
standards.
b. Lack of Certification
The extent to which lack of certification 2 4 1 should be inde-
pendent evidence of a teacher's negligence is unclear. It has
been suggested that an uncertified or unlicensed professional
should be held strictly liable for injuries caused in the perfor-
mance of a function requiring certification or license. In Biakanja
v. Irving,2 4 2 for example, the defendant, who was not licensed to
practice law as required by statute, was held to be negligent per
se in a suit arising from his drafting of a faulty will. In the
education context, this view implies that an uncertified teacher
would be negligent per se or strictly liable if his classes failed to
obtain the average level of performance for students with the
same essential characteristics.
243
Other authorities suggest that lack of certification is evi-
dence of negligence where injury results from performance of a
function for which certification is required by law.244 Some sup-
port for the application of this theory is provided by Kobylski v.
Board of Education,245 in which a New York court held that the
failure of a teacher to have a valid teaching certificate could
constitute substantial evidence of incompetence in a dismissal
proceeding. This theory could result in finding an uncertified
teacher negligent where he followed the same procedures and
obtained the same results as a certified teacher, who might not
be found negligent.
Perhaps the best view is that of the majority of the New
York Court of Appeals in Brown v. Shyne:24 6 Lack of statutorily
required certification is evidence of negligence only where it is
241 It has been suggested that there is a presumption of competence on the part of a
properly certified teacher. E. REUTrER & R. HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 450. This
presumption, however, must be subject to rebuttal by the kinds of evidence discussed in
this section.
242 310 P.2d 63 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), aff'd in part, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16
(1958).
243 See text accompanying notes 221-24 supra.
244 E.g., Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926) (Crane, J., dissenting).
245 33 App. Div. 2d 603, 304 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1969).
246 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926).
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logically relevant to a showing that the defendant failed to meet
the standard of conduct required of certified members of the
profession-for instance, where the defendant was unable to ob-
tain a certificate because of unsatisfactory practice teaching. The
theories that impose a higher standard on uncertified teachers,
however, may have the arguably desirable effect of discouraging
uncertified people from teaching.
The extent to which lack of certification indicates negligence
by the officials who hired the uncertified teacher is also unclear.
The determination of whether hiring an uncertified teacher con-
stitutes negligence per se, evidence of negligence, or nothing in
itself, might depend on the statutory requirements for hiring
and whether or not the hiring of uncertified teachers should be
discouraged. It may also be asked whether the fact that an in-
competent teacher is certified conclusively proves that the school
district was not negligent in hiring him (apart from possible vi-
carious liability). It can be argued that a school district is acting
per se reasonably where it hires a certified teacher because it can
reasonably rely on the teaching certificate as conclusive proof
that the teacher is minimally competent. While certification may
be a defense against a claim of administrator negligence during
the first year of the teacher's employment, a school district
clearly could be negligent in retaining or rehiring a certified
teacher who performed poorly during the first year. Further-
more, a school district might be found negligent for hiring a
certified but incompetent teacher of whose past or probable in-
competence school officials had knowledge, perhaps from poor
letters of recommendation.
c. Other Types of Proof
Evaluations of a teacher by his or her principal or supervisor
might provide other evidence of teacher negligence.247 If, on the
basis of observation, a principal or supervisor rated a teacher's
performance unsatisfactory, these evaluations might be available
to the plaintiff as evidence of the teacher's negligence or incom-
petence; moreover, if a principal or supervisor rated a teacher
unsatisfactory but failed to dismiss the teacher "for cause" or
rehired the teacher, this would seem to be evidence that the
supervisor or principal was negligent.
As was suggested earlier, 248 the unexcused failure of a
247 See Conley v. Board of Educ., 143 Conn. 488, 123 A.2d 747 (1956), in which a
teacher's supervisor testified about the teacher's shortcomings in a dismissal proceeding.
248 Notes 145-63 supra & accompanying text.
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teacher or school official to conform to statutes or regulations
enacted to protect students against the risk of not learning may
constitute negligence per se or evidence of negligence.249 If, for
example, a teacher failed to follow a school district regulation
requiring that a certain percentage of class time be used for
reading instruction, and the students fell behind their grade
level in reading, violation of the regulation may constitute neg-
ligence per se or evidence of negligence. Failure of a school
official to follow statutorily prescribed hiring criteria also may
constitute negligence per se or evidence of negligence if he hires
an incompetent teacher who causes educational harm to stu-
dents. On the other hand, compliance with statutes and regula-
tions does not preclude a finding of negligence.250
Where a teacher has taken a "teaching test, '' 251 his perfor-
mance on the test might be introduced (along with expert tes-
timony) as evidence of negligence or incompetence. If the
defendant performed well on the test, he might introduce the
results to prove his competence or non-negligence.
Teacher negligence might also be established by evidence
that the teacher did not follow conventional teaching methods,
or at least methods recognized by a substantial portion of the
profession. 252 In Gardner v. State,25 3 for example, the state of
New York was held liable on a negligence theory for injuries
sustained by a student caused by the failure of a gym teacher to
give gymnastic instruction according to customary methods. 25 4
This is not to say, of course, that mere deviation from traditional
teaching methods alone should constitute negligence. 255 If a re-
249 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288 B (1965).
250 Id. § 288 C.
251 See Lubell v. Nyquist, 31 App. Div. 2d 569, 294 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1968), appeal
denied, 23 N.Y. 645, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969); note 222 supra.
2'52 See notes 94-104 supra & accompanying text.
253 281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939). See Keesee v. Board of Educ., 37 Misc. 2d
414, 235 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1962), in which a gym teacher's deviation from a syllabus
was considered evidence of negligence.
254 It has been suggested that an attorney's deviation from customary methods
should constitute negligence if he fails to accomplish the desired objective. Wade, supra
note 52, at 227 & n.58. A recent law review comment, moreover, has contended that a
professional's deviation from established procedures should create a rebuttable presump-
tion of negligence. Professional Negligence, supra note 51, at 645; see generally Curran, supra
note 95, at 4-6. A possible objection to using deviation from conventional procedures as
an indicium of negligence is that it might discourage experimentation and restrict de-
velopment of new and better educational methods. For an answer to this objection, see
text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
255 Under some circumstances there may be constitutional problems with requiring a
teacher to follow particular teaching methods. Cf. Webb v. Lake Mills Community School
Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
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spected segment of the educational community recognizes or
adheres to the method, the deviation should not be considered
negligent, even if, in a particular case, students learned less than
they probably would have if taught by conventional methods.
III. PRIVATE EDUCATION
The case of the public school student presents the most
difficulties and has the least chance of success of any suit by a
student who fails to learn because of teacher negligence. The
private school student who fails to learn because of teacher neg-
ligence could use most of the legal arguments and methods of
proof developed in the public school context 256 unencumbered
by several of the difficulties encountered in the public school
suit. Governmental immunity would not bar recovery, although
charitable immunity doctrines might;257 the doctrine of respon-
deat superior is more likely to render the private school liable for
the acts and omissions of its teachers than the public school; and
the existence of a contract upon which to base a breach of con-
tract theory is not at issue. 258 It is even possible in the private
school case that the promise of non-negligent instruction will be
express, either oral or written. If not, it is perhaps easier to find
an implied promise of non-negligent instruction than in the pub-
lic school situation. Furthermore, teacher negligence aside, it
may be possible to find a promise or warranty of a minimum
level of student performance or subsequent educational oppor-
tunity, either expressed in the contract or implied by advertising
or other promotional representations.2 5 9 In the event of breach,
the amount of tuition paid is a measure of damage seemingly
less speculative than any of the damages assertible in the public
school situation.
2 60
A troublesome feature of the private school case is that the
private school is not as effective a risk bearer or distributor as a
256 Obviously, liability could not be based on the kinds of statutes discussed in text
accompanying notes 145-63 supra.
257 See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 133.
258 See, e.g., Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Parris, 243 Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967)
(student recovered prepaid tuition for unused lessons because dance studio breached
contract by failing to provide competent instruction); Olson v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 181
Cal. App. 2d 165, 5 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Sciortino v. Leach, 242 So. 2d
269 (La. Ct. App. 1970).259 See Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Parris, 243 Ark. 441, 420 S.W.2d 518 (1967). See
generally Note, Developing Protection for the Consumer of Future Services, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
926 (1972).
260 See id.; Olson v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 165, 5 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960); Stad v. Grace Downs Model & Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d 1095, 319
N.Y.S.2d 918 (Queens County Civ. Ct. 1971).
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public entity. While tuition refunds might not cripple the school,
the broader damages discussed in the public school context
might be ruinous. If insurance is available, however, a suit for
failure to learn remains more likely to succeed in the private
than in the public school context. This greater likelihood of
success also applies to suits against private colleges and
universities.
26 1
A student in a professional or occupational training course
also might bring a successful suit to recover for his failure to
learn. For example, a student in a computer repair course would
have a strong contract or tort case if the techniques he was
taught applied only to computers of a type no longer used by
anyone. 262 Problems of proof are clearly less troublesome than in
the public school situation. Damages would not be speculative,
and could encompass not only tuition but provable loss of in-
come if the student gave up a job in expectation of learning a
new occupation. If a technical training course falsely represents
that graduates will find employment, deceit or negligent misrep-
resentation would provide a plausible basis for an action for
tuition refund or more extensive damages.
263
A final possible situation in which a suit for failure to learn
because of teacher negligence could be brought with the legal
theories and methods of proof outlined in this Comment might
arise where a bar review course fails to teach the students the
correct law. An important change in the law, for example, is not
incorporated into the review course. The negligence of the in-
structor seems easily provable.2 64 The comparative methods
could be used to prove cause and harm. Suppose the normal bar
exam pass rate of similarly composed review classes is eighty
percent and the pass rate in the plaintiff's incorrectly instructed
class was thirty percent. Over a ten-year period the lowest pass
rate of any non-negligently instructed class was seventy percent.
Out of a class of one hundred students who took the course, it
could be argued that twenty would have failed even if the in-
struction had been non-negligent, and the failure of the remain-
ing fifty is attributable to the negligent instruction. Thus, all
261 See Paynter v. New York Univ., 64 Misc. 2d 226, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676 (N.Y. County
Civ. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 66 Misc. 2d 92, 319 N.Y.S.2d 893 (App. T. 1971).
262 See Note, supra note 259; cf. Sciortino v. Leach, 242 So. 2d 269 (La. Ct. App.
1970).
262 See Stad v. Grace Downs Model & Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d 1095, 319
N.Y.S.2d 918 (Queens County Civ. Ct. 1971); Brown v. Search, 131 Wis. 109, 111 N.W.
210 (1907); W. PROSSER, supra note 25, §§ 109-10, at 728-36.
264 See text accompanying notes 237-55 supra.
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things being equal, it is more likely than not that the failure of
any particular student was caused by the negligent instruction.
Of course, it would be open to the defendant to prove that a
particular student's failure is attributable to something other
than the negligence of the instruction, for instance, the student's
failure to attend the classes. 26 5 In the case of a homogeneous
group, however, any member of the class could use this method
to establish that, more likely than not, he would have passed "but
for" the negligence of the instructor. In a negligence action,
proximate cause would easily be established, since the risk
created by negligent instruction in a bar review course clearly is
that students will fail the bar exam.
The plaintiff's case might be strengthened by a showing that
he was an outstanding law student who had diligently prepared
for the bar exam. A less outstanding plaintiff should try to show
that he was typical of the group who took the course, that is, that
there is no reason to believe that he was more likely to fail than
anyone else.
Calculation of damages is also easier in this situation than in
the public school context. Beyond tuition refund, the students
who failed the bar exam could be compensated for income lost
while they retook the course and waited for the exam results.
Recovery might also be possible, on a more speculative basis, for
loss of a job because of failing the bar exam. Finally, even those
who passed the exam might be able to recover tuition on a con-
tract theory, because they did not receive that for which they
bargained.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the present time, the problems involved in bringing a suit
for failure to learn because of teacher negligence or incompe-
tence may seem insurmountable. Traditional legal principles,
however, provide ample guidance for fashioning a viable cause
of action.
First, failure to learn is not a harm beyond the law's reme-
dial capabilities. The replacement of incompetent by competent
teachers, the provision of, or payment for, remedial instruction,
and monetary compensation for diminished future income could
"make whole" public school students who have suffered a loss of
educational benefits.
Second, tort law, contract law, and mandamus provide legal
theories on which a suit for failure to learn might be based. A
265 See text accompanying notes 219-36 supra.
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negligence suit stands the most chance of success; various statu-
tory, common law, and scholarly authorities support the conten-
tion that school districts and teachers should be held liable for
the failure of students to learn because of the negligence of the
teachers. The standard of acceptable instruction should be com-
parative, that is, the level of skill and learning of the minimally
acceptable teacher in the same or similar communities. In limited
circumstances, causes of action based on intentional tort or mis-
representation may also be available. Contract law may supply
the public school student with a cause of action if the factfinder
can be persuaded of the existence of implied contracts between
the student and the teacher or between the student and the
school district, with an implied promise of non-negligent instruc-
tion. Although in many cases the contract theory may be less
plausible than the tort theory, the contract approach has several
advantages: Governmental immunity, which may bar recovery in
tort, might not preclude a successful contract action; courts may
be more willing to allow recovery for loss of an expectancy or
benefit in contract than in tort; defenses such as contributory
negligence or assumption of risk may bar recovery in tort but
not in contract; and statutes of limitations are generally longer
for contract actions. A contract theory would, of course, be of
more use to a private school student than to a public school
student. Finally, in narrowly defined circumstances, mandamus
may provide minimal relief.
Third, there are several methods of proving teacher negli-
gence and causation of harm. The latter can be established if
the plaintiff proves that a class of which he was a member
performed significantly worse than did classes identical in
all essential respects except that they were not taught by the de-
fendant teacher. Negligence can be established if the plain-
tiff proves that the teacher's performance fell significantly below
the average worst performance of teachers in classes identical to
the plaintiff's in all essential respects. Lack of certification, a
supervisor's poor evaluations, failure to conform to statutory
educational requirements, and failure to use recognized teaching
methods might provide other evidence of negligence.
The legal framework for a cause of action for failure to
learn is supported by strong policy considerations, including the
importance of education, the ability of teachers and school dis-
tricts to bear or spread the costs of students' failure to learn, and
the desirability of deterring negligent teaching and the hiring of
incompetent teachers.
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The novelty of the theories advanced in this Comment does
not condemn educational malpractice suits to an eternity of sus-
tained demurrers and motions to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. Dean Prosser's tribute to the flexibility of tort
law is an acknowledgement of the dynamism of the common law
generally:
[T]he progress of the common law is marked by many
cases of first impression, in which the court has struck
out boldly to create a new cause of action, where none
had been recognized before. . . . The law of torts is
anything but static, and the limits of its development are
never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff's in-
terests are entitled to legal protection against the con-
duct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is
novel will not of itself operate as a bar to recovery.
266
266 W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at 3 (footnote omitted).
IMPLEMENTING TITLE IX: THE HEW REGULATIONS
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, signed into
law on June 23, 1972, prohibits sex discrimination in education.I
This provision was enacted in response to extensive hearings
held by the House Special Subcommittee on Education, which
documented nationwide sex discrimination in education.
2
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana urged his colleagues to take ac-
tion in this area:
[O]ne of the great failings of the American educational
system is the continuation of corrosive and unjustified
discrimination against women. It is clear to me that sex
discrimination reaches into all facets of education-
admissions, scholarship programs, faculty hiring and
promotion, professional staffing, and pay scales. In-
deed, the recent "Report on Higher Education"
concluded,
Discrimination against women, in contrast to
that against minorities, is still overt and socially
acceptable within the academic community.
3
The main provision of Title IX is an absolute prohibition,
similar to that of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:4 "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance .. ."5 Regulations imple-
menting Title IX, promulgated by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, became effective on July 21, 1975.6
Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 36 Stat. 373, (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§
1681-86 (Supp. II, 1972)).
2 Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before a Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
3 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
5 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. II, 1972). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
forbids discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin in any program
receiving federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
6 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975). HEW spent two years preparing the Title IX imple-
menting regulations. On June 20, 1974, the Office of Civil Rights presented its proposed
regulations. 39 Fed. Reg. 22228 (1974). In order to accommodate the expected flood of
reaction from educational institutions and women's groups, comments were accepted
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This comment will first develop from the legislative history,
from executive and judicial interpretation of Tides VI and VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 and from relevant constitutional
adjudication, a framework with which to approach Tide IX. The
framework will then be applied to evaluate the HEW regulations
as an implementation of the mandate of Tide IX in the substan-
tive areas of admissions and recruitment, access to classes and
activities, behavior and appearance rules, use of marital or pa-
rental status, facilities, and athletics.
I. THE STATUTE
The absolute prohibition of section 901(a) of Tide IX,8 is
followed by several exceptions relating to admissions.9 Section
901(a) applies only to vocational, professional and graduate
schools, and public undergraduate schools.' 0 Public under-
graduate schools that have had a continual tradition from
their establishment of admitting only students of one sex are ex-
empted from the prohibition against sex discrimination in
admissions." Once a student is admitted, however, there can be
no sex-based discrimination.' 2 Educational institutions run by
religious organizations are exempted insofar as application of
Title IX would be inconsistent with the religious tenets of the
organization.' 3 A complete exemption from the statute is pro-
vided educational institutions whose primary purpose is training
through October 15, 1974. Id. 22231. Over 9,700 comments were received by the De-
partment. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000e (1970).
8 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. II, 1972); text accompanying note 5 supra.
9 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(1), (5) (Supp. II, 1972):
(1) In regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply
only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and
graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher
education;
(5) In regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public institution
of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and
continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of
one sex.
For a section by section analysis of the statute in light of its legislative history, see Buek &
Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to a Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1973).
10 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
11 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (Supp. II, 1972); see Shelton & Berndt, Sex Discrimination in
Vocational Education: Title IX and Other Remedies, 62 CAUIF. L. REv. 1121 (1974).
12 HEW FACT SHEET 3 (June, 1975).
13 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1972).
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individuals for the military services. 14 Section 901(b) is an anti-
quota provision:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section
shall be interpreted to require any educational institu-
tion to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percent-
age of persons of that sex participating in or receiving
the benefits of any federally supported program or ac-
tivity, in comparison with the total number or percent-
age of persons of that sex in any community, State,
section, or other area .... 
5
The only other exception to the absolute prohibition is sec-
tion 907: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in this chapter, nothing contained herein shall be construed to
prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this
Act, from maintaining separate living facilities for the different
sexes."'
16
On December 31, 1974, section 90117 was amended to ex-
empt fraternities, sororities, and youth service organizations
from the prohibitions of Title IX.' 8 The amendment resulted
from the flood of objections received by HEW19 to section
86.31(b)(7) of the proposed regulations, which would have left
open the possibility of educational institutions losing their fed-
eral funds if found substantially to support an organization that
discriminates by sex.20 This newest amendment and the admis-
sions exemptions reflect the ambivalence of the Congress in its
1Id. § 1681(a)(4).
15 1d. § 1681(b).
Is Id. § 1686.
17 Id. § 1681(a).
" Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862, amending 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
19 N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1974, at 23, col. 4 (city ed.).
'0 39 Fed.Reg. 22235 (1974):
86.31 Education programs and activities:
(b) [A] recipient shall not, on the basis of sex:
(7) Aid or perpetuate discrimination against any person by assisting any
agency, organization, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex
in providing any aid, benefit or service to students ....
Senator Bayh, the primary Senate sponsor of Title IX, 117 CoNG. REc. 30155 (1971),
proposed the new amendment to make explicit what he considered Congress' intent that
the Act not extend to such organizations. 120 CONG. REc. 21567-68 (daily ed. Dec. 16,
1974). There was no problem in getting it passed by the House, because a House confer-
ence report had attempted to achieve the same objective by generating legislative history
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attempt to abolish the most harmful effects of sex discrimination
while responding to political pressure to keep the status quo in
some areas.
2 1
Section 902 of Title IX 2 2 provides enforcement machinery
identical to that of section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,23 but limited to education programs or activities. Each
department and agency empowered to extend federal financial
assistance is directed to issue rules and regulations to implement
the statute. If after a hearing it is determined that a recipient is
not complying with the rules and that future compliance cannot
be effected on a voluntary basis, compliance may be enforced
through termination of funds or refusal to grant further assis-
tance. A department that takes such action must file a written
report with the committees of the House and Senate having
legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved. Ju-
dicial review is authorized by section 903,24 again in language
almost identical to that of Title VI.
25
II. ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE
Discrimination against female students in education has
taken many and varied forms. It has ranged from overt exclu-
sion from particular classes such as shop, to more subtle dis-
crimination such as inculcation of limited career orientations in
female students. This diversity in modes of discrimination neces-
sitates an assessment of the intended scope of Title IX. Is every
classification by sex impermissible? Does the statute reach
practices that are facially neutral but have a disparate effect
on one sex? To what extent is separate but equal a permissible
alternative?
to defeat HEW's interpretation of Title IX. 120 CONG. REC. 11106-07 (daily ed. Nov. 26,
1974).
Representative Green of Oregon, the author of the statute, 117 CONG. REc. 9822
(1971), put into the Congressional Record on Nov. 26, 1974, the substance of the recom-
mendation of the House conference report: "[Title IX] was never designed for the
purpose of having the Federal Government intrude on private organizations and to force
by Government fiat the integration of such groups as Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts .... and all
sororities and fraternities." 120 CONG. REc. 11106 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1974) (remarks of
Representative Green). Representative Green suggested other changes in the proposed
HEW regulations that will be discussed below. See text accompanying notes 78-229 infra.
2, See Buek & Orleans, supra note 9.
22 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. II, 1972).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
24 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (Supp. II, 1972).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1970).
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A. Overt Discrimination
The practices most obviously covered by Title IX involve
overtly different treatment of male and female students. Some
elementary schools forbid girls to join the safety patrol. Colleges
and universities often prescribe earlier curfews for women than
for men. Vocational interest tests have been color coded pink
and blue with different career choices for women and men. All
of these are examples of explicit discrimination based on sex,
prohibited by Title IX. Educational institutions should not be
allowed to justify such overtly different treatment. When schools
make explicit rules according to sex, Title IX's prohibition
should be applied absolutely, with a narrow reading of section
907's "living facilities" exception.
26
The legislative history of the statute is not particularly in-
structive on this interpretive question. Most of the congressional
debate focused on the admissions exceptions that eventually be-
came part of Title IX.27 At one point in the debates, however,
Senator Bayh referred to Title IX as a "narrower embodiment"
of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which Congress had
recently sent to the states for ratification.28 The Senate Report
on the ERA interprets it as an absolute prohibition of overtly
different treatment on the basis of sex .2 No justification by a
state would be accepted for overtly disparate treatment under
the ERA, and none should be accepted under Title IX.
Executive construction of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,30 forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in any program receiving federal financing, also
supports an absolute reading of the statute.31 Caution should be
exercised, however, since Congress did not limit the effect of
Title VI in any way, whereas Title IX has elaborate admissions
exemptions and a living facilities exception. Congress obviously
does not see race and sex discrimination in exactly the same way.
One cannot conceive that Congress would enact a statute allow-
ing higher admissions standards for blacks than whites in the
interest of permitting educational institutions to determine the
optimal environment for learning. Nor could money be allotted
26 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. II, 1972).
27 See, e.g. 118 CONG. REC. 5812-15 (1972); 117 id. 30408-12, 39248-61 (1971).
28 117 CONG. REc. 30414 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
29 S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972); see Brown, Emerson, Falk &
Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women,
80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1970).
1 See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1974).
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to a state system of education in which one school specializing in
engineering and science admitted whites only, while another
school, set up for blacks, taught only auto mechanics and
maintenance work. That is just what the admission exemptions
in Title IX allow. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that
because Congress was willing to write in certain exemptions, it
did not intend the statute absolutely to prohibit overt sex-based
discrimination in the areas not excepted. One might ask whether
differences in treatment allowed by the HEW regulations to
Title IX would be valid under Title VI, and, if not, whether
sex should be viewed differently from race in that particular
situation.
An absolute reading of the statute must take account of
section 907, which allows "separate living facilities for the differ-
ent sexes. ' 32 The term "living facilities" may include restrooms,
lockers, and other school areas where disrobing takes place; but
to extend the term any further would frustrate Congress' at-
tempt to give women equal educational opportunity. 33 A narrow
reading of section 907 also conforms to the privacy exception to
the ERA, on which much of the legislative history of that
amendment is premised.34 The source of this implied exception
is the constitutional right of privacy enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut35 and Roe v. Wade.3 6 The Senate
Report on the ERA indicates that the right of privacy exception
extends only to separate restrooms and sleeping quarters.3 7 Such
should also be the limit of the explicit exception of section 907 of
Title IX.
The narrow reading given to the "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ) exception to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196438 also supports a similar approach under Title IX.
Title VII forbids discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 39 Such discrimina-
tion may be made, however, "in those certain instances where
32 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. II, 1972).
33 Support for a narrow reading of the exception can be found in the Supreme
Court's construction of the Fair Labor Standards Act § 13(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2)
(1970), in A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945). "To extend an exemption
to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the
interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people." Id. at 493.
34 See note 29 supra & accompanying text.
35 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31 See note 29 supra & accompanying text.
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
3
9 Id. § 2000e-2.
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religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qual-
ification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise. '40 In Title VII as in Title IX, a
general prohibition is qualified by a single exception.
Both the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission have allowed very few employers to justify different
treatment based explicitly on sex under the BFOQ exception.
One court held that "sexual characteristics, rather than charac-
teristics that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a
particular sex" are the only basis for applying the BFOQ
exception. 41 Thus, wet nurses and sperm donors are two of the
few occupations that would fit such a narrow reading. Another
court imposed on the employer the "burden of proving that he
had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believ-
ing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to per-
form safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. 42
In summary, the legislative histories of Title IX and of the
ERA and executive and judicial construction of Titles VI and
VII support an analysis of Title IX which absolutely proscribes
explicitly different treatment of students according to sex, ex-
cept in the area of living facilities.
B. Facially Neutral Regulations Having a
Discriminatory Effect
Some school policies and regulations do not refer explicitly
to male and female students and thus appear to be non-
discriminatory. Their effect, however, often is to burden female
students. Restrictions on part-time attendance at colleges or uni-
versities is an example. Although applicable to men and women,
women with young children feel the impact of this policy much
more than male students, because of the inadequacy of child
care facilities in this country. Schools often follow admissions
policies that give preference to students from certain schools. If
those schools are single-sex institutions, the college in effect dis-
criminates against the sex excluded from the favored single-sex
institution.
Title IX is broad enough to cover facially neutral practices
having a disparate impact on women. However, the educational
institutions should be allowed to justify the necessity of such
practices in relation to the objectives of the educational program.
401d. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
41 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
42 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Such an interpretation of the statute is supported by parallel
decisions under Tides VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 43 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 4 4 the Supreme Court ex-
amined neutrally stated employment procedures that were
found disproportionately to disqualify blacks. The Court held
that the requirement of a high school education or the passing of
a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of em-
ployment could be sustained only if it had a "manifest relation-
ship" to success in the job.45 Lack of discriminatory intent was
irrelevant; the effect of the policy triggered application of
Tide VII.
A similarly broad definition of discrimination was applied in
Lau v. Nichols.46 In Lau, Chinese speaking students alleged that
the school system violated their rights under Title VI by failing
to teach them English. The Court decided that regardless of
intent, this failure amounted to discrimination based on national
origin prohibited by Title VI. As in Griggs, effect was all impor-
tant. It was not enough that all students were provided with the
"same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum, for students
who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from
any meaningful education. '47 Lau and Griggs both suggest that a
facially neutral requirement that is applied to all candidates for
admission/to a school or activity will be held to be discriminatory
if its effect is to burden a protected group.48 Thus even facially
neutral policies and regulations may be within the regulatory
power of HEW under Tide IX. A rule or practice having a
disparate impact on women should be allowed only if the school
shows "educational necessity"-that the goal sought by the fa-
cially neutral but effectively discriminatory rule cannot be
achieved in any other manner.
C. Regulations Concerning Unique Physical
Characteristics
Schools sometimes enact rules based on physical characteris-
tics unique to one sex or the other. It must be asked whether,
and if so, under what circumstnaces, Tide IX forbids such rules.
Pregnancy is usually the characteristic at issue. Both the Equal
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000e (1970).
44 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
45 Id. at 432.
46 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
47 414 U.S. at 566.
48 See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
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Employment Opportunity Commission regulations under Title
VII,4 9 and the HEW regulations implementing Title IX,50 apply
to various practices of employers and schools relative to preg-
nant women. A federal district court recently held that an
employer's disparate treatment of pregnant employees was not
cognizable under Title VII.5 1 In so holding the court relied on
footnote twenty in Geduldig v. Aiello, 52 where the Supreme Court,
in holding that California's disability insurance program did not
violate the equal protection clause, rejected the contention that
the pregnancy classification there involved was sex-based. The
district court considered the definition of discrimination based
on sex to be the same under the fourteenth amendment and
under Title VII, and therefore considered itself bound by the
Supreme Court's analysis in Aiello.
53
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's
analysis, admonishing the court for reading the Aiello language
out of the factual context in which it was used, 5 4 and holding
that in implementing Tide VII the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission is not bound by the narrow fourteenth
amendment definition of sex-based classifications suggested in
Aiello.55 This broader view is consistent with the approach taken
in Lau and Griggs.56 Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in
Lau, indicated that although section 601 of Tide VI, standing
alone, might not have called for a judgment against the school
districts, HEW interpretations of the section required the
decision. 57 He relied on an earlier decision of the Court to hold
"that the validity of a regulation promulgated under a general
authorization provision such as § 602 of Tide VI 'will be sus-
tained so long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the
49 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1974).
10 40 Fed. Reg. 24137-44 (1975); see text accompanying notes 170-81 infra.
51 Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 F. Supp.
679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), petitionfor cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No. 74-160 1).
52 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974).
53 379 F. Supp. at 682.
54 Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024,
1028-30 (2d Cir. 1975), petition for cert.fided, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No.
74-1601).
55 Id. at 1030-32. "There is," the court noted, "no requirement that the discriminat-
ory practices forbidden by this statute should be limited to practices violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. Practices forbidden by Title VII and the EEOC guidelines issued
thereunder may, nonetheless, be able to survive Equal Protection attack." Id. at 1031.
56 See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
51 414 U.S. at 570-71 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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enabling legislation.' ",58 In Griggs, the Court noted that such
agency interpretations are entitled to "great deference. '59
This criterion should also be used to evaluate the regula-
tions issued under Title IX. What the Court said in Aiello in the
context of fourteenth amendment litigation should not limit
HEW's attempt to enforce remedial legislation. That a preg-
nancy classification is not sex-based for fourteenth amendment
purposes does not foreclose the constitutional claim, but merely
shifts the analysis from the greater burden of justification re-
quired for sex-based discrimination by Reed v. Reed60 and Fron-
tiero v. Richardson,61 to the traditional "rational basis" analysis. 62
In the same way, such classifications will be examined under
Title IX and will be permitted if educational necessity can be
demonstrated. But the failure of a pregnancy classification to
constitute a sex-based classification for fourteenth amendment
purposes and the possibility that it can be justified by a showing
of educational necessity should not be relevant to the initial ques-
tion of the cognizability under Title IX of an attack on the
regulation.
D. The Separate But Equal Doctrine
Pervading the statutory analysis suggested above is the
spectre of the "separate but equal" doctrine. When may an edu-
cational institution fulfill its obligations under Title IX by pro-
viding separate but equal programs or activities? Proponents of
the ERA suggest that under that amendment there is no place
for separate but equal. "It would simply operate to perpetuate a
dual system of equality, different but not equal. Essentially the
58Id. at 571 (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356,
369 (1973) (footnote omitted)).
59 401 U.S. at 434. In Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19,
1975) (No. 74-1601), the Second Circuit in part relied on the deference to be accorded
agency interpretations of its statutory mandate to hold that the Supreme Court had not
intended, contrary to the district court's holding, to imply that is Aiello footnote would
invalidate EEOC regulations broader than the narrow fourteenth amendment definition
of sex-based discrimination there articulated. 513 F.2d at 1030.
60 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
61 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
62 In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
that gave an automatic preference to males in granting letters of administration. Evidenc-
ing a sensitivity to the sex classification without finding it a "suspect" classification, the
Court found the statute to be without rational basis. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), struck down federal statutes wherein the procedures for claiming one's
spouse as a dependent varied between servicemen and servicewomen. Four members of
the Court found sex a "suspect" classification while three did not reach that issue since
they found the scheme irrational under traditional equal. protection analysis.
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separate-but-equal doctrine is a device for keeping one group in
a subordinate position.... Experience has shown, furthermore,
that in practice separate-but-equal is rarely in fact equal." 63 If it
can be shown that a separate program is not equal, there is no
question that Title IX is violated. Where the tangible aspects
of separate programs for females and males are arguably equal,
however, the long tradition of separation of the sexes militates
against an automatic rejection of the concept.
An attempt to assess the place of separate but equal under
Title IX must begin by looking to the analysis of Brown v. Board
of Education64 that caused the Supreme Court to denounce sep-
aration of the races. It might be argued that separation of the
sexes is not based on a judgment of inferiority, as was racial
segregation, but rather on a conception of the different, com-
plementary roles of women and men. It is, however, just that
assumption and inculcation of role that is at the heart of
sex discrimination in education. 65 Only recently has this
"equalitarian veneer" been put on the system that has channeled
women into a single career while men have been encouraged to
reach their educational and career potentials. 6 In addition to
effect on motivation is the even sadder loss of self-esteem oc-
casioned by sex segregation. One elementary school girl wrote in
a letter: "Dear God, Are boys better than girls? I know you are
one, but please try to be fair. ' 67 Although this sense of inferior-
ity and development of sex roles has taken place frequently in
integrated environments, it is certainly exacerbated by overt
separation.
It has been suggested that Supreme Court cases antedating
Brown might be used for guidance in evaluating separate ac-
tivities within schools. In Sweatt v. Painter,68 the Court ordered
the University of Texas Law School to admit a black student
because its legal education was superior to that of a state law
school established for blacks.
[T]he University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of
63 Brown, supra note 29, at 902.
64 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
's See, e.g., Bern & Bern, Case Study of a Nonconscious Ideology: Training the Woman to
Know Her Place, printed in 1970 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1042; Comment, Teaching
Woman Her Place: The Role of Public Education in the Development of Sex Roles, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 1191 (1973).
66 See Bern & Bem, supra note 65, at 1043.
67 Comment, supra note 65, at 1191.
68 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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objective measurement but which make for greatness in
a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include
reputation of the faculty, experience of the administra-
tion, position and influence of the alumni, standing in
the community, traditions and prestige.
69
The decision of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents70 also in-
volved the separate but equal doctrine, but within a single educa-
tional institution. The Court held that forcing a black student to
sit apart in the classroom, cafeteria, and library impaired "his
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students... .' -71 Buck and Orleans, HEW lawyers, consider
these cases "entirely apposite to Title IX.
' 72
They dictate that where separate treatment on the basis
of sex is proposed by an entity subject to Title IX, all
indicia must indicate that full experiential equality is
accorded those who will be affected. Put slightly differ-
ently, the treatment proposed must be such as demon-
strably would not affect a student or employee's "free
choice" among the separate activities, were sex not a
factor.
• . . In the multitude of practices subject to this
provision, simply the possibility of substantive in-
equalities, including those derived from the fact of
isolation itself, gives rise to a presumption against
separate treatment.
73
If Title IX is to have its intended remedial effect there must
be a presumption against separate treatment of females and
males. The reasons asserted for the separate treatment should be
relevant to a determination of its acceptability uder Title IX.
One reason that might be asserted as a justification for separate
treatment is the explicit living facilities exception of section
907,74 or what the educational entity might think a proper ex-
tension of that exception. Also, separate but equal treatment
might be necessary at times to forestall an attack by female stu-
dents under Lau and Griggs.75 For example, it could be argued
that opening all competitive athletic teams to female students
6 9 Id. at 634.
70 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
7 1 1d. at 641.
72 Buek & Orleans, supra note 9, at 19.
73 Id.
74 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. II, 1972).
" See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
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without any separate athletic program for them would effectively
shut out the great majority of women from competitive athletics.
They would then receive less benefits than their male counter-
parts in much the same way as the Chinese-speaking students
were discriminated against in Lau.76 A final possible reason
school officials might advance for separate programs is the belief
that girls learn differently than boys and, therefore, need differ-
ent environments in which to reach their potentials. Educational
authorities could be marshalled on both sides of this issue in the
same way the medical authorities contradicted each other in the
early sports cases.7 7 Because of the risk that young girls will be
channelled into a stereotype of one preparing for very limited
future activity and will thereby suffer the sense of inferiority
noted in Brown, this last rationale should be accorded no place
under Title IX.
Separate but equal treatment should be permitted only
when an educational entity is within the narrowly interpreted
living facilities exception discussed above, or when there is proof
that without a separate activity, female students will be, in effect,
foreclosed from meaningful particpation in the activity and thus
discriminated against in the sense recognized in Lau.
III. THE REGULATIONS
The principles developed in the preceding paragraphs pro-
vide a framework against which to assess the effectiveness of
regulations promulgated by HEW as an implementation of the
policy of Title IX. The regulations, finalized as Part 86 of Title
45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 78 consist of Subparts A
through F.79 This Comment will not deal with Subpart E (Dis-
crimination on the Basis of Sex in Employment in Educational
Programs)"° or with Subpart F (Procedures).8' The discussion
will focus on Subparts C (Admission and Recruitment) 2 and D
(Discrimination in Programs and Activities), 3 both of which re-
76 See text accompanying notes 207-08 infra.
7 Compare Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 473 (D.R.I. 1974),
rev'd, 514 F.2d 344 (Ist Cir. 1975) and Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F.
Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1973), vacated, 497 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1974), with NOW, Essex
County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33 (1974).
78 40 Fed. Reg. 24128-24145 (1975).
79 Id. 24137.
80 Id. 24143-44.
81 Id. 24144. For proposed consolidated procedural regulations for Title IX and
other civil rights laws see id. 24148.
8
2 Id. 24140.
8 3 Id. 24140-43.
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late directly to the treatment of students. The introductory and
coverage sections will be examined only briefly.
A. Subparts A and B: Introduction and Coverage
The introduction to the regulations defines terms and ex-
plains when remedial and affirmative action and assurances of
compliance are required.84 Most of the section is a straightfor-
ward application of the statute. The coverage regulations also
adhere closely to the statute and, therefore, are not a source of
controversy. The coverage section establishes procedures to
assure that the section 901(a)(3) 85 exemption for educational in-
stitutions of religious organizations is narrowly limited. If a re-
ligious institution wishes to claim that certain guidelines are in-
consistent with its religious tenets, it must set forth in writing to
the Director of the Office for Civil Rights the extent of the
requested exemption and a copy of the religious tenets under
which the exemption is claimed.
86
B. Subpart C: Admission and Recruitment
After a general prohibition of sex discrimination in admis-
sions, Subpart C delineates specific prohibitions such as ranking
separately on the basis of sex, and the use of quotas.87 The use
of separate rankings of male and female applicants as a means to
enforce higher admissions standards for women has been at-
tacked successfully under the rational basis test of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 88 This is a blatant
form of admissions discrimination and certainly violates Title IX.
The quota system was specifically mentioned in the legislative
history as a practice prohibited by the statute.89
In language similar to that used by the Court in Griggs,9" the
regulations forbid the use of
any test or other criterion for admission which has a
disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the
8
4 Id. 24137-39.
85 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1972).
80 40 Fed. Reg. 24139, § 86.12 (1975).
87 Id. 24140, § 86.21(a), (b).
88 In Bray v. Lee, 337 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972), the Boston Latin School was
forbidden to demand higher admission test scores from girls than from boys. Berkelman
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974), disallowed the same
practice by a college preparatory high school.
89 See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. 5812 (1972) (remarks of Senator Beall).
90 Text accompanying note 44 supra.
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basis of sex unless the use of such test or criterion is
shown to predict validly success in the education pro-
gram or activity in question and alternative tests or
criteria which do not have such a disproportionately
adverse effect are shown to be unavailable. 91
The regulations do not prohibit other practices neutral on their
face but having a disparate impact on the protected class, such as
restrictions on age or part-time attendance. The Women's Equity
Action League and Representative Bella Abzug prepared a pre-
liminary analysis of the regulations, 92 recommending prohibition
of such policies.93 A broader attack on such procedures is within
HEW's province and would increase the effectiveness of the
regulations in eradicating all forms of sex discrimination in
admissions.
Also forbidden in admissions procedures is any rule or pol-
icy concerning marital or parental status of students which oper-
ates to exclude members of one sex.9 4 Pregnancy and related
conditions are to be treated as any other temporary disability or
physical condition.95 According to the analysis suggested above,
rules dealing with pregnancy should be considered within the
regulatory power of HEW even though based on a physical
characteristic unique to one sex. 96 The school must show educa-
tional necessity to justify different treatment of pregnant
women. Such a showing probably cannot be made with respect to
admissions policies that discriminate on the basis of marital or
parental status.
Section 86.22 covers another method by which sex discrimi-
nation has been achieved in admissions. It prohibits schools from
giving "preference to applicants for admission, on the basis of
attendance at any educational institution . ..which admits as
students predominantly members of one sex, if the giving of
such preference has the effect of discriminating on the basis of
9140 Fed. Reg. 24140, § 86.21(b)(2) (1975).
92 WEAL-ABZUG PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED TITLE IX REGULATIONS, re-
printed in 120 CONG. REC. E 4863-69 (daily ed. July 18, 1974).
93Id. 4865.
9 40 Fed. Reg. 24140, § 86.21(c) (1975). Perhaps enforcement of this regulation
could be facilitated by providing that requests for information concerning marital or
parental status cannot be included on applications for admission.
9SId. § 86.21(c)(3): "A recipient ... shall treat disabilities related to pregnancy,
childbirth, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom in the same manner and
under the same policies as any other temporary disability or physical condition ......
" See text accompanying notes 49-62 supra.
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sex .... "97 However, the introductory remarks put a gloss on the
section.
Such preferences may be permissible .. .if the grant-
ing institution can show that the pool of applicants eli-
gible for such preferences includes roughly equivalent
numbers of males and females, or if it can show that the
total number of applicants eligible to receive prefer-
ences is insignificant in comparison with its total ap-
plicant pool.
98
The subpart on admissions ends with a command that re-
cruitment be directed equally to both sexes and a warning
against primary or exclusive recruitment from single-sex or pre-
dominantly single-sex institutions.99
C. Subpart D: Programs and Activities
1. Education Programs and Activities
Subpart D of the regulations, containing the substantive
guidelines for treatment of students within the schools, is the
principal focus of this Comment. It should be emphasized that
the subpart D regulations apply to all educational institutions
receiving federal financial assistance; the admissions exemptions
stop once the student is accepted. 100 A general prohibition of
discrimination under any "academic, extracurricular, research,
occupational training, or other educational program or activity,"
is followed by specific prohibitions. 101 Neither aid, benefit, nor
service can be denied, or given in a different manner or under a
97 40 Fed. Reg. 24140, § 86.22 (1975); see id. § 86.23(b).
98 1d. 24130.
9 9 Id. 24140, § 86.23.
100 See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
101 40 Fed. Reg. 24140-41, §§ 86.31(a), (b) (1975):
86.31 Education programs and activities.
(a) General. Except as provided elsewhere in this part, no person shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any academic, extracurricular, research,
occupational training, or other education program or activity operated by a
recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance. This sub-
part does not apply to actions of a recipient in connection with admission of its
students to an education program or activity of (1) a recipient to which Subpart
C does not apply, or (2) an entity, not a recipient, to which Subpart C would not
apply if the entity were a recipient.
(b) Specific prohibitions. Except as provided in this subpart, in providing any
aid, benefit, or service to a student, a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex:
(1) Treat one person differently from another in determining whether
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different set of requirements, on the basis of sex.10 2 All clubs
and service organizations conducted by the school must be open
to women and men. Girls must be allowed to participate in such
activities as safety patrol.' 0 3 Recreational opportunities also must
be equalized. The following practices are open to attack under
these guidelines.
At one Ohio institution a woman could not use the
handball courts unless a male signed up for her.
At a large midwestern university, the intramural
pool was specifically reserved for "Faculty, Administra-
tive Staff and Male Students" for approximately two
hours each day. That is, this was a time for men only.' 0 4
An educational institution may not on the basis of sex
"[s]ubject any person to separate or different rules of behavior,
sanctions or other treatment."'0 5 No longer may a school have
different curfew requirements for women and men. Such regu-
lations previously withstood equal protection challenges.10 6
such person satisfies any requirement or condition for the provision of such aid,
benefit, or service;
(2) Provide different aid, benefits, or services or provide aid, benefits, or
services in a different manner;
(3) Deny any person any such aid, benefit, or service;
(4) Subject any person to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions,
or other treatment;
(5) Discriminate against any person in the application of any rules of ap-
pearance;
(6) Apply any rule concerning the domicile or residence of a student or
applicant, including eligibility for in-state fees and tuition;
(7) Aid or perpetuate discrimination against any person by providing sig-
nificant assistance to any agency, organization, or person which discriminates on
the basis of sex in providing any aid, benefit or service to students or employees;
(8) Otherwise limit any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege,
advantage, or opportunity.
102 Id. §§ 86.31 (b)(1), (2), (3).
103 For a discussion of recommended changes in this area and others, see K.
DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION (1974) [hereinafter cited as DAVIDSON].
104 PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, WHAT CONSTITUTES
EQUALITY FOR WOMEN IN SPORT? 5 (April, 1974).
105 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(4) (1975).
106 An attack on such a regulation under the equal protection clause failed in Robin-
son v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974), in
which the Sixth Circuit found a rational relationship between the regulation and the
State's legitimate safety objective. However, it is arguable that even under present equal
protection standards, such a regulation should fall. Although the objective of protecting
female students is commendable and to be encouraged, such a sweeping regulation goes
beyond the Reed test of a "substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). When a right as important as freedom of movement is at
stake and the rule is so over-inclusive, the school should be required to pursue its
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Also specifically forbidden is discrimination "in the applica-
tion of any rules of appearance."'107 Presumably girls must now
be allowed to wear pants, and boys must be permitted to wear
their hair as long as they wish. It is difficult to know how much
further the rule will or should go. In analogous Title VII litiga-
tion, courts have struck down differing rules for hair length but
have sustained those for beards. 10 8 Since women cannot grow
beards, they were considered a sex-specific characteristic and not
within the purview of the statute. This Comment contends, how-
ever, that all "appearance" rules should be scrutinized under
Title IX, but should be allowed to stand if educational necessity
can be shown. 10 9 In defending due process challenges to dress
codes" schools have attempted to show that certain hair styles
for men disrupt school activities. Courts have divided on this
issue. Some have held that freedom to wear one's hair as one
wishes is within the concept of liberty."' Others have either
abstained" 2 or sustained the regulation as a reasonable effort to
maintain order in the schools that does not infringe any constitu-
tional right." 3 The regulation's general prohibition permits an
appropriately flexible approach to evaluating school rules in this
area.
A school may no longer apply any sex-differentiated
domicile or residency rule in providing any aid, benefit, or ser-
vice to a studeiit." 4 The Secretary's introductory remarks to the
proposed regulations make clear that the Department is con-
cerned in this area with eligibility for in-state tuition fees.
objective through more narrowly drawn means. Dormitory curfews are easier to imple-
ment than would be more narrowly drawn regulations, but administrative convenience
should not save a classification based on sex. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
107 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(5) (1975).
108E.g., Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
109 See text accompanying notes 49-62 supra.
110 E.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist. 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 979 (1971); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281 (Ist Cir. 1970); Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp.
550 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Rumler v. Board of School Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C.
1971).
1I Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d
1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
112 Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
113 King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 979 (1971); Rumler v. Board of School Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C. 1971).
114 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(6) (1975).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:806
"[M]any educational institutions base their determinations of
eligibility for in-state tuition on domicile; applicable state law
may require a married woman to take the domicile of her hus-
band as of the date of marriage, or further require a year of
residency to demonstrate domicile." 1 5 This kind of rule oper-
ates in favor of the female student attending school in her
husband's domicile, but against the one whose school is located
in her pre-marital domicile. Application of such a rule in either
instance is now prohibited. HEW is clearly implementing the
mandate of Title IX in this regard. A federal district court re-
cently held that application of such a rule by Pennsylvania state
universities violates the equal protection clause.16 The court was
struck by the fact that there was "no rule ... to tie the residency
classification of any group other than married women to the
classification of someone else."
' 7
Section 86.31(b)(7)"18 provides that a recipient of federal
funds shall not "[a]id or perpetuate discrimination against any
person by providing significant assistance to any agency, organi-
zation, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in pro-
viding any aid, benefit, or service to students or employees
.... "'9 Sororities, fraternities, and youth service organizations
such as the Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts successfully lobbied for
the amendment exempting them from this provision. 20 The
amendment may have been unnecessary under the proposed
regulations, the introduction to which stated:
Among the criteria to be considered in each case are the
substantiality of the relationship between the recipient
subject to the regulation and the other party involved,
including the financial support by the recipient, and
whether the other party's activities relate so closely to
the recipient's educational program or activity, or to
students or employees in that program, that they fairly
should be considered as activities of the recipient
itself.'
2 1
"1 39 Fed. Reg. 22229 (1974).
116 Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed,
506 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1974).
117d. at 1131.
118 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(7) (1975). This section was severely critized in the
letters received by HEW after the announcement of the proposed regulations. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1974, at 23, col. 3.
119 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(7) (1975).
120 See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
121 39 Fed. Reg. 22229 (1974).
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In explaining the final regulations, HEW writes, "[s]uch forms of
assistance to discriminatory groups as faculty sponsors, facilities,
administrative staff, etc., may be significant enough to render
the organization subject to the . . . regulation.' 1 22 The use of
school facilities will involve the most difficult determinations.
HEW's approach in the final regulations 123 can be criticized for
allowing any use of school facilities by sex-restricted organiza-
tions. The language of Title IX is absolute. The right of privacy
is not at issue. Use of facilities is not restricted to discriminatory
organizations whose "discrimination" might be justified by edu-
cational necessity.124 Under the approach taken in this Comment
the discrimination potentially tolerated by this section cannot be
justified.
The WEAL-Abzug report correctly points out that the lan-
guage of section 86.31(b)(7) prohibits recipients from assisting
only those organizations that provide a benefit or service to
students. 125 Such single-sex organizations as the Junior Chamber
of Commerce and Little League (while it remained single sex),
which fall outside that qualification, could take advantage of
school property and services without the intervention of
HEW.' 26 Such a loophole in the regulations is in conflict with the
broad construction of the statute suggested by Griggs and Lau.
Section 86.31 ends with the regulation of programs not op-
erated by the recipient in which students or employees of the
recipient are required or permitted to participate, including
"educational consortia and cooperative employment and
student-teaching assignments."'127 The recipient must develop a
procedure to ensure that the operator of the program takes no
action in regard to students or employees which the recipient
would be forbidden to take.' 28 If the recipient cannot ensure
non-discrimination by the operator, it must dissociate itself from
the program. 29 This is a commendable attempt by the Depart-
ment to reach less direct but nonetheless destructive discrimina:
tion encountered by women in education.
122 HEW FACT SHEET 7 (June, 1975).
123 Text accompanying note 122 supra.
124 See text accompanying notes 44-62 supra.
125 WEAL-ABZUG PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED TITLE IX REGULATIONS, re-
printed in 120 CONG. REC. E 4866 (daily ed. July 18, 1974).
126 Id.
127 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(d)(1) (1975).
128 Id. § 86.31(d)(2)(i).
129 Id. § 86.31(d)(2)(ii).
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2. Housing and Other Facilities
The housing regulations are a straightforward implementa-
tion of section 907, which allows schools to maintain separate
living facilities for the sexes. 130 The separate housing for females
and males must be proportionate in quantity and quality,131 gov-
erned by non-discriminatory rules, and subject to the same
fees.' 32 If the institution is involved in any way in off campus
housing, it must take reasonable action to assure itself that such
housing of equal quantity, quality, and cost is available to women
and to men.' 33 The next section permits separate but compara-
ble toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of
sex. 134 This interpretation comports with the rationale underly-
ing the living facilities exception.
35
3. Integration of Courses
The provision for equal access to educational programs or
activities is controversial. "A recipient shall not provide any
course or otherwise carry out any of its education program or
activity separately on the basis of sex,... including health, phys-
ical education, industrial, business, vocational, technical, home
economics, music, and adult education courses."'1 36 The two most
heatedly discussed aspects of this regulation are the possible in-
tegration of sex education and physical education classes.' 37 Sex
education classes were specifically exempted in July, 1974,138 but
gym classes must be integrated.
It is difficult to reconcile the sex education exemption with a
general rejection of the separate-but-equal doctrine. 39 It might
be argued that the right of privacy justifies this exemption.
However, discussion of sexual matters is far different from the
type of sexual activity protected by Griswold and Roe.' 40 Neither
130 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. II, 1972).
131 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.32(b) (1975).
132 Id. § 86.32(a).
133Id. § 86.32(c).
13 4 Id. § 86.33.
135 See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
13' 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.34 (1975).
137 The following letter was received during the comment period on the subject of
the integration of physical education classes: "The morals of this nation are low enough
now. Please don't make it worse. I pray the time will soon come again when men can be
men and women can be women and each proud of what God made them." N.Y. Times,
Nov. 25, 1974, at 23, col. 5 (city ed.).
138 Id.; 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.34(e) (1975).
139 See text accompanying notes 63-77 supra.
140 See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
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can the concept of "unique physical characteristics" justify sepa-
rate sex education classes.1 4 1 Nevertheless, HEW's toleration of
separate sex education classes probably will not be challenged.
According to HEW, the tentative existence of sex education
classes would be threatened by a forced integration.1
42
Integration of physical education classes is required, despite
a hostile reaction to the proposed regulations and a move in the
House for a physical education exemption. 43 There should be
no question that separate and unequal physical education pro-
grams would violate Title IX. The Project on the Status and
Education of Women has compiled examples of how sex dis-
crimination is manifested in this area.
At a prestigious private institution the women's and
men's physical education departments were separate
and the instructional courses available to female and
male students varied considerably. For example, women
could not take wrestling and men could not take self
defense or volleyball.
At a southern state university female students could not
take coaching courses for credit, with the result that
they were not "qualified" to coach teams.
At an Ohio liberal arts college women majoring in phys-
ical education must take a service course each term.
There is no similar requirement for men.
At a Pennsylvania college women must show proficiency
in two sports in order to graduate. Men need only to
show proficiency in one sport.
144
These examples of different 'treatment accorded male and
female students are prohibited by the regulations.
45
Separate-but-equal physical education programs should also
141 See Brown, supra note 29, at 893-96.
142 Action Memorandum from Director of Office for Civil Rights to Secretary of
HEW, June 12, 1973, quoted in DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 847.
143 In November, a Conference Report on H.R. 15580, making appropriations for
the departments of Labor and HEW, attempted to make legislative history for Tide IX to
forestall HEW action in this area. Representative Edith Green expressed the position of
the report: "[It] has just [been] called to my attention that one of the proposed regula-
tions was that all physical education classes had to be integrated. Tide IX was never
designed to have the Federal Government get into the internal operations of how to run
the classes in each and every school in the country .... 120 CONG. REc. 11106 (daily ed.
Nov. 26, 1974).
144 PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WoMEN, supra note 104, at 4-5.
145 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.34 (1975).
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be unacceptable. It was suggested above that separate-but-equal
is permissible only within the narrow privacy exception or when
necessary to assure equal opportunities for women.146 The ex-
emption for separate locker facilities takes care of any disrobing
problem. 147 The arguments for separation that have force in
competitive athletics where ability is the criterion for partici-
pation14 8 are not applicable here, since students of all abilities
are included in physical education classes. This is an area where
the risks of inequality are great. Separate treatment discourages
serious athletic interests of women and perpetuates expectations
of low athletic achievement and denigration by women of their
own physical abilities.
149
Business and vocational classes, especially home economics
and shop, are often sex segregated. No longer may a school
offer separate cooking classes where girls are taught to be
homemakers and boys to be chefs.150 In this area also, require-
ments for graduation have differed. In Robinson v. Washington,15'
a female student challenged a state board of education regula-
tion requiring one unit of home economics for girls, but not for
boys, as a prerequisite to graduation. In denying the plaintiff's
request for a three judge court, the judge articulated the 'judi-
cial perspective"' 52 from which the pursuit of sexual equality has
often been viewed: "[A] judge who enjoys food is hard put to
make a decision in this type of a case. Perhaps he wears his
prejudice on his sleeve or in the area of his belt.' 53
4. Appraisal and Counseling Materials
Some of the more subtle and destructive sex discrimination
in education takes place in the area of counseling. 154 The effect
146 See text accompanying notes 63-77 supra.
147 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.33 (1975).
148 See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra and notes 207-19 infra.
149 See Fasteau, Giving Women a Sporting Chance, Ms., July, 1973, at 56.
"The phsysically inferior, it turns out, are not women, but any human beings
who do not develop the body's potential-exactly what women have been taught
not to do for centuries. Just how much that indoctrination has cost them is only
now being revealed, as more and more girls challenge the age-old prejudices
defining their physical capacities."
Scott, Closing the Muscle Gap, Ms., Sept., 1974, at 49.
150 But see 120 CONG. Rc. 11106-07 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1974) (remarks of Represen-
tative Green).
151 Civil No. 9576 (W.D. Wash., filed Mar. 22, 1971).
1'2 See Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46
N.Y.U.L. REV. 675 (1971).
'53 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP., Spring, 1972, at 42.
154 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 2, at 501-10, 435-50, 314-15.
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on a young girl of a counselor's saying that a given career is
inappropriate for her can be irreversible. The results of a voca-
tional guidance test that has been color coded "pink" to direct
female students into careers such as homemaker, nurse, actress,
and model, can determine the career choice of a potential scien-
tist. During the hearings on discrimination against women,
academicians working in this field painted a very dark picture of
a girl's chances of getting adequate career guidance. 155 "[T]here
is some evidence, a small but growing body of research and
investigation, that the individual counselor reflects-and his at-
titudes may even be reinforced by current training programs
-the prejudices and biases of the larger society relating to
woman and her educational/vocational choices."'
156
The proposed regulations would have changed only the
most blatant discriminatory practices. A school would not have
been able to use different materials for the two sexes, and tests
that require or permit different treatment of students on the
basis of sex would have been prohibited. 157 The final regulations
have been extended to prohibit discriminatory counseling itself.
Because discriminatory counseling can be difficult to detect,
especially by the counselors, schools are required to reexamine
counseling when a single sex predominates in any particular
class or program.,
8
155 Id.
15
6 
Id. 507.
15' 39 Fed. Reg. 22228, § 86.34(c) (1974).
151 40 Fed. Reg. 24141-42, § 86.36 (1975):
(a) Counseling. A recipient shall not discriminate against any person on the
basis of sex in the counseling or guidance of students or applicants for admis-
sion.
(b) Use of appraisal and counseling materials. A recipient which uses testing
or other materials for appraising or counseling students shall not use different
materials for students on the basis of their sex or use materials which permit
or require different treatment of students on such basis unless such different
materials cover the same occupations and interest areas and the use of such
different materials is shown to be essential to eliminate sex bias. Recipients shall
develop and use internal procedures for ensuring that such materials do not
discriminate on the basis of sex. Where the use of a counseling test or other
instrument results in a substantially disproportionate number of members of
one sex in any particular course of study or classification, the recipient shall
take such action as is necessary to assure itself that such disproportion is not
the result of discrimination in the instrument or its application.
(c) Disproportion in classes. Where a recipient finds that a particular class
contains a substantially disproportionate number of individuals of one sex, the
recipient shall take such action as is necessary to assure itself that such dispro-
portion is not the result of discrimination on the basis of sex in counseling or
appraisal materials or by counselors.
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Since the human element is so crucial in this area, educa-
tional institutions should probably have been required to con-
duct training sessions for their counselors to make them more
sensitive to the necessity of approaching female students with the
same open-ended career suggestions offered to males.159 Alice
Fins, of the American Personnel and Guidance Association, fo-
cused the problem when relating the reaction of counselors to
women with strong career ambitions: "You'll be getting married
soon. Why this?"'160 No matter how neutral the materials, rein-
forcement of sexual stereotypes cannot be eradicated when en-
forcement of the regulations rests solely in the same school offi-
cials who are often unaware of their own discriminatory outlook.
5. Financial and Employment Assistance
The only exceptions to a complete prohibition of different
treatment in the area of financial assistance relate to athletics
16
and to foreign wills, trusts, or provisions by a foreign
government. 162 The most obvious scholarship suggested by the
foreign will exemption is the prestigious Rhodes Scholarship.
The only justification offered for the exemption is that the Sec-
retary does not think the statute was intended to cover such
programs.' 63 No theoretical reason justifies this assumption.
Title VI contains no such exception.' 64 It is anomalous to allow
one of the most coveted rewards for excellence to be denied a
student on the basis of sex. Harvard and several other institu-
tions have already nominated women who have been rejected
solely on account of sex.' 65 Title IX does not permit such an
exception to its mandate of equality.
There are no apparent loopholes in the employment
guidelines. An educational institution which itself employs stu-
' See 1970 Hearings, supra note 2, at 501-10.
160 Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 1, 1974, at 4, col. 5.
161 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.37(c) (1975):
(1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or grants-in-
aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of
each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of each sex
may be provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of each sex to
the extent consistent with this paragraph and § 86.41 of this part.
162 Id. § 86.37(b).
163 Statement by Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, HEW NEWS, June 3, 1975,
at 3.
164 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)-(iii) (1970).
165 WEAL-ABzUG PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED TITLE IX REGULATIONS, re-
printed in 120 CONG. REc. E 4866 (daily ed. July 18, 1974).
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dents must do so in a nondiscriminatory manner. 166 If an
agency, organization, or person is assisted by a recipient in mak-
ing employment available to students, the recipient must assure
that such employment is available to both sexes. 167 If assurances
are not forthcoming, the recipient may not assist the
organization. 16 8 Health and insurance benefits and services also
must be provided equally for both sexes.
169
6. Marital or Parental Status
Section 86.40(a) prohibits the application by recipients of
"any rule concerning a student's actual or potential parental,
family, or marital status which treats students differently on the
basis of sex.' 170 The regulation goes on to provide that recipients
may not exclude pregnant students from their education pro-
grams or activities "unless the student requests voluntarily to
participate in a separate portion of the program or activity.
. . .)1"' A recipient may, however, require a pregnant student
who desires to remain in the regular program
to obtain the certification of a physician that the student
is physically and emotionally able to continue participa-
tion in the normal education program or activity so long
as such a certification is required of all students for
other physical or emotional conditions requiring the at-
tention of a physician.1
7 2
If a recipient operates a separate program for pregnant stu-
dents, it must be comparable with the regular program. 7 3 Any
disability related to pregnancy or recovery therefrom must be
treated in the same manner as any other temporary disability
with respect to student medical benefits, and pregnancy must be
treated as a justification for a leave of absence for a period
deemed medically necessary by the student's doctor, "at the con-
clusion of which the student shall be reinstated to the status
which she held when the leave began.'
u7 4
Although it was suggested above that pregnancy-based clas-
166 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.38(b) (1975).
167 Id. § 86.38(a).
168 Id.
169 Id. § 86.39.
170 Id. § 86.40(a).
17 1 Id. § 86.40(b)(1).
172 Id. § 86.40(b)(2).
173 Id. § 86.40(b)(3).
174 Id. §§ 86.40(b)(4), (5).
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sifications are not absolutely prohibited by Title IX and might be
justified by a showing of educational necessity, l 75 HEW has de-
termined that exclusion or separation can be justified only under
the specific conditions stated in the regulations. The
Department's judgment, if challenged, will be given great defer-
ence by the courts; 17 6 and its judgment seems sound. The expul-
sion of pregnant teenagers from schools is a serious problem. A
1972 HEW report comments on the policy:
Every year over 200,000 young women under 18
give birth. Usually these young women are expelled
from school at the first sign of pregnancy. Out of
17,000 school districts surveyed in 1970, fewer than one
third offered pregnant school-age girls any education at
all. School districts that did allow students to study dur-
ing pregnancy usually kept them at home or segregated
them in special classes for various reasons-on moral
grounds, for special protection or for convenience.
Expulsion compounds the already serious problems
of teenage pregnancy. Of every 100 pregnant teenagers
who leave school, 85 never come back. Rejected, cast
out with a child to support and often no salable skills,
these teenagers are nine times more likely to commit
suicide than their peers.'
77
In Ordway v. Hargraves,7 8 a federal district court ordered a
high school to admit a pregnant student to all classes. Medical
testimony was offered to show that the student herself would be
in no physical danger in attending school; on the contrary, there
was a possibility of mental depression if excluded. 17 9 The plain-
tiff had not disrupted school activity in any way, and the court
failed to find an educational purpose for the policy.' 80 The prin-
cipal suggested that the policy might have developed from a
desire of the school officials not to appear to condone, and thus
possibly increase the incidence of, pre-marital pregnancy.'18 The
validity of such moral censorship is open to serious question on
first amendment grounds, but even if constitutionally permissi-
175 See text accompanying notes 49-62 supra.
176 Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
177 DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 867.
1 8 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971).
17aId. at 1156-57.18 0 d. at 1157.
8'Ild, at 1158.
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ble, the likelihood of the feared effects is too remote to justify
exclusion.
The two exceptions to the general prohibition against exclu-
sion of pregnant students-student request and physician
certification-can be justified. Since the well-being of the student
should be the primary objective of educational institutions, a
student's desire to separate herself from her peers during her
pregnancy should be honored. A physician's judgment of medi-
cal necessity seems also to justify exclusion on this rationale,
where a doctor's certificate is required of all students with other
physical or emotional conditions necessitating medical attention.
This general requirement prevents stigmatization of the ex-
cluded pregnant student.
7. Competitive Athletics
Not to have confidence in one's body is to lose con-
fidence in oneself .... It is precisely the female ath-
letes, who being positively interested in their own game,
feel themselves least handicapped in comparison with
the male. Let her swim, climb mountain peaks, pilot an
airplane, battle against the elements, take risks, go out
for adventure, and she will not feel before the world
that timidity.
-Simone de Beauvoir.
182
Probably the most controversial HEW regulations are those
involving equalization of opportunities for men and women in
the area of competitive athletics. 18 3 Athletic associations around
the country complained of the impossibility of complying with
the proposed athletic regulations, 184 claiming that the regula-
tions would destroy collegiate athletics as it is known today. Such
pressure exerted on HEW resulted in the weak athletic section of
the final regulations.
The general prohibition of different treatment according to
sex in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics 8 5 is significantly undermined by section 86.41(b).
186
Whenever the activity involved is a "contact sport," the educa-
tional institution may operate separate single-sex teams, whether
182 Loggia, On the Playing Fields of History, Ms., July, 1973, at 64.
183 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41 (1975).
184 See Comments to the Proposed HEW Regulations, on file with the Region III
Director of the Office for Civil Rights, 3535 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.
185 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41(a) (1975).
186 Id. § 86.41(b).
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on an intramural or competitive level. 187 Where non-contact
sports are involved and selection for a team is based on competi-
tive skill, separate teams are also allowed. 188 If, however, a school
fields only one team in a non-contact sport, the excluded sex
must be permitted to try out for the single team if athletic op-
portunity for the excluded sex has previously been limited.' 89
The only check on the discrimination permitted by this section is
the general requirement that the schools provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes. The regulation lists var-
ious factors relevant to a determination of the required equality
of opportunity, including unequal aggregate expenditures for
male and female teams.190
One threshold contention of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association [NCAA] is that according to the language of the
statute, sports programs should not be covered at all unless they
receive direct federal funding.' 9 ' The statute provides, "[T]er-
mination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance . . .
shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part
thereof, in which.., noncompliance has been ... found .... ,,9
The NCAA argues that funds cannot be refused other programs
and activities in a school because of the athletic department's
187 Id.
1
88 Id.
189 Id.
190 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41(c) (1975):
(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportu-
nity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are
available the Director will consider, among other factors:
(i) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(ii) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(iii) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(iv) Travel and per diem allowance;
(v) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(vi) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(vii) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(viii) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(ix) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(x) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expendi-
tures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate
teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Director may
consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in as-
sessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex.
191 Statement of the NCAA on Title IX Implementation Regulations, June 26,
1974, on file with the Director of the Office for Civil Rights of Region III, 3535 Market
St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19101; N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1974, at 23, col. 4 (city ed.).
192 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. II, 1972).
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discrimination, since the discrimination must exist in the specific
program being cut off. 193 Such a reading of the statute is
plausible, 194 but HEW takes a broader view. The Department
subjects any program or activity to its requirements "if it receives
or benefits from such assistance."'
95
Another theory through which some organizations hope to
escape the statute is that revenue-producing sports should be
exempted from Title IX. Congresswoman Green reads an ex-
emption into the statute for "intercollegiate sports financed by
gate receipts .. ".. ,196 Representative Abzug, however, warned
that "making a differentiation as to the source of funds could
result in unequal benefits. Thus a man's basketball team . . .
could continue to travel in first-class planes while the women's
basketball team . . . would have to sell cookies to pay for their
transportation.' 97 Although there is certainly a difference be-
tween activities supported by tuition, fees, or tax dollars and
those financed by gate receipts, HEW does not exempt the latter
from the general prohibition against sex discrimination. It also
seems improbable that many sports would fit into such an ex-
emption since account would have to be taken of the funds that
may be "'hidden' in the institution's budget in a number of
ways-maintenance on the stadium, practice gyms and fields;
'93 Some of the stronger protests, notably by the NCAA, have provoked congres-
sional reaction to the new regulations. On July 8, 1975, H.R. 8395 was introduced, a
measure that "would allow revenue-producing sports to use their profits to maintain
their own teams before diverting any profits to other men's teams and women's teams."
33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPT. 1484 (July 12, 1975). For further discussion of congressional
efforts to block or amend the athletics regulations, see id. 1484-85. As of this writing H.R.
8395 was tentatively scheduled for hearings in September, 1975. Id. 1672 (Aug. 2, 1975).
19
4 See DAvIDSON, supra note 103, at 872: "Unlike Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, which provides for sanctions limited to the noncomplying unit or pro-
gram, Executive Order sanctions may be directed at the university or college as a whole."
195 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975) (introductory material) (emphasis supplied). Both
HEW and NCAA rely for their interpretations on Board of Public Instruction v. Finch,
414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). This case construes parallel language of Title VI, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970), which provides: "[T]ermination or refusal ... shall be limited in
its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which... noncompliance has been
... found .... "
The court called for individualized consideration of the use of funds of each grant
statute but noted that a program may be "so affected by discriminatory practices else-
where in the school system that it thereby becomes discriminatory." 414 F.2d at 1079.
Athletic departments may be able to argue that they have not infected the environment
sufficiently to cause other programs to lose funding; the burden, however, should at
least be on the recipient to demonstrate the lack of effect on other programs.
196 120 CONG. REc. 11107 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1974), (remarks of Representative
Green).
' 197 Id. 11108; see PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, supra note 104,
at 13.
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health care provided by the university health service; salaries of
coaches or trainers"; athletic scholarships, etc.
198
One highly questionable provision is section 86.41(c):
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each
sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams
if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will
not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the
Director may consider the failure to provide necessary
funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of
opportunity for members of each sex.' 99
One might argue that the decision not to require equal aggre-
gate expenditures is justified, because even after opportunities
are equalized fewer girls will participate in competitive athletics
than boys. Also some sports are more expensive to equip than
others. If one sex predominates on such teams, total expendi-
tures will be unequal. However, if the assumption is that girls are
not as interested as boys and will not come out for competitive
athletics in the same numbers, one must look to the reasons for
this lack of interest. One major reason must be past discrimina-
tion. If all through school girls have had no training, no access to
gyms and equipment, no "encouragement" to participate, it is
hardly a justification for unequal expenditures that at the age of
sixteen they are not as interested in sports as are boys.
200
Without an equal expenditure requirement it is difficult to
see how HEW will evaluate the equality of sports programs. The
warning has come that an equal expenditure approach would
change the face of intercollegiate athletics. 20 1 But that is just the
purpose of Title IX-to prevent the tuition, fees, and tax dollars
of women students and taxpayers from being used to benefit
only men. It is true that resources are finite; Title IX does not
mandate spending money that does not exist. But it does de-
mand spending available funds without discrimination on the
basis of sex. Surely the Supreme Court's decision in Lau v.
Nichols 20 2 cost the San Francisco Unified School District some
money. And Brown v. Board of Education20 3 changed the face of
198 PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, supra note 104, at 13; see
Dunkle, College Athletics: Tug-of-War for the Purse Strings, Ms., Sept., 1974, at 114.
199 40 Fed. Reg. 24143, § 86.41(c) (1975).
200 See Fasteau, supra note 149, at 57.
201 See Comments to the Proposed HEW Regulations, on file with the Region III
Director of the Office for Civil Rights, 3535 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.
202 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
203 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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education in the South. If such be the result of implementing the
will of Congress, educators and athletic organizations must face
that reality, and proceed forthwith to reevaluate the use of their
resources with the goal in mind of developing the physical well-
being of female and male students.
Questions about the applicability of the separate-but-equal
doctrine inevitably arise in this area. The regulations allow:
separate teams for members of each sex where selection
for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the
activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a
recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular
sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors
no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic
opportunities for members of that sex have previously
been limited, members of the excluded sex must be al-
lowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport
involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this
part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice
hockey, football, basketball and other sports the pur-
pose of [sic] major activity of which involves bodily
contact.
204
Earlier it was argued that under Title IX there should be only
two justifications for separate treatment based on sex: to imple-
ment the explicit, narrow living facilities exception, or to assure
equal access to certain activities. 20 5 The narrow construction of
the living facilities exception discussed earlier in the Comment
does not justify separate treatment in the context of competitive
athletics beyond the provision of separate locker room
facilities.20 6 Thus, only separation necessary to assure equal ac-
cess for women can be justified.
The acceptability under Title IX of fielding separate male
and female teams in a particular sport should depend on the age
204 40 Fed. Reg. 24142-43, § 86.41(b) (1975). HEW explains:
Where selection is based on competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact
sport, athletics may be provided through separate teams for males and females or
through a single team open to both sexes. If separate teams are offered, a
recipient institution may not discriminate on the basis of sex in provision of
necessary equipment or supplies, or in any other way, but equal aggregate expendi-
tures are not required. The goal of the final regulation in the area of athletics is to
secure equal opportunity for males and females while allowing schools and
colleges flexibility in determining how best to provide such opportunity.
HEW, Fact Sheet 6 (June, 1975).
205 Text accompanying notes 74-77 supra.
206 See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
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level of the students involved. It might be argued that there are
sufficient physiological differences between the sexes not only to
justify but to mandate separate-but-equal in this context. Where
boys are physically stronger and larger than girls, Lau and Griggs
alert us to the danger of impermissible de facto exclusion of girls
from teams selected on the basis of competitive skill.20 7 In such a
situation separate teams might be not merely acceptable, but
mandatory, to prevent unequal access to competitive athletic
activities.
20 8
A full medical evaluation of the physical differences be-
tween men and women is well beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. Yet some discussion of those differences is necessary to set
standards for deciding when Title IX permits separate teams for
girls and boys. Whatever the physical differences between girls
and boys, they clearly increase as children get older.
[T]hroughout childhood, boys and girls are roughly
similar in size, strength, and reaction times. Girls aged 9
to 12 are, if anything, larger and stronger than their
male peers because their bone structure and muscula-
ture begin developing earlier and mature by age 12 or
13. Boys do not generally achieve the same stage of
development until age 14, 15, or 16.209
Medical evidence to this effect convinced the New Jersey Su-
preme Court to uphold a finding by the New Jersey Division on
Civil Rights that girls of eight to twelve are not as a class subject
to greater hazard of injury than boys and therefore must be
allowed to play Little League baseball. 210 It appears, then, that
medical evidence does not justify athletic separation of the sexes
before the junior high school level.211 If before junior high
school some sports end up being predominantly of one sex be-
cause of personal preferences, there would be no violation of
Title IX. But mandatory separation of the sexes in sports should
not be allowed below the junior high school level unless substan-
tial evidence indicates that failure to maintain separate teams
207 See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
208 See Fasteau, supra note 149, at 103. For analyses of the constitutional adjudication
in this area and possible ways to eradicate sex discrimination in athletics, see Comment,
Equality in Athletics: the Cheerleader v. the Athlete, 19 S.D.L. REv. 428 (1974); Comment, Sex
Discrimination in Interscholastic High School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 535 (1974).
209 Scott, supra note 149, at 50.
210 NOW, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522,
318 A.2d 33 (1974).
211 Fasteau, supra note 149, at 58.
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will, because of physical differences, result in the de facto exclu-
sion of girls from the particular competitive sport in question.
At adolescence, physical differences increase and might well
support the conclusion that separate teams should be permitted
lest girls receive less benefits than boys. "[Y]oung men are on the
average about 10 percent larger than young women, and their
muscle mass is about twice that of girls. They perform two to
four times as well in test of strength .... -212 These differences
should not be overemphasized. "Evidence shows that the dif-
ference in strength between trained male and female athletes
is far less than that between average or untrained men and
women."213 Nevertheless, at present the gross disparity in train-
ing and conditioning and the undeniable physical differences
between the sexes allow separate teams beginning at the junior
high school level. The regulations, of course, permit them at
every level.214
The regulations do not, however, require separate teams at
any level. If a school maintains a single team in a non-contact
sport without providing a separate female team in the sport,
women must be permitted to try out for that single team.215 The
regulations do not imply that a single, non-contact-sport team
for which women may try out per se satisfies the requirements of
section 86.41.216 If under an open tryout system interested
women are in fact excluded, the single team arrangement may
not satisfy the "equal opportunity" requirements of section
86.41(c).2 17 This interpretation is consistent with the general
212 Scott, supra note 149, at 50.
21
3 Id. 49. Women are catching up to men in international competitions such as track
and swimming. At the 1924 Olympic games, men's time in the 400-meter freestyle was 16
percent faster than women's; 11.66 percent faster in 1948; and only 7.3 percent faster in
1972 at Munich. Id.
214 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41(b) (1975).
215/vfany young women have obtained injunctions to force their schools and athletic
associations to allow them to try out for non-contact sports for which there was no girls'
team. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Reed v.
Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972); Haas v. South Bend
Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972). Contra Bucha v. Illinois High
School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. 111. 1972). The complaints generally charged viola-
tion of fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection. In Brenden the Eighth Circuit
examined the interest of the student in competing in interscholastic athletics and that of
the high school in assuring that persons with similar qualifications compete among them-
selves, and found no "sufficient rational basis for concluding that women are incapable of
competing with men in non-contact sports." 477 F.2d at 1300.
216 See Statement of Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, HEW News, June 3,
1975, at 4.
217 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41(c) (1975).
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principles suggested earlier.218 Thus, if teams theoretically open
to all on a competitive basis result in exclusion of women from
athletic participation, separate teams for women may be re-
quired by the regulation and are certainly required by the statute
itself.219
The general framework developed earlier 220 indicates that
separate contact-sport teams are justifiable in no more situations
than are separate teams for non-contact sports. It might be ar-
gued that privacy should justify separating boys and girls in con-
tact sports. As noted earlier, however, the living facilities excep-
tion does not extend this far.
221
Safety is often advanced as an additional reason for sex
segregation in contact sports. But, "[a]s one proponent for the
integration of contact sports puts it: 'If we are worried about
girls' breasts and internal organs, then give them chest and belly
protectors. We haven't spared our male football players any ex-
pense in that department.' ",222 Male athletes, no less than
female, may get hurt playing certain sports. In the team selec-
tion process girls not sturdy enough to play successfully will be
weeded out as are weak boys. Girls must be able to decide for
themselves whether or not the rewards of playing certain sports
are greater than the possibility of injury. Boys of all levels of
strength and ability play all types of intra-mural sports. This
situation may be compared to Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co. ,223 where the court held that calling ajob strenuous
would not disallow a woman from making her own decision on
whether the effort of the job was worth the pay and other advan-
tages. Women can no longer be "protected" by rules and regula-
tions that for the most part discriminate against them.
If separate teams are justified to prevent de facto exclusion
of women from competitive sports, the next question is whether
female athletes should nonetheless be allowed to try out for the
men's team in this separate-but-equal situation. People dedicated
to equalizing opportunities for women and knowledgeable in the
area of athletics disagree to such an extent on this question that
judgment should be left to individual schools. Brenda Feigen
Fasteau would not allow women to "compete up" because of the
"' See text accompanying notes 43-48, 75-76 supra.
2 19 Id.
220 See text accompanying notes 206-07 supra.
221 See text accompanying notes 32-41 supra.
222 Fasteau, supra note 149, at 103.
223 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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potential unfairness to men who could possibly make the
women's team but not the men's. 224 "Even more importantly, it
cheats the women's team which would lose its best athletes to the
male squads, thus setting women's sports back even farther.
225
If an equally well-equipped girls' team is available, the question
of "competing up" should be left to recipients. This is the ap-
proach apparently taken in the regulations.
Even if a difference in competitive athletic opportunities
passes muster under sections 86.41(a) and (b),226 it can still be
challenged under the multifactor test of section 86.41(c). 227 For
example, if a school sponsors all-male football, basketball, box-
ing, and wrestling teams but no teams at all for girls, no attack
can be made under sections 86.41(a) and (b).22 s This arrange-
ment, however, is clearly subject to challenge under the "equal
athletic opportunity" requirement of section 86.41(c). 229 It is dif-
ficult to predict how challenges to less blatant discrimination
will fare when the Director considers the ten factors listed in
subsection (c).
IV. CONCLUSION
Title IX's general prohibition of sex discrimination in edu-
cation should be construed broadly, and the limited living
facilities exception narrowly, in order to effect the remedial
purpose of the statute. There is no justification for most sex-
based discrimination in education. The living facilities exception
should be limited to living quarters, restrooms, locker facilities,
and other areas where disrobing takes place. The only justifica-
tion for separation of the sexes other than privacy is to assure
access to a program or activity for both male and female stu-
dents. This justification will operate only in the area of competi-
tive athletics.
The HEW regulations adhere to this analysis fairly closely.
Their breadth fits in well with judicial construction of Titles VI
and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In controversial areas
such as athletics, however, the Department has attempted a mid-
dle course. The result is ambiguous requirements, which will
224 Fasteau, supra note 149 at 103.
225 Id.
226 40 Fed. Reg. 24142-43, §§ 86.41(a), (b) (1975).
227 Id. § 86.41(c).
228 Id. §§ 86.41(a), (b).
229 d. § 86.41(c).
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make enforcement difficult. Nevertheless, HEW's conscientious
oversight of educational institutions receiving federal financial
assistance should have a great influence in removing sex dis-
crimination from the educational system.
PIERCE v. COOK & CO.: CHANGE IN STATE
LAW AS A GROUND FOR RELIEF FROM
A FEDERAL JUDGMENT
A supervening change in controlling law generally is not
held to justify relief from a final judgment under rule 60(b)' of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit relied on clause (6) of rule 60(b), however, to
grant relief on this ground in Pierce v. Cook & Co.,2 in which
parties to a common catastrophe litigated to different conclu-
sions in federal and state courts due to earlier resolution in the
federal courts and a subsequent change of the controlling prece-
dent in the state courts.
Pierce involved a vehicular accident which occurred on
January 11, 1968, in Oklahoma. Ted Pierce was killed and pas-
sengers in his car were injured in a collision with an independent
contractor who was transporting wheat for defendant-appellee
Cook. Pierce's widow, Claudiatte Pierce, and Pierce's passengers,
Davis and Ellenwood, brought suit against Cook in an Oklahoma
state court. On Cook's motion, each suit was removed to federal
court on grounds of diversity of citizenship. The Davis suit was
dismissed on plaintiff's motion and refiled in state court by co-
guardians of Davis, a minor. Because the guardianship de-
stroyed diversity, it precluded removal to federal court.
Claudiatte Pierce and Ellenwood were unsuccessful on the merits
'FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) now provides in part:
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been dis-
covered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other mis-
conduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its opera-
tion.
2 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 19,
1976).
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in the federal district court, which awarded Cook summary
judgment on the basis of Oklahoma precedent established in
Marion Machine, Foundry & Supply Co. v. Duncan;3 the Tenth
Circuit affirmed. 4 The decision of the circuit court became final
in January, 1971. The state trial court in the Davis suit also
granted Cook summary judgment, finding Marion Machine
controlling. On appeal the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically
overruled Marion Machine and remanded the suit for jury trial.5
The case was then settled favorably to plaintiff Davis.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court judgment became final in
May, 1974. In November, 1974, Claudiatte Pierce and Ellen-
wood filed a rule 60(b) motion with the Tenth Circuit, seeking
relief from the judgment of that court as a matter of law. The
Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the movants were enti-
tled to relief from the circuit court's judgment under rule
60(b)(6) because the federal courts in which they were forced to
litigate treated them substantially differently than the state su-
preme court treated another person injured in the same acci-
dent, contrary to the command of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins6 and
the interest of justice. The case was remanded to the district
court which was directed, upon movants' filing of the motion
below, to consider the rule 60(b)(6) motion as one for relief from
the trial court's judgment in light of the supervening Oklahoma
decision and the opinion of the Tenth Circuit.
Thus Pierce presents the question whether rule 60(b)(6) re-
lief from a federal judgment in a diversity case is required either
by the Erie doctrine or by the need to correct the inequity of
divergent results on the same or similar facts, when the state law
relied upon by the federal court is subsequently altered.
I. RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(6) GENERALLY
When relief may properly be granted under clause (6) of
rule 60(b) depends on the function of the rule as a whole and on
the relationship of clause (6) to the preceding five clauses. Rule
60(b) in its present form7 embodies a balancing of the conflicting
3 187 Okla. 160, 101 P.2d 813 (1940).
4 Pierce v. Cook & Co. 437 F.2d 1119 (10th Cir. 1970).
5 Hudgens v. Cook Industries, Inc., 521 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973).
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Compare text accompanying notes 59-66 infra with text accom-
panying notes 93-121 infra.
7 Note I supra. The substance of rule 60(b) in its present form is the product of the
1946 amendments. In 1948, the rule was insignificantly amended by the substitution of
its present statutory reference, "Title 28 U.S.C § 1655," for its former citation, "Section
57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C., Title 28, § 118." See J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES
PAMPHLET pt. 1, at 1071 (1975) [hereinafter cited as RULES PAMPHLET].
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values of finality of judgments and provision of relief from
judgments when justice so requires.8 Original rule 60(b) estab-
lished a six-month limit on the commencement of proceedings
for seeking relief from final judgments. 9 Although the rule ef-
fectively lengthened the period of time during which a court had
control over its judgments, the grounds for relief were not ex-
panded beyond those previously existing at common law. 10 The
courts soon devised ways to evade the six-month time limitation
imposed by rule 60(b). Rule 6(b), allowing courts to extend time
limits stipulated by the rules, was applied by the courts to rule
60(b); the "inherent power" of courts over their judgments was
invoked when the courts wished to grant relief unavailable
under the rule; and the ancillary remedies existing prior to the
enactment of the Federal Rules were read into rule 60(b). 11
In the 1946 amendments, the Advisory Committee estab-
lished "reasonable time" limits, not to exceed one year, for mo-
tions under clauses (1)-(3) while motions under clauses (4)-(6)
were made subject only to a "reasonable time" requirement.
1 2
Rule 6(b) was amended to prohibit the extension of the max-
imum time periods prescribed by rule 60(b). 13 Relief previously
available by ancillary remedies was incorporated into rule
60(b).1 4 Under the 1946 amendments, relief was to be obtained
exclusively by motion under one of the six clauses of rule 60(b)
or by an independent action to enjoin enforcement of the
judgment.' 5 The sixth clause, upon which the Tenth Circuit re-
lied in Pierce, is a residual clause which was inserted to provide
relief in unforeseen circumstances.
16
According to the prevailing interpretation of rule 60(b)(6),
8 Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 927 (1970); 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.18[2], at 203 (2d ed. 1975); Com-
ment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposalfor General Reform, 60 CAL L. RaV. 531, 533 (1972).
9 7J. MoORE, supra note 8, 60.09, at 10-10.1.
10 Comment, Civil Procedure-Federal Rules 60(b)(5) & (6)-Applicability to Change of
Law Situation, 44 IowA L. REV. 574, 574-75 (1959).
11 Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief From CivilJudgnents, 61 YALE L.J. 76, 78 (1952). For
a discussion of original rule 60(b), see 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.10-.17 at 10.1-94;
Comment, supra note 8, at 535-37; Comment, Temporal Aspects of the Finality of
Judgments-The Signijficance of Federal Rule 60(b), 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 664, 668-69 (1950).
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.27[3], at 378.
13 See RULES PAMPHLET, supra note 7, at 1076.
14 See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 8, T 60.18[8], at 224-25; 58 MICH. L. REv. 793, 794
(1960). The grounds for relief under clauses (1)-(3) were historically equitable, those
under clauses (4) & (5) were historically legal, while clause (6) "invokes the pure equity
power of the court." Comment, Equitable Powerof a Federal Court to Vacate a FinalJudgnent
for "Any Other Reason Justifying Relief "-Rule 60b(6), 33 Mo. L. REv. 427, 434-35 (1968).
,5 7 J. MOORE, supra note 8, 60.18[8], at 225; Comment, supra note 8, at 537.
16 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.27[2], at 353-54.
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relief cannot be granted under that clause on a ground covered
by any of the first five clauses. In Klapprott v. United States,17 the
first Supreme Court case construing rule 60(b)(6), Justice Black
stated that "the language of the 'other reason' clause, for all
reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power in
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever
such action is appropriate to accomplish justice."' 8 This view was
reaffirmed by the Court a year later in Ackernann v. United
States,19 this time over Justice Black's dissent.20 Construing clause
(6) and clauses (1)-(5) to be mutually exclusive is consistent with
the scheme of time limits in the whole rule and the wording of
clause (6): If relief could be granted on the same facts under
either clauses (1)-(3) or clause (6), the purpose of the one year
time limitation on clauses (1)-(3) would be undermined, and the
word "other" in clause (6) would be meaningless.
21
17 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949). The district court entered a de-
naturalization decree against Klapprott by default. Due to incarceration and illness KIap-
prott had been unable to attend the denaturalization proceedings or to petition for relief
from the decree for more than four years after the issuance of the decree. The district
court dismissed Klapprott's subsequent petition to set aside the judgment because of
laches, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
with directions to determine the veracity of the allegations contained in the petition to
vacate the default judgment.
18 Id. at 614-15.
19 340 U.S. 193 (1950). The district court entered judgments cancelling the naturali-
zation certificates of petitioner, his wife, and a relative. Petitioner and his wife failed to
appeal because of lack of funds. The relative's decree was subsequently reversed on
appeal. Then, more than four years after entry of the judgment against the petitioner, he
petitioned the district court to vacate the judgment of denaturalization. The district court
denied petitioner's rule 60(b) motion for relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts.
20 Repudiating the literal effect of his Klapprott opinion, Justice Black argued that the
specified grounds for relief in rule 60(b)(1)-(5) were not intended to prevent the granting
of similar relief in other situations where justice so requires. Id. at 202-03 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Consistent with Justice Black's dissent, Judge Hand in United States v.
Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953), read rule 60(b)(6) "to provide for situations of
extreme hardship, not only those, if there be any, that subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not
cover, but those that they do." Id. at 333. On rehearing, however, Judge Hand noted the
divergence of his interpretation of rule 60(b)(6) from the majority's reasoning in Klapprott
and retracted the opinion to that extent. Id. at 335.
Not all courts, however, conscientiously adhere to the mutual exclusivity principle.
See, e.g., Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951) (relief
granted on motion under 60(b)(1) and (6) without rejecting either clause); Nelms v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 11 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (relief granted under 60(b)
without identifying a specific clause).
21 Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 626 (Reed, & Jackson, JJ., & Vinson,
C.J., dissenting), miodified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Gambocz v. Ellmyer, 438 F.2d 915, 917
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Alker, 30 F.R.D.
527, 532 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 880 (1963); 7
J. MOORE, supra note 8, 60.27[I], at 343-44.
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The language of rule 60(b)(6) requires not only that the
reason for relief fall outside of the preceding five clauses, but
also that the reason be one "justifying relief." Justice Black's
opinion in Klapprott contains broad language to the effect that
rule 60(b)(6) should be applied to afford relief "whenever such
action is appropriate to accomplish justice. '2 2 Thus, courts com-
monly hold that rule 60(b), and specifically clause (6), should be
interpreted liberally to do justice in particular cases.23 But Justice
Black's opinion also observed that the facts before the Court
presented an "extraordinary situation. '24 The Court later em-
phasized this aspect of the Klapprott case in denying rule 60(b)(6)
relief in Ackerrnann, making an "extraordinary situation" a re-
quirement for rule 60(b)(6) relief.
25
In addition, several general principles must be considered in
determining whether a party should be relieved of a judgment
under rule 60(b)(6) or any of the preceding clauses. Considera-
tion must be given to the principle of finality of judgments;2
6
rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for appeal; 27 justifica-
tion must be shown for failure to resort to other remedies; 28 a
rule 60(b) motion must be made within a reasonable time;29 and
consideration must be given to any prejudice that might result to
the other party,30 to any intervening equities that would make it
unjust to grant relief,3' and to any other factors affecting the
equities of the case.32
22 335 U.S. at 615.
23E.g., Radack v. Norwegian America Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir.
1963); Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245
(3d Cir. 1951); 7 J. Moont, supra note 8, 60.27[1], at 342.
24 335 U.S. at 613.
25 See, e.g., Wagner v. United States, 316 F.2d 871, 872 (2d Cir. 1963); Collins v. City
of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958); Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305,
308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See generally Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776 (5th
Cir. 1954).
26 See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950); Collins v. City of
Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958).
27 See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950); Rinieri v. News Syndi-
cate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1967).
28 7 J. Moont, supra note 8, 60.27[l], at 348-49, 60.28[2], at 403; Wham, Federal
District Court Rule 60(b): A Humane Rule Gone Wrong, 49 A.B.A.J. 566 (1963).
29 7 J. MoonE, supra note 8, 1 60.27[3], at 378.
30E.g., Pierre v. Bernuth Lembcke Co., 20 F.R.D. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Comment, supra note 8, at 565.
31 E.g., Albion-Idaho Land Co. v. Adams, 58 F. Supp. 579, 581-82 (D. Idaho 1945).
32 7 J. Moona, supra note 8, 60.27[1], at 351.
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II. OPERATION OF THE MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY
REQUIREMENT IN THE CHANGE OF LAW CONTEXT
A. Implications of the Requirement
Because the reasons for relief under rule 60(b)(6) must be
exclusive of those under clauses (1)-(5), a supervening change of
law must be shown to be outside of the scope of any of the first
five clauses if it is to serve as a ground for relief under clause (6).
Although a grant of relief under any of the six clauses would
bring the same result, the clause relied upon must be deter-
mined. First, strict adherence to the doctrine of mutual exclusiv-
ity could result in a denial of relief when the rule 60(b) motion is
filed after one year from the entry of the judgment, as it was in
Pierce, if the change of law ground were found to be subsumed
under one of the first three clauses. Little practical difference
would result, however, if the change of law ground were covered
by clauses (4) or (5) rather than clause (6), because motions
under these three provisions are subject to the same flexible limit
of "reasonable time." 33 Second, alleged grounds for relief not
enumerated in the first five clauses are subject to the "extraordi-
nary situation" requirement established for rule 60(b)(6) by the
Supreme Court.
3 4
Arguments have been made that a judgment may be set
aside on the ground of a supervening change in controlling law
under clauses (1) and (5) of rule 60(b). As demonstrated below,
these arguments fail to establish that rule 60(b)(6) Telief in a
change of law situation is precluded by the mutual exclusivity
principle.
B. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(1)
Professor Moore asserts that relief from judgments because
of a post-judgment change in the applicable law may be available
under 60(b)(1) in a limited class of cases.3 5 Moore's position is
based upon a construction of the word "mistake" in 60(b)(1) that
includes a substantive error of law by the court.36 Original rule
60(b) provided for relief when the moving party had made an
error of law but not when the error was made by the court.
Relief from judicial error was still available by the common law
remedy of the bill of review for error apparent upon the record,
33 Id. 60.27[1], at 346.
31 See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra. See also Wham, supra note 28, at 567.
"' 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.22[3], at 258-67.
36 Id. 60.22[3], at 260.
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left standing by the saving clause of original rule 60(b). Moore
asserts that although the bill of review did not afford relief in a
change of law situation because the error was not apparent upon
the record, new rule 60(b)(1) should not be limited by the prac-
tice under the bill of review because the word "mistake" in the
new rule is broader than the term "error of law apparent upon
the record.'38 In deference to the principle of finality and the
general rule that 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal, Moore
suggests that the definition of "reasonable time," which has an
upper bound of one year for 60(b)(1), should be further limited
so as never to exceed the time allowed for appeal from the
judgment.39 Consequently, a moving party could not circumvent
the time limits for appeal by bringing a rule 60(b) motion after
the time allowed for appeal had expired. The advantage of af-
fording relief under rule 60(b)(1) for judicial error would be the
avoidance of the inconvenience and expense of an appeal when
the trial court is prepared to correct its own error.
40
The question arises whether, in circuits subscribing to
Moore's interpretation of rule 60(b)(1), judgments can be set
aside under rule 60(b)(6) on the basis of a supervening change in
controlling law without violence to the mutual exclusivity princi-
ple. To allow relief after the challenged judgment has been af-
firmed on appeal, as in the Pierce case, would transgress neither
the requirement that rule 60(b) not serve as a substitute for
appeal nor the principle of mutual exclusivity. The first re-
quirement is satisfied because relief is granted only after the
moving party has diligently, though unsuccessfully, pursued his
remedy of appeal. 41 The doctrine of mutual exclusivity is re-
3
7 Id.
3 8 Id. 261.
39 Id. Cases in which rule 60(b) relief was granted under the conditions proposed by
Professor Moore include Tarkington v. United States Lines Co., 222 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.
1955) and Oliver v. Monsanto Co., 56 F.R.D. 370 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 514
(5th Cir. 1973).
40 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, $ 60.22(3], at 260.
41 To require the moving party to appeal the judgment in order to qualify for rule
60(b)(6) relief, however, would not be beneficial. If the trial judge has correctly applied
the law that is soon to be changed but still is controlling during the time for appeal,
bringing a futile appeal will accomplish little. See Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426,
437-38 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see id. at 431-33 (majority opinion suggesting
that such an appeal must be taken).
Even if an appeal were not required, other principles of law may limit the amount of
time available to a petitioner who has justifiably chosen not to appeal. For example, how
long would such a case remain subjudice? See text accompanying notes 67-90 infra. In the
Pierce case petitioners did bring an appeal; a full discussion of the problems presented by
the failure to appeal is beyond the scope of this Comment.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:843
spected because the supervening change in law upon which
60(b)(6) relief is based occurred after an appeal was taken and
thus was not in existence during the time prescribed by Moore
for relief under rule 60(b)(1). In addition, unlike the conditions
underlying the traditional bases of relief under clauses (1)-(3),
which are discoverable and hence remediable within one year
after entry of a judgment, at least in theory, a change of law
leading to the motion for relief under clause (6) may not even
materialize until the time limit on the first three clauses has
expired. Therefore, it is fallacious to presume that relief was
available under rule 60(b)(1). Thus a court that construes rule
60(b)(1) to provide relief in a change of law situation before the
time for appeal has run is not necessarily barred by the doctrine
of mutual exclusivity from granting relief under rule 60(b)(6) in
response to a supervening change of law after the judgment has
been appealed.
C. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(5)
The moving parties in Pierce urged rule 60(b)(5) as an alter-
native basis for relief but the majority ignored this argument in
its opinion.4 2 Although the language of the two component
clauses of rule 60(b)(5) may appear at first reading to allow relief
in a change of law situation, such relief is not available on that
ground except in limited situations.
The first clause authorizes relief when "a prior judgment
upon which the challenged judgment is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated . . . . -43 A judgment must have been ex-
plicitly and directly based on a prior reversed judgment to be set
aside under this clause. A change in controlling law after entry
of the judgment does not satisfy this requirement. 44 In reaching
this result, the First Circuit in Lubben v. Selective Service System
45
42 Chief Judge Lewis, dissenting in Pierce, criticized the court's reliance on rule
60(b)(6) when the moving parties sought relief only under rule 60(b)(5). 518 F.2d at 725
(Lewis, C.J., dissenting). The majority, in determining whether the movants presented
facts justifying relief under any of the clauses of rule 60(b) rather then denying relief
because the movants used the wrong nomenclature, followed the better course. See 7 J.
MOORE, supra note 8, 60.18[8], at 216.1 (nomenclature is unimportant); e.g., United
States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d 469, 472-73 (4th Cir. 1961) (60(b) relief granted even without a
rule 60(b) motion); In re Cremidas' Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alas. 1953) (60(b) relief
granted on petition for a writ of coram nobis).
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
44 Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952); Loucke v. United
States, 21 F.R.D. 305, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Commentsiupra note 10, at 575-77; Note,
Federal Rule 60(b): Finality of Civil Judgments v. Self-Correction by District Court of Judicial
Error of Law, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 98, 104 (1967).
45 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).
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described the requisite relationship between the prior and sub-
sequent judgments:
For a decision to be "based on" a prior judgment within
the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5), the prior judgment must
be a necessary element of the decision, giving rise, for
example, to the cause of action or a successful de-
fense .... It is not sufficient that the prior judgment
provides only precedent for the decision.
... [A] change in applicable law does not provide
sufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(5).46
The second relevant clause of 60(b)(5) allows relief from a
judgment when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application . . . -47 This provision is
used primarily for relief from permanent injunctions; 48 it en-
compasses cases in which a change of law makes the continuance
of an injunction inequitable. 49 Although this provision is not
limited to equitable decrees, a judgment may not be brought
within its purview unless it has a prospective application.5
Because the Pierce case involved a judgment neither directly
based on a previously reversed judgment nor intended for pro-
spective application, relief under rule 60(b)(5) would not have
been proper. Thus relief under rule 60(b)(6) did not violate the
principle of mutual exclusivity.
III. CHANGE IN APPLICABLE LAW AS A REASON
"JUSTIFYING RELIEF" UNDER RULE 60(b)(6)
A. The Pierce Rationale
Even when the mutual exclusivity test has been satisfied,
rule 60(b)(6) relief must be justified under equitable principles,
51
including a showing of an "extraordinary situation. '5 2 The court
46 Id. at 650 (citations omitted).
47 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
48 Comment, supra note 10, at 576; see Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d
776, 780 (5th Cir. 1954).
49 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.26[4], at 335-36 (especially apt when a federal
injunction is based on state law that has changed).
- 0 Id. 337; see Polities v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 438 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing, argued that relief was appropriate under rule 60(b)(5) because the challenged judg-
ment, a denaturalization decree, determined status affecting future conduct); Note, supra
note 44, at 105.
5' See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
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in Pierce held that the supervening change in state law justified
relief under rule 60(b)(6) because (1) otherwise the inconsistency
of results in the state and federal courts on the same facts in a
diversity case would violate the "outcome determination princi-
ple mandated by Erie v. Tompkins, ' 53 and (2) different treat-
ment by the state and federal courts of persons injured in the
same accident would be unjust.
54
Pierce represents a significant departure from prior in-
terpretations of rule 60(b)(6) in holding that a change in control-
ling law is cause for setting aside a final judgment. Relief in a
change of law situation has been denied even when the applicant
diligently pursued his remedy of appeal 55 or lacked the financial
resources to appeal. 56 Despite considerable equities on the side
of the moving party, the interest in finality of judgments has
prevailed.57 Pierce is all the more remarkable because, rather
than treat the motion before the court as a request for leave to
file a motion for relief with the district court, whose ruling on
the motion would be subject to review only for an abuse of
discretion, the court of appeals granted relief from its judgment
as a matter of law.58 The Pierce rationale, however, provides
shaky support at best for its exceptional holding.
53 Pierce v. Cook & Co. 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Compare text accompanying notes 59-66 infra with text
accompanying notes 93-121 infra.
54 518 F.2d at 723. See text accompanying notes 94-112 infra.
15 Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
56 Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); cf. Ackermann v. United
States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
11 Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("situation with a
measure of obvious human appeal").
-s 518 F.2d at 722 (majority oponion), 725 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting), 726 (Seth, J.,
dissenting). It is highly unusual for a circuit court to adjudicate the merits of a rule 60(b)
motion in the first instance. A rule 60(b) motion is addressed to the sound discretion of
the district court. E.g., Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 443 F.2d 796, 799
(10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1961). A question of
law arises when the issue is whether the rule 60(b) motion was made within the time
prescribed by the rule such that the district court had the power to grant relief, or when
relief turns on such questions as the validity of a judgment; but when the decision to
grant relief depends on a discretionary review of the facts of a particular case, the
question is one for the district court. 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.30[1], at 418-19 &
n.13.
After the challenged judgment has been affirmed by a court of appeals, however,
the district court cannot disturb the judgment without leave of the appellate court.
Butcher & Sherrerd v. Welsh, 206 F.2d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 925
(1954). Because the rule 60(b) motion in Pierce was filed with the court of appeals, and
because the grant or denial of relief depended on an appraisal of the facts, the court of
appeals should have treated the motion as a petition for leave to file a motion with the
district court. Tribble v. Bruin, 279 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1960); see United States v. Jacobs,
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B. Reliance on Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
1. Application of the Basic Doctrine
The decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 9 was rendered to
guarantee that any case in federal court only because of diversity
of citizenship would be decided according to the same substan-
tive law by which it would have been decided had it been
brought in state court. If the Pierce court held that Erie required
rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment in the change of law situation
before the court,60 such relief would be called for whenever a
state court changed state law that had been applied by a federal
court in a diversity case and was necessary to its decision. It is
unlikely, however, that Erie requires retroactive application of
state law to federal judgments that have been final for as long as
the judgment in Pierce; and the availability of alternate remedies
during the period in which Erie requires the retroactive applica-
tion of state law61 makes relief under rule 60(b)(6) inapprop-
riate.
For Erie purposes, the Pierce case is indistinguishable from
the more usual circumstances of an unrelated accident case in
which analogous but unconnected suits are brought in state and
federal courts, the federal case is resolved first, and the state
supreme court alters the law applied by the federal court in the
course of adjudicating the state case. Erie itself did not involve a
common catastrophe; nor was it rendered only to ensure that
298 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1961). The cases cited by the majority in Pierce, 518 F.2d at 722,
discuss whether a district court must obtain leave of an appellate court before entertain-
ing a rule 60(b) motion; they do not support the courtes action in hearing the merits of
the motion in the first instance.
59 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
60 The court said: "The outcome determination principle mandated by Erie v.
Tompkins has been violated." 518 F.2d at 723.
Whether Erie requires the retroactive application of a supervening change in state
law in diversity cases is a separate question from whether a federal court must grant rule
60(b) relief in circumstances in which a state court would allow comparable relief from its
own judgment. Rule 60(b) is a valid rule of procedure under the Rule-Making Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1970); granting relief from a federal judgment is determined by the
provisions of the rule, not by state policies concerning relief from state judgments. 7 J.
MooRE, supra note 8, 60.18[8], at 218; 6A id. 60.04[3], at 4049-51; cf. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Thus the issue in Pierce was not whether the state court
would grant relief from its final judgment on the basis of a supervening change in state
law, but whether relief was required on the facts as a matter of federal law. Relief under
rule 60(b), granted to ensure that the currently controlling state substantive law will be
applied, might result ironically in retroactive application of state law in which the state
court itself would not engage. This "procedural" conflict is presumably permissible under
Hanna.
61 See text accompanying notes 68 & 69 infra.
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state substantive law would be applied to suits arising from
common transactions being litigated simultaneously in state and
federal courts. The Pierce holding is unsupported to the extent
that its finding of an "extraordinary situation" is based on a view
that Erie requires relief under rule 60(b)(6) only when a federal-
state divergence emerges from a common catastrophe. 62 If the
majority in Pierce meant not that relief was compelled by Erie,
but only that the underlying policy of Erie of promoting uniform
administration of the laws 63 moved the court to grant relief, then
Pierce would not be as far-reaching.
64
The alternative posed by Judge Barrett in his concurring
opinion in Pierce also fails to comport with Erie. Judge Barrett
suggests that a change in state law should not be available as a
ground for relief to a party who selected the federal forum
voluntarily but only to a party forced to litigate in the federal
courts.65 This argument is faulty if based on Erie and not simply
on equitable considerations. 66 The logical implication of Erie is
that when state law is controlling, the party selecting the federal
forum has the same right to correction of a retrospectively "er-
roneous" application of state law as the party who is in federal
court "involuntarily." Erie determined that the decision whether
to apply state or federal law is a matter of judicial power, not
judicial discretion guided by a sense of fairness or by who
brought suit in which court.
2. Application of the Sub Judice Requirement
In any case, Erie probably does not require vacation of a
federal judgment, erroneous in retrospect because of a super-
vening change in state law, when the decisional change comes as
long after entry of the federal judgment as it did in Pierce.67
62 518 F.2d at 723.
Chief Judge Lewis, dissenting from the decision in Pierce, takes this position:
The factual background of this case is based on a common disaster and ....
I assume that the majority ruling is intended to be limited by this "extraordinary
circumstance." But the driving force of the ruling, the desire to obtain consistent
results in state and federal cases involving state law, to me, seems equally applic-
able to identical accidents .... Id. at 725 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
Judge Seth, also dissenting in Pierce, expresses the same view: "The argument advanced
by the majority is equally applicable to any diversity case, and the fortuitous circumstance
of one accident makes no legal difference whatever . Id. at 726 (Seth, J., dissenting).
63 304 U.S. at 74-75.
64 See text accompanying notes 93-121 infra.
65 518 F.2d at 724-25 (Barrett, J., concurring).
'6 See text accompanying notes 93-121 infra.
67 The federal judgment became final in January, 1971, and the supervening state
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Under the Supreme Court ruling in Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co.,68 federal courts must apply any recent changes in ap-
plicable state law "until such time as a case is no longer sub
judice.' 69 In Vandenbark, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit7 ° not to reverse the
district court's judgment in a diversity case after the state court
decisions on which the district court relied were overruled by the
state supreme court during the appeal. In reversing the decision
of the Sixth Circuit the Court held:
Until such time as a case is no longer subjudice, the duty
rests upon federal courts to apply state law under the
Rules of Decision statute in accordance with the then
controlling decision of the highest state court. Any
other conclusion would but perpetuate the confusion
and injustices arising from inconsistent federal and state
interpretations of state law.7 1
After Vandenbark it appeared that a case was no longer sub
judice once the judgment of a court of appeals had become final.
Four years later, however, in Huddleston v. Dwyer, 2 the Supreme
Court made clear that recent pronouncements by a state su-
preme court must be applied to federal decisions even after
entry of the judgment of a court of appeals. Petitioners in Hud-
dleston filed a timely petition for rehearing with the Tenth Cir-
cuit after that court affirmed the judgment of the district
court. 73 The petition was denied on September 1, 1943. On De-
cember 17, 1943, petitioners moved for leave by the circuit court
to file a second petition for rehearing, because of a decision of
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 4 on October 19, 1943, over-
ruling an earlier decision that had been followed by the court of
appeals in affirming the judgment of the district court. Petition-
ers' motion was denied. On certiorari, the Supreme Court vac-
ated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case
for reconsideration under the recent rulings of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma. The Court reaffirmed Vandenbark, quoting
judgment became final in May, 1974. The rule 60(b) motion was filed in November,
1974. 518 F.2d at 722.
68 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
69 Id. at 543.
70 Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 110 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1940).
71 311 U.S. at 543 (footnote omitted).
72 322 U.S. 232 (1944).
73 Huddleston v. Dwyer, 137 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 232 (1944).
74 Wilson v. City of Hollis, 193 Okla. 241, 142 P.2d 633 (1943).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:843
the requirement that the federal courts apply recent decisional
law as long as the case remains subjudice.7
5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, interpreting
Huddleston in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. ,76 be-
lieved the Supreme Court to have "indicated that so long as the
case was 'subjudice' the court of appeals should have entertained
the petition for rehearing based on a change in state law; [the
Supreme Court] did not indicate, however, precisely what the
bounds of the term 'subjudice' might be."'77 In Braniff a change in
controlling state law occurred after entry of the judgment of the
court of appeals. After the time for petitioning for rehearing by
the court of appeals elapsed, petitioners filed a petition for cer-
tiorari; while that petition was still pending, they filed a motion
with the court of appeals for modification of the judgment or for
extension of the time to petition for rehearing. The court of
appeals held that it had power under rules 26(b) and 40 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to extend the time to peti-
tion for rehearing and that it could modify an erroneous deci-
sion after the time for rehearing had expired. In addition, the
court believed that Huddleston required it to grant the petition
for rehearing and to consider the effect of the recent state
ruling.
78
Huddleston and Braniff read together do not necessarily ex-
tend indefinitely the period during which a case is sub judice. In
Huddleston, the change in state law came prior to expiration of
the time allowed for petitioning for certiorari,7 9 and the motion
for leave to file the second petition for rehearing was filed within
the sixty-day period by which the time for petitioning for cer-
tiorari could be extended.80 In Braniff, the motion for extension
of the time to petition for rehearing was filed before the petition
75 322 U.S. at 236.
76 424 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
77 Id. at 429.
78 Id. at 429-30.
79 When Huddleston was decided in 1943, the time allowed for petitioning for cer-
tiorari was "three months." Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 8(a), 43 Stat. 940, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970). Because the timely petition for rehearing filed by petitioners in
Huddleston suspended the finality of the court's judgment, Department of Banking v. Pink,
317 U.S. 264, 266 (1942), the announcement of the Oklahoma decision in October was
within the period allowed for petitioning for certiorari, which extended three months
from the denial of the first petition for rehearing on September 1.
80 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 8(a), 43 Stat. 940, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2101
(1970). The motion for leave was filed on December 17 which was within this extended
period. The Supreme Court in Huddleston heard the case after expiration of the initial
three-month period which began on September 1, see note 79 supra, and ended before
filing of the motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing.
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for certiorari was disposed of by the Supreme Court.81 In both
cases, then, review by the Supreme Court was still available short
of the rehearing process.
The Supreme Court's practice of granting rehearings from
its orders complicates the task of defining the time during which
a case is sub judice. In Conner v. Sinler,82 a diversity case, the
Court granted a rehearing on its prior denial of certiorari and
then vacated and remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to
consider the case in light of an Oklahoma Supreme Court deci-
sion handed down after the initial denial of certiorari. The
Court's lack of explanation makes its action in Conner
ambiguous, and a remand for consideration "in light of" is not a
command to apply the new decision. 83 Conner at least indicates
that denial of certiorari does not terminate irrevocably the re-
sponsibility of the federal courts to consider supervening state
decisions. But it may not be fruitful even to look to the deadline
for petitioning for rehearing on a denial of certiorari as an outer
limit for the period during which a case is subjudice, because the
Court on occasion has disregarded its own rules concerning
rehearings. 4
On the other hand, the Court in Vandenbark must have con-
templated some end to the period during which changes in state
law have to be implemented retroactively by the federal courts.
If a case were held to be sub judice whenever a motion pointing
out supervening changes in state law was filed, the concept "sub
judice" would become circular. A reasonable line might be drawn
when a case is denied certiorari or decided on certiorari8 5 such
that Supreme Court review is no longer available except through
the rehearing procedure.86 The cases themselves suggest that a
rule 60(b)(6) motion addressed to the lower federal courts after
this point may be inappropriate. Vandenbark, Huddleston, and
Braniff had not reached disposition by the Supreme Court; the
courts of appeals still had control over the cases and were held to
be required by Erie to apply the newly interpreted state law. In
Connors, on the other hand, the relief was requested after the
denial of certiorari and the petition was directed not to the lower
federal courts but to the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme
81 424 F.2d at 429.
82 367 U.S. 486 (1961), vacating and remanding 282 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1960).
8' See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 96 (1961).
8' Gondeck v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25 (1965).
85 Cf. Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
86 See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
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Court's rehearing of the case with the subsequent vacation and
remand appears to have been discretionary and the court of
appeals was not required to apply but only to consider the new
state opinion. If the case had still been subjudice, presumably the
court of appeals would have been bound to apply the new law
under Erie as interpreted in Vandenbark.87
In any event, the surprise and disruption that would result
from retroactive application of state law beyond this point may
outweigh the interest in exactly parallel application of state law. 88
In addition, because the state courts themselves might not apply
their recent decisions to judgments they entered years before the
change of law, discrimination might result between those who
choose the federal forum and those who choose to stay in the
state system in diversity cases. 89
Although it is difficult to fix a precise point signifying the
termination of the period during which a case is sub judice, the
period in Pierce was beyond the range of reasonableness. In
Pierce, the rule 60(b) motion was filed almost four years after the
judgment of the Tenth Circuit became final. 90 Moreover, during
the limited period following entry of judgment by the court of
appeals in which the federal courts arguably are bound to rec-
ognize supervening changes in state law, Huddleston and Braniff
indicate that relief is available through a petition for rehearing
addressed to the court of appeals. Normally rule 60(b) relief is
not available when other remedies exist.91 Relief under rule
60(b)(6), an extreme remedy, 92 is especially inappropriate in
these circumstances.
C. Role of Equitable Concerns
To say that Erie does not require relief under rule 60(b)(6)
on the facts of Pierce is not to deny that one of the policies
underlying Erie-preventing inequitable administration of the
laws 93-may be an adequate justification for allowing relief
under rule 60(b)(6) in a change of law situation. Accomplishing
justice in particular cases is a major concern of rule 60(b). In
fact, remedying the inequity of inconsistent treatment by the
87 311 U.S. at 543. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
88 See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, supra note 83, at 97.
89 But see note 60 supra.
90 518 F.2d at 722.
91 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.28[2], at 403; see Wharm, supra note 28, at 566.
92 Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
93 304 U.S. at 74-75.
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state and federal courts of parties to the same accident was a
second motivating force behind the Pierce opinion. The question
presented is whether Pierce truly is distinguishable on equitable
grounds from situations involving unconnected but similar acci-
dents, in which litigants in federal court are treated differently
from litigants in state courts or even litigants in the same federal
court at a later time, because of a supervening change in control-
ling law.
In reaching its decision in Pierce, the Tenth Circuit referred
specifically to the unfairness of inconsistent treatment only
briefly, by quoting from Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.94 In that case, petitioner was awarded death benefits by the
Department of Labor under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.95 The district court judgment set-
ting aside the award was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.96 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari97 and the following term de-
nied rehearing.98 The Fourth Circuit subsequently upheld an
award to the survivors of another employee killed in the same
accident.99 The Supreme Court then granted rehearing to the
survivors of the first employee, granted certiorari, and reversed
the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. Speaking of its deviation from
United States Supreme Court Rule 58(2) concerning rehearings,
the Court said: "[S]ince, of those eligible for compensation from
the accident, this petitioner stands alone in not receiving it, 'the
interests of justice would make unfair the strict application of
our rules.'"100 Judge Seth, dissenting in Pierce, may have been
correct in his observation that the Supreme Court in Gondeck was
simply acting in its supervisory capacity to require two circuits to
construe a federal statute consistently. 0' Yet the Court's lan-
guage in Gondeck does emphasize the peculiar inequity in the
different treatment of parties to the same event, which may have
entered into the Court's determination to abandon its own rules
and hear the case.'
0 2
Unfairness exists, however, in any case in which a superven-
94 382 U.S. 25, 27 (1965), quoted in 518 F.2d at 723.
95 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970).
96 299 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 382 U.S. 25 (1965).
97 370 U.S. 918 (1962).
98 371 U.S. 856 (1962).
99 Pan Am. world Airways, Inc. v. O'Hearne, 355 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965).
100 382 U.S. at 27 (quoting United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 99
(1957), quoted in 518 F.2d at 723.
101 518 F.2d at 726 (Seth, J., dissenting).
10
2 See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 519 (4th ed. 1969).
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ing change of controlling law, state or federal, results in the
incompatible treatment of persons similarly situated. 10 3 In fact,
two Justices of the Supreme Court found the equities more
compelling in an unrelated accident case, Weed v. Bilbrey,10 4 than
in Gondeck. In Weed, two men were killed in navigable waters in
Florida in unconnected accidents. Weed, a widow of one of the
men killed, was unsuccessful in the state courts with her claim
that maritime law afforded a cause of action for wrongful death.
The second widow, Moragne, litigated to the same conclusion in
the federal courts. Weed preceded Moragne to the Supreme
Court, but her first petition for certiorari was denied over three
dissents.10 5 Three weeks later, Moragne raised the same claim in
her petition for certiorari. Weed's petition for rehearing, asking
that her claim be heard with Moragne's, was denied. 0 6 Subse-
quently, certiorari was granted in the Moragne case.10 7 Weed was
denied leave to file a second petition for rehearing. 10 8 Thereaf-
ter, Moragne prevailed in the Supreme Court. 0 9 Justice Doug-
las, joined by Justice Black, dissented from the denial of Weed's
third petition for rehearing:
Every plaintiff who loses his claim cannot reinstate
his action when a rule of law favorable to him is de-
clared, either by the legislature or the court. But that is
not what is attempted here .... The facts of this case
are even more compelling than those in Gondeck ....
Moreover, had Mrs. Weed proceeded through the fed-
eral courts, or had she instituted her suit later, she
might have arrived in this Court after Mrs. Moragne. °
The majority's decision not to grant a rehearing in Weed,
despite having granted a rehearing in Gondeck, does not neces-
sarily imply that the majority disagreed with Justices Douglas
and Black on the issue of fairness. The results in the two cases
are reconcilable independently of the equities because Supreme
Court review was required in Gondeck to resolve a conflict in the
circuits"' but was unnecessary in Weed because the pertinent
103 Id.
104 400 U.S. 982, 984 (1970) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
105 394 U.S. 1018 (1969) (Douglas, Black & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
106 395 U.S. 971 (1969).
107 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
108 397 U.S. 930 (1970).
109 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
110 400 U.S. at 984.
'" Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 726 (1975) (Seth, J., dissenting); see text
accompanying note 101 supra.
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legal issue was raised in Moragne. 12 The position of the dissent-
ing Justices in Weed suggests that an unrelated accident case may
present as strong a case for relief as a related accident case like
Gondeck or Pierce. At least, the subjective perception that denial
of relief would result in greater unfairness to the moving party
in a related accident case than in an unrelated accident case is
not sufficiently persuasive to establish the former as an extraor-
dinary situation as a matter of law.
If the distinction between cases of related and unrelated
accidents in terms of fairness to the unsuccessful party is too
amorphous to justify an exception to the general practice of not
allowing rule 60(b) relief in a change of law situation, perhaps
the Pierce decision may be justified by the differing degrees of
prejudice to the prevailing party occasioned by granting relief in
the two types of cases. In the Pierce situation, the defendant
secured a favorable judgment in the federal courts earlier than
in the state courts. His expectations about the finality of the
federal judgment may have been less crystalized than those of a
prevailing party who had all claims growing out of the same
event litigated in a single court. The split litigation in Pierce may
have given rise to a sense of nonfinality until all adjudication
arising from the accident had been consummated. When per-
ceptions of finality are still tentative, setting aside a judgment
rendered early in the course of multiple-action litigation on the
basis of later determinations may be considered not to encroach
severely upon the interest in finality of judgments.
The subjective sense of unfairness to the unsuccessful party
in a related accident case and the absence of substantial prej-
udice to the prevailing party are probably necessary but not suf-
ficient to justify the holding in Pierce. In Ackernann,11 3 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of rule 60(b)(6) relief
to the petitioner from a denaturalization decree even though the
denaturalization judgment against the petitioner's relative, is-
sued in the same proceeding, had been reversed on appeal. The
petitioner claimed that he had been unable to appeal because of
financial hardship, but the Court regarded the decision not to
"1
2 See also United States v. Maryland ex rel. Meyer, 382 U.S. 158 (1965), in which
the Court granted leave to file a conditional petition for rehearing pending the Court's
decision in Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, vacated, 382 U.S. 159
(1965), which involved a conflicting decision by another circuit growing out of the same
accident, and then reversed after deciding Levin. The Court decided to hear both cases
because they not only involved a common accident but were litigated on a single record.
381 U.S. at 43.
113 Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
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appeal as a free choice and therefore fatal to his plea for
relief.114 Thus, Ackernann involved disparate treatment of per-
sons who not only were similarly situated but whose denaturali-
zation decrees were issued in the same judicial proceeding, when
little prejudice would have resulted to the prevailing party, the
Government, had relief been granted.
The court in Pierce may also have been concerned with the
element of free choice." 5 The majority notes twice in its opinion
that plaintiffs were "forced" into the federal forum where they
could not utilize the "strategem" of urging that state precedent
be overruled that the plaintiff employed in the state courts."
6
Judge Barrett would have voted to deny relief had the plaintiffs
chosen the federal forum in the first instance." 7 In fact, Judge
Barrett would grant rule 60(b)(6) relief to a party who did not
voluntarily choose the federal forum whenever that party would
have prevailed in state court, apparently even in an unrelated
accident case." 8
It is difficult to say, then, just what rule Pierce purports to
announce. The mere fact of divergent results in state and fed-
eral courts in cases arising from the same accident, singled out
by the majority as the distinguishing feature of the case,"19 may
not be sufficient to merit relief under rule 60(b)(6). The absence
of free choice in being in the federal forum may have been a
critical factor in the determination to grant relief. Countervailing
considerations may require the denial of relief even in a related
accident case. The presumption that the prevailing party's ex-
pectations of finality are weaker in a related accident case than
in an unrelated accident case may be refuted by actions taken in
reliance on the first judgment. In addition, when the party pre-
vailing in the first decision in parallel suits growing out of a
common catastrophe is not a party to the second suit, his expec-
tations about the finality of his judgment are substantial, because
litigation terminated for him with the first judgment. Finally,
Collins v. City of Wichita,' 20 distinguished in Pierce as a case involv-
114Id. at 198.
I" In Pierce the absence of freedom was in the choice of forum, not the decision
whether to appeal.
116 518 F.2d at 723.
" Id. at 724-25 (Barrett, J., concurring); see text accompanying notes 65 & 66
supra.
118 518 F.2d at 724-25.
"'Id. at 723.
120 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
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ing unrelated transactions, 121 concerned property rights whose
existence in a case involving related transactions might make
rule 60(b)(6) relief inequitable.
Although the decision in Pierce might not have been im-
peachable as an abuse of discretion if handed down by a district
court, the decision of the court of appeals is not persuasive as a
matter of law. It is by no means clear which facts, if any, consti-
tuted the extraordinary situation prerequisite to relief under
rule 60(b)(6).
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether relief should be granted under rule 60(b)(6) when
inconsistent results are reached in state and federal courts in
suits arising from a common catastrophe is still an open question
after Pierce. Such relief is not barred by the requirement that
grounds for relief under clause (6) be exclusive of grounds
covered by clauses (1)-(5), nor by the prohibition of the use of
rule 60(b) as a substitute for appeal, if relief is granted after the
case has been heard on appeal. On the other hand, such relief is
not required by Erie beyond a limited time after entry of the
judgment of a court of appeals, and within that time alternate
remedies are available. Consequently, if an exception is to be
made to the general rule against rule 60(b)(6) relief from judg-
ments in a change of law situation, it must be based on equitable
grounds. Although a presumption that expectations of finality
are weak in common catastrophe litigation might weigh in favor
of relief in a case like Pierce, a just decision can only be reached
by a careful balancing of all the competing equities in a particu-
lar case.
121 518 F.2d at 722-23.
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THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY. By BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, JAMES W. SAWYER, JR., AND DALE W. HEN-
DERSON. New York: The Free Press, 1974. Pp. x, 386. $13.95.
Wallace E. Oatest
The growing concern with environmental protection has
manifested itself in both the natural and social sciences in a
concerted research effort to extend our understanding of
ecological systems and to employ this knowledge in the design of
policies for an improved environment. Biologists and chemists
have labored, for example, to learn the dynamics of the proces-
ses of decay and assimilation of waterborne wastes in streams
and rivers; at the same time, economists have turned their tools
of applied welfare economics to the evaluation of policy alterna-
tives for the preservation of water quality.
While all this is certainly commendable in itself, the trouble
has been that the analyses forthcoming from these efforts have
taken a highly technical form. The description of river dynamics
(a "materials balance analysis") typically takes the form of a
highly complex set of simultaneous differential equations.
Likewise, the economist's "cost-benefit analysis" draws on a sub-
stantial set of often-implicit assumptions as well as extensive
quantitative studies. Simply to understand the character of these
analyses and their limitations requires considerable expertise.
How, then, can policy-makers, who are not technical ex-
perts, evaluate such analyses and incorporate them in an intelli-
gent way into actual policy proposals? This, incidentally, is not
simply a matter of following the prescription of an able technical
adviser, for there are typically important value judgments and
individual interests at stake; technical assistance is obviously im-
portant, but it is not the whole of the decision.
In addition to making technical analyses comprehensible,
there is the closely related and crucial matter of the actual use of
such analyses in the process of debate leading to the formulation
t Professor of Economics, Princeton University.
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of an environmental program. How, for example, are these
studies likely to influence not only the choice of method to
achieve the environmental targets but also the selection of the
objectives themselves? In short, the issue is how technical analysis
itself interacts with the other elements of the decision process.
As a corollary to these problems of technical inputs, how can
we design political institutions whose structure will embody the
right sorts of incentives for environmental decisions? It is the
rule rather than the exception that the natural boundaries for
environmental control (water basins and air sheds) do not coin-
cide with existing political jurisdictions. Is it enough simply to
ensure that the decisionmaking authority includes representa-
tives from the concerned states and federal agencies?
A recent interdisciplinary study centered at the University
of Pennsylvania has produced a profoundly important explora-
tion of these issues in terms of a detailed, thorough examination
of the decisionmaking process that resulted in a major and costly
program to clean up the Delaware River. The result is, in my
view, the most significant book' yet written on the determination
of environmental policy. The study, under the direction of
Bruce Ackerman, is an example of what interdisciplinary re-
search ought to be. Drawing on the technical expertise of natural
scientists, economists, and lawyers, the Ackerman group under-
took a painstaking three-and-a-half-year effort to understand
the roles and interaction of those individuals, both scientists and
politicians, whose influence came to bear on the choice of the
Delaware program. The book is a fascinating description of this
decisionmaking process along with a careful and judicious at-
tempt to ascertain the lessons to be learned from the Delaware
experience.
It is this second facet of the Ackerman study that yields
something far more then merely an absorbing case study. At
appropriate junctures, the authors step back from their analysis
of the Delaware decision to consider what of a more generic
nature can be gleaned from the proceedings. 2 And it is here that
they can generate a series of insights into environmental de-
cisionmaking that transcends the problems of the Delaware Es-
tuary. The reader comes away from the book with a far deeper
understanding of the complexities inherent in the application of
I B. ACKERMAN, S. ROsE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, JR. & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCER-
TAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1974) (hereinafter cited as B. ACKERMAN).
2 Id. 67-78, 136-61, 208-20.
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cost-benefit analysis and of the limitations of the much heralded
"co-operative federalism" in resolving our environmental prob-
lems, an understanding greatly enhanced by "seeing" these tech-
niques in action in the Delaware program.
To organize the discussion in this Review, I first describe
briefly the institutional structure and proceedings for the Dela-
ware enterprise. 3 With this as background, I subsequently turn
to three fundamental issues: the use of formal "modeling" and
of cost-benefit analysis to define and evaluate the policy
alternatives, 4 the significance of the institutional structure for
the choice and implementation of programs, 5 and the selection
of a form of regulation of polluters to achieve the designated
standards for environmental quality.
6
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE DELAWARE PROGRAM
The principal actors in the Delaware drama composed two
distinct groups. The first was an essentially technical staff sup-
ported by the federal Public Health Service to undertake an
ambitious scientific analysis: the Delaware Estuary Comprehen-
sive Study (DECS). Greatly intrigued by the appearance of cost-
benefit analytical techniques in Washington in the early 1960's,
the Public Health Service saw in the Delaware case an opportu-
nity to push these new techniques into the field of water quality.
In 1962 the Service launched, at a cost of $1.2 million, the four-
year DECS enterprise with the research under the direction of a
young sanitary engineer, Robert Thomann, who had recently
completed a doctoral thesis involving mathematical modeling of
the effects of pollutants on estuaries. The DECS staff was eager
to show how such scientific techniques could form the basis for
decisions on water quality in an actual estuary.
7
In contrast to the research-oriented DECS, there existed at
the same time a decisionmaking body, the Delaware River Basin
Commission (DRBC). Created in 1961, the DRBC was a new
"model regional agency" with a constituency from the four in-
terested states (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Del-
aware) and the federal government. The Commission itself took
an innovative form of "co-operative federalism": a regional body
' Text accompanying notes 7-16 infra.
4 Text accompanying notes 17-61 infra.
5 Text accompanying notes 62-83 infra.
6 Text accompanying notes 84-111 infra.
B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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representing the interests of the concerned states and the federal
government and endowed with broad decisionmaking powers
for the development of the resources of the Delaware River.
Moreover, the voting members of the DRBC were not obscure
figures; they consisted of the governors of these four states and
the Secretary of the Interior.
8
The origin of both the DECS and the DRBC can be traced
to a series of disastrous floods in the Delaware during the 1950's.
These pointed up the need for a concerted effort for flood con-
trol of the Delaware's waters. This concern, however, soon ex-
panded into a wider undertaking to investigate and control not
only water quantity, but also its quality.9 This enlarged perspec-
tive received, moreover, a powerful impetus from the passage of
the Federal Water Quality Act of 1965;10 the Act required the
states to submit by June 30, 1967, a set of water quality standards
and plans for implementation.'
The new federal Act also ushered in a new relationship
between the DECS and the DRBC. The Commission faced the
difficult task of formulating a set of objectives and programs for
water quality in the Delaware, but did not as yet possess an
adequate technical staff or research effort to provide a sound
and intellectually respectable foundation for such decisions. The
DECS staff, however, was well along its way in the development
of an operational model of the estuary to be accompanied by
estimates of the costs and benefits of alternative water quality
objectives.' 2 The DECS clearly had what the DRBC needed.
To assist the Commission with its decisions, the DECS staff
undertook to produce a preliminary report by mid-1966.
This report summarized five potential water quality programs
with varying objectives; using a cost-benefit analysis, the staff
went on to estimate in dollar terms the benefits and costs associ-
ated with each objective set. 3 I have reproduced these estimates
as Table I.
What must be emphasized is that it was this set of choices
summarized in Table I that came to be the frame of reference
for the debate over the Delaware program. When the delibera-
tions began among groups of concerned citizens, polluters, and
8 
Id. 3-5.
9 Id. 11-12.
10 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1970).
11 Id.; B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 13.
12 B. ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 13.
13 Id. 14.
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TABLE I
COsT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF DECS POLLUTION PLANS'
4
High Estimate-Low Estimate
Objective Set Cost of Benefits
I $490 million $355-155 million
II 275 " 320-135 "
III 155 " 310-125 "
IV 110 " 280-115 "*
V 30 "- -
the DRBC itself, attention was focused on which of the DECS
objectives was the most appropriate. 15 In the end, the DRBC
adopted a slightly modified version of Objective 1116 (which, in-
cidentially, is considerably more ambitious than Objective IV,
which produces the largest expected net benefit according to the
DECS estimates). Important as the final choice may be, it is of
far greater significance that the technical staff of the DECS effectively
defined the alternatives. Just why this is so critical will become ap-
parent in the next section, where we examine what lies behind
the figures in Table I.
II. "MODELING" AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
IN POLICY FORMULATION "
The DECS staff had first to confront what is basically a
definitional issue: the meaning (in measurable terms) of water
quality. Opting for a widely used measure, the staff essentially
chose the level of dissolved oxygen (DO) to serve as its "proxy"
for water quality. In fact, the objective sets cited in Table I effec-
tively represent differing levels of DO; Table II indicates this
correspondence.'
7
The first issue this raises is the adequacy of DO as a measure
of water quality. The DO content of a body of water certainly is
of some significance: If, for example, the DO level "sags" suffi-
14 Id. 15.
"See generally id. 13-14.
16 See id. 187. See generally id. 170-207.
17 Although the various objective sets did include goals for a number of other pol-
lutants, the DECS staff never considered the costs of reaching any of these "secondary"
goals independently of the DO objective. Letter from Susan Rose-Ackerman to Wallace
E. Oates, July 20, 1975.
BOOK REVIEW
ciently low for an extended period, the waters can no longer
support fish life.' 8 Moreover, should DO levels approach zero, a
noxious process of "anaerobic decomposition" sets in with a vile
discoloration of the waters and foul odors. 19 This vitiates any
recreational uses (or aesthetic value) of the river or lake.
TABLE II
AVERAGE DO IN PARTS PER MILLION IN MOST POLLUTED AREA
OF THE DELAWARE
2 0
Objective Set Level of DO
I 4.5
II 4.0
III 3.0
IV 2.5
V 1.0
To prevent dissolved oxygen from falling to undesirably low
levels, a river authority can undertake a number of measures.
Most basic, however, is the control of the quantity and quality of
those wastes that utilize oxygen in the process of decomposition;
the oxygen consumption made by such wastes is typically mea-
sured in terms of its Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD).
21
Programs to increase DO levels thus entail both reductions in
organic wastes and treatment of such wastes to reduce the BOD
emissions into the receiving waters.
While the DO level represents one important dimension of
water quality, it is by no means the only significant characteristic.
For example, another aspect of pollutants that poses an obvious
threat is the toxic properties of certain inorganic wastes which
can themselves render the water unsafe for drinking, swimming,
or fishlife.2 2 In short, a certain DO content may be necessary to
support fish and for certain recreational uses of the water, but it
is not sufficient.
18 Id. 18.19 Id. 18-19.
20 See id. 32.
21 See id. 18-22. More precisely, the BOD of a waste discharge is the number of
pounds of oxygen that will be consumed in, the biochemical oxidation of the organlic
impurity present in the emission.
2 2 Id. 27.
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Moreover, the authors point out some particular characteris-
tics of the Delaware estuary that create considerable uncertainty
about the gains from a program to increase levels of DO. One
problem concerns the high levels of river turbidity, which give
the water an opaque brown appearance with adverse aesthetic
and recreational consequences. 23 It is not clear that a DO
"cleanup" would have much effect on the turbidity; but if it did,
the clearer water might well prove far more receptive to the
growth of algae so that in the end it "may simply mean that the
valley is trading a brown river for a green one. 24
In addition, the sludge deposits in the bottom of the Dela-
ware support a large population of oxygen-consuming worms
("tubificid"). As DO levels increase, the authorities can expect a
rapid multiplication of these worms with the associated rise in
the "benthic oxygen demand" on the river's supply of oxygen.25
The extent of these side effects is uncertain; the point, however,
is that the ecology of a river like the Delaware is highly complex,
and programs to alter one characteristic of the system are likely
to have some additional and unexpected effects on other forms
of water life.
Suppose that we push all this aside and accept, for the mo-
ment, the adequacy of dissolved oxygen as a measure of water
quality for the Delaware. How well does the DECS model de-
scribe and predict DO levels in the Delaware estuary? The an-
swer is, only moderately well at best. It must first be recognized
that DO content is not a single number. The Delaware Estuary
stretches about one hundred miles from Trenton to Liston's
Point on the coast,26 and its DO level exhibits wide variations
over different spans of its flow. Rather than one level of DO, the
oxygen content of the river is described by a "profile" which
exhibits graphically the existing DO concentrations at each point
along the river. Such a profile indicates a "sag" in DO im-
mediately below Trenton which becomes even more accentuated
downstream from Philadelphia. This, of course, reflects the de-
composition of the relatively heavy waste emissions from both
industrial sources and municipal waste treatment plants in these
two areas of concentrated populations and industrial activity. To
analyze DO levels, the DECS staff divided the river below Tren-
ton into thirty sections; the DECS model thus aimed at describ-
23 Id. 26.
24 Id. 27.
25d. 22, 51-53.
26 Cf. id. 23-24.
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ing and predicting DO concentrations in each of these thirty
stretches of the river.
2 7
This is no easy task. The levels of DO depend not only on
the quantities and quality of the wastes emitted at various points
along the Delaware, but they are also crucially dependent on the
level of the water flows, 28 on water temperatures, 29 and on wind
velocities above the river surface. 30 DO is typically at its lowest
levels during the hot summer months when the capacity of
the river to assimilate waste discharges is at its minimum.3'
Moreover, the water flows are complicated by the fact that the
Delaware is an estuary and thus subject to influences from the
ocean tides; BOD can flow upstream as well as downstream.3
Finally, during periods of heavy rain, the sewer systems of Tren-
ton, Camden, Philadelphia, and Wilmington tend to overflow,
pouring huge and unpredictable quantities of BOD into the
Delaware; these overflows take place about ten days each
year.
33
To keep the problem relatively simple and to reduce data
requirements, the DECS staff chose essentially to ignore all these
sources of variation over time and to assume a "steady state"
condition;34 that is, they assumed that "relevant river conditions
remained constant over time."'35 This is obviously a major simplifi-
cation, but the critical question is the extent to which this as-
sumption impaired the precision of the model's predictions.
Ackerman and his colleagues looked carefully at the per-
formance of the DECS model and found substantial inac-
curacies. In about one case out of three, the predicted DO con-
tent for a given sector of the Delaware differed from the actual
level of DO by more than .5 parts per million.36 This is not
a minor imprecision, as a look at Table II indicates that this
can represent the difference between one objective set and an-
other at costs of possibly over one hundred million dollars.37
2 7 See id. 22-25.
28 Id. 35.
29 
Id. 38.
30 Id. 49-5 1.3 1 Id. 38.
32 Id. 33-34.
33 Id. 42-45.
34 Id. 37-39.
Id. 37 (emphasis in original).
n See id. 57-58.
3? If Objective Set I is chosen, for example, the cost will exceed that of Objective
Set II by $215 million, see Table I supra; yet with a possible DO error of .5 parts per
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Moreover, this appears to understate to some extent the full
disparities between "actual" and "predicted" values of DO, for
the DECS staff had itself previously adjusted some of the predic-
tions in the light of excessive deviations from actual DO
concentrations.
38
All this is not meant to understate the accomplishments of
the DECS. The construction of an operational model of the
Delaware represents a substantial achievement. The margins of
error in the model's predictions, however, appear quite consid-
erable, and this expected divergence of predicted from actual
DO levels is a matter that the decisionmaking body should weigh
with care. We shall return to this shortly.
3 9
The next step in the DECS analysis was to estimate the po-
tential benefits from increased levels of DO and the costs neces-
sary to achieve these improvements in water quality. At this junc-
ture, the staff turned to the economist's technique of cost-benefit
analysis, 40 an approach with a substantial history in the evalua-
tion of water resource projects.
A cost-benefit study involves essentially four steps. The first
is simply an enumeration of the various forms of benefits and
costs inherent in the undertaking. In the case of the Delaware,
the "tangible" benefits from a cleanup of the river were deter-
mined to consist primarily of an improved recreational potential:
swimming, boating, and fishing.41 To achieve these benefits, it
would be necessary to reduce levels of waste discharges into the
river with consequent higher costs to polluters who would have
to adopt more expensive alternatives in order to reduce the
quantity and/or improve the quality of their waste emissions.
The costs of the Delaware program were thus primarily the ad-
ditional expense in cutting back on wastes and increasing the
levels of treatment.
The second step is the assignment of actual dollar values to
the various forms of benefits and costs. The DECS staff under-
took an extensive questionnaire study of the forty-four major
polluters along the Delaware estuary to collect information for
the estimation of the costs of reduced BOD emissions. 42 At the
million we have no guarantee that the DO level will exceed that available under the
rejected Objective Set II, see Table II supra.
38 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 59-61.
3' Text accompanying notes 54-55, 59-60 infra.
40 For a comprehensive treatment of cost-benefit analysis, see E. MISHAN, CosT-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1974).
41 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 102.
42 Id. 85-86.
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same time, a range of estimates was made for the benefits from
expanded recreational uses.
43
The third step involves the selection of an appropriate rate
of discount for the evaluation of benefits and costs that are ex-
pected to accrue in future years. The point is, simply, that 100
dollars in benefits or costs one year hence is worth less than 100
dollars at the present moment; with positive rates of return (in-
terest), 100 dollars today is worth 100 dollars plus the accrued
interest at some future date. If, for example, we adopt a dis-
count rate of six percent, we are effectively saying that we will
assign a "present discounted value" of 100 dollars to a sum of
benefits (or costs) of 106 dollars to be realized one year in the
future. The final step in the cost-benefit study is simply to take
our time profile of dollar benefits and costs along with the cho-
sen rate of discount and then to calculate the present discounted
value of the entire expected future stream of benefits and of
costs. These are the numbers presented in Table I above, where
the DECS staff used a discount rate of three percent.
Although the general cost-benefit approach seems quite
straightforward, there are in fact a number of problems or am-
biguities, both in principle and in practice. There are effectively
two sets of issues at stake. The first is the assumptions inherent
in the cost-benefit technique itself, and the second is the particu-
lar procedures employed by the DECS staff to reach the esti-
mates of the benefits and costs of the selected set of objectives
for the Delaware. I will comment only briefly on these two mat-
ters, for the most fascinating dimension of the book goes beyond
the content of the DECS cost-benefit study to the way in which
the study was employed in the decision process.
The authors set out carefully and lucidly for the non-
specialist the nature of cost-benefit analysis. 44 In particular, it is
important to recognize just what the cost-benefit test is. In com-
puting the value of the benefits and costs associated with a par-
ticular project, the assignment is determined upon the basis of
people's "willingness to pay." The cost-benefit test is effectively
an attempt to apply market criteria to the evaluation of public
projects. When the researcher calculates and compares the pres-
ent discounted value of the expected future stream of benefits
with that of costs, he is asking the question: Does the value of the
undertaking, as measured by what people would be willing to pay,
43 Id. 102-03.
14 Id. 104-09. See generally E. MISHAN, supra note 40.
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exceed (or, alternatively, fall short of) its costs, again measured
in terms of actual or imputed market prices? The cost-benefit
test is thus an analogue to the profit test in the market place, for
it measures whether, in principle, there could be sufficient
revenues (if people were to pay for the benefits) to cover costs.
Seen from this perspective, we can determine what a cost-
benefit test does and does not tell us. It does not, for example,
indicate to whom the benefits accrue or who bears the costs; it is
an aggregative test in the sense that benefits and costs are
summed over all persons. This immediately suggests that al-
though the cost-benefit test may supply some valuable informa-
tion, it is not in itself the sole criterion on which to base project
decisions.
Environmentalists, in particular, have raised a second objec-
tion to the application of the cost-benefit approach: its exclu-
sively anthropomorphic perspective.45 The benefits and costs
that enter the calculations are the valuations to human beings.
But should not some weight be given to the shad or other wild-
life whose well-being is at stake? Does man have the right to
destroy animals for his own purposes? This involves some tricky
philosophical issues-in the end, for example, men will make the
decision and it must, therefore, be men's valuation of the in-
terests of wildlife that is relevant. Nevertheless, one can still
argue that man has certain responsibilities or interests regarding
the "integrity of nature" that extend beyond the scope of con-
ventional cost-benefit calculations.
In addition to these matters of principle, Ackernran and his
colleagues explore carefully the specifics of the DRBC cost-
benefit study. Here again they find a number of important
anomalies and, in some instances, outright errors. From the out-
set, the DECS staff carried over all the simplifications in the
Delaware model to the cost-benefit calculations; the computa-
tions, for example, refer only to the attainment of alternative
levels of dissolved oxygen.46 The valuations of benefits and costs
are thus themselves subject to all the reservations cited earlier in
this section.
Moreover, the authors find that the DECS estimates of the
costs of pollution control were far too low, while (largely because
of a conceptual error) the benefits appear somewhat exagger-
ated. In particular, an underestimate of costs resulted, first from
45 See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 138-42.
46 Thus the benefits are expressed as correlates for DO Objective Sets I-IV, compare
id. 103, at Table 4 with id. 15, at Table 1, id. 32, at Table 2, and id. 63, at Table 3.
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restricting the study to the forty-four major point-source pollu-
ters who account for about two-thirds of BOD emissions47 and,
second, from an inadequate provision for the growth in emis-
sions over time.48 Some later revised estimates of the costs of
dealing with anticipated increases in wasteloads pushed the price
from 20 million to 140 million dollars; by this time, however,
certain commitments had been made on the basis of earlier esti-
mates, and officials apparently were quick to suppress these new
and potentially embarrassing cost overruns.
49
On the benefit side, the DECS calculations were based on
existing estimates of the "intrinsic" value (in dollar terms) of a
day of fishing, boating, or swimming, multiplied by a predicted
number of users. 50 This measure of benefits, however, is highly
misleading; the cost-benefit analyst seeks to measure the value of
the new facilities in terms of what consumers would be willing to
pay rather than do without them. This implies that the benefits
from the new recreational opportunities must be evaluated rela-
tive to already existing facilities. The proper basis for valuation is
not one of the intrinsic worth of a day of fishing, but rather the
value to fishermen of having the Delaware available in addition
to existing fishing sites. 51 This methodological bungle (for which,
incidentally, there is considerable precedent)52 probably imparts
a substantial upward bias to the DECS estimates of benefits.
With this as background, we can now turn to the most fas-
cinating part of the Delaware story: the way in which the DECS
cost-benefit study figured in the deliberations on and ultimate
choice of the Delaware program. The preceding paragraphs in-
dicate the substantial degree of imprecision and uncertainty in-
herent in the DECS estimates of the benefits from and costs of a
cleanup of the Delaware; the sweeping, simplifying assumptions
and the limited availability of critical information suggest that
the findings should be couched in terms of a number of qualifi-
cations and warnings. But this is precisely the opposite of what
happened. In their eagerness to impress the outside world with
their accomplishment in constructing an operational model of
the Delaware and using this model to derive actual dollar esti-
mates of the benefits and costs of various programs, the DECS
47 Id. 85-86.
4 8 Id. 86-90.
49 Id. 94-96.
50 See generally id. 124-32.
51 See id. 115-19. See also id. 109-15.
52 Mack & Meyers, Outdoor Recreation, in MEASURING BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT
INVESTMENTS 71-116 (R. Dorfman ed. 1965).
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staff produced a report that hardly even hinted at the impreci-
sion inherent in the predictions of the model and the associated
estimates of benefits and costs.
In short, the basic failing of the DECS Report was
not so much that it failed to achieve a degree of com-
prehensiveness and exactitude that is never achieved
outside the most fantastic science fiction; what was seri-
ously defective was the manner in which the DECS Re-
port understood the very idea of "achievement." The
DECS succeeded insofar as it developed a set of equa-
tions defining a system that accurately described a small
piece of reality. Thus, in emphasizing its achievement,
the research staff emphasized the accuracy of the num-
bers its model generated. While this may be fine in a
scientific forum in which the findings will be scrutinized
by other experts concerned with the development of
truth within a single disciplinary speciality, it is nothing
short of disastrous when the same attitude is transposed
into the policy-making arena.
5 3
More basic is the effect the DECS study had on the actual
deliberations and the ultimate decision. As noted above,54 the
DECS findings, summarized in Tables I and II, for all practical
purposes defined the alternatives. The debate among both in-
terested citizens and the DRBC amounted to haggling over the
appropriate objective set from these tables; in short, the DECS
effectively channeled the discussion into a consideration of the
proper level of dissolved oxygen.
This is enormously important, for it means that, from the
outset, public discussion took the narrowest of perspectives. In
the view of the authors, the real questions of strategy for an
environmental program were eclipsed by the DECS report; Ack-
erman and his colleagues argue quite persuasively that the likely
benefits from the costly Delaware program will be miniscule:
It is easy to imagine that when society decides to
spend almost three quarters of a billion dollars to clean
up a 40-mile stretch of river, something significant will
come of it. The mind rebels at the thought that such
vast sums are spent in vain. Yet in 1978, or 1980 or
1984, when the DRBC announces that it has "suc-
53 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 65-66.
54 Text accompanying note 15 supra.
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ceeded" in achieving its DO objectives on the river, the
Delaware will be just as cloudy as it ever was; it will be
just as difficult to obtain access to the river; boating will
be neither better nor worse than it was; the drinking
water will taste the same as it always did. Perhaps good
fishing will be a few minutes closer, and during some
years more shad will "survive" their journey up and
down the river. Is this what all the talk about improving
"the quality of life" amounts to?
55
The authors contend that primary attention ought to be
"focussed on the discharge of exotic chemicals and heavy metals
which may pose a real risk to human health when present in
drinking water or in seafood"; 56 the first priority here is the
avoidance of ecological catastrophe. Yet this seemed to have
generated little concern among the DECS staff.5 7 As to environ-
mental protection generally, Ackerman and his colleagues see
little to be gained from extensive and costly efforts to rehabilitate
heavily used water systems; instead, they argue that the general
strategy should be to preserve those resources as yet relatively
unspoiled by twentieth-century life.58 Rather than attempting at
great expense to raise the level of DO in the Delaware around
Trenton and Philadelphia, we would do better to preserve the
lower estuary from the incursion of sources of pollution.
Whether or not they are correct on this basic issue of en-
vironmental strategy, it is striking that in the course of the De-
laware deliberations this matter was never even acknowledged! 59
The force of the DECS preliminary report was such as to sidet-
rack the discussion from a consideration of the real alternatives
to a relatively trivial controversy over whether the DO level
would be brought to 2.5 or 3.0 parts per million. And the ulti-
mate outcome may well be, as the authors suggest,60 an ex-
tremely expensive program with little noticeable effect on the
quality of the Delaware's waters.
What are we to conclude from all this? It seems to me that a
reader's first reactions may be of two general kinds. One may
conclude that the real trouble rests in the DECS analysis; if the
technical staff had simply adopted a broader perspective on the
55 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 142 (emphasis in original).
56 Id. 145.
57 Cf. id. (noting DRBG and general national inattention to poisons discharges).
58 E.g., id. 137, 140, 144-45.
59 See generally, e.g., id. 145.
60 Text accompanying note 55 supra.
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environmental alternatives and at least made clear the basic qual-
ifications to their findings, we might have expected a far more
enlightened public discussion and a more informed choice of a
Delaware program. In short, what was needed was a better
Delaware model and cost-benefit study. One may, on the other
hand, take a more pessimistic stance and reason that such
analyses are likely to be more misleading than helpful, that we
would do better to give up attempts aimed at "sophisticated"
definitions of the problem and at quantification and leave the
decision to the judgment of the responsible bureaucrats and
elected officials.
Neither of these reactions, however, seems to me the proper
inference. It is too easy simply to put all the blame on the DECS
study. There were obviously a multitude of serious deficiencies
in the analysis and in its presentation, and we could certainly
look to improved analytical studies to provide a better founda-
tion for public debate. But even if the technical work is of a high
quality, there remains the very formidable problem of its trans-
mission in a usable form to decisionmakers. In particular, the
nature of analytical studies and the needs of the political de-
cisionmaker seem to verge on incompatibility: Analysis involves
simplification which in turn implies important qualifications to
any findings, while the political participant is seeking a position
or decision he can take without fundamental ambiguities. I do
not want to suggest that this is an insurmountable obstacle: We
have, for example, benefited greatly from the use of analytical
work in determining macro-economic policy. The tension (and
the compromises) between the informational needs of the politi-
cal process and the tentative character of analytical findings and
predictions, however, surely exists.
Conversely, it really does not make much sense to abandon
analytical studies of policy alternatives. As the authors put it,
When confronted with this precis, the reader is
doubtless tempted to conclude that the DECS exercise,
when properly understood, contributed nothing of
value to a more precise understanding of the problems
confronting the sensitive decision maker. But this would
be a mistake; for it is only as a result of our effort to
trace the DECS' investigations that it has been possible
to obtain a perspective on the probable consequences of
the costly program of pollution control which the
DRBC has adopted. Our basic complaint does not go to
the wisdom of the effort at sustained understanding of
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river dynamics but to the way in which the DECS staff
chose to translate their insights into language comprehensible
to decision makers.
61
Where this discussion leads is not to the abolition of policy
analysis but rather to a study of institutional structure. The basic
issue is the formation of a set of decision procedures that, first,
will pose the proper questions, and, second, will generate and
bring to bear the relevant kinds of information and analysis. It is
to this matter of institutional structure that we turn next.
III. THE DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS FOR POLICY DECISIONS
The Delaware experience also represents an innovative ven-
ture in "cooperative federalism." Not only was the decisionmak-
ing body, the DRBC, composed of prestigious representatives
from both the federal government and the concerned states, but
federally supported technical assistance from the DECS staff
provided, as we have seen, the basic research capability for the
undertaking. How well did this institutional structure fulfill
its role?
The authors have grave reservations about the division of
the research and decision functions between the DECS (the
"thinkers") and the DRBC (the "doers").62 The problem is best
seen by considering the incentives confronting each agency and
following through the likely implications. From the standpoint of
the federally supported DECS, the basic enterprise was one of
implementing and selling a highly complex and sophisticated
form of environmental analysis. For the staff of the DECS, the
Delaware study presented an opportunity to demonstrate the
effectiveness of an innovative technique. With this perspective,
such a "pure thinking agency may be expected ... to justify its
existence by overselling the accuracy and importance of its pre-
liminary reports by underemphasizing the uncertainties underly-
ing its predictions.
'63
Moreover, the "thinking agency" is unlikely to have a long-
term commitment to the program. The DECS staff would realize
the bulk of their returns in the short run from the establishment
of a basic analytical framework and from the initial results, not
from the longer and more mundane efforts to accumulate basic
and improved data and to follow up and refine the results.
64
61 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 64 (emphasis in original).
62 The authors so label the two agencies, e.g., id. 74.
63 
Id. 74.
64Id. 74; cf. text accompanying note 7 supra.
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In contrast, the orientation of the "action agency" is toward
the implementation of a program. This agency, in our case the
DRBC, typically requires the assistance of a technical body of
some sort to help in the formulation of the program and to
provide a kind of intellectual respectability. 65 But once the fun-
damental program is outlined, the action agency, like the think-
ing agency, is interested in selling the program, not in pointing
up existing uncertainties or qualifications; 66 the decisionmakers
can thus be expected to reinforce the tendencies of the research
group to stress the precision and reliability of the plan.
Moreover, once the action agency has implemented the pro-
gram, its concern will be primarily with the enforcement of the
plan, rather than with continuing basic research aimed at future
planning efforts.6 7 This bifurcation of responsibility appears to
discourage follow-through on the basic planning efforts.
The DECS and DRBC seem to have followed this pattern of
behavior quite closely. I have already stressed the exaggerated
level of precision in the DECS reports.6 8 In addition, the re-
search effort apparently lost most of its vitality following the
publication of the DECS preliminary report in 1966. The pre-
liminary report promised a definitive "final document" by the
end of 1967, a document which has yet to be published. 69 With
the completion of the preliminary report, there was a shift of the
basic research and planning function from the federally sup-
ported staff to the regional level. 70 Although there was much
additional work to be done in extending the DECS model and
developing a more comprehensive and reliable data base, little
seems to have followed on the preliminary report. In fact, the
data-collection effort is at present so sporadic and generally in-
adequate as to preclude further effective research aimed at im-
proving the predictive capability of the model. 71
From this experience, Ackerman and his colleagues con-
clude that
The course of events along the Delaware eloquently
warns against placing the federal "thinkers" in one
bureaucratic box, then shifting the responsibility for
65 Cf. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 74-75.
66 Id. 75.
67 Id.
68 Cf. text accompanying notes 26-38 supra.
69 B. ACKER MAN, supra note 1, at 68-69.
70 Id. 69.
71 See id. 69-73.
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scientific follow-through to the regional "decision-mak-
ing" agency, simultaneously consigning the task of data
gathering to yet another set of state agencies. In such a
structure each component is prone to lose sight of the
function it should be performing to enhance the ration-
ality of the pollution control scheme that is the ultimate
product of all the sound and fury.
72
The implication of all this would seem to be that the de-
cisionmaking agency should have within its own organization the
basic research capability. This too presents difficulties, however;
in particular, the control of the agency's officials over the re-
search personnel may serve to inhibit critical evaluations of exist-
ing policies.7 3 At least the division of functions in the Delaware
provided a certain protection and scope of independence for the
DECS staff.
There seems to be no easy resolution of the dilemma. After
considering a number of alternatives, the authors propose the
creation of a new body: an Environmental Review Board.7 4 The
Board's function would be to provide an outside, independent
assessment of each agency's environmental planning efforts.
With a "quasi-judicial independence" from the executive and
legislative branches of the government, the Board would
scrutinize and evaluate basic environmental plans to ensure that
the proper alternatives have in fact been posed and that the
analysis of the alternatives is sound.7 5 In the case of the Dela-
ware, for example, such a Review Board would presumably
have required a broadening of the perspective beyond just
the DO level of the estuary, as well as the resolution of certain
anomalies in the basic model and the cost-benefit analysis.
The potential for such a review body is, I think, considerable;
our closest relative to the proposed Board has probably been
the General Accounting Office (GAO), several of whose re-
ports have been extraordinarily revealing.7 6 Simply the existence
of such a reviewing agency keeps people on their toes with the
knowledge that a shoddy job of analysis may easily be exposed.
72 Id. 77.
'3 For an account of the conflict between DECS and DRBC, see id. 191-93.
74 1d. 156-61.
75 Id. 156-57.
7
1
6 See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, EXAMINATION INTO THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONSTRUCTION GRANT PROGRAM FOR ABATING, CONTROLLING, AND
PREVENTING WATER POLLUTION (1969) (critical review of federal program for subsidiz-
ing construction of municipal waste treatment facilities).
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Let us turn next to the decisionmaking process in the DRBC
itself. Through a lengthy series of interviews with the actual
participants in the DRBC decision and a study of associated writ-
ten documents, the authors found a number of recurring pat-
terns of behavior which again cast considerable doubt on the
efficacy of some of the new forms of cooperative federalism.
Without trying to recapitulate the positions and roles of the indi-
vidual Governors, the Secretary of the Interior, and others with
some influence in the decision process, let me simply highlight
some of these tendencies. 77 The central difficulty stems from the
basic and obvious fact that the primary political commitment of
each of the participants is to a constituency other than the re-
gional agency itself. The interviews and proceedings made clear
that what was uppermost in the minds of each of the members of
the DRBC was how best to further his own interests in terms of his
own political jurisdiction.78 This meant, among other things, that
these extremely busy political figures were able to devote little
effort to an understanding of the distinctly regional dimensions
of the Delaware problem. They turned for advice to their own
political advisors with the result that a truly regional orientation
never developed in the DRBC.
79
It is not surprising that when it came time to take a position
on the Delaware program, each participant consulted his own
political calculus. As the Delaware experience makes clear, how-
ever, the inevitable compromise that emerges from such an
amalgamation of varying interests may bear little resemblance to
an effective regional program.
The technocratic-political decision, whatever its ultimate
value, requires tight integration among fact finders,
analysts, and politicians. In contrast, federalism is in-
stinct with the demand that power be fractionalized
among competing groups and levels of government,
and the suspicion that a coherent, tightly organized
governing structure will by virtue of that single fact pos-
sess too much power and so act irresponsibly. Unfortu-
nately, the federalist effort to eliminate the possibility of
the abuse of power can often make it impossible to use
power intelligently as well. s0
77 For a full discussion of the political maneuvers accompanying the DRBC's adop-
tion of the DECS Objective Set II, see B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 170-89.
"8 See id. 182-87.
79 See id. 193-200.
80 Id. 189 (footnote omitted).
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There is, moreover, no obvious way to resolve this funda-
mental dilemma of American federalism. One potential response
would be the creation of a new layer of government: regional
political bodies to address explicitly regional issues. But it is dif-
ficult to be sanguine about imposing yet another set of bureau-
cracies and associated political activities on the American system.
The authors explore a number of institutional alternatives and
offer several provocative proposals. Their approach is essentially
to distinguish among various environmental issues according to
the sorts of geographical and institutional demands they make
on our public institutions. As they see it, the most promising
response would involve some national agencies-a Poison Con-
trol Board 8I and a Nature Preservation TrustS2 -along with
some regional and perhaps metropolitan units to protect and
develop recreational facilities.8 3 These proposals, however, are
an exploration of various responses to an enormously complex
set of issues rather than a definitive blueprint for a set of public
institutions for the formulation and implementation of environ-
mental policies.
IV. LEGAL-ORDERS VERSUS REGULATION
BY MARKET INCENTIVES
In the last section of this Review, I want to examine another
set of problems with somewhat more economic content: the
method of regulating waste emissions. Once the environmental
targets are specified, it becomes necessary to design and imple-
ment a program to achieve them. In the case of the Delaware
Estuary, we have seen that the designated objective was a certain
minimum level of dissolved oxygen.8 4 To attain this target, the
environmental authority faced the problem of allocating emis-
sion quotas among polluters so as to restrict waste discharges to a
level consistent with the prescribed level of dissolved oxygen.
The authors' analysis of this issue is most illuminating. In
principle, there were two broad options available to the DRBC.
The first is "regulation through legal orders." This, in fact, has
been the traditional approach: The authority issues orders to
each of the polluters specifying a limit to his waste emissions and
indicating certain penalties if this limit is exceeded.8 5 There is,
81 See id. 209-10.
82 See id. 214-15.
83 See id. 210-13.
84 Text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
" See id. 225-26.
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however, a second general technique for controlling levels of
emissions, which the authors call the "market model" of regula-
tion. This approach involves the use of pricing incentives to "ra-
tion" the available pollution rights.
86
Economists have, for many years, been pressing the case for
price incentives. 8 7 And the Delaware experience adds substantial
support to this case. The basic appeal of the pricing approach is
its potential for achieving the environmental objective at rela-
tively low cost and doing so without making major demands for
information or intervention on the part of the regulating author-
ity. In principle, the regulator need only set a price or charge on
the BOD content of waste emissions and adjust this charge until
polluters cut back waste emissions to the target level.
In addition to its (at least apparent) simplicity, the pricing
technique can result in large savings. Suppose, for example, that
we have a world of two polluters in which the first can reduce
waste emissions at a cost of five cents per pound while the sec-
ond suffers a cost of twelve cents per pound. To minimize the
cost of a reduction in total waste emissions, we would obviously
assign the entire cutback to the first polluter, for any cutbacks by
polluter number two would involve an "excess" cost of seven
cents per pound. Note that this is precisely what would happen
under a pricing regime: If, for example, the regulator set a price
of six cents per pound, all the reduction in waste emissions
would come from the first polluter; the second would pay the
charge of six cents per pound and maintain his level of waste
discharges. 88 More generally, in a model with many polluters,
a single uniform charge will lead to the least-cost pattern of re-
ductions in emissions: Those who can cut back on effluents
most cheaply will do so to avoid the charge, while those pollu-
ters for whom this is very costly will elect instead to pay the
effluent fee.
89
86 See id. 226.
87 This dates at least to A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). For a sam-
pling of more recent literature, see W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PoLICY: EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC OUTLAYS, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE
(1975); A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY,
INSTITUTIONS (1968); Freeman & Haveman, Clean Rhetoric and Dirty Water, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, Summer 1972, at 51.
88 See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 260-61.
89 This is a somewhat oversimplified example. In general, the cost per pound of
reduction in emissions will depend on the magnitude of the cutback; this, however,
does not impair the generality of the argument since each polluter will reduce his waste
discharges to the point where the cost of an additional pound's reduction (the marginal
cost) equals the effluent fee.
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One most interesting output of the DECS mathematical
model of the Delaware was a set of estimates of the costs of
achieving the various objectives by alternative regulatory tech-
niques. The DECS staff found, for example, that a set of legal
orders imposing a uniform percentage reduction on the emis-
sions of all polluters sufficient to achieve the DRBC objective
(that is, Objective Set II) would entail an estimated treatment
cost of 335 million dollars as compared to a cost-minimizing
allocation of reductions of 235 million dollars-an "excess" cost
of 100 million dollars!9"
This finding becomes of more than hypothetical significance
in the light of the actual course of events. The DRBC elected the
traditional regulatory approach: a system of legal orders to all
polluters.91 They were well aware, however, of the cost-
minimizing potential of varying the quotas among polluters. In
particular, the DRBC sought to realize a large portion of these
savings by dividing the eighty-six-mile estuary into four zones
and assigning different percentage reductions in wastes for each
zone, a "zoned-uniform percentage treatment plan." Once the
differences in costs implied by the recommended zonal differen-
tials became clear, however, the DRBC was quick to narrow the
variation, presumably in the interests of fairness and consensus,
until in June, 1968, they promulgated emission reductions for
the four zones of 86.0, 89.25, 88.5, and 87.5 percent. 92 The au-
thors conclude that "the DRBC four-zone scheme was nothing
more than a public relations triumph, masking a traditional uni-
form treatment regime.... [T]he retreat [of the DRBC] repre-
sents a dramatic example of the difficulty of taking even modest
steps toward cost minimization when constrained by the tradi-
tional version of the legal orders model. '93
Even these guidelines proved terribly difficult to implement.
The appeal of uniform percentage reductions for all polluters is
some notion of fairness or equity based on "equal effort." But
uniform percentage reduction from what? Surely a refinery that
has already instituted extensive and costly treatment procedures
should not be required to reduce its emissions by the same pro-
portion as a neighbor who has been emitting untreated wastes
into the river. To deal with this issue, the DRBC staff had to
undertake the enormously complex task of determining the
90 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 230, Table 7.
9 1 /d. 231.
92 Id. 234-35.
9 3 d. 235-36.
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hypothetical "raw waste load" for each major polluter to use
as a benchmark for determining its pollution quota.94 The au-
thors document some of the anomalies that emerged in this
case-by-case determination. 95 In particular, their Table 896 indi-
cates a range of pollution quotas for different refineries (from
692 to 14,400 pounds of BOD per day) that would probably be
difficult to reconcile with any reasonable standard of equity. In
short, the legal-orders regime produced an allocation of pollu-
tion quotas that appears excessively costly and bears little rela-
tion to the "equal effort" principle of fairness.
This experience would seem to make the alternative ap-
proach of relying on market incentives all the more attractive.
Under this general rubric, however, the environmental authority
has two further options. The first is the imposition of effluent
charges to induce the necessary reductions in waste emissions.
9 7
The second is the sale or auctioning of "pollution rights."98 In
principle, both lead to the same outcome: With effluent charges,
the regulator raises the fee until the target level of emissions is
achieved (he sets the price at the level required to realize the
desired quantity); under the pollution-rights scheme, the reg-
ulator offers for sale emission rights equal in total to the target
level (he sets the desired quantity directly and then lets price
adjust to the market-clearing level). This is easily seen in Figure
I, where DD 1 is the polluters' demand curve for emission rights
and Qo is the target level of waste discharges. Under a system of
effluent fees, the environmental authority would establish a
FIGURE I
Price
D
___________________________Quantity of
Waste Emissions
94 1Id. 248-53.
95Id. 2 53-57.
96Id. 254.
97 Id. 260-6 1.
98Id. 26 1.
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price of P,0 to which polluters would respond by emitting wastes
of Qo. Alternatively, the authority could simply sell Qo of pollu-
tion rights for which the market-clearing price would be Po.
While these two techniques yield the same result in princi-
ple, they have some important differences in practice. In particu-
lar, the use of effluent charges involves an element of risk and,
perhaps, delay that is not inherent in the pollution-rights
method. The difficulty is the imprecision in the authority's
knowledge of the demand curve: with only rough estimates of
the likely response of polluters to differing levels of charges, the
regulator may set a fee other than Figure I's Po, as a result of
which either too much or too little pollution (relative to the
target Q0) will occur. 990f course, the environmental authority
can make subsequent adjustments to the effluent charge in a
process that should converge to the target level of emissions, but
this may take time.100 Moreover, continuing adjustments in
charges and levels of emissions are costly to firms and other
polluters, as well as politically unpopular. 10' In contrast, if the
regulator simply sells the targeted quantity of pollution rights,
this source of uncertainty and adjustments is eliminated. Since
the objective is a specified level of waste emissions, the authority
can set this directly by specifying quantity.'
0 2
In addition, the authors point to the administrative advan-
tages of the pollution-rights technique in the context of a grow-
ing economy. Over time, with the expansion of the economy and
industrial activity, we can expect the cost of treatment necessary
to maintain a specified level of water quality to grow; new plants
99 Id. 262-63, 265-67.
100 Id. 263.
10 Id. 268.
102 Id. 267. By eliminating the uncertainty regarding the quantity of emissions, how-
ever, the pollution-rights technique necessarily introduces uncertainty concerning the
market-clearing price. This may not, incidentally, be a trivial matter. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that x pounds of BOD emissions have been offered for sale, but that the issue of
1,000 additional pounds of emission licenses would make possible a substantial saving in
abatement expenditure (and perhaps release to society resources that could instead be
used to build schools and hospitals) with only a very minimal effect on environmental
quality. Then the decision to issue only x (rather than x + 1,000) pollution rights would
have imposed a heavy cost on society, one very likely unforeseen by the environmental
authority. The grounds for the choice between the use of fees and the auctioning of
pollution rights may then be a matter of which risk constitutes the greater danger. If
unanticipated emissions are the most imminent threat to the public welfare, that argues
for the auction of rights, which leaves little doubt about the probable volume of pollu-
tion. On the other hand, if pressing alternative uses for society's resources mean that
excessive outlays on pollution control are a luxury that society can ill afford, then
the fees approach, with its firmer control of abatement outlays, may be the preferable
procedure.
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will appear and the tendency will be toward expanding waste
emissions. With a given effluent charge, emissions will rise and
water quality will deteriorate.
Of course there is nothing to prevent an aggressive au-
thority from raising the charge whenever this is ap-
propriate. Nevertheless,... an effluent fee system will
place the burden of affirmative action to maintain the
agency's original environmental objectives on nonpollut-
ing river users. In contrast, under the effluent rights sys-
tem, the maximum permissible discharge is fixed at the
time of the original decision, and the costs of growth
will be borne only by polluters who will bid the price of
the rights up over time. Thus, the rights system places
the burden of affirmative action on the polluters to convince
the agency that the increasing marginal compliance
costs so outweigh the marginal environmental benefits
of the status quo that some degradation below current
levels should be permitted and additional rights
issued.1
03
For these reasons and others, the authors endorse a
pollution-rights scheme as the most promising means for con-
trolling waste discharges. 10 4 While this is by no means a new
proposal, 10 5 it is not (to my knowledge) one that has really been
considered very seriously at the policy level, and this is unfortu-
nate. Perhaps this is because the proposal sounds strange: "The
auctioning of pollution rights" has an almost otherworldly (Uto-
pian or Satanic) ring.10 6 Although unfamiliar, I would suggest
that it is quite workable: Once having determined the acceptable
level of waste emissions, I see no insuperable barrier to the allo-
cation of quotas by sale rather than by the elaborate, and ulti-
mately unsatisfactory, legal-orders method followed by the
DRBC.
For my own tastes, I would be delighted with the introduc-
tion of either effluent charges or pollution rights into the pursuit
of our environmental objectives. Either technique would repre-
sent an enormous improvement over the costly, and often
largely ineffective, legal-orders tradition which has dominated
10 3 Id. 269-70 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
104 1d. 281. But see id. 275-81.
105 See, e.g., J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND VALUES (1968).
106 See generally B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 276-78.
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environmental policy in this, and most other,10 7 countries. While
there is mounting evidence that pricing incentives are an effi-
cient and highly effective means for controlling water pollution,
air pollution, and the generation of solid wastes,10 8 there re-
mains a latent hostility to any technique that explicitly recognizes
"pollution rights" or the desirability (in view of the costs) of
maintaining positive levels of various polluting activities. 10 9
I do not want to leave the impression that the authors (or I)
see the "market model" as the sole answer to our environmental
problems. In fact, one of the most impressive aspects of this
study is its painstaking effort to assess both the advantages and
disadvantages of the various policy alternatives. The market
model, if used alone, suffers from some serious deficiencies. (For
example, there is the problem of coordination: Economies of
scale in treatment may dictate the need, in certain instances, for
joint planning and use of facilities; but it is not clear that volun-
tary action on the part of individual polluters will result in the
establishment of such facilities in the most advantageous
locations." 0 Moreover, some effluents may be so dangerous to
human life that their discharge should simply be banned
altogether."') The point is rather that a heavy reliance on price
incentives should constitute an integral part of an overall en-
vironmental strategy. Unfortunately, we have to this point cho-
sen to ignore this potentially powerful instrument for protection
of the environment.
V. CONCLUSION
The authors conclude their study on a relatively pessimistic
note as regards the formulation and implementation of an effec-
tive environmental policy." 2 The Delaware experience not only
indicates the deficiencies in a single episode of analysis and de-
cisionmaking, it also reveals a series of extremely complex and
troublesome obstacles inherent in the very process of instituting
a sensible environmental program. It is clear that we have a
107 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 348-56 (4th-
Annual Report 1973).
108 William Baumol and I are preparing a survey of this evidence to appear as part
of our forthcoming book, Economic Policy for the Quality of Life.
109 See B. ACKERMAN, supra note. 1, at 276-78.
1 0 1d. 282-85.
111 See id. 209-10.
M2 See id. 317-30.
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great distance yet to travel to our objective of a rational, effica-
cious policy for the protection of the environment.
What is perhaps most disheartening about this are the re-
curring lapses in understanding in policy determination in the
most critical places. Not long ago, for example, Congress enacted
the extensive Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 with the nonsensical declaration that "it is the national
goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985.""13 Such flights of fancy indicate the perva-
sive character of certain fundamental misconceptions regarding
environmental policy and, in the end, serve to confuse and im-
pede any real progress toward the realization of a reasonable set
of environmental objectives. And on the administrative side, we
witness such things as the agonizing delays and time extensions
to meet emission requirements for new automobiles followed by
recent reports of the ineffectiveness of the new emission-control
devices. All in all, there is much evidence to support the authors'
closing statement:
What is disappointing, even alarming, is the prospect of
government, frustrated by the difficulty of structuring a
coherent response, embarking on an urgent quest to
achieve a poorly defined goal without institutions pres-
ent to raise the right questions, and without the reg-
ulatory tools to achieve objectives either efficiently or
fairly. The environmental revolution of the 1970's sug-
gests that we have yet to learn the lessons of the 1960's.
After all these lessons have been mastered, however, we
shall only have taken the first step toward a system of
government that will permit modern men to live in
harmony with themselves and nature."
4
Yet the limited perspective of the Delaware hides some real
progress elsewhere. Regarding air pollution, for example, the
last decade has witnessed quite striking reductions in the sulphur
and particulate content of the atmosphere over most of our
major cities (as well as many cities abroad)." 5 And new pro-
grams, such as Oregon's requiring deposits for beverage con-
tainers, are showing encouraging results for the recycling of
113 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. III, 1973). See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at
319-25.
114 B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 330.
"' COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 107, at 273.
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solid wastes. 116 In the water resource field itself there is some
evidence of reduced waste discharges in response to municipal
waste-treatment fees." 7 Progress, however, is slow and difficult;
it is the important contribution of this book to help us to under-
stand why this is so and to face up to the basic dilemmas and
tradeoffs inherent in the quest for environmental quality.
116 D. Waggoner, Oregon's Model Bill, Two Years Later (May 1974).
117 Elliott & Seagraves, User Charges as a Means for Pollution Control: The Case of Sewer
Surcharges, 3 BELLJ. ECON & MGMT. Sci. 346 (1972).

